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SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
HILL, ROBERT KENT
PLAINTIFF
VS
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 830908099 CV
DATE 01/18/90
HONORABLE DAVID S.-YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. LAUCHNOR, WALLACE
D. ATTY. HANNI, GLENN C.

THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A "FIR.ST AMENDED
COMPLAINT" IS DENIED. THIS MATTER MUST PROCEED TO TRIAL WITH
DISPATCH. THE CASE IS NOW IN IT'S SEVENTH (7TH) YEAR.
MR. HANNI IS TO PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND
WITH HIS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION.
C.C.- TO COUNSEL
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

HILL, ROBERT KENT

CASE NUMBER 830908099 CV
DATE 05/25/90
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER 9
COURT CLERK NP

PLAINTIFF
VS
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

RECEIVED

P. ATTY. LAUCHNOR, WALLACE R.
D. ATTY. HANNI, GLENN C.

JUNO 119901
VEHAR, BEPPIER, UWIflY,
ROSE & BOAU RC.

THE DEFENDANT STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
GRANTED CONSISTENT WITH THE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
SINCE THE COURT HAS GRANTED THE MOTION, NO ORAL ARGUMENT IS
NECESSARY AND IS THUS DENIED.
MR. HANNI IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE A JUDGMENT CONSISTENT
HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS IN THIS MATTER.
C.C. TO COUNSEL
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
•HILL, deceased, ana LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs Of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
DECEASED,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Civil No. C83-8099
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
TO:

PLAINTIFFS THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
You are hereby notified that judgment in the above-

referenced matter was entered on March 26, 1990.
DATED this

nc

day of April, 1990.
STRONG &

JMLNNI

^-*-^7
100187

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Entry of Judgment was mailed, postage
prepaid, on April

3

1990, to the following:

Roy A. Jacobson, JrV. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Wallace R. Laucbnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

100157
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RECEIVED
JUN 2 0 1990/

GLENN C. HANNI, #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

VEHAn. 3EPPIER, LAVERY
ROSE & BOAL, P.c.1"' '

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT KENT HI LL, Individually
and as persona 1 representative
of the heirs o f TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased ; and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Indi vidually and as
personal repre sentative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Civil No. C83-8099

Plaintiffs,
Judge David S. Young
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant,
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
You and each of you will please take notice that the court
on June 11, 1990, entered a judgment in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, Individually and as
personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased,
no cause of action.
Dated this 14th day of June, 1991
STRONG ($/Ei

Glenn C. Hanni
attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June, 1990, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Entry of
Judgment, first-class postage prepaid, to:
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Roy A, Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. 0. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101

Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7 080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

C i v i l No. C83-8099

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Hill
and for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Caldwell was
heard by the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, pursuant
to notice, on March 12, 1990. Glenn C. Hanni of the law firm of
Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and V. Anthony
Vehar of the law firm of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobsen,*Lavery & Rose,
P.C., and Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esquire, appeared on behalf of
plaintiffs.

The court, having reviewed defendant's motion and memoranda,
plaintiffs' memorandum, having considered oral argument, and
being advised in the premises, now, therefore;
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED, FOUND, AND DECREED as
follows:

1.
in

The court finds that since the Supreme Court's decision

Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah

1988), State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to
plaintiffs.

Therefore, the only remaining claims are for bad

faith and punitive damages.
2.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff

Hill is granted on the following grounds:
(a)

Hill's claim for bad faith against defendant is an

insurance first-party bad faith claim similar to Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Since Hill was not

in privity of contract with defendant there was no duty owed to
him by defendant and he has no cause of action for first-party
insurance bad faith against State Farm;
(b)

Hill has no claim to recover punitive damages against

State Farm because he has alleged no independent tortious conduct
against State Farm.

No punitive damages may be awarded for a

claim of first-party insurance bad faith because such claim
constitutes a contract action, not a tort action.

2

3.

Summary judgment dismissing Hill's complaint against

State Farm should be entered, with prejudice, on the merits, no
cause of action;
4.

State Farm's motion for partial summary judgment as to

Caldwell's claim for punitive damages is granted on the grounds
that Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is for first-party
insurance bad faith, which is a contract claim, and for which no
punitive damages may be awarded absent an allegation of
independent tortious conduct. Caldwell has failed to allege any
independent tortious conduct against State Farm which would be
the basis for punitive damages;
5.

Partial summary judgment should be entered in favor of

defendant and against plaintiff Caldwell dismissing Caldwell's
claim for punitive damages, with prejudice, on the merits, no
cause of action;
6.

The court further finds that the issues raised by

plaintiffs' claims of first-party bad faith against State Farm
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly
debatable issues.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of state

Farm and against plaintiff Hill, and Hill's complaint and all
claims contained therein against State Farm, are dismissed with
3

prejudice, on the merits, no cause of action;
2.

Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of

State Farm and against plaintiff Caldwell as to plaintiff
Caldwell's claims for punitive damages against State Farm, and
said claims for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice, on
the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:
By
Honorable David S. Young
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, on March
1990, to the following:
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
M o f f a t , P a u l s e n , Lauchnor & Young
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s
S u i t e 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-7500

Defendant's Address:
Roger C. Day
Utah Insurance Department
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs
of TAMARA ELAINE HILL,
deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative
of the heirs of TROY
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased,

3-&3?9

Plaintiffs,
vs .
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
oooOooo
The Plaintiffs, for cause of action against the Defendant,
allege as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, had an insurance

policy with the Defendant, insuring an automobile owned by
said Defendant, on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, and
that said insurance coverage provided by the Defendant on said

o n n r> n A ;

-2automobile included collision damage coverage.
2.

That the Defendant is an insurance company licensed

to do business within the State of Utah and the Plaintiffs
are residents of the State of Utah.
3.

That on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or

near the intersection of 3900 South Street, where the same
intersects with 700 East Street, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, a vehicle owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell
and insured by the Defendant, was involved in an automobile
accident with a vehicle being driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan,
and insured by the Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.
4.

That said collision was caused by the negligence and

intoxication of the Defendant driver, Kenneth Paul Bryan.
5.

That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence

and intoxication of the said driver, the driver of the vehicle
insured by the Defendant and son of Plaintiff, Caldwell was
killed by said collision and at the time of his death was a
minor under the age of eighteen (18) years.
6.

That as a further direct and proximate result of

said collision, the Plaintiff, Robert Kent Hill, suffered the
loss of his daughter, who was accidentally killed while riding
in the automobile with the minor decedent, Caldwell, as a
passenger at the time of said accident.

ooe:oo:;

-37.

That neither the driver or the passenger of the

Caldwell vehicle was negligent in any manner in causing said
accident.
8.

That as a direct and proximate result of said accident

the above-named Plaintiffs brought suit against Kenneth Paul
Bryan and others for the wrongful death of the above-named
minors.
9.

That as a result of said accident, the automobile of

Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, was damaged in the sum of
$5,510.
10.

That the Defendant driver, Kenneth Paul Bryan, was

driving an automobile insured by the Cumis Insurance Society,
Inc.#

with

a single limit insurance coverage on the automobile

in the amount of $50,000.
11.

That the wrongful deaths of the Plaintiffs' children

exceeded in value the sum of $25,000 per wrongful death, or
a total of $50,000, as insurance afforded by the single limit
policy aforementioned.
12.

That the above-named Plaintiffs arrived at a compromise

solution and settlement with the driver of the vehicle causing
said accident in the sum of -the policy limits of $50,000, but
were unable to conclude their settlement of the litigation
because the above-named Defendant failed and refused, and still

OOO-CGM

-4refuses to acknowledge that there was insufficient insurance
coverage to satisfy the entire claim of the Plaintiffs, and
has demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision payment made
to Lorin Dean Caldwell be reimbursed to the Defendant out of
the insurance policy limits of the driver of said vehicle
causing said accident,
13.

That Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company failed to join in said litigation and refused to
cooperate in settlement of said litigation by the Plaintiffs
for the insufficient funds afforded by the insurance coverage
evidencing bad faith toward its insureds in attempting to
settle saj
lid litiqation
14.

That Plaintiffs investigated the feasibility of

litigation and possible recovery against the Defendant driver,
independent of the insurance coverage and determined that
said driver was insolvent.
15.

That Plaintiffs have in their possession a check

drawn by the Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. in the sum of
$5,510 payable to the Defendant and its insured Lorin Dean
Caldwell.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Defendant be required
to endorse said check payable to the Plaintiffs for the
$5,510 remaining unpaid on the death claim of the Plaintiffs
as personal representatives of said minor decedents, that

0000005

-5Plaintiffs recover their attorney's fees in a reasonable sum
to be determined by the court herein, t^ogetherj^hfc_pnni hive
damage_s_for bad faith in obstructing settlement of Plaintiffs'
claim against a tort feasor and causing unnecessary litigation
where it is obvious that the insurance coverage afforded
by the tort feasor's vehicle was inadequate to satisfy said
death claims, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit incurred
herein, and such other and further relief as the Court deems
proper in the premises, [ u ^ ^ ^ i
DATED this

^ ^ 4 )

day of November, 19 83.
MOFFAT, PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & YOUNG
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs f Address
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

A
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R. Scott Williams, 3498
Strong & Hanni
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

COUNTER CLAIM
:

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

CIVIL NO. C83-8099
Judge Judith M. Billings

:

Defendant.

Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company for it's Counter Claim against plaintiff alleges as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County,

2.

Plaintiff Caldwell had an insurance policy with

State of Utah.

defendant, insuring an automobile owned by Caldwell, on or about
the sixth day of June, 1982, and that the insurance coverage
provided by defendant on said automobile included collision
damage coverage.

ooee^s

3.

That on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at

or near the intersection of 3900 South Street and 700 East Street,
the said vehicle owned by plaintiff Caldwell and insured by
defendant, was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle
driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, and insured by Cumis Insurance Society,
Inc.
4.

As part of the insurance policy between plaintiff

Caldwell and defendant, defendant paid plaintiff Caldwell approximate
$5,510.00 under it's collision coverage for damage done to Caldwell's
vehicle.
5.

Under the terms of the above referenced policy of

insurance, defendant was subrogated to all of the insured's rights
of recovery and the insured was required to do whatever is necessary
to secure such rights and to do nothing to prejudice such rights
of subrogation.
6.

That plaintiffs, on behalf of their deceased

children, without the knowledge of defendant, filed suit against
Kenneth Paul Bryan and or entered into settlement negotiations
with Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., for claims of wrongful death.
7.

Without the knowledge or consent of defendant,

plaintiffs settled their claims against Bryan and signed complete
and full Releases in favor of Bryan.
8.

Plaintiffs executed said complete and full

Releases with knowledge that State Farm had paid $5,510,00 in
favor of plaintiff Caldwell under the collision portion of the

0000053

insurance policy and that State Farm had a subrogation right against
Bryan.
9.

By signing said Releases, plaintiffs prejudiced

the subrogation rights of defendant and thereby breached the
insurance contract with defendant, and defendant is entitled to
damages by reason of said breach in the amount of $5,510.00, it's
subrogation claim against Bryan.
10.

Plaintiff Caldwell as part of the Release signed

in favor of Bryan, acknowledged that $5,510.00 of the consideration
being received by Caldwell for the Release was for property damage
incurred to Caldwellfs vehicle, and by such acknowledgement
Caldwell specifically itemized that amount of the settlement funds
as reimbursement for property damage, for which Caldwell had already
been reimbursed by defendant State Farm.
11.

That Caldwell is not entitled to be reimbursed

twice for the property damage he suffered as a result of the
accident, and that by itemizing the $5,510.00 as reimbursement
for property damage, plaintiffs are bound to deliver that said
$5,510.00 to defendant, under it's subrogation rights against
Bryan.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for judgment against
plaintiffs in the amount of $5,510.00, for costs of court
incurred, interest, and for such other and further relief as to
the court seems just and equitable.

0 0 f* o o * :
U V U ^ V \J 'i

Dated this

day of

, 1984.

STRONG & HANNI

By
R. Scott Williams
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby do certify that on the 22nd day of June,
1984, that true and correct copies of the Counter Claim were
hand delivered to the following:
Mr. Wallace Lauchnor
CSB Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

R. Scott Williams, 3498
Strong & Hanni
Attorneys for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

vs.
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

CIVIL NO.

C83-8099

Judge Judith M. Billings

Defendant,

STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third Party
Defendant.

Third party plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, for it's Third Party Complaint against Kenneth
Paul Bryan alleges as follows:

0000050

1.

That Third Party Defendant is a resident of

Salt Lake County from the State of Utah.
2.

A Complaint has been filed against third party

plaintiff by Robert Kent Hill and Loren Dean Caldwell, individually
and as personal representatives of Tamera Elaine Hill, deceased,
and Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, respectively, in which the said
plaintiffs make certain claims against third party plaintiff relating
to the settlement of the said plaintiff's claims against the
third party defendant.
3.

The plaintiff's claims arise out of an accident

which occurred on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or near
the intersection of 3900 South and 700 East in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, involving a vehicle owned by plaintiff Caldwell,
and a vehicle driven by third party defendant.
4 . The third party plaintiff insured the vehicle
owned by plaintiff Caldwell and provided collision coverage on
said vehicle.
5.

As a result of the accident involving the

Caldwell vehicle and the vehicle driven by third party defendant,
third party plaintiff provided approximately $5,510.00 to it's
insured, plaintiff Caldwell, for collision damage incurred as a
result of the above specified accident.
6.

Third party plaintiff is subrogated to the rights

of it's insured against third party defendant to the extent of the
payments made by the third party plaintiff to it's insured for
property damage caused by the above specified accident.

00C005T

7.

That on information and belief, the accident

caused to the Caldwell vehicle was a direct and proximate
result of the negligence and/or other misconduct of the
third party defendant, and in the event Judgment is entered
in favor of plaintiffs against third party plaintiff with
respect to $5,510.00 of the settlement proceeds from the
settlement of plaintiff's claims against the third party
defendant, then third party plaintiff is entitled to the
indemnified and is entitled to judgment over and against
the third party defendant for the full amount of the judgment,
if any awarded to plaintiffs and against third party plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, third party plaintiff prays for judgment
against third party defendant in the amount of any judgment
entered in favor of plaintiff and against third party plaintiff,
for costs of court incurred thereon, interest, and for such
other and further relief as to the court seems just and
equitable.
Dated this

day of

, 1984.

STRONG & HANNI

By
R. Scott Williams

0C0 f, 05-

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby do certify that on the 22nd day of June,
1984, that true and correct copies of the Third Party Complaint
were hand delivered to the following:

Mr. Wallace Lauchnor
CSB Tower
50 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

TabC

Glenn C. Hanni, A1327
R. Scott Williams, 3498
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant &
Third-Party Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

:

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No.

C83-8099

:

vs.

Judge Judith M. Billings

KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third-Party
Defendant.

:

Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
State Farm moves this court for summary judgment as to
plaintiffs1 claims against State Farm and also as to plaintiffs1
counterclaim against defendant on the grounds that there are
no genuine issues of any material fact and that State Farm is

000009.1

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Dated this J&tK day of September, 1984.
STRONG & HANNI

Glenn C. Hanni
R. Scott Williams
Attorneys for Defendant &
Third-Party Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this \&£tr day of September,
1984, true and correct copies of the foregoing Motion for
Summary Judgment were hand delivered to:
Wallace Lauchnor, Esq.
CSB Tower, Suite 300
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorney for Plaintiffs
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq.
Kipp & Christian
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant

000009:
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GLENN C. HANNI, A1327
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS, 34 98
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs
Of TAMARA ELAINE HILL,
deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and'>
as personal representative
of the heirs of TROY
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

J U D G *M--E-N- T
Civil No. C83-8099
Honorable Judith M. Billings

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third-Party
Defendant.

0000135

On September 28, 1984, this matter came on for hearing
before the Honorable Judith M. Billings, one of the judges of
the above-entitled court, on motion for summary judgment of
defendant State Farm, and on motion for summary judgment of
third-party defendant Kenneth Paul Bryan.

Plaintiffs were

represented by their attorney, Wallace R. Lauchnor.

Defendant

State Farm was represented by its attorney, Glenn C. Hanni of
the firm of Strong & Hanni. Third-party defendant was represented
by his attorney, Heinz J. Mahler of the firm of Kipp and Christian.
It was stipulated by plaintiffs and defendant State Farm
that a copy of the depositions that have been taken in this case
could be used with the same force and effect as the original.
The court having heard arguments of counsel and being
fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted and judgment is hereby entered on plaintiffs1 complaint
in favor of defendant State Farm and against plaintiffs and all
of them, no cause of action.
2.

Defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment

on its counterclaim against plaintiffs is hereby granted and
judgment is hereby entered in favor of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean
Caldwell, for the sum of $5510.00 with interest on said sum at
the rate of 10% per annum from March 16, 1983, being the date
that Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. delivered its check to plaintiff,

00C0I3G

Lorin Dean Caldwell, which said check was payable to defendant
State Farm and Lorin Dean Caldwell, to the date hereof, making
a total judgment in favor of State Farm and against plaintiff,
Lorin Dean Caldwell of Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Three
and 11/100 Dollars ($6,393.11) together with costs in the amount
of $

. This judgment shall bear interest at the rate

of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid.
3.

Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, shall forthwith

endorse said Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. check and shall
deliver the same to counsel for defendant State Farm.
4.

The motion of third-party defendant, Kenneth Paul

Bryan, for summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is
hereby entered in favor of Kenneth Paul Bryan and against State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the third-party
complaint, no cause of action.
Dated this

JJ£> day

of October, 1984.

BY THE COURT:

15.

Hondrable Judith M. Billings, Judge
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Strong &. Hanni, Attorneys
f0r

Defendant and T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f

he rein; that she served the attached

upon

S t a t e Farm Mutual

proposed Judgment

a l l counsel

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to;
Wallace Lauchnor
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
CSB Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Heinz J. Mahler
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon,
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the

October

•1984-

f~^S__

16th day of

V

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th

day of

October

198 4.

^>^^^^^VQjk
My commission expires;

/
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

5/13/85
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GLENN C. HANNI, A1327
R. SCOTT WILLIAMS, 3 4 98
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-7080
Telephone
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs
of TAMARA ELAINE HILL,
deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative
of the heirs of TROY
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Defendant.
Civil No. C83-8099
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Honorable Judith M. Billings

Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third-Party
Defendant.

0000130

TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS:
You will please take notice that judgment was entered
in the above case in favor of defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiffs on the
22nd day of October, 1984, by the above-entitled court.
Dated this 1st day of November, 1984.
STRONG Sc HANNI

By
Glenn C. Hanni
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm

OOOOJUO

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, s a y s :
That she i s employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys
for

Defendant

and T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f

h e r e i n ; that she s e r v e d the attached

upon

all

S t a t e Farm Mutual

N o t i c e of E n t r y of

Judgment

counsel

by placing a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy thereof in an envelope a d d r e s s e d to:
W a l l a c e Lauchnor
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
CSB Tower
50 South Main S t r e e t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
Heinz J . Mahler
Attorney for T h i r d - P a r t y Defendant
600 Commercial C l u b B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111

and depositing the s a m e , sealed, with first c l a s s postage prepaid t h e r e o n .
in the United States m a i l at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 1 s t
November

$ 198 L

day of

\

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn to before m e t h i s ' 1 s t

day of

November

»

1984

My c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s :
5/13/85

"J
Notary p u b l i c
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

0 0 0 014 "i

TabE

WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR , No. 1905
Attorney for Plaintiff
CSB Tower, Suite 500
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone:
521-7500
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party
PIaintiff.

CIVIL NO. C83-8099

vs .
KENNETH PAUL

BRYAN,

Third-Party
Defendant .

Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from
the Summary Judgment entered herein in favor of Defendant,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and against
the Plaintiffs.
DATED this / /

day of November, 1 9 8 4 .

'JsJ?
R. Lauchnor
Attorney for Plaintiffs

i-L^^-l-L-

<^v
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,

*

*

:

Plaintiffs,

:
:
:
:
:
:

-vsSTATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Civil No. C83-8099
Judge Judith M. Billings
Deposition of:
LORIN DEAN CALDWELL

:

STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

:
:

Third Party Plaintiff,

:

-vs-

:

KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,

:

Third Party Defendant.

:
•

*

•

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of August, 1984, the
deposition of LORIN DEAN CALDWELL, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the defendant and third party
plaintiff, herein, in the above-entitled action now pending in
the above-named court, was taken before BRAD J. YOUNG, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 1:15 p.m. of said day
at the offices of STRONG & HANNI, Sixth Floor Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice.
*

•

*

BRAD J. YOUNG
Associated Professional Reporters
420 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-3441

QQQn
M

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiffs:

WALLY LAUCHNOR
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

For the Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff:

R. SCOTT WILLIAMS
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys at Law
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Also Present:

Janet Hill
Robert Hill
LaRue Caldwell
•

*

•

I N D E X
PAGE

WITNESS

LORIN DEAN CALDWELL
Examination by Mr. Williams
•

*

*

EXHI^ESI^TJS

Defendant's Exhibit 1

25
*

•

*
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LORIN DEAN CALDWELL,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Q

This is the deposition of Lorin Dean Dean Caldwell.

The

deposition is pursuant to notice, governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Would you state your name, please.
A

Lorin Dean Caldwell.

Q

Your present age?

A

55.

Q

Date of birth?

A

June 3, 1929.

Q

Your address?

A

7311 Chris Lane.

Q

How long have you lived there?

A

19 years.

Q

That's in Salt Lake County?

A

Yes.

Q

You are married?

A

Yes.

Q

Your wife's name?

3

A

Mary LaRue.

Q

Have you ever had your deposition taken before?

A

No.

Q

J u s t so we u n d e r s t a n d e a c h o t h e r - - and you h a v e b e e n

o b v i o u s l y s i t t i n g in w h i l e I a s k e d Mr. H i l l q u e s t i o n s ,
u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e of a d e p o s i t i o n ;

is that

right?

A

Yes, I guess I u n d e r s t a n d

Q

I f t h e r e i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t I a s k and you d o n ' t

understand that question,
rephrase i t .

it.

please t e l l

me so t h a t I can

Okay?

A

Yes.

Q

Otherwise, I will assume that you understand my

questions.

so you

All right?

A

Okay.

Q

Tell me how many children you have presently.

A

How many children I have living?

Q

Yes.

A

Four.

Q

What are their ages, names and ages, if you can tell me,

roughly?
A

Colleen —

do you want their last name or the married?

0

Yes.

A

Colleen Herriman, who is 31 —

Q

She is married?

A

Yes.

33.

4

0

Her husband's name?

A

Keith.

They have two boys, two children.

I have another

daughter, Barbara Ann Romaro.
Q

She is married?

A

She is married and has three children.

Q

Her age?

A

Her age is 31.

Q

What is her husband's name?

A

Carl.

Q

The other two?

A

I have one, Chet Bryan.

Q

Still living at home?

A

No.

And he is 24.

He is married, living away from home.

His wife's

name is Wendy Humpherys.
Q

And finally?

A

And Todd.

Q

So he is what?

A

19.

Q

Is he living at home?

A

Yes.

Q

Is he in college?

A

No.

Q

Where is he working?

A

Utah Power & Light.

Q

Mr. Caldwell, I understand that you had a son Troy Neil

He is a twin brother of Troy.

He is working.

5

Caldwell; is that correct?
A

That* s right.

Q

He was killed as a result of an accident on June 6, 19R2;

is that correct?
A

That's right.

Q

At the tine of that accident he was how old,

approximately?
A

16 —

17.

Q

Do you know his date of birth?

A

May 7, 1965.

Q

That

particular night,

d r i v i n g your

t h e n i g h t o f t h e accident,

was h e

vehicle?

A

That's

true.

Q

You were t h e owner of a 1979 Honda?

A

Yes.

Q

Troy had h i s d r i v e r ' s

A

Yes.

Q

How long had he had it, do you remember?

A

Probably several months.

license?

He got it when he was through

the drivers education.
MRS. CALDWELL:

He had a year and probably two months,

three months.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I think that as we go along in this

deposition, the way it probably would help Brad the best is
that you try to answer the question, and then if you need your

6

wife's help, ask for it, and then we will get it that way.

Or

I may direct some questions to you.
THE WITNESS:

I might on my dates, a little b:t.

Q

(By Mr* Williams)

How long had you owned that vehicle?

A

Since 1979.

Q

Can you tell me, just very briefly, your understanding as

to how the accident happened?

Then I will ask you a little

bit about how you have gained that information.
A

Actually how the accident happened?

Q

Yes, as far as you understand it, very briefly.

A

My son Troy and his girlfriend Tammy had went to a show

at Trolley Corners.

They was coming home on 7th East.

Q

Going southbound?

A

Going southbound on 7th East.

light at 39th South and 7th East.
lane, or the right lane.

They approached a red
They was in the far outside

And they waited -- I am not sure

whether -- how many other vehicles were there at the time, but
as they proceeded through, as the light changed and they
proceeded through the intersection, there was a four-wheel
drive vehicle eastbound on 39th South at a high rate of speed,
and hit them broadside in the middle of the intersection, and
they was pushed from the impact all the way across 7th East
and in front of the Arctic Circle hamburger place on the east
side of 7th East.
Q

Do you know the names of any witnesses to the accident?
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A

I have heard then but I do not recall who they are.

Q

Have you ever talked with Kenneth Paul Bryan?

A

No.

Q

As you understand it, he was the party in the four-wheel

drive vehicle?
A

That is right.

Q

Have you ever talked with his parents?

A

No.

Q

Has your wife ever talked with either Kenneth Bryan or

his parents?
A

Yes.

Q

Did she relate to you what the results of those

conversations were?
A

Well, just the fact that she

—

Q

Let me ask you this, so we get the necessary background.

How many times did she talk to them, do you know?
A

Probably once to each one, to my knowledge.

Q

Did she ever talk to Kenneth Paul?

A

I don't know that she talked directly to him.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Let me ask her.

Did you ever talk with

him?
MRS. CALDWELL:
Q

No.

(By Mr. Williams)

So, as far as you know, she talked

with the mother and the father on one occasion?
A

I don't know that she talked to the father.

I think she

8

talked to the mother only, as far as I know.
MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS. CALDWELL:
Q

Is that right?
Yes.

(By Mr. Williams)

Do you know when that conversation

took place, in the chain of events?

Was it early on or later

on?
A

Early on.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Maybe I can shortcut this by asking

Mrs. Caldwell a couple of questions.
MRS. CALDWELL:

It was a few days after the death of

Troy.
MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS. CALDWELL:

Where did the conversation take place?
I called her at her home, and wanted her

to know what kind of a boy Troy was and Tammy was and what her
son had done.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Was there anything else said in the

conversation?
MRS. CALDWELL:

She said she was very sorry.

She

proceeded to tell me the tragic life that Paul had had, and
she was very sorry for what he had done.

And I told her that

I felt like they had responsibility in that, too, because they
knew that he did not have a driver's license, it had been
revoked.

He had been convicted of DUI's and they still let

him drive their vehicle.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Did she say that she or her husband had

9

actually given him permission to drive that car?
MRS. CALDWELL:

They said they give him that truck

because he had to have it to live in.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Was there any discussion about the facts

of the accident with her?
MRS. CALDWELL:
Q

No.

(By Mr. Williams)

Back to you, Mr. Caldwell.

Did you go

to the hearing for the criminal matter?
A

No.

Q

Was it your understanding that Mr. Bryan was convicted of

some offense?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you know what he was convicted of?

A

I don't know what he was convicted of.

it was —

Whatever it was,

he was sentenced to a lesser charge.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Mrs. Caldwell?

MRS. CALDWELL:

They tried to get him on murder charges,

which there had not been a case on this particular thing that
they could charge because they said there was not intent of
the person that was —

and so he was charged with

manslaughter.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

Do you understand that he is in prison

at the present time?
A

Yes.

Q

I understand, Mr. Caldwell, that you were insured through

10

State Farm at the time of this accident; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And I understand that shortly after the accident you were

paid some money by State Farm; is that right?
A

Yes, that's true.

Q

Again, as I understand it, they paid you approximately

$5,600 for property damage?
A

That is correct.

Q

You had $100 deductible on the policy; is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q

There was also $5,000 paid for survivor benefits, wasn't

there?
A

Yes, that is true.

Q

Did they also pay $1,000 for funeral expenses?

A

I think that was correct, yes.

Q

You didn't have any complaints, did you, about the

timeliness of those payments?
A

No.

Q

After the accident, tell me what was the first thing you

did in terms of talking to anyone to help you understand your
rights against Mr. Bryan and his insurance company.
A

As far as the insurance company?

Q

Or rights against him, either one.

A

We just went to the insurance company to see what we had

to do.
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That was CUMIS Insurance?

A

No.

We went to State Farm.

We didn't know at that time

who CUMIS even was.
Q

Who did you talk to at State Farm?

A

I talked to Clark Davis.

Q

Who went with you?

A

My wife was with me.

Q

Were Mr. and Mrs. Hill with you?

A

No, not at that time.

Q

What was discussed about what you were entitled to, othe

He was the adjuster.

than what State Farm was paying
A

you?

Well, they said that they would recoup for the loss of

the damage —

for the automobile, and that was all at that

time.
Q

Did you talk to State Farm, with Mr. Davis at that time,

about Mr. Bryan's insurance company or anything like that?
A

Yes, I think I did.

Q

What was said about that?

A

I think at that time they told us that we would be paid

for the loss of the automobile, which was around $5,600 or
whatever it was.

And that

they

was going

to take money

from

the other insurance company to make themselves whole on the
$5,600 that they was giving us.
Q

As early as that first conversation with Clark Davis, he

was telling you that?
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A

Yes.

Q

What about the next contact?

What was that?

With

anybody concerning trying to get some money from some source.
A

Well, we probably went back to Clark.

I am not sure just

how the sequence went.
Q

What happened in that conversation?

A

Basically, the same thing.

They told us that they would

give us the money for the automobile, but as far as the death
benefits and the funeral, they was going to recoup that out of
the other insurance money.

And at that time I felt real

uneasy about it, to think that they would want to take the
insurance money that was to go to us, and they was going to
take their share out of that portion.
Q

What did you know at that time about. what insurance

Mr. Bryan had and how much insurance?
A

I don't know at that time whether we knew exactly how

much that policy —

well, I think that we knew that his

parents had the policy and that, but I am not sure whether we
knew how much it was or anything like that.
Q

What I am trying to get at, was there some contact with

CUMIS before you talked with Clark Davis about those things?
A

I guess there must have been.

Like I say, I am not sure

just how the events went.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I think your wife wants to make a

comment.
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MRS. CALDWELL:

Mr. Winget from CIJMIS Insurance was out

at our home, probably four days after the accident, with this
one paper, wanting us to sign for that $25,000 for us and
$25,000 for Hills.

He came to our home with that.

my husband went back.

And then

Then State Farm, we talked to Clark

Davis in the meantime, and he told us that would not be so
because they were going to go back and recoup for the benefits
that they had given us and the benefits they had given Hills.
So we went back and talked to State Farm.

That's when they

told us they were going to recoup it all, this Mr. Clark
Davis.
And my husband said he would like to speak to someone
else in State Farm.

So we talked to someone else.

While we

were in there, talking with them, they called, I guess, back
East or somewhere and told us at that time that they would not
take, recoup the death benefits that they had given the Hills
and that they had given us, that they did want their money for
the automobile.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

Mr. Caldwell, do you remember that

initial visit where Greg Winget came to your home?
A

Yes.

Q

In that conversation with him, do you remember that he

offered you essentially $25,000?
A

I think that at that time, yes, that they wanted to

settle.
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Q

Did he present in front of you a release at that time,

for you to sign for the money?
A

I think they wanted us to sign the release.

As I recall,

we wanted to get some legal advice or something before we
signed any papers or that.
Q

Do you remember a meeting at CUMIS with Mr. and Mrs. Hill?

A

Yes.

Q

Was that about three weeks after the accident?

A

I guess.

Q

It could have been?

A

Yes.

Q

Was money offered to you at that time?

A

I am not sure.

I think that it could have been, but,

like I say, there was so much going on at that time, one thing
and another, I was, I guess, kind of confused as to whether
they wanted to —

I think also at that time that they had to

have approval through their home office or something, in order
to authorize payment or something like that.

That took quite

awhile.
Q

Do you remember some question coming up about whether

there was actually insurance coverage for this accident?
A

Yes, there was.

They said there was coverage.

they stated it was $50,000 single

I think

—

Q

Limit liability?

A

That's total limit or whatever.

Anyway, whatever it was.
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Q

When did you first contact an attorney?
MR. LAUCHNOR:

Q

I am not sure when it was.

(By Mr. Williams)

How many months after the accident,

approximately?
A

I would say three months, but I don't know.

I am not

sure.
Q

Who did you first contact?

What lawyer did you make

contact with?
A

I think at that time the one that we contacted was Ton

Crowther,
Q

Was Dennis Haslam working for them at that time?

A

Yes, that's right.

Q

He became the one that

A

Was handling it, yes.

Q

Did you have some specific questions for him or did you

—

just generally want him to handle your case and take care of
your interests?
A

I guess we just wanted him to tell us just through the

legal advice, as to what is best.

How do you pursue the

thing?
Q

Did you have any additional meetings with anybody from

CUMIS at that earlier time period, within the first three or
four months?
A

We might have had one other one, as far as I recall.

Q

Was there anything that happened in that other contact
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that is different from what you have told me?
A

I think at that time they said that there was a third

party or something that wanted part of that money.
Q

Meaning who?

A

Meaning State Farm.

Q

Your memory is that CUMIS was telling you that State Farm

wanted their money as early as three or four months after the
accident?
A

I am not sure just what the time frame was.

Q

What did CUMIS say about that, in general terms?

I

assume we are talking about Greg Winget; is that correct?
A

That's correct, Greg Winget and Cornevaux or whatever her

name was, Mary.
Q

What did he or she say about State Farm's interest?

A

Well, I think at that time they just was indicating that

State Farm was in for their money that they had paid us, and
they wanted to recoup that money.

Of course, I told them that

that was a bunch of nonsense, that they wasn't entitled to
that.

If in fact they wanted to pursue the thing, they could

go a different route, rather than taking the money that was to
be paid out on insurance.
Q

Were Mr. and Mrs. Hill present with you at that time?

A

I think they was, yes.

Q

Had you obtained an attorney by the time that you were

talking with Mr. Winget on this last occasion you were telling
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me about?
A

I don't remember whether it was then or a little later.

Q

From what source did you get the information that you had

that told you State Farm was not entitled to that money?
A

My own judgment.

Q

Just common sense or something?

A

Yeah, I guess.

Q

Did you read the policy for your —

policy, for example?
A

your own insurance

Did you do that?

I don't know how you read a policy, like I am, and come

out with anything that you can understand.
Q

Okay.

I just

—

Did you ask your attorney, Dennis Haslam, about

that question, whether State Farm was entitled to some of that
money or not?
A

Probably in the conversation, we -- that question

probably came up, yes.
Q

What did he say?

A

I don't recall.

Q

After you went to Mr. Haslam, what happened next in the

chain of events that was part of your effort to pursue a claim
against Bryan and his insurance company?
A

I guess they pursued the thing to see if maybe we could

maybe recoup some money through his insurance, through the
place where Mr. Bryan was drinking, which was
Q

—

It was a bar?
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A

A bar on State Street and about 40th South.

They also

wanted to pursue, I guess, what they call the Drain Shop Act or
whatever it is.
Q

I am not too faniliar with that.

Was your attorney investigating the assets of Mr. and

Mrs. Bryan, as far as you know?
A

I think they did, yes.

Q

He was also looking into the Dram Shop Act, the

possibility of that kind of a case against the bar?
A

Yes.

Q

How long did this investigation go on, approximately?

A

Well, it went on for a few months.

I am not sure just

what it was, but it was several months that it went on.
Q

What was the next event or contact that took place?

A

I think after they was satisfied that they pursued all

avenues that they thought they could, they said at that time
that they didn't think there was anything that was available
through the Dram Shop Act, through Mr. Brown, the fellow that
served Mr. Bryan.

And he didn't have any insurance.

I don't

know whether he actually owned the bar or whether he was just
managing it or what.
Q

But there was no insurance there.

So the problem was lack of assets for the bar to make it

worth pursuing?
A

I guess, yes.

Q

Is that what Mr. Haslam told you?

A

Yes.
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Q

Did you ever file —

did Mr. Haslan on your behalf ever

file a lawsuit, do you know?
A

I don't know whether they did or not.

I don't think they

did.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Mrs. Caldwell?

MRS. CALDWELL:
brought against —
Q

I think that there was.

The suit was

but we never actually went to court on it.

(By Mr. Williams)

Did you have an attorney fee

arrangement with Mr. Haslam?
A

Ours was just on just —

they was going to take a

percentage or whatever, I guess.
Q

Was it like Mr. Hill's arrangement, where you were to pay

him a percentage of what he was able to get over the $25,000?
Do you understand what I am saying?
we can explain that.

Let me back up and see if

There was an offer already from CUMIS to

pay you $25,000.
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Did Mr. Haslam, after you employed him, intend to take

any of that $25,000 as part of his fee?
A

I don't think so, no.

Q

If he was to get any contingency fee, it was from money

that was collected in addition to that $25,000?
A

Right.

Q

Since there was no effort to pursue that case, I assume

Mr. Haslam didn't get paid anything; is that correct?
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A

The only thing we paid him was sone money for what they

call, what, in-office expense or whatever.
Q

Can you give me a time frame, approximate date or year

that Mr. Haslam told you the case isn't worth pursuing?
A

No.

Q

Was it within the first six months after the accident or

after that, do you know?
A

Probably within the first six months.

Q

I assume that during this time the investigation was

going on, you were communicating with Mr. Hill; is that
correct?
A

That's right.

Q

Were you talking about the merits of pursuing a lawsuit

together?
A

I don't know that we was talking about a lawsuit.

I

think all we were talking about was trying to collect the
money that we felt was ours, that should have been coming to
us through the insurance companies.
Q

Is it true and correct, as Mr. Hill has testified, that

before you got your lawyers involved it was your decision not
to take at that point in time the $25,000 that they had
offered you?
A

Yes, that's right.

Q

You were intending to investigate the case before you

decided to sign a release?
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A

I think that's probably true, yes.

Q

At some point in time you wanted the insurance company

now to pay you the money, $2 5,000; is that correct?
investigation was complete.

The

Now you wanted the company to pay

you the money?
A

Yes.

Q

What was the first contact you had with CUMIS to give

them that understanding?
A

Did you go in and talk to Mr. Winget?

As I recall, that's what we did, is either went in and

talked to him or over the phone or something.
Q

Do you remember a meeting with him after your lawyer had

finished the investigation?
A

I remember two or three different meetings but I can't

tell you exactly the time frame of when they was.
Q

Were you always present with the Hills at those meetings?

A

Not always.

Q

Sometimes you met with Mr. Winget alone?

A

I think the first time we was alone, as far as I remember

it.

But I am not sure.

Q

That was when he came to your house?

A

Well, yes.

Q

Did you ever go out there to his office alone, just you

and your wife?
MRS. CALDWELL:
THE WITNESS:

I don't think so.

Maybe not.

I don't remember.
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Q

(By Mr. Williams)

On the first meeting after your lawyer

told you the case isn't worth pursuing, on this first meeting
with CUMIS, after that —

I am trying to key into some

events -- tell me what happened in terms of the discussions in
that meeting.
A

I can't tell you exactly what took place in that meeting.

Q

Do you remember wanting to settle the case at that time?

A

Yeah, we wanted to settle the case right from the start.

But we didn't want to settle it on their terms.
Q

What were their terms at that time?

A

Their terms was that State Farm wanted part of that money.

Q

For the reimbursement of the property damage?

A

That's right, yes.

Q

Did CUMIS tell you that's the way it had to be done?

A

They told us that's the way -- I guess they told us

that's the way it had to be done.
said it had to or not.

I am not sure whether they

But there was the third party involved,

Q

You were unwilling to accept that?

A

Yes.

Q

At that time had you sought legal advice about whether

that was an appropriate thing to do?
A

I don't remember at what time frame that we sought Wally

Lauchnor's help.
Q

I am not sure when it was.

Mr. Hill was of some value because he was doing some

legal research?
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A

That1s true.

Q

I guess you were relying to a certain extent on what he

was telling you?
A

That's true, yes.

Q

Mr. Caldwell, after this meeting with CUMIS, where they

told you they are not going to release the money without also
paying State Farm, what did you do at that time?

Did you go

to Mr. Lauchnor or was there something else that happened
before that?
A

I think that's probably when we went to Wally, through

some —

I don't remember who it was that referred us to Wally.

MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:
Q

Probably Brett Paulsen in the office.
I guess that's who it was, yeah.

(By Mr. Williams)

You met with Mr. Lauchnor and told him

the problem, and I assume that you then left it in his hands;
is that correct?
A

That is true, yes.

Q

Then do you remember a time when you were told that the

money could be paid with certain reservations?
A

I think that that was true, yes.

Q

You had a meeting where you were presented with a

settlement agreement or with a release?
A

Yes.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Let's mark this as an exhibit.
•

*

•
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1 was
marked for identification.)
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

Let me show you what has been marked

as Exhibit 1, and ask you if you recall seeing that document
before or a copy of it?
A

This is probably the one, as far as I can determine.

Q

That appears to be the release that you were presented

with by the attorneys for CUMIS?
A

Yes.

Q

You understand that your lawyer had participated in

negotiating for that release?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you sign this document?

A

I guess I did.

At that time I didn't know what I was

signing or anything else.

I must have signed it, yes.

Q

Did you read the document before you signed it?

A

Yeah.

Q

Did your wife sign it?

A

To my knowledge, yes.
MR. WILLIAMS:

You did sign it, didn't you?

MRS. CALDWELL:
Q

I think so, yes.

(By Mr. Williams)

Did you ask your lawyer to help you

understand the release?
A

Yes, I guess.

Q

Did he do that?
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A

Yes.

Q

Did you feel like when you signed this document that you

knew what it meant?
A

Yeah.

Q

I guess by signing the agreement you intended that there

were no other terms or understandings with CUMIS, other than
what is in this agreement.
A

Is that a fair statement?

We was just going on our —

the lawyer's advice that we

should sign it.
Q

Was there anything that was part of your understanding

that was not contained in this document, as far as you know?
A

No.

Q

By signing this agreement you intended that, as it says,

$27,755 was to be paid to you, but that approximately $5,500
was to be kept out for property damage?
A

Yes, that's right.

Q

And that that would be a dispute as to who gets that

between you and State Farm?
A

Yes.

Q

At the tine you signed this agreement, were you aware of

the rights of State Farm to pursue what you have called a
recoupment of their money that they have paid for property
damage?
MR. LAUCHNOR:

I am going to object to the question as i

calls for a legal conclusion as to what their rights are, and
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instruct him not to answer.
0

(By Mr. Williams)

Okay, I will ask it a different way.

Did you have some kind of an understanding as to what kind of
what we call subrogation rights State Farm had?

Did you have

some kind of an understanding about that?
A

Well, they told me, I guess in the conversation, that

they was going after that money, and at that time that's when
1 told them that I didn't think that they should pursue it in
that direction.
Q

Did you have some kind of an understanding from some

source about, assuming State Farm didn't go after that money
from the $50,000, that they could go after Mr. and Mrs. Bryan
or their son for the money?

Did you have any understanding

about their rights to do that?
A

That State Farm could go after them?

Q

Yes.

A

No, I didn't have any idea about that.

Q

Your attorney didn't tell you about that?

A

To my knowledge, he didn't.

He might have, but I don't

know.
Q

Did anyone tell you that by signing that agreement State

Farm wouldn't be able to do that?
A

I don't think so.

Q

Did you have an understanding about that one way or

another?
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A

Mo.

Q

Were there any discussions before you signed this

document, Exhibit 1, with anyone from State Farm, other than
the early contacts you have told me about?
A

I don't recall whether there was or not.

Q

You don't remember talking to Clark Davis about what

State Farm's position was before the money was paid?
A

Yeah, we talked to Clark Davis several times.

Q

You understood he was with State Farm?

A

That's right.

Q

When was the last time that you talked with him about

these matters?
A

I don't know.

Q

Was it before you signed this release document?

A

Probably.

Q

Tell me what was said in substance in that conversation,

that last conversation.
A

I can't tell you.

I don't know.

I don't remember.

Q

Can you tell me generally what his position was?

A

His position was that they was going to get part of that

money from CUMIS.
Q

What part?

A

The part of the $50,000 on the policy.

Q

Did you have a dispute with him about that?

A

I sure did.
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1

Q

What was your position?

2

A

My position was that they didn't have any right in that

3

part of the money.

4

but I asked to talk to his boss also.

5

Q

Do you know who that was?

6

A

His boss -- I can't remember what his name was.

7

Q

Does Grant Cutler sound familiar?

ft

A

That name came up.

9

I am not sure whether it was Morgan or —

In fact, I not only talked to Clark Davis

But there was another name, Morgan.
I don't remember

10

what his boss' name was, but it was his boss.

11

Q

Did you talk to that person, whoever it was?

12

A

Yes, I sure did.

13

Q

Was that in a meeting or a telephone call?

14

A

That was in a meeting.

15

Q

At State Farm?

16

A

That's right.

17

Q

Again, we are talking about -- correct me if I am

18

wrong -- but a time period prior to the time you signed this

19

release?

20

A

That's right.

21

Q

Whoever it was, the boss -- by the way, who else was

22

present in that meeting?

23

A

24

I remember, his boss.

25

Q

Was your wife?

I think there was me and my wife and Clark and, as far as

What was said, in substance?

Tell me their position.
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A

I have told you just what has been said before, that the

fact renained that they wanted to pursue in getting money
from CUMIS out of the $50,000 that was owed to us.
what Clark told us to begin with.
meeting with his boss.

And that's

And I insisted on having a

And he rejected that at first.

And I

told him that I insisted on having a meeting with him.
Q

When you say he rejected it, he didn't want you to talk

to his boss?
A

That's right.

He wanted to handle the thing himself.

I

insisted on talking to him.
0

You were able

to get

the audience

with

the boss.

What

did the boss say?
A

I think the boss read some documents or whatever and got

on the phone and called the head office or whatever and said
that's the way it was.
$5,000 —

I think at that time that they -- the

they paid us for the $5,600 for the automobile, and

they said that they would go with the -- I think the death
benefit, but as far as the other, that they would not —

they

couldn't do it, that they was going after that money.
Q

Was there a discussion by either Clark Davis or this

fellow who was his supervisor --* was there some discussion
about their rights to proceed against Paul Bryan or his
parents?
A

Well, I am not sure whether there was anything said as

far as Paul Bryan or the parents.

They was going —

as far as
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I recall, it was after the insurance company and not them.
my knowledge.
Q

To

I don't remember.

Were there any discussions with anyone from State Farm

concerning their getting involved to try to recover their
money in the lawsuits that you were contemplating?

Was there

any discussion about that?
A

Not that I know of.

Q

At the time that you signed this release -- by the way,

had your attorney explained what the terms of the release were
going to be before you were invited to come in and sign it?
Did you know in advance what you were going to be doing?
A

Yes.

Q

That was Mr. Lauchnor that explained that to you?

A

Yes, I think so.

Q

Did you ever contact anyone from State Farm to tell them

what you were going to do?
A

To my knowledge, no.

Q

Do you know if your attorney did?

Did he tell you that

he had contacted State Farm?
A

I am not sure.

He might have done.

Q

You have alleged in your complaint that State Farm was

aware of this agreement.

But I don't remember,

Is that something that your attorney

knows more than you do?
A

I am sure.

(An o f f - t h e - r e c o r d d i s c u s s i o n was h e l d . )
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Q

(By Mr. Williams)

Were there any other contacts w^'th

anyone from CUMIS after this document was signed?

Did you

have any reason to go back and talk to them?
A

After they had released the money?

Q

Right.

A

To my knowledge, no.

Q

Yes.

A

No, I didn't talk to them.

Q

I want to ask you some questions about Troy in the same

For me, you mean?

manner that I asked about Tamara.

My personal?

Here, I will expect, we

will be getting some help from Mrs. Caldwell.

I just ask you

to keep in mind that the reporter has to somehow make a note
who is talking here.

So we have to try to do this carefully.

Was Troy just going into his junior year at high school?
A

Troy had just finished junior high and was going into

senior class, the following year.
Q

You mean sophomore class?

A

He was going into his senior year.

He was going to be a

senior at Brighton High School the following year.
Q

So he had not just finished junior high, he had finished

his junior year?
A

Yes.

Q

You said junior high.

A

Just finished his junior class.

Q

He would have graduated in 1983?

That's what threw me off.
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Q

He had not, however, got to the point where he could own

his own car?
A

That's true, financially.

Q

Did he have any other property of substance, other than

clothes and usual things?
A

Motorcycle.

Q

He did have a motorcycle?

A

Yes.

Q

Was it a dirt bike?

A

Yes.

Q

How long had he been riding that?

A

Since he was eight years old.

Q

Other than the contribution to help while his brother was

on a mission, can you tell me some of the other things he did
for the family that for which the whole family somehow got
some benefits or which the parents got benefit for?
A

Nothing, other than like I say, he was just a real

generous and considerate boy.
Q

Did he have some jobs that were assigned to him around

the home?
A

Yeah, I guess.

Not definite assignments, but he helped

around the house, yes.
Q

You didn't have to get after him to help you with the

yard or anything like that?
A

No.
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Q

I guess he and Todd sort of were close?

A

Very close.

Q

How about the other kids?

Did he have a good

relationship with the other children?
A

Yes, had a real good rapport with all of his brothers and

sisters.
Q

Did he stay with projects once he started them, pretty

much?
A

Yes.

Q

Is there anything you would like to add about his

personality that you haven't already told ne about, that would
help me understand it a little more?
A

Nothing other than he was just a top-notch boy.

He had

the ability to read the paper or whatever it might be and
glean things from what he read, and had a real good use.
had the ability to —

He

he knew what was going on.

Q

You mean current events?

A

Current events.

Q

What kind of a relationship did you have with him

personally?
A

Real good relationship.

Q

During the year before he died, did you spend some time

with him alone?
A

Yes.

Q

How o f t e n , g e n e r a l l y speaking?
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A

Oh, probably days, maybe two or three days, whatever, out

of each month.
Q

Were there things that you and he liked to do together?

A

Yes.

Q

Like what?

A

We liked to play baseball together.

motorcycles together.
together.

We liked to ride

We done some fishing and some hunting

Although, he liked to stay home with his mother

when I would go hunting, he would usually like to stay home
with mother.

Him and his mother had a very close

relationship.

More so than any of the other children.

Q

Did he have any health problems prior to his death?

A

No.

Q

Who were his closest friends before he died?

A

Well, his brother was his closest, his twin brother.

Q

Who else?

A

Bill Holt and Ron Wade was, I guess, one of his closest.

Q

Anybody else that comes to your mind?

A

Well, he just had —

Q

Any idea what Bill Holt is doing nowadays?

A

Yes.

I guess everybody was his friend.

Bill Holt is living at home and working.

I don't

know exactly where he works.
Q

What is his father's name, do you know?

A

Herbert.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Mrs. Caldwell?
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MRS. CALDWELL:

Bill is one of the best players for

U.S.C. College basketball,
THE WITNESS:

He is going to school but he is hone now.

Q

(By Mr. Williams)

S.U.S.C?

A

In Price.

Q

That's College of Eastern Utah.

A

Right.

Q

And Ron Wade, do you know what he is doing?

A

Ron Wade is on a mission.

Q

Do you know which one?

He is one of their top basketball players there.

MRS. CALDWELL:

He is in Brazil, I think.

His father is

president of Dixie College.
THE WITNESS:

Alton Wade is his father.

MR. WILLIAMS:

I think that's all I have.

MR. LAUCHNOR:

I don't have anything.

(Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m. this deposition was concluded.)

44

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony

j

consisting of 42 pages, numbered from 3 to 44, inclusive,
and the same is a true and correct transcription of said

J

testimony except as I have corrected it in ink, giving my

J

reasons therefor and affixed my initials thereto.

j
i
i

i

LORIN DEAN CALDWELL
*

*

•

Subscribed and sworn to at
day of

, this
, 1984.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was
taken before me, BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah.
That the said witness was by me, before examination duly
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth in said cause.
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in
Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into
typewriting, and that a full, true and correct transcription
of said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the
foregoing pages numbered from 3 to 44 inclusive, and said
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed
deposition.
I further certify that after the said deposition was
transcribed, the original of same was held at the offices of
Associated Professional Reporters, 420 Kearns Building, Salt
Lake City, for the witness to read, signed before a Notary
Public, and to be returned to me for filing with the Clerk of
the said Court.
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I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action,
and that I am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal of Salt Lake City,
Utah, this ^&fa

day of A^v.^

, 1984.

My commission expires:
December 8, 1986

wNG//

BRAD J. Yi
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to the undersigned at this time of the sum of TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($27,755.00) , the receipt c
which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, being of lawful
age, individually, as parents, natural guardians, and representatives of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, and for and on behalf
of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, do hereby release,
acquit, and forever discharge KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, FARRELL L.
BRYAN, ILENE M. BRYAN, NORMAN L. BROWN dba SPOT II, their agents
servants, employees, and insurers, of and from any and all actio;
causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of servi^
loss of society, comfort, and companionship, expenses, loss of
income or other compensation, on account of, or in any way grcwi:
out of all known and unknown injuries and/or damages, resulting
or to result from that particular automobile accident that occur:
on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or near the intersectic
of 3900 South Street and 7th East Street in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, wherein a vehicle operated by Kenneth Paul Bryan
collided with a vehicle in which Troy Neil Caldwell was riding,
resulting in his death.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that of the above amount, FIVE THOUSA:
FIVE HUNDRED TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,510.00) represents damage
to the undersigned's automobile and that such amount will be made
payable by separate check to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
and Lorin D. Caldwell, wherein a controversy exists between State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is
entitled to the said amount, and that the matter will be resolvec
between the two or by payment into court or by judicial determine
tion.
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARE AND REPRESENT that in
making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed
that the undersigned rely wholly upon their own judgment, belief,
and knowledge of the nature and extent of said damages, and that
the undersigned have not been influenced to any extent whatsoever
in making this release by any representations or statements
regarding the accident, or regarding any other matters, made by
the persons, firms, or corporations who are hereby released, or
by any person or persons representing them.

IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this settlemer.
is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the
payment made pursuant to this release is not to be construed as
an admission of liability on the part of the parties released
hereby, by whom liability is expressly denied.
THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTAND AGREE that the accident
resulting in the death of Troy Neil Caldwell, described in this
release of all claims, may have caused damages, the existence
of which and the consequences of which are nov; unknown but which
may become known in the future. The undersigned nevertheless
intend to and do release, for and on their own behalf, on behalf
of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, and on behalf of all the
heirs of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, all claims for all
injuries and damages to the undersigned, the estate and/or the
heirs of the estate of Troy Neil Caldwell, whether now known or
unknown and whether now in existence or hereinafter to arise.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that should the
undersigned commence legal action against any third party, not
released under this release, for the damages resulting from the
accident and subsequent death of Troy Neil Caldwell, as described
in this release, that such third party will be entitled to a seto
for the amounts paid under this release or the percentage of
responsibility that might be attributable to the parties released
herein, if any, whichever is greater, and this release is intende,
to comply with the provisions of Section 73-27-42 and Section
78-27-43 of Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
THIS RELEASE contains the entire agreement between the
parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual
and not a mere recital.
THE UNDERSIGNED FURTHER STATE that they have carefully
read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and the
undersigned sign the same as their own free act.
DATED this

day of March, 1933.

LORIN DEAN CALDWELL, Individually and
as Father, Natural Guardian, and Representative of the Estate and Heirs
of Troy Neil Caldwell

-2-

M. LARUE HENDERSON CALDWELL, Individi
ally and as Mother, Natural Guardian,
and Representative of the Estate and
Heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell
! Witness

-^-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, et al. ,

:
Civil No. C83-8099
Judge Judith M. Billings

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Deposition of:
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

:
ROBERT KENT HILL

Defendant.
STATE FARM INSURANCE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

:
:

Third Party Plaintiff,

:

-vsKENNETH PAUL BRYAN,
Third Party Def<andant.

:
*

*

•

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of August, 1984, the
deposition of ROBERT KENT HILL, produced as a witness herein
at the instance of the defendant and third party plaintiff,
herein, in the above-entitled action now pending in the abovenamed court, was taken before BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:50 a.m. of said day at the
offices of STRONG & HANNI, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice.
•

*

*

BRAD J. YOUNG
Associated Professional Reporters
420 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-3441

0000175

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiffs:

WALLY LAUCHNOR
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

For the Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff:

R. SCOTT WILLIAMS
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys at Law
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Also Present:

Janet Hill
Dean Caldwell
LaRue Caldwell

I_ N D E X
WITNESS
ROBERT KENT HILL
Examination by Mr. Williams
Examination by Mr. Lauchnor
Further Examination by Mr. Williams
Further Examination by Mr. Lauchnor
Further Examination by Mr. Williams

Defendant's Exhibit 1
•

*

•

8

2

ROBERT KENT HILL,

A

3

called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant and

1

4

Third-Party Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined

0

5

and testified as follows:

5

6

0

7

BY MR, WILLIAMS;

8

Q

9

for the taking of the deposition of Robert Hill.

EXAMINATION

Let the record show this is almost the time and the place
The

10

deposition is pursuant to notice and governed by the Utah

11

Rules of Civil Procedure.

12

Would you state your name, please, for the record.

13

A

Robert Kent Hill.

14

Q

What is your age, Mr. Hill?

15

A

45.

16

Q

Your present address?

17

A

3213 East Danforth Drive, Salt Lake.

18

Q

Have you ever had your deposition taken before for any

19

reason?

20

A

I don't recall.

21

Q

Just so we understand what this procedure is about today,

22

I intend to ask you questions about the nature of this lawsuit

23

that we have going and a little bit about your deceased

24 I daughter.
25

I don't believe I have.

If you don't understand any of my questions, I

| would appreciate it if you would let me know so that we know

3

we are communicating.

Is that fair?

A

Yeah, I will.

Q

If you don't tell me, I will assume you understand my

questions.
Mr. Hill, tell me where you are presently employed.
A

Presently I am employed for Rick Warner Ford.

Q

In what capacity?

A

Automobile salesman.

Q

Used

A

New; primarily new.

Q

How long have you been there?

A

About six and a half, seven weeks.

Q

Tell me just briefly what your educational background is

A

I graduated fro© Brigham Young University

cars?

with a

Bachelor's in Spanish and a minor in accounting in August of
1963.
Q

Any additional schooling after that?

A

Just various classes at the universities and colleges in

various towns since then but no degree, no other degree.
Q

You have how many children presently?

A

We have five children.

Q

What is your wife's name?

A

Janet.

Q

Tamara Elaine Hill was your daughter; is that correct?

A

That's correct.
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Q

Would she have been the sixth child?

A

She would have been the second child.

Q

I mean you would have six children if she were still

alive?
A

That's right.

Q

Tell me just briefly the names of the others and their

approximate ages.
A

Okay, Lisa is our oldest.

She is 21.

Tammy was 16, so

she would be 18. Teresa is 15, Teresa Helen.
Tina Irene.
He is seven.

She is nine.

Then there is

Then there is Robbie, Robert John.

And then Richard.

He is one year.

Q

Are these, all of your children, natural children?

A

They are all natural children, every one of them.

Q

Both you and your wife, Janet?

A

That's right.

We have never been married before.

This

is our family.
Q

I understand that Tamara was killed as a result of an

accident on June 6, 1982; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

That accident apparently happened at the intersection of

7th East and 3900 South; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Tamara would have been a passenger in a vehicle that Troy

Caldwell was driving?
A

That's right.

5

Q

As far as you know, she would have been sitting in the

front seat, I assume, the information you have?
A

That's the information I have.

I never did visually

verify it but I am sure that's correct.
Q

Apparently, Troy —

do you understand that Troy was

driving his father's automobile at the time?
A

That's right.

Q

Did you know Troy Caldwell prior to this day?

A

Yes.

Q

How did you happen to become acquainted with him?

A

Well, he liked our daughter, and they dated a little bit,

and he had been over to our home a few times.
Q

How long had they dated prior to June 6 of 1982?

A

About six months, I guess.

Q

Was that a pretty steady dating relationship?

A

Well, she was 16, and he was 17.

I would say for that

age, relatively so.
Q

Once a week?

A

Sometimes.

Were they together once a week for a date?
Sometimes more than that, depending.

They

weren't going "steady" that I am aware of in terms of what the
social mores of the kids is.
Q

They certainly were not engaged?

A

No.

Q

They had not talked with you about any plans for marriage?

A

Oh, no, not to me.
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Q

You hadn't heard of those plans from any other source, I

guess?
A

Well, I think the subject was broached in terms of them

thinking an awful lot of each other.

But in terms of any

seriousness of approaching that idea, no.
Q

Tell me just briefly, again from whatever source, your

information as to how the accident happened, very briefly.
A

Well, very briefly, Troy and Tammy were in the Honda

Prelude.

Troy was driving south on 700 East, about midnight

of that night. They were returning from a show downtown in
Salt Lake City.

I also have some information of a friend who

was in a car right in front of them.
MRS. HILL:

Behind.

Q

(By Mr. Williams)

A

His name is John —

Who was that person?
he works for Imperial Realty.

MRS. HILL: Nielsen.
THE WITNESS:

So he has verified that as the only real

personal contact I have had.

They were driving down that

road, and they came to a stop light, which was at 3900 South
intersection.

They were in not the left most lane but --

well, I don't know exactly which lane they were in —

but they

came to a stop, and the light changed, and they proceeded
now, John Nielsen's wife spoke to him
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

A

To John.

—

—

Spoke to who?

They were in the car behind them.

And said

7

—

you know, she was watching, and said, Don't go.
seen the other vehicle coining.

She must have

But they proceeded into the

path of the vehicle driven by Kenneth -- Paul Kenneth Bryan,
and he broadsided them with impact and pushed them almost
over to the intersection where the Arctic Circle drive-in
was.

The impact of the pickup being driven by Paul Bryan

striking them broadside was where Tammy was seated.

He was

going at a fairly high rate of speed -- this was all taken in
the testimony of the court —

it is a matter of record -- 50

miles an hour, perhaps in excess, and knocked the car clear
over there by the corner of where the Arctic Circle drive-in
was.
Q

Was there anything else that you wanted to say?

A

Just that we understand that Tammy was killed instantly

and Troy died very shortly, within less than a half hour
thereafter.
Q

From your understanding, Mr. Bryan would have been

traveling westbound?
A

No.

He was traveling eastbound on 3900 South.

Q

That's right, because Caldwell was traveling southbound,

you say?

A

South on 7th East.

Q

You mentioned something about t h i s John N i e l s e n .

Did

you p e r s o n a l l y t a l k to him?
A

After i t was a l l over, I d i d , because he came t o work a t
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1

Imperial Realty after this was all over.

2

previously but I had not spoken to him about it.

3

rather interesting that we sat down and had this conversation.

4

He was so close that they could have been involved.

5

Q

They were in the vehicle immediately behind

6

A

I don't even know if they were in the same lane or not.

7

Q

You mentioned something about the fact that Mrs. Nielsen

8

reported that she could see Paul Bryan's vehicle coming?

9

A

She said something to him.

I had known him
It was

—

I don't know any other

10

details about that.

11

Q

12

go because of the vehicle coming?

13

A

14

have reason to believe that they weren't in the same lane.

15

But they did not proceed.

16

Q

17

assume that that was on the negligent homicide action that was

18

brought against Mr. Bryan; is that right?

19

A

Prosecution of Paul Bryan.

20

Q

Did you go to that hearing?

21

A

I did not.

22

feel emotionally —

23

face.

24

Q

Did you --

25

A

For my own personal reasons, which I won't tell here.

It is your understanding that she told her husband not to

Yeah.

He felt like he could have been in their place.

You mentioned also that there was a court hearing.

I read through transcripts of it.

I

I

I didn't

I didn't want to meet Paul Bryan face-to-

Q

I understand.

I assume you know how the court case came

out.
A

That's right.

Q

The result.

Can you tell us what that was, from your

understanding?
A

Well, rather sketchy.

He was convicted on a lesser

count than was originally charged.

And, gee, I think they

were pressing for the most serious charge that could have been
brought against someone driving under those conditions.

Quite

frankly, I don't remember the terms as to just exactly what it
was reduced to.

But he was convicted and sentenced to the

prison, which is unusual in those cases.
Q

Is it your understanding that he is still in prison?

A

As far as I know.

Q

Have you ever at any time talked with Paul Bryan?

A

Never.

Q

Have you ever talked with an attorney who represented

Mr. Bryan?
A

Yes.

Q

Was that an attorney that represented him on the criminal

action or one that was hired by his insurance company, do you
know?
A

One hired by his insurance company.

Q

I will ask you about that in a few minutes.
I understand that Mr. Caldwell was insured by State Farm
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at the time of this accident.

Were you insured at the time on

any vehicles you owned?
A

I probably was but I didn't make any --

Q

Do you know the name of the company that you were insured

with?
A

No.

I didn't come prepared to answer that.

Q

I understand.
I understand also, Mr. Hill, that after your daughter's

death that there was a certain amount of money paid to you
under what they call the no fault benefits of Mr. Caldwell's
policy; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Am I correct in stating that that was approximately

$6,000?
A

$5,000 was paid to me on about the 17th of June, and I

understand that another $1,000 was paid to the mortuary
direct.

Well, I am sure that was paid —

I verified that

—

by State Farm.
Q

At some point in time did you obtain the services of an

attorney after your daughter's death?
A

Yes, we did.

Q

Who did you contact first?

A

Well, I contacted the bar to get some references, some

referrals.

They gave me Dale Kent and one other one, one

other attorney.

I went to see Dale Kent, but I don't recall
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the name of the other one.

I am not sure I called,

I made

several inquiries to try to get some sort of referral through
either the bar or this referral service they have for
attorneys.
Q

What were you hoping to accomplish by going to see

Mr. Kent?
A

And we did have a meeting with Dale Kent.

What was the reason for that?

Well, okay, now, this all boils down to a highly

emotional situation.

I would have to interject that right

shortly after the accident, CUMIS, CUNA Mutual Insurance,
called us in, the Caldwells and Janet and I, to make us an
offer of the amount of the insurance coverage, as soon as they
had gone through their rigmarole of death certificates and so
forth.

And I don't remember whether we contacted an attorney

before or after that.
Q

I think it was after that.

Let's go back to that, just take things chronologically.

Your first contact with anybody from CUMIS was in response to
a phone call from them?
A

I don't remember how that was initiated.

I think our

first contact with an insurance company was with State Farm.
I talked to Mr. Davis, and I went in and saw Mr. Davis.

And I

think as a result of that we were able to supply him with
death certificates or whatever he required for the no fault
benefits that were subsequently paid.

And then somehow —

of

course, the Caldwells and Janet and I worked together on
this —

either through State Farm or through our own resources
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we somehow got in touch with CUMIS.
Q

Perhaps they called us.

Can you give me a time frame that that might have taken

place, from the date of the accident?
A

I wasn't able to find my correspondence file with CUMIS.

Q

Just approximately how many months after?

A

Well, like I say, CUMIS made us an offer, us and the

Caldwells, within a relatively —

you know, within three weeks

of the time, maybe a month or less.

I don't remember exactly.

We went to their office, and they wanted us to sign the
release.
Q

You and your wife went?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And Mr. and Mrs. C a l d w e l l

A

That's

Q

Who did you meet with at CUMIS, do you remember?

A

Greg Winget.

Q

Is that W-e-n-g-e-t?

A

I think it is W-i-n-g-e-t.

is spelled.

went

in?

right.

I don't know exactly haw it

I remember in our conversations, I also talked

with Mary Cornevaux.
Q

Prior to the actual meeting in the office of CUMIS, can

you tell me anything about the substance of conversations you
had with anybody from CUMIS over the phone?
A

Yeah.

It had to do with a question as to whether or not

they were liable in the accident, as to whether —

that's
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where i t

started.

come b a c k .
outset,

Now t h a t I r e c a l l ,

my mind i s s t a r t i n g

to

They d i d n ' t c l a i m any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t a t

in our i n i t i a l

the

conversations.

Q

T e l l me about

that,

A

Well

Q

Who did you talk to and what was said?

A

Either Mary Cornevaux or Greg Winget.

~

been one other individual.
insurance claim.

There may have

You know, we were pursuing the

One of the reasons is because I wasn't

particularly well —

I wasn't financially strong at the time.

I didn't have any savings.

And there was some people that

gave us some money, because I was totally incapable of working
right at first.
me.

The emotional impact of it was a surprise to

I didn't realize that I would be incapacitated the way I

was.
Q

I understand.

A

So we pursued the insurance thing, and they had to call

their home office and see if actually there was liability,
because there was a question as to whether or not they were
liable for the insurance on the vehicle because Paul Bryan was
not a licensed driver at the time and his parents were the
ones who provided him with the vehicle —

my understanding -—

and they were the ones who carried the insurance on the
vehicle he was driving, on the pickup.
Q

Let me see if I can summarize that to your satisfaction.
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Apparently, you initiated the contacts with CUMIS, based on
your memory now?
A

I can't say for a fact whether or not I initiated or

whether they did.
Q

I honestly do not recall.

In any event, you are asking the question about trying to

get some insurance proceeds?
A

Yeah.

We got together, that's right.

Q

You wanted to get paid some money from their insurance

policy; is that right?
A

(The witness nods head in the affirmative.)

Q

And you let them know that; is that right?

A

(The witness nods head in the affirmative.)
MR, LAUCHNOR:

Answer audibly.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

They said, in short, there may be a

question about whether there is coverage that would require
the insurance company to pay?
A

That's right. That was definitely a question at first.

Q

Your understanding of that coverage question relates to

the fact that he wasn't a licensed driver?
A

Well, the fact that the vehicle was not registered in his

name, apparently.

That, I can't state for a fact.

But I do

know that he had had his license revoked on several occasions,
so he was incapable of purchasing insurance on his own.
the vehicle was insured by his parents.

And

He was driving the
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vehicle —

and there is no question about that —

of this accident.
were liable.

at the tine

So CUMIS did raise a question that they

And they had to determine that.

And part of

that was corresponding with their home office and getting a
certified copy of the policy.

It had to be registered in the

county wherever the policy was issued, back in the Mid-West
and so forth.
Q

What is the next thing that happened?

A

That was at the time they made us the offer.

Q

They brought you in after they had done their initial

checking?
A

Yes.

They determined that they were liable, to their own

satisfaction.
Q

Then they invited you in?

A

Brought us in and made -us an offer, at which time they

wanted us to sign a release of all claims.
Q

Tell me, as best you remember, everything that was said

in that meeting.
A

Mr. Winget came in.

the form.

We were all seated there.

He had

He was polite and gracious and made reference to

the fact that they had to deal with this, and made a
statement, and of course, it was in writing on the release of
all claims.

They made a full offer of the full limits of the

liability —

the coverage under that policy, which was a total

combined limit of $50,000, divided equally between the
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Caldwells and ourselves.
each.

So that would have been $25,000 for

That offer was made in writing and verbally.

And that

was in the form of a release of all claims, that they wanted
us to sign at that time, at that meeting.
Q

What else was said or what else happened in that meeting?

A

Well, we declined to sign it.

Q

Declined to sign the release?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative). We declined their offer.

Q

For what reason?

A

Well, I think by that time we had contacted another

attorney.

Yeah.

I think we had contacted Keith Nelson, and

suggested that that may not be a wise thing to do.
Q

Let's back up a little bit.

Prior to going into the

meeting at CUMIS, you apparently met with Dale Kent?
A

Yes.

That was one of the first things we did.

Q

I assume, though I don *t want to put words in your mouth,

that you were going to Mr. Kent for legal advice about
A

That's right.

Q

—

A

The broader background of it would be this.

what to do with

—

—

been involved in a lawsuit before.

I have never

I have never been through

a traumatic situation like this in my life.

And I was a

little befuddled and I was a little unsure what was the best
thing to do.

There was a very deep

moral issue involved as to

whether or not I should just forgive the man, take the
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insurance money offered and let it go.

So there was this old

human motive of whether or not I should pursue that family.
I learned very early on that his parents were aged.
of them was infirmed.

They didn't have great assets.

And

that if we sued, we would be suing them, not this guy.
life was in a mess.

One

His

He didn't have control of his life or he

wouldn't have done this.

So we —

in my own mind, it was a

very conscience-oriented thing as to whether or not I should
even consider suing them.
yokel.

I knew I wouldn't be suing this

I would be suing his parents.

it was a conscience issue with me.

He had no assets.

So

I did not want to sue.

But I was correlating the wishes of my wife and the
Caldwells.

We were all heated.

action or choice on my part.
decisions.

And it was not a unilateral

I did not make all the

I was trying to reconcile the points of view of

three other parents.

And that is the reason that I consulted

an attorney in the first place.
Q

That must have been within the first three weeks you saw

Mr. Kent?
A

Yes.

Q

Prior to the time you went in to see Mr. Kent, had you

done some of your own investigation about the financial
abilities of the Bryans?
A

Well, I think there had been some conversations between

the Caldwells and the Bryans, as I recall, early on.

I did
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not personally go to see
proceedings.

then

But I did —

until much later in the

you know, the word got out very

quickly that they were very sorry about it, the parents.
was an adopted child.

They were very sorry.

He

I did not feel

emotionally prepared to confront them or him.
And so I just went on the information that we got through
phone calls and -- you know, there were other people that were
intensely interested in this.
officers.

There were law enforcement

This Officer Odor was deeply involved in it.

took it very seriously.
was helpful, nice.

He did a lot of investigation.

He
He

I received information from many sources.

It was very early on, right after the accident, that I
ascertained the parents provided the insurance.
older, infirmed and penitent.
Q

They were

They felt very bad about it.

Did they appear to have assets, and, if so, can you tell

me what they had?
A

It was just hearsay at first, that they didn't have

anything much, and so then after we saw Dale Kent, we decided
not to go with him, we talked with Keith Nelson, he suggested
there may be other insurance coverages.

He suggested there

may be some insurance in the bar where this guy was served.
According to the Utah Dram Shop Act, he should not have been
served when he was under the influence of alcohol.
the situation so he committed what he did.
decisions were based on one or two items.

It abetted

None of these
They were based on
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the feelings, emotions of the other people involved.
Q

Let me see if we can just focus in on one event at a time.

A

But all these things happened at once.

All these bits of

information were at my disposal very early on so I could make
a determination, shall I forget these people and just let it
go and take the offer, or shall we pursue it from a legal
standpoint?

Because my motive I have was not just money.

had been hurt.

We felt perhaps maybe some sort of warped

justice could be done.
all of our parts.
is done.
up.

We

Because there were heated feelings on

To be very frank, my first reaction was, it

The poor guy, you know.

I can't better my situation.

He has really loused it
So I really didn't want to

sue at first.
Q

You went to Dale Kent.

A

That's right.

Q

Can you tell me why?

A

Just thought that perhaps Keith Nelson would be better.

I knew Keith.

You decided not to use Mr. Kent?

We grew up together.

He was a better attorney.

And he had some knowledge and expertise in this field.
Q

It wasn't because of anything Mr. Kent said?

A

No.

like —

He was nice and fine.
it is all relative.

It was just I didn't feel

If one man is more qualified than

another, I will go with the man I feel I can trust, first of
all, because I knew Keith.
background.

I knew his family.

I knew his

To me, he was trustworthy and I could rely on
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his expertise as well as the fact that he would be square.
Q

Did you meet with Keith Nelson prior -- just so I am

clear on this — prior to the meeting at CUMIS?

I think you

implied that but I am not sure,
A

I think I did on an informal —

remember exactly.

I am not sure.

I do not

I met with Keith once before we met at his

office.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Let's see if your wife can help us, if it

is all right with you, Wally.
MR. LAUCHNOR:
MRS. HILL:

Fine.

I think it was exactly two weeks, I remember,

meeting with Keith in their home.
THE WITNESS:

Was that before we met with CUMIS and they

made us the offer?
MRS. HILL:
THE WITNESS:
Q

I think so.
I am still not sure about that.

(By Mr. Williams)

In any event, when you went to see

CUMIS, you had reservations from someplace about whether it
was the best thing to do to sign the release at that time?
A

Yeah.

As a matter of fact, even on the simple basis of

whether or not I was properly oriented and emotionally clear
at the time to be able to do that.
Q

You didn't take their money at that time, and you told

them that.

What is the next thing that happened in the chain

of events, as far as you can remember?
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I

A

And then we proceeded with Keith Nelson and Mr. Davies,

his assistant, who started an investigation into the -- all of
the avenues of possibility.
Q

That was Lynn Davies?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative). Simultaneously, they were

investigating The Spot II, which was the bar where Paul Bryan
had had his last drink.

At the same time they were checking

into the possibility of any other insurance coverage or
whatever that the Bryans may have had.

To make a long story

short, they found out there wasn't much, and after it drug on
and on and on, I finally went out to see the parents of
Kenneth Bryan myself.

I made an appointment with them and

went out and saw them and talked with them face-to-face.

I

could see their situation.
Q

Let me stop you there for a second.

After you saw

Mr. Nelson again, and he started the investigation, was there
any contact during that period of time, any further contact
during that period of time, with anybody from CUMIS, before
you go to see the Bryans?
A

Well, I am sure there was.

Okay, I have a letter here

that shows when Keith Nelson sent a letter to CUMIS, telling
them to withhold payment of all claims until they had been -any claims had been satisfied.

So that's —

so I don't

remember exactly what happened after then, it was kind of a
waiting period for the Nelson —

Keith Nelson and his
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assistant to do their thing.
Q

That was approximately how long a period of time before

you went to see them?
A

The letter was dated in August, where he sent it to

CUMIS, telling them to not pay any claims until all claims
were satisfied through his office.

Then the investigation

continued.
Q

Can I see that letter, so we just don't have to ask any

more questions about it?
A

Yes.

Q

We are looking at a letter dated August 4, 1982, to Mary

Cornevaux of CUMIS Insurance, signed by Keith Nelson and Lynn
Davies.
Mr. Hill, how long after this letter do you think it may
have been before you went to see Mr. and Mrs. Bryan?
A

Oh, it was probably at least six weeks, maybe two months.

It may have been more than that.

Because the whole thing drug

on until February of the next year.
Q

You think you saw them in the fall of 1982 sometime?

I

understand it is hard to come up with dates.
A

I think it was towards the fall.

I really do.

have been even a little later than that.

It may

Because, you know,

the other investigation was taking place, and we took —

you

know, they took depositions from this guy that had
The Spot II, and that was fruitless.
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Q

Did Mr. Nelson file a lawsuit at some time in your behalf?

A

That's right, there was a lawsuit filed against the

Bryans and against this guy that owned The Spot II —

that had

The Spot II .
Q

That lawsuit would have been filed approximately August

of 1982; is that right?
A

Shortly after this letter, I am quite sure.

They just

went right into it.
Q

Mr. Nelson was representing you and your wife in that

case?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative). And Mr. Davies.

Q

As I understand it, The Spot II, Norman L. Brown, he

represented himself in that action?

Does that sound right to

you?
A

For a while, until it came to the point of the

depositions, and then he had an attorney.
Q

Who was his attorney at that point?

Do you remember?

If

you don't, that's fine.
A

I could probably think of the name.

He was a local

attorney.
Q

I assume you would agree that Tony Eyre represented

Kenneth Bryan in that case?
A

There was two or three attorneys involved there.

was Tony Eyre.
Q

Does that sound familiar?

And I talked to him.

There

And I also talked to

And Leonard Russon?
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—

A

Yes.

Q

Leonard Russon was representing the parents, though.

Does that sound right?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative), that firm.

Q

Both Mr. Russon and Mr. Eyre, as far as you understand,

would have been hired by Bryan's insurance company?
A

I guess.

I don't really know for a fact whether they

were hired by them personally or the insurance company.
Q

You went to see Mr. and Mrs. Bryan.

First of all, did

you go with your wife?
A

I went alone.

telephone.

I made an appointment with them on the

We had talked briefly on the telephone.

Q

What was said in the telephone conversation, briefly?

A

Oh, I don't know, just things like -- you know, they were

so sorry.

It was usually the woman that I talked to.

a little more talkative.

She was

And I just told them, you know, I

don't hold anything against you personally, but I would like
to come out and talk to you.
Q

So you met with them.

I want to get this resolved.
Tell me what was said, briefly, in

that conversation.
A

Well, I just went to their home in Tooele.

the appointment.

I had made

They were there and a daughter of theirs

was there, in their living room.

They talked a lot about

Kenneth, how they adopted him, their lives.

He even talked

about his earlier life, and how he had had all these
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problems, and they were so sorry.
So I finally asked them a few pointed questions about
assets.

And he said he didn't have any except his home, which

was free and clear.

But I wasn't about to proceed against

them to take their home away, because they were aged.
were beyond 70.

They seemed like nice people, decent people.

So I must have been there half an hour.
those subjects.

They

We talked around

I talked about my daughter, our family.

talked about his son and their family.

He

He talked quite a bit

about his early life and his relationship with his family, as
I recall.
Q

Was their story about the assets they had consistent

with what you had learned before?
A

Yes.

Q

Apparently, Mr. Nelson and the attorneys from that firm

had done their own investigation into the assets?
A

That's right.

Q

And they told you essentially the same thing; is that

correct?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative). Of course, my purpose for going

out there was not primarily to check into assets.
part of it.

That was

I just wanted to meet them face-to-face because

to me the moral issue was more important than the legal.

I

mean, you know, in the Bible it says that you are supposed to
forgive.

So I wanted to meet them so that I would have
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something in my mind to grab onto to help me to come to grips
with my own feelings in the matter,
person,

I am not a mercenary

I was not angry or vehement towards them.

polite the whole time.

I was

I did ask them a couple of pointed

questions about their assets.

If they had been wealthy

people and it wouldn't have hurt them, maybe it would have
been right to pursue it.

It would have hurt them in a time in

their life where it maybe could have caused physical harm to
them had we proceeded further with this.

And they were

anxious to get it settled and over with.

Because it was an

anxious time for them.

They suffered in a way just as much as

we did, I am sure.
Q

Is it fair to say that from the point that the lawsuit

had been filed that your contacts with CUMIS were through the
attorneys representing CUMIS?
A

Pretty much for a period of time there, while we were

waiting to see if we could, you know, do anything.
Q

Can you tell me the course of events, what is the next

thing that happened that you feel is significant?
A

Just before I went to see the Bryans, I felt —

remember whether that was actually —
the deposition of this Brown.

I don't

the turning point was

And Keith Nelson said, Well,

you know, I don't think there is anything to be gained by
going against either one of them.
the owner of the —

They were both —

either

not the owner but the man who had
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The Spot II.
Brown,

He didn't own the real estate, this Norman

He didn't have any assets.

And they weren't able to

ascertain that there was anything to be accomplished by
pursuing the Dram Shop Act.

So he advised me to drop it.

that's when I went to see the Bryans.

So

And then, you know, we

told them, Okay, we are going to get it wrapped up.
Q

As I understand it, Mr. Nelson is not representing the

Caldwells during that time period; is that right?
A

That's right.

He was representing us alone.

Q

Mr. Caldwell, though we can ask him, apparently was

getting counsel from someone else?
A

That's right.

Q

Is there a reason why, in your discussions with

Mr. Caldwell, you decided not to use the same attorney?
A

I don't even remember, except that we didn't agree

100 percent on the approach of this.
want to sue at first, but —

anyway, we ended up doing it.

just got different attorneys.
seeing Keith.

Like I said, I didn't
We

I guess I just felt good about

I really didn't know what to do.

I just

—

Q

I understand.

A

You understand, the moral issue is this.

Q

You told me.

A

If you sue a rich man and you don't break him, it is an

altogether different thing than getting blood out of a poor
man, which would serve no purpose.

That was my whole feelings
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at the tine.

If there were something they were hiding, I

thought we should find out.

Because it was still concert of

all of us rather than just my decision.
Q

Tell me what the next event is that you think is

significant.
A

Well, then, after we decided to drop the suit, then the

delays started, and then we couldn't get settlement.
Q

When you say the delays started, you mean --

A

Well

Q

What do you mean?

A

We got Nelson to withdraw officially from the case, which

—

had to be done.
Q

Tell me about that.

Why is that?

A

Well, because he went on record as representing our

interest, and nothing was to be paid, as that letter
indicated, out, without their approval.

It is a legal action

that would enable him to speak in our behalf and to receive
moneys in our behalf, whatever came out of the suit.
Q

Did you have some kind of a fee arrangement with

Mr. Nelson —

I assume you did —

where he was to be paid

somehow for legal services rendered?
A

That's right.

Q

What was the arrangement?

A

It started out as a verbal agreement.

And I don't

remember exactly what it was.
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Q

Did he take the case on what we call a contingency fee?

A

Yes, that was the agreement.

Q

Was there a discussion about whether he would be entitled

or whether he would take money from out of the $2 5,000 that
you had already been offered?
A

There was.

Q

What was that discussion?

A

I think it was something in the nature of one third.

don't recall.

I

We had a verbal agreement, and then when it

came in writing, it was different.
Q

Do you have a copy of an attorney fee contract that he

provided you?
A

I probably do if I can locate —

when I locate my file.

I wasn't able to locate that file but I really didn't start to
look for it soon enough.
Q

Just so I understand what you were saying a minute ago,

are you'saying that when it came time to drop the case against
Mr. and Mrs. Bryan and against The Spot II that Mr. Nelson
backed out of representing you?
A

Yeah.

That was the only thing to do.

I asked him to

withdraw because we weren't going to pursue it any more, based
on his investigation, our accumulation of facts and
information and our own feelings, decided to drop it.

And

that would necessitate his withdrawing legally so that we
could proceed to claim the money that they had offered us
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initially.
Q

Is there some reason why he didn't at that point continue

the negotiations with CUMIS, or is it just that you felt he
wasn't needed at that point?
MR. LAUCHNOR:
time.

Maybe I can help here Scott, save some

Correct me if I am wrong.

It was my understanding that

you hired Keith after they had offered you the policy limits
to see if there was any other assets and to find out all of
the facts, that Keith came back and said they had thoroughly
investigated all of these other possible defendants and the
boy and found there was nothing available in assets to pursue
further, other than the insurance with CUMIS, and his
contingent fee, as I understand it, was based upon anything he
was going to find over what you had already been offered.
THE WITNESS:
MR. LAUCHNOR:

That's right exactly.
They couldn't find anything, Keith

withdrew.
THE WITNESS:

That's right.

I am sorry, I didn't

remember that. That's what it was.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

That makes sense, then.

I appreciate

that, Wally.
So at that point you were prepared, ready to go to CUMIS
yourself?

Is that what you are saying?

A

Yes.

We figured, well, let's get it over with.

Q

Had the Caldwells reached the same point in their
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investigations, where they were ready to go with you to CUMIS?
A

Their attorney was a little slower, and they couldn't get

positive response so they could act at the same time we could,
Q

We will go into that with them.

Tell me, did you then

have a meeting with CUMIS or did you talk with them on the
phone?
A

What happened next?

We resumed our correspondence.

telephone.

A lot of it was on the

I went in to see Greg a few times and then some

other things started to happen in regards to the change in the
initial offer was —
Q

the initial offer was no longer extant.

At the time that —

things in my own mind.

let me see if I can clarify some
At the time you were given the initial

offer by CUMIS, had you already been paid by State Farm for
the $5,000?
A

We had been paid the no fault benefits for the

—

Q

Death benefits?

A

For the death, right.

Q

Carrying us through now to the time that you are going

back to CUMIS, ready to negotiate a settlement yourself with
them, are you telling me that their offer somehow changed?
A

That's right, in addition to —

they had made the initial

offer of $25,000 each, and after all of this had been done, in
the meantime State Farm came in and said. Through our right of
subrogation, we want $5,500 of that money.

They had

originally wanted all the death benefits too, apparently.
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That, I wasn't personally involved in.
insured by State Farm.
for.

That was Dean.

He was

The car they were killed in was paid

And they wanted that taken out of the proceeds of the

$25,000.

Initially, they wanted the death benefits that we

both received taken out of the total $50,000 that CUMIS had.
Q

How did you find out about that?

A

Through

the Caldwells and I worked closely together.

We each knew what the other was doing.
Q

Did you ever personally talk with anybody from State Farm

prior to that meeting with CUMIS, where they tell you that the
settlement has been changed?
A

I honestly do not recall.

Mr. Davis.

I remember meeting with

I may have talked to him one other time.

I was

keeping some notes on the chronological progression of this,
but I don't know if it is in those notes or not.

I could only

find a page or two of them.
Q

Did you bring your notes with you today?

A

Just one page of them.

Q

If you need to refer to your notes to help you with these

questions, I would appreciate it if you would do so.
MR. LAUCHNOR:

Do you understand what he is asking you?

He wants to know if before you went back to Greg Winget to
tell them you decided to go ahead and take the $25,000, had
State Farm, the adjuster or whoever at State Farm you were
dealing with, told you that they wanted out of that $25,000 to
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be repaid the damage on the car and your no fault benefits
that you had been paid?
THE WITNESS:

I think I got that indirectly through the

Caldwells, quite frankly.

Because Dean really went to bat

with him because he had paid premiums to them for 20 years or
more.

If I did make contact with them, I may have made

telephone contact, but I don't honestly recall at this point.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

You went into CUMIS.

What did they

tell you?
A

Then they told me that the amount was reduced to the

$5,500 less than the $50,000 that was going to be split.
Q

Is that the total $50,000 was reduced or was your $25,000

reduced?
A

Well, our $25,000 was reduced by $2,250.

Q

That was the offer they made to you?

A

Yeah.

we —

That was drawn up on the second release.

I think

I don't remember if we went out there or what.

Q

Was that Greg Winget that was carrying on this discussion?

A

Primarily, yeah.

Q

What happened then?

A

Well, that's when we started to demonstrate against that

and said. That isn't fair.
was a concerted effort.

We don't feel that's right.

We weren't alone in it.

It

The

Caldwells were with it.
Q

At this point you were not personally represented by a
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lawyer?
A

In between, we weren't, no.

Q

At the time you went out to meet with them, you were not

represented?
A

When they made the first offer, we were -- I don't think

we were represented.
Q

I am talking now about the time they said the offer was

reduced.
A
did.

I can't remember if we went out there again.
Yes, I know we did.

I think we

The Caldwell's and Janet and I went

out there again, trying to get it settled.

It was in the same

room, the same type of form, except the figures were changed
from $25,000 each.
Q

They were changed to $22,250 each.

There is the first time back before you ever filed a

lawsuit?
A

That's right.

Q

And this is the second time you are now talking about,

where they said you have got to take $22,500 or whatever it
was?
A

That's right.

$22,250.

Q

That was Greg Winget?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Did he tell you why you had to take that reduced amount?

A

Well, the reason was that State Farm had paid $5,500 out

for the car, the Prelude, that they were killed in, and they
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wanted it through their rights of subrogation*
combined limit.

It was a total

Technically, it was a problem as far as from

their point of view,
Q

Did he say anything else about it that you can now

remember?
A

Well, there was a lot of correspondence, primarily on the

telephone, between myself and Greg Winget.
Q

There was some written correspondence?

A

I think there was some.

Very little.

There was a lot of

verbal.
Q

Whatever is written, you have now misplaced someplace and

hope to be able to find it?
A

Yeah, I can find it.

I just wasn't able to find it.

didn't start looking early enough.

I

But the essence of it was

that once we were ready to drop the suit, had dropped the
suit, they would not pay us the money without deducting that
amount.
Q

If we were willing to sign then, they would pay it.

That was their firm offer, and they were not going to

deviate from that?

Is that what you understand?

A

That's right.

Q

Their position is, we have got to pay this to State Farm?

A

That's right.

Q

Can you tell me now what is the next thing that

happened —

here, what I am looking for, I want to try to get

this in chronological order —

did you then go to see an
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attorney again or did you then go to see State Farm?

Tell me

what happened next.
A

I don't recall that I personally went to State Farm,

because it would just have been redundant.
Caldwell was doing that.

Dean was —

Dean

I was aware of what he was doing.

Q

He was talking to them?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

What do you understand the substance of those

conversations to be?
A

Well, that he didn't feel it was fair, either.

As far as

I understand, if he hadn't have gone to them and raised Cain,
they would have deducted the amount of the death benefits from
this.

So he went down there, and spoke very strongly in our

behalf, with State Farm, and they said they would waive that,
quote unquote.

I don't know about the correctness of that.

But that's the term they put it in.
MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:

You mean the death benefits?
Yes.

They were going to initially take

that out of the proceeds.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

I will ask Mr. Caldwell more about

that.
A

I am just trying to give you what I did personally.

This

is all second.
Q

Were the two of you more or less working together at that

point in time, you and Mr. Caldwell?
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1

accident?

2

A

Sophomore.

3

Q

Just completed her sophomore year or just going into it?

4

A

Just completing it.

5

Q

She was at what high school?

6

A

Brighton.

7

Q

What kind of grades did she get in school?

8

A

She got B plus.

9

Isn't that correct?

10

MRS. HILL:

I would have to check Janet with that.

B average.

11

Q

(By Mr. Williams) Were you, as a father, satisfied with

12

her grades in terms of her potential?

13

A

14

little better grades.

15

socially oriented.

16

was more important to her to be active in all kinds of affairs

17

and not spend quite so much time studying.

18

nature.

19

Q

What were her best courses, as far as you know?

20

A

Well

Well, not entirely, because I knew she was capable of a

21

MR. WILLIAMS:

22

I would invite it.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

well in modeling.

25

something else?

But I also knew that she was highly

She was an approval-oriented child.

So it

That was her

Mother, if you can help on some of these,

She did pretty well in English.
She did well in PE.

She did

Didn't she have
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MRS. HILL:
Q

She liked literature

(By Mr. Williams)

Did she have some preferences for a

career that she discussed with you or your wife?
A

She was a cheerleader and she wanted to be in modeling.
MRS. HILL:

She also wanted to be a hairdresser.

THE WITNESS:

She was interested a little bit in

cosmetology.
MRS. HILL:

She was going to do both, modeling and

hairdressing.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Had she taken any courses toward a

cosmetology degree?
MRS. HILL:
Loujene.

She had -- what would be the word -- under

She could have gotten a scholarship because she

worked under a friend of mine that had a beauty shop in her
basement.
THE WITNESS:

She took that modeling course at school.

She did well in that.

She worked for Denver Manufacturing,

modeling this western wear.
MRS. HILL: So early in her life to have gotten
everything completed.

SY\e was starting but really hadn't had

a chance to finish anything.
Q

(3y Mr. Williams)

Did she have some part-time jobs?

A

She had just taken a job at Wolfe's, Jack Wolfe

Ranchwear, worked a couple of days.
MRS. HILL: That was in Fashion Place Mall.
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0

(By Mr. Williams)

Was that a job that she was to work

full time through the summer?
MRS. HILL:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. WILLIAMS:

That's a yes over there?

MRS. HILL: Yes.
MR. WILLIAMS:
depositions.
Q

This is probably better than taking two

But it is a little hard on Brad.

(By Mr. Williams)

Had she worked part time anywhere else

prior to that?
A

Only as a babysitter and that sort of thing that the kids

do.
Q

I assume at Jack Wolfe's she was just going to be a

salesclerk?
A

That's right.
MRS. HILL:

She sold more in those two days, though, than

some of their people had in two months.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

She was a goer.

Did she have some particular skills

that you want to tell me about that I haven't asked about
already, skills or
A

Well, Tammy's greatest assets were her ability to deal

with humanity.
Q

A

She had the gift of friends, I call it.

Did she have some particular talents that she had

developed?
into.

—

I understand this may be emotional for you to go

If you would like to take a break, we can.
She was —
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MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:

Do you want to take a five minute break?
No, let's get it done.

intelligent child.

She was very outgoing.

loving and very understanding.

She was a very
She was very

I had a better relationship

with her than I have ever had with any of my other children.
Excuse me.
MR. WILLIAMS:
questions.

Let me ask your wife a couple of

You are affected, too.

Can one of you tell me, did she play any musical
instruments?
MRS. HILL:

She played piano.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Had she reached the point of excellence in

that, or was she just sort of hit and miss with it?
MRS. HILL:

She took it for about two years.

What she

did learn in those two years, she did very well.
THE WITNESS:
thing.

Her forte was dancing and that sort of

She was a cheerleader.

She was the elite of Brighton

High School.

The president, the student body president was in

their group.

They were just really good, clean kids.

They

were leaders. They were just cream of the crop, you might
say.

She had that ability to mix with all of those kids.

They liked her.
MR. WILLIAMS:

You say she was a cheerleader.

Was that a

sophomore or freshman cheer leading group?
MRS. HILL:

Sophomore.
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MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS. HILL:

It wasn't the varsity cheer leading?

She would have been her junior year.

junior varsity.

She was

She was elected.

THE WITNESS:

But she never got to fulfill that.

MR, WILLIAMS:

What other clubs or activities at school

did she engage in?
MRS. HILL:

She was in DECCA Club.

MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS. HILL:

In fashion class.

gymnastics, too.
anyway.

Anything else?
I think she took

That helped her in her cheerleading,

She also took a dance class from a private

individual.
THE WITNESS:
MRS. HILL:

She also worked.

One thing she did is she cut a lot of —

had a lot of clientele in our neighborhood in school.
cut my hair and permed.
about three years.
MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS. HILL:

she

She

I didn't to go a beauty shop for

She cut his hair, too.
That was for a period of how long?

About two years, she did that.

charge a fee but people would give her money.
How much do you charge?

She couldn't

They would say.

She would say, I can't charge you,

but they would pay her.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Have you ever sat down and calculated the

amount of money she saved you, for example?
MRS. HILL:

On perms alone, probably $100 or more.
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MR. WILLIAMS:
MRS, HILL:

Did she cut the other children's hair?

She did all of our hair, everybody's hair.

Did she even do Troy's?
MR. WILLIAMS:

She did Troy's hair, too.

She cut Troy's hair, too?

MRS. HILL: Yes.

Like I say, she was talented.

sounds like she might have been a little frivolous.
talent in every area.

It
She had

If we talked about her four years

later, I an sure she would have definite -THE WITNESS: We talked to all of her teachers on the
parent-teacher conference.
MRS. HILL:

She had no enemies.

THE WITNESS:

She always participated in the discussions

and was constructive.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

Did she have any special awards that

she had received or achievements, school or otherwise?
A

We thought being selected to cheerleader was quite an

achievement twice in a row.
MRS. HILL:

And her modeling.

In junior high she was class representative

several times. They got awards for that.
THE WITNESS:
MRS. HILL:

She was very active in her church work.

She had started to inquire about Junior Miss.

She wanted to be in that pageant.

In fact, my doctor called

me and said, I know a lady that is in charge of this.
you ought to sign her up for that.
THE WITNESS:

I think

My doctor.

She had a lot of poise and confidence and

51

feminine grace.
Q
A

(By Mr. Williams)

Did she indicate any plans for college?

Yes.
MRS. HILL:

She wanted to go to Rick's College.

That's

where we are from.
THE WITNESS:

She was dyed-in-the-wool LDS.

active in the church.

She wanted to go to Rick's College.

She wanted to marry a returned missionary.
religious girl.
Q

She was

She was a very

She was very close to her Father in Heaven.

(By Mr. Williams)

I take it that other than the

babysitting jobs and the money she would get on the occasion
for cutting hair, her support was pretty much provided by you
as parents; is that correct?
A

Yeah.

always

She made most of her own spending money, but we

—

Q

Did she ever file any income tax returns?

A

We have got some W-2s from that job and that's about all,

two days worth.
Q

Did she ever pay any money to you as the parents, for any

reason?
A

No.

She wasn't obligated to.

She may have borrowed five

bucks from time to time and paid it back or something like
that.
Q

There was no payment for room and board and things like

that?
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A

None of that.

Q

She was never in trouble with the law, I take it?

A

Mo.
MR. WILLIAMS:

She was only 16.

Oh, no.

Did she have a driver's license at the

time?
MRS. HILL:

She had turned 16 in January and she had been

out there twice to take it.
pass.

That's the only test she couldn't

That's not unusual, though, for kids that age.

Our

oldest daughter went out there four times before she passed.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

I suppose other than clothes and

incidental things, she didn't have any assets or property of
note?
A

No.

Q

Did she have a checking account, savings account?

A

Savings account.

it.

She wasn't much for saving.

She may have had, what, $15 or $20 in
I am the one that got her to

open that account.
Q

Other than the services for hair, cutting hair and

permanents, just briefly tell me what other services or
activities she was involved in that supported the family.
A

Well, gee, she tended her younger brother and sisters.

They loved her.
MRS. HILL: She fixed dinner.
THE WITNESS:

She did the housework.

She helped her

mother around the home.
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MRS. HILL:

I worked for many years.

the responsibility.

She had to take on

At that time there was five of them.

the older girls had to —

So

they took turns babysitting for me

after school.
Q

(By Mr. Williams) How tall was she?

A

5'8".
MRS. HILL:

I don't think she was quite that.

THE WITNESS:

She was almost as tall as I was.

MR. WILLIAMS:

How much did she weigh at the time of her

death, do you know?
MRS. HILL:

115.

MR. WILLIAMS:

I have got a better picture here.

I would like to see a picture, if you have

one, when we take a break.
Q

(By Mr. Williams) How did she relate to the other

children?
A

Very well.

Q

Were there disputes more than the ordinary between her

and the other children?
MRS. HILL:

Heavens no.

THE WITNESS:

She was the peacemaker.

She was too kind-hearted.

Even when she

would get physically incapable of handling her older sister™
She couldn't fight.
Q

(By Mr. Williams) Let's just take the year prior to her

death, Mr. Hill.

How much time did you spend with her alone

on an average?
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A

That's a good question.

liked.
date.

Not as much as I would have

I usually waited up for her when she came home from a
She was a real good kid that way.

And sometimes we

would sit at the table and talk after dinner.
we spent some time together.
rapport.

And on Sundays

Like I say, we had a good

She had an understanding.

I have had a better

relationship with her than any of my other daughters.
an understanding that was beyond her years.

She had

She was my

confidant.
Q

You confided in her with some of your problems?

Is that

what you are saying?
A

Yes.

Q

That provided you some comfort, did it?

A

A lot of comfort.

Q

Would you say that you talked with her alone on a

personal basis more than once a month during the year prior to
her death?
A

Yeah.

I even made a rule that she wouldn't go out so

much.

Because she was going out a lot with her friends, in

cars.

I have a piece of paper that I had her sign under

objection that she would reduce her outings.

Because at that

age you want to be with your kids but you can't because
they are out, running around with their friends.
always a source of disappointment to me.
I —

she went out in the evenings.

That was

She was so busy that

Sometimes I would work
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1

evenings.

I just couldn't.

2

Q

3

died?

4

A

Male or female?

5

Q

Both.

6

A

Well, there was Debbie Karren and there was Debbie Miles.

Other than Troy, who were her closest friends before she

7

MRS. HILL:

8

THE WITNESS:

9

MRS. HILL:

13

MRS. HILL:

14

THE WITNESS:
one

Then that kid that went on a mission.

Lance Rawl.
He was a friend but not as far as the

—

16

MRS. HILL:

17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

THE WITNESS:

Whiting.

There was a whole group of kids that ran

around together.

20

Q

(By Mr. Williams)

21

A

None.

22

MRS. HILL:

23

THE WITNESS:

What was his first name?

That's good enough.

19

25

Trent Wolfert.

And Wendy Poulsen was close to her at that time.
THE WITNESS:

24

Was Trent one of her close

He was Debbie's boyfriend.

12

15

Karen Cutler.

friends?

10
11

Karen Cutler.

Did she have any health problems?

She had had braces.
That was not a health problem.

She was the

healthiest kid.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Mr. Hill, I appreciate that.

That's all
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I have.

Thank you.
EXAMINATION

BY MR, LAUCHNOR:
Q

Bob, after you hired Keith Nelson, as I understand it,

and correct me if I am misstating anything, Keith related to
you, that is Keith and his associate, that they had
thoroughly, in their mind, checked out the possibilities of
recovering anything against the bar or these older folks that
were the parents of this young boy, and decided that there
wasn't anything, any liability there that they could find to
get any further funds?
A

That's right.

That was the conclusion.

Q

As I understand it, when you went in to Keith, you had

already been offered the policy limits on the CUMIS policy,
and Keith took the case on the condition that if he could find
some additional funds he would take a contingent fee.

If he

couldn't, he would withdraw and return the case back to you to
settle?
A

That's right.

I forgot that, but that's exactly what it

was.
Q

I want to make sure I understand it, too.
MR, WILLIAMS:

Can I interrupt you a minute?

MR. LAUCHNOR:

Sure.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Do you have any problem with me going

through his file while you ask him questions?
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MR. LAUCHNOR:
Q

No.

(By Mr. Lauchnor)

Then from that point on, Bob, as I

understand it, you were told by Greg Winget and Mary Cornevaux
at CUMIS Mutual, when you went back to then to tell them that
you were ready to take the money, that they had had a demand
on the money by State Farm?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And the demand was for the collision to be taken out

first, the collision money?
A

Right.

Q

Paid on the car and the death benefits paid under the

PIP?

They wanted that out of there first?

A

(The witness nods head in the affirmative.)

Q

Could you answer out loud, please.

A

Yes.

Q

Then, as I understand it, so it is clear, the matter was

then taken up by Mr. Caldwell, going to State Farm, and, as
you understood it, after a discussion that he had with State
Farm, they agreed to not make a claim for their PIP or the
death benefits, they would waive that, but they insisted on
getting the money for the repairs of the car out of the
benefits that were on the insurance policy -A

That's right.

Q

—

of CUMIS?

Was it at that time that you went back to

CUMIS and, I understand it, they told you that they couldn't
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1

release all of the funds with the claim of State Farm on

2

unless they included them on a check as well, State Farm?

3

IA

4

Q

5

even division of the funds that were available under

6

policy to you and Mr* C a l d w e l l , with a separate check

7

to M r . Caldwell and State Farm, so that we could

8

words litigate, if necessary, whether or not State Farm

9

entitled to that money;

10

A

That's right,
You employed m e , and I negotiated

is that

that they release an
the
payable

in other
was

correct?

Yes.

11

M R . WILLIAMS:

12

these questions as being

13

there

M R . LAUCHNOR:

Can I have a standing objection to all of
leading?

Sure.

(By M r . Lauchnor)

You can as to the last o n e , anyhow.

14

Q

Approximately how long would you

15

it was from the time y o u went back to C U M I S to get a

16

settlement of the case, after talking to K e i t h N e l s o n , and

17

time y o u actually were able to get some funds with my help?

18

About how many months?

19

A

20

could remember exactly the date of that deposition that this

21

Brown took, that was the turning p o i n t .

22

got Keith to release as quickly as p o s s i b l e .

23

pursue that.

24

Q

25

the boy and the other people involved?

It was at least four and a half m o n t h s , I b e l i e v e .

say

the

If I

We got them to —

we

And I started

to

Did State Farm know that you had filed a lawsuit against
Did you tell them

that
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this was going on when you were talking to them?
MR. WILLIAMS:

I am not sure it is established that he

talked to State Farm.
Q

(By Mr. Lauchnor)

Did you ever talk to any adjusters at

State Farm?
A

I am not sure I did.

So he was
Q

Dean was always talking to them.

—

I am trying to find out, did you ever personally talk to

any of the State Farm adjusters about your case?
A

Only Mr. Davis at the outset.

Q

At that time had a suit been filed?

A

No.

Q

Your only recollection is that you didn't talk to State

Farm after that?
A

Yeah.

It was Mr. Caldwell that did?

I didn't need to.

MR. LAUCHNOR:

That's all I have.
FURTHER EXAMINATION

BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Q

Just a couple of things, quickly.

I noted that you

brought with you a file that contains some information.

Can

you describe for me just generally what this file was for?
A

It was just going through, looking for anything this

morning that pertained to this.
thought might be helpful.

I just picked up what I

It contained the officer's report,

and the letter of Keith Nelson taking the case, and it had
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some notes that I had taken, and it had a remittal slip from
State Farm when they paid the death benefits, or $5,000 of
them.

Just things that pertained to the whole process from

the time Tammy was killed.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Would you have any objection if we copied

the contents of this file, attach them?
MR. LAUCHNOR:
motion to produce.
is in it.

Yes, I would.

If you want to make a

I haven't even seen it.

Maybe I won't, after I see it.

I don't know what
I don't know if

there is anything in there confidential from Keith.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I may not file a motion.

MR. LAUCHNOR:

I don't know.

Rather than just say so, I

would have an objection, at least until I have looked at it.
Q

(By Mr. Williams)

There is one letter that I just —

one

set of notes that I would like to ask you about that is dated
July 7 of 1982. It has a list of about 12 names with
telephone numbers.
A

That's when the actual court case against Paul Bryan was

to take place, and everybody —

from the Caldwells we found

out that everybody that had been in attendance at those court
sessions were in favor of Paul Bryan, and there was no one
there in support of our side.

And so I didn't feel like going

to the thing because I didn't want to see this Bryan.
MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:

Is this the criminal case?
Yes.

So we called several people and asked
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them if they would attend, friends and neighbors.
what I did.

So that's

And those several of them did agree to attend.

Some weren't able to.
MR. WILLIAMS:

I just took notes of what happened.

That's all I have.
FURTHER EXAMINATION

BY MR. LAUCHNOR:
Q

Just one other question, Mr. Hill.

Did you ever talk

to Greg Winget at CUMIS Mutual when you went back to accept
the funds as to why he couldn't give you all of the money?
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE WITNESS:

It has been asked and answered.
Yes.

We went over that several times.

Q

(By Mr. Lauchnor)

Have we already covered that today?

A

That was the basis of most of our conversations, was I

don't think it is right, plus the fact that he wasn't about to
pay any money.
Q

Did he say why he was withholding the money?

A

Well, yeah, because State Farm was contesting it.

His

hands were tied, I guess.
MR. LAUCHNOR:

That's all I have.
FURTHER EXAMINATION

BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Q

Let me follow up with just one additional question.

Did

he indicate to you one way or another whether he agreed with
State Farm's position?
A

He may not have made a statement in so many words but
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he -- by all of his actions and indirectly, he did, because
the ultimate -- the outcome was he didn't change his
position.

There was one occasion where we —

you know, it was

pretty serious, as far as I am concerned, because there was
some reasons given that I didn't even think were valid.
Q

Tell me about those.

A

Well, he lied to me on one occasion.
MR. LAUCHNOR:

Who is this?

THE WITNESS:

Greg.

MR. LAUCHNOR:

What did he say?

THE WITNESS:

I can't remember but it had something to do

with his home office.

They kept telling us that the checks

were going to be done and then they never were.
it was.

He kept telling me —

That's what

I think we got to a point where

they were going to make the checks or they were going to
agree.

And then they changed their position and went the

other direction.
yeah.

And it was all home office.

That was —

And that

I think that was after the fact.

—

Because

it took a long time after we got these final depositions to
get the check.

Didn't we?

MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:
MR. LAUCHNOR:
THE WITNESS:
MR. LAUCHNOR:

I don't recall any depositions.
Excuse me.

These statements.

Releases?
These releases.
It was after the releases.
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THE WITNESS:

It turned out to be a very poor

relationship,
MR. WILLIAMS:

Thanks.

(Whereupon, at 12:33 p.si. this deposition was concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony
consisting of 62 pages, numbered from 3 to 64, inclusive,
and the same is a true and correct transcription of said
testimony except as I have corrected it in ink, giving my
reasons therefor and affixed my initials thereto.

ROBERT KENT HILL
•

*

*

Subscribed and sworn to at
day of

, this
, 1984.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of ROBERT KENT
HILL, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was
taken before me, BRAD J. YOUNG, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah.
That the said witness was by me, before examination duly
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth in said cause.
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in
Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into
typewriting, and that a full, true and correct transcription
of said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the
foregoing pages numbered from 3 to 64 inclusive, and said
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed
deposition.
I further certify that after the said deposition was
transcribed, the original of same was held at the offices of
Associated Professional Reporters, 420 Kearns Building, Salt
Lake City, for the witness to read, signed before a Notary
Public, and to be returned to me for filing with the Clerk of
the said Court.
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I further certify that I am not of k m or otherwise
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action,
and that I am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal of Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 'pOij] day of

My commission expires:
December 8, 1986

-4uu,

, 1984.

n

<m^u Uiu^
BRAD J. YOUNGV
/.

RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to the u nder- |
signed at this time of the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED !
FORTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($22,245.00), the receipt of which |
is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, being of lawful a
individually, as parents, natural guardians, and represent atives j
of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, and for and on behalf of the i
heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, do hereby release, acqui t, .
and forever discharge KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, FARRELL L. BRYAN, ILENE I
M. BRYAN, NORMAN L. BROWN, dba THE SPOT II, their agents,
servants, employees, and insurers, of and from any and all actions
causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of
»
services, loss of society, comfort, and companionship, exp
I
loss of income or other compensation, on account of or in enses, !
growing out of all known and unknown injuries and/or damag any way
resulting or to result from that particular automobile ace es,
that occurred on or about the 6th day of June, 1982, at or ident
the intersection of 5900 South Street and 7th East Street near
Lake County, State of Utah, wherein a vehicle operated by in Salt
Paul Bryan collided with a vehicle in which Tamara Elaine Kenneth i
was riding, resulting in her death.
Hill
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARE AND REPRESENT that in
making this release and agreement, it is understood and agreed
that the undersigned rely wholly upon their own judgment, belief,;
and knowledge of the nature and extent of said damages, and that j
the undersigned have not been influenced to any extent whatsoever!
in making this release by any representations or statements
regarding the accident, or regarding any other matters, made by
the persons, firms, or corporations who are hereby released, or
by any person or persons representing them.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that
the payment made pursuant to this release is not to be construed
as an admission of liability on the part of the parties released
hereunder, by whom liability is expressly denied.
THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTAND AND AGREE that the accident
resulting in the death of Tamara Elaine Hill, described in this
release of all claims, may have caused damages, the existence of
which and the consequences of which are now unknown but which

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

#1
wit

jmay become known in the future. The undersigned nevertheless
[intend to and do release, for and on their own behalf, on behalf
jbf the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, and on behalf of all the
jheirs of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, all claims for all
injuries and damages to the undersigned, the estate and/or the
heirs of the estate of Tamara Elaine Hill, whether now known or
'unknown and whether now in existence or hereafter to arise.
I!
;'
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the above amount of TWENTY TWO
'THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($22,245.00)
[represents TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($25,000.00)
(policy limits less the collision claim of FIVE THOUSAND FIVE
jHUNDRED TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS by State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company, wherein a controversy exists as to who is entitled to thu
said amount, and that the matter will be resolved between the two
jor by payment into court or by judicial determination.
i!

||
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that should the
jundersigned commence legal action against any third party, not
'released under this release, for the injuries and damages
[resulting from the accident and subsequent death of Tamara Elaine
Hill as described in this release, that such third party will be
'entitled to a setoff for the amounts paid under this release or
[the percentage of responsibility that might be attributable to
»the parties released herein, if any, whichever is greater, and
ithis release is intended to comply with the provisions of Section
1^8-27-42 and Section 78-27-43 of Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
i
(•
THIS RELEASE, contains the entire agreement between the
:
parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual
:and not a mere recital.
j
THE UNDERSIGNED FURTHER STATE that they have carefully
read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and
jthe undersigned sign the same as their own free act.
I

DATED this

(:
H
jj
;i
;
.i

day of March, 1933.

ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually and
as Father, Natural Guardian, and
Representative of the Estate and
Heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill

:»
i*
;

I

.

.

I)
\\

i!
is

-v.

JANET WEBER HILL, Individually and
as Mother, Natural Guardian, and
Representative of the Estate and
Heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill
Witness

!,
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S's't*

Glenn C. Hanni, A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

i
)
I
,I
])

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO PLAINTIFF HILL AND
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO PLAINTIFF CALDWELL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

]
Civil No. C83-8099

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

1

Judge Young

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT
STATE FARM CLAIMS NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS
1.

Plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell (hereinafter

"Caldwell") at all times relevant to this action, was the owner of
an automobile insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (hereinafter "State Farm") which was involved in a
collision on June 6, 1982, while Caldwell's son, Troy, was driving
the automobile, and Robert Kent Hill's (hereinafter "Hill")
daughter, Tamara, was riding as a passenger in Caldwell's
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automobile.

The automobile accident was with a vehicle driven by

Kenneth Paul Bryan (hereinafter "Bryan"), and the collision
resulted in the deaths of Caldwell's son and Hill's daughter, both
minors at the time.
2.

[See Plaintiffs' Complaint, paras. 1, 3-6.]

Hill had no ownership interest in the automobile

driven by Troy Caldwell at the time of the accident.

[Plaintiffs'

Complaint, paras. 1, 9.]
3.

As a result of the accident, Caldwell's automobile

was damaged, and State Farm paid Caldwell $5,510 under the terms
of the insurance policy for collision damage to the automobile.
[Caldwell Depo., p. 11.]
4.

Caldwell received no-fault benefit payments from

State Farm of $6,539.00, and Hill received no-fault benefit payments from State Farm in the amount of $6,120.00.

[See Affidavit

of Grant Cutler attached to State Farm's Memorandum in Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment dated 9-12-84, unsigned copy attached
hereto as Exhibit B.]
5.

The policy of insurance between State Farm and

Caldwell included a condition regarding subrogation which states,
in pertinent part:
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy,
. . . the company shall be subrogated to all
the insured's rights of recovery therefor and
the insured shall do whatever is necessary tosecure such rights and do nothing to prejudice
them. [Certificate of Certified Policy and

j\
/
W
j
I
/

copy of policy attached hereto as Exhibit A.] [1
6.

Section III of the insurance policy, entitled

"Physical Damage Coverages Insuring Agreements," provides for
326
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collision coverage under Coverage G, which states:
To pay for loss to the owned motor vehicle
caused by collision but only for the amount
of each such loss in excess of the deductible
amount stated in the declarations as applicable
hereto. If the deductible amount is $100 or
less it shall not apply if the collision is
with another motor vehicle insured with this
company.
7.

The definitions contained in Section III of the pol-

icy include the following:
Collision--means collision of a motor vehicle
covered by this policy with another object or
with a vehicle to which it is attached or upset
of such motor vehicle.
* * * *

Loss--wherever used with respect to coverages
D, F, G, R and Rl, means each direct and accidental loss of or damage to
(1)

an owned motor vehicle, or

(2)

its equipment.

Under coverages D, F, and G, loss includes
direct and accidental damage to wearing apparel
and luggage.
Owner Motor Vehicle—Means the motor vehicle or
trailer described in the declarations, and
includes a temporary substitute automobile and
a newly-acquired automobile. [See Exhibit A
attached hereto.]
The owned,motor vehicle applicable to the policy of
insurance at issue in this case was a 1979 Honda two-door vehicle.
That is the vehicle which was owned by Caldwell.

[See Declaration

Sheet of Exhibit A, attached hereto.]
8.

S26

Cumis Insurance Society Inc. (hereinafter

,t

Cumis,,)
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was the insurer for Bryan.

It had a $50,000 single limit

liability policy and offered to pay its $50,000 limit to Caldwell
and Hill ($25,000 each) in exchange for a complete and full
release of all claims of Caldwell and Hill.

This offer was made

the first time Cumis1 representative talked to Caldwell and Hill,
but Caldwell and Hill wanted to obtain legal advice and
investigate other possible defendants and sources of recovery
before signing any papers and did not accept the offer.

[Caldwell

Depo., pp. 14-15, 21-22; HillDepo., pp. 16-17, 24-25, 27-28.]
9.

After Hill's and Caldwellfs respective lawyers had

completed their investigation of the matter and determined that
pursuing a lawsuit would not be productive, Caldwell and Hill went
back to Cumis expressing a desire to settle for the original offer
of $25,000 each.

Cumis had since been put on notice by State Farm

of its subrogation claim for the $5,510 in property damage, and
Cumis would not release the full $50,000 to Caldwell and Hill
without also paying State Farm its $5,510.

[Caldwell Depo., pp.

22-23; Hill Depo., pp. 34-36.]
10.

Ultimately, Caldwell and Hill and their wives signed

separate releases in favor of Bryan, Cumis and others.

[Hill

Depo., pp. 41-43, 45; Exhibit 1; Caldwell Depo., pp. 25-26, 31;
Exhibit 1.]

The release signed by Caldwell and his wife recited

consideration of $27,755 and specifically stated that $5,510 of
that recited consideration "represents damage to the undersigned's
automobile and that such amount will be made payable by separate
S26
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check to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D.
Caldwell, wherein a controversy exists between State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company and Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to
the said amount, and that the matter will be resolved between the
two or by payment into court or by judicial determination."
[Caldwell Depo., Exhibit 1.]
11.

Caldwell and Hill demanded that State Farm waive its

subrogation claim for the $5,510 in property damage to Caldwell's
automobile.

Litigation ensued in which plaintiffs Hill and

Caldwell brought suit against State Farm to recover the $5,510 and
further seeking punitive damages for State Farm's alleged bad
faith obstruction of plaintiffs' settlement. Plaintiffs'
complaint does not allege any independent tort cause of action
against Sate Farm.
12.

[See generally Plaintiffs' Complaint.]

State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in

this litigation as to all the claims of Hill and Caldwell on or
about September 12, 1984. Judgment granting State Farm's motion
for summary judgment was entered on October 22, 1984, from which
plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's

granting of summary judgment and remanded the case to the district
court.

S26
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT HILL HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST STATE FARM BECAUSE HILL WAS NOT AN
INSURED AND THERE WAS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
BETWEEN HILL AND STATE FARM WITH RESPECT TO
THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO CALDWELL'S VEHICLE.
State Farm's right of subrogation under the terms of its
policy with Caldwell grants to State Farm the right to "be
subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery" with respect
to any payment made by State Farm under the policy.

The $5,510

payment at issue in this case was made by State Farm to Caldwell
for the damage done to Caldwell's vehicle. Hill was not an owner
of that vehicle.

Hill had no claim for property damage to the

vehicle against the tortfeasor Bryan.
Therefore, as to the payment made by State Farm under the
collision coverage provision of the policy, it was subrogated only
to the rights of Caldwell, the owner of the vehicle.
This fact was recognized by Cumis and Caldwell in the
release Caldwell signed where it was specifically stated that a
separate draft was being made payable to State Farm and Caldwell
for the $5,510 representing property damage.
83 C.J.S. Subrogation §1 defines subrogation "as the
substitution of another person in the place of a creditor, so that
the person in whose favor it is exercised succeeds to the rights
of the creditor in relation to the debt."
State Farm was substituting itself only in the place of
S26
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Caldwell with respect to the $5,510 because Caldwell was the only
one who had received that payment from State Farm.
Therefore, insofar as the right of subrogation under the
insurance policy is concerned, it only applied to the payment made
by State Farm to Caldwell, and had no application whatsoever to
Hill.

Hill was not an insured under the policy for purposes of

the right of subrogation asserted by State Farm because State Farm
had not paid Hill anything for which State Farm was asserting a
right of subrogation.
Since the Supreme Court's decision reversing State Farm's
summary judgment, State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to
^Caldwell Q Thus, the only remaining claims at this point are for
bad faith and punitive damages.
Plaintiffs' claims of bad faith arise in the context of
a first-part^ insurance claim, i.e., the payment by State Farm of
Caldwell's collision claim.

Caldwell does not assert any bad

faith conduct on the part of State Farm with respect to
investigation of the property damage claim and payment thereof.
Instead, Caldwell and Hill claim State Farm acted in bad faith by
refusing to waive its subrogation claim and thereby obstructed
Caldwell's and Hill's settlement with Cumis. Nonetheless, this
claim of bad faith still arises out of the payment of a firstparty insurance claim even though the actions that are alleged to
constitute bad faith occurred after payment of the claim.
A similar situation arose in Arnica Ins. Co. v. Schebtler,
S26
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768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), which involved a claim of bad faith
against the insurer for conduct which occurred after the insurer
had paid the first-party claim.

The Court of Appeals analyzed

this case within the framework of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the seminal Utah case which held there
was a contractual implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in
first-party insurance claims. Beck refused to recognize any tort
cause of action for bad faith in first-party insurance claims.
In Schettler, Arnica fully paid Schettler's first-party
claim, but Schettler alleged that Arnica acted in bad faith by its
conduct subsequent to the time the first-party claim was paid.
The Court of Appeals considered the allegation to be a first-party
bad faith contract claim just the same as Beck.
Thus, Schettler held that conduct by an insurer after
payment of a first-party claim which is alleged to constitute bad
faith is still subject to the principle set forth in Beck that
such a claim is a contractual claim only and not a tort claim.
In addition to asserting a claim against Arnica, Schettler
also asserted a bad faith claim against defendants NATB and Black
& Guiver.
defendants.

The trial court granted summary judgment as to those
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and stated:
We find the claim against NATB and Black &
Guiver without merit. There are no facts to
establish (1) that a contractual relationship
ever existed between Schettler and NATB or
between Schettler and Black & Guiver, or
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(2) that the third-party defendants owed
Schettler an independent duty outside a
contractual relationship. • . .
* * * *

In order to maintain an action under a
contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the
parties must be in privity of contract at
the time of the alleged wrong. Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d
576, 577 (1967). . . . [768 P.2d at 957-958.]
Therefore, Schettler further holds that a party may not
bring a bad faith claim unless that party stands in privity of
contract to the insurer against whom the claim is being brought.
Hill was not in privity of contract with State Farm as an insured
with respect to the subrogation rights of State Farm under its
policy with Caldwell. As a result, Hill cannot have a bad faith
claim against State Farm for failure to waive its subrogation
claim.
With respect to the privity of contract requirement, the
Court of Appeals in Schettler cited the case of Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., supra.

In Ammerman, the insured, and Eddie

Soliz, a judgment creditor and party injured by the negligence of
Ammerman, joined together to sue Farmers Insurance, Ammermanfs
insurer.

The predicate for their suit against Farmers was that

Farmers had refused to settle Soliz' claims for $9,000 prior to
trial.

As a result of a trial between Soliz and Ammerman, Soliz

obtained a judgment against Ammerman for $15,282. This judgment
was affirmed on appeal. Farmers then paid $10,000, its policy
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limit.

Thereafter, Soliz sued Farmers to recover the $5,280

balance of his judgment against Ammerman based on Farmers' alleged
bad faith in refusing to settle prior to trial.
The Utah Supreme Court found that Soliz had not been
damaged by Farmers' action in that Farmers' refusal to settle for
$9,000 actually resulted in Soliz recovering a judgment for
$10,000 from Farmers and having a judgment for $5,180 against
Ammerman.

Additionally, and of vital importance to the instant

case, the Utah Supreme Court held that Soliz had no standing to
bring suit against Ammermanfs insurer:
In assessing the claimed right of Soliz to take
this cause of action for himself, the first
problem presented is that at the time of the
alleged wrong by the defendant company, it had
no privity of contract with Soliz and therefore
owed him no duty, so there could be no breach
thereof. . . . [430 P.2d at 577]
Although Ammerman involved a third-party claim of bad
faith, the principle enunciated with respect to the need for
privity of contract is valid even in the instant case where we are
dealing with a first-party claim.

The Utah Supreme Court again

cited with approval the privity concept from Ammerman in the more
recent case of Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Police, Inc., 680 P.2d
740 (Utah 1984).

If there is no privity of contract, there is no

duty owed by State Farm to Hill, and there can be no claim for
first-party bad faith by Hill against State Farm.
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POINT II,
NEITHER HILL NOR CALDWELL ARE ENTITLED TO
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS
AGAINST STATE FARM ARE CONTRACT CLAIMS, AND
THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT TORTIOUS CONDUCT.
As indicated in Point I, above, the claims of bad faith
asserted by plaintiffs in this case against State Farm arise out
of State Farm's assertion of its subrogation right under its
contract of insurance subsequent to payment of a first-party claim
for property damage.

Thus, plaintiffs' claims of bad faith are

for bad faith in the first-party insurance context, as enunciated
in Beck, supra.
contract.

Punitive damages are not awardable for breach of

There must be some independent tortious conduct aside

from the contract breach.

In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica,

Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We prefer the standard articulated by the
Kansas Supreme Court . . . which states that
breach of contract, standing alone, does not
call for punitive damages even if
intentional and unjustified, but such
damages are allowable if there is some
independent tort indicating malice, fraud or
wanton disregard for the rights of others.
7~r~T [657 P.2d at 750]
~^
In Beck, supra, the Supreme Court clearly stated that bad
faith in a first-party insurance claim case is a breach of a
contractual duty only, and does not give rise to a tort cause of
action.

The court further stated there is no fiduciary

relationship between the insurer and the insured in a first-party
insurance claim context.

S26
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first-party bad faith claim can recover "both general damages,
I.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract
was made."

[701 P. 2d at 801]

Punitive damages are not general

damages or consequential damages.
In a concurring opinion in the case of Gagon v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 92 U.A.R. 21 (Sept. 28, 1988), Justice
Zimmerman agreed with the Supreme Court's refusal to grant a
petition for certiorari, but Zimmerman made very clear that bad
faith in a first-party context does not give rise to a claim for
punitive damages.

He stated:

Specifically, the trial judge may feel
compelled to permit the jury to award
punitive damages if Gagon shows nothing more
than a breach of the Beck covenant of good
faith. To do so would be error under Beck.
In Beck, we were very careful to make it
plain that a claim for an insurer's breach .
of its implied covenant to act in good faith
toward its insured did not, alone, give
rise to a cause of action in tort; rather,
the cause of action is one in contract.
While consequential damages for breach of
the covenant would be available, tort
damages, including punitive damages, would
not. To recover punitive damages, a
plaintiff would have to show all of the
elements of a separate tort. . . .
Accordingly, under Beck, a plaintiff is not
entitled to put on evidence of punitive
damages unless he or she can make out a
sufficient case to go to the jury on an
independent tort theory.
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There being no claim for any independent tortious conduct
against State Farm in the instant case, there is no basis for
punitive damages to be awarded, as a matter of law, for either
Hill or Caldwell.
SUMMARY
State Farm owed no duty to Hill with respect to the
subrogation provision in the insurance policy because Hill was not
an insured for purposes of that provision and had no privity of
contract with State Farm.

State Farm was stepping into the shoes

of Caldwell only when it asserted its subrogation right.

There

being no duty owed to Hill, all his claims for bad faith and
punitive damages should be dismissed.
There is no basis for a punitive damage award in favor of
Hill or Caldwell because their claims arise out of contract and
not tort.
State Farm respectfully requests the court to grant
summary judgment in its entirety as to all claims of Hill and to
grant summary judgment as yp the punitive damage claim of Caldwell.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

^

day of May, 1989,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
was

hand-delivered to:

Wallace R. Lauchnor
PAULSON, LAUCHNOR & DAVIS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CSB Tower, Suite 500
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

3- vAsX$K
Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED POLICY
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian
of the records pertaining to the issuance of policies by
the Utah Division for State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company of Bloornington, Illinois.

I further certify that the attached Policy #4653-327-D10-44A
is a copy of the policy issued to Lorin Dean and LaRue Caldwell
of 7311 Chris Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121, together with
any endorsements issued subsequently, based on our available
records- This policy was in full force and effect on the

r
accident date of June 6, 1982,

M

\

Operations Superintendent

STATE OF COLORADO
COUNTY OF WELD
Subscribed and sworn to before me this twenty second day of
February, 1989.

Vicki K. HughesJ
Notary Public
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: August 21, 1991
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DECLARATIONS
1. POLICY P E R I O D : The policy period shall be as shown
under "Policy Period" and for such succeeding periods of
six months each thereafter as the required renewal premium
is paid by the named insured on or before the expiration of
the current policy period. The "Policy Period" shall begin
and end at 12:01 A.M.. standard time at the address of the
named insured as stated herein. The premium shown is for
the policy period and coverages indicated in the
declarations.
2. G A R A G E D : The owned motor vehicle will be principally
garaged in the declared town and ttste.
3. INSURANCE A N D LICENSE HISTORY: Unless stated
In the exceptions (a) no insurer has canceled vehicle
Insurance Issued to the named insured or any member of his
or her household within the past three years, and (b) no
license to drive or registration has been suspended, revoked
or refused for the named insured or any member of his or
her household within the past three years.
4. OWNER: The named insured is the sole owner of the
described motor vehicle except as stated in the exceptions.

5. L I E N H O L D E R : If a mortgage owner, condition/-"
vendor, or assignee is named in the exceptions, lots, if an
under coverages O. F and G shall be payable to the nameu
insured and to such additional interest as such interest may
appear, and this insurance as to such additional interest
shall not be invalidated by any act or negligence of the
mortgagor or owner, nor by any change in the title or
ownership, nor by any error or inadvertence in the
description of the motor vehicle until alter notice ol
termination of the policy shall be given to such mortgage
owner, conditional vendor, mortgagee or assignee stating
when not less than 10 days thereafter such termination
shall be effective; provided, the lienholder shall notify the
company within 10 days of any change of interest or
ownership which shall come to the knowledge of said
lienholder and failure to do so will render this policy null
and void.
Whenever the company shall pay the lienholder any sum for
lost under this policy and shall claim that, as to the named
Insured, no liability therefor existed, the company shall, to
the extent of such payment, be thereupon legally
subrogated to all the rights of the party to whom such
payment shall be made, under all securities held as
collateral to the debt. The company may. at its option, pay
off the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof
and of the mortgage or other lien and all such other
securities; but no subrogation shall impair the right of tl
lienholder to recover the full amount of its claim.
6. PURPOSE OF USE: The purposes for which the owned
motor vthlcl* it to be used are "pleasure and business"
unless otherwise stated in the exceptions, la) The term
"pleasure and business'* Is defined as personal, pleasure,
family and business use. (b) The term "commercial" or
"commercial-farm" It defined as use principally in the
business occupation of the named insured as stated in the
exceptions. Including'occasional use for personal, pleasure,
family and other business purposes.
7. U N D E R COVERAGE S each
named insured's household.

: > *

insured resides in the

•-

iTATI FAKM

State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
REGIONAL OFFICE

'0«M
04I7&S

Mountain States Off Greeley Co 80631
INSUIANCI

•UMEDIMWRU

THIS PAGE, ANY ENDORSEMENTS INDICATED
HEREON ANO FORM
9844
7
CONSTITUTE TMf POUCY
'
IDENTIFIED I Y T N I POUCY NUMBER.

Caldwell, Lorin
Dean & La Rue
7311 Chris Ln
Salt Lake City
Ut 84121

£©PY

WUCY W I U I U

UNITS Of LUSIUTY

4653-327-D10-44A

(TMOUfAMOf O O i U U I t l

•oofiv
I ACM
ACQOfMf

KXJCY fCJdOO (yOKTM-OAT-YIAJU

Apr 02,79 to Oct 10,79

25

50

fACM
FtMfOM

I ACM
ACCIOCMT

25

15

2

30

?K3d

Usffie

ntoiiUM rot POUCT rcnoo SHOWN
$117.24

OBCRUED mvaxruixi-nutoor mu-wwia /1 toiaua « KFIKO IN NUCT

fc

U

!AO«
ACClOtMT

6 6

* sat,j?- 3a §"gt88 & a M
^OVERAGES:
COVERAGES:
COVERAGES:
aOPTIONS ANO OtOOR$£J4£Xn

6256G. 6382L - Amend. End. Financed - Utah Power and
Light Cr Und, 41 N Redwood Kd, Salt Lake City Ut 84116.

Current
Semi Annual
Premium
($112.80

t£J

fCJUQKS INSUIEO C0VCRA6C J

2oiS? 4653327-44

-,/SL

<3fy>

A6ENT

Attach t h i s page to 9844,

000022*

1178

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILc INSURANCE COMPANY
BLOOMiNGrON LLINOIS
A Mutual insurance Company, Hereto Called the Company
Agrees with the insured, named »n the declarations made \ Dart hereof, m consideration of the payment of the premium
and »n reliance uoon the statements in the declarations and jubject to all of the terms of this policy
(NOTE. The words in bold face italic type *r defined under Definitions within each Section.)

SECTION

i-UABfUTY COVERAGES

INSURING AGREEMENTS
COVERAGE A - 8 0 0 I L Y INJURY LIABILITY

(a) COVERAGES
AUTOMOBILE

A

AND

8

TO

A

NON-OWNED

COVERAGE B-PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
I I ) WHILE MAINTAINED OR USED 8Y A N Y PERSON
* .WHILE -SUCH
PERSON
IS
EMPLOYED
OR
OTHERWISE
ENGAGED IN AN
AUTOMOBILE
BUSINESS OF THE INSURED OR OF ANY OTHER
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION. OR

To pay on behalf of the insured ail sums which the injured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persont;~ahd
(81 property damage,
caused by accident arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use, including loading or unloading, of (he
owned motor vehicle; and to defend, with attorneys
selected by and compensated by the company, any sun
against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property
damage and seeking damages which are payable hereunder
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless,
false or fraudulent; and the company may make such
investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or
suit, as it deems, expedient. The company shall not be
obligated to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted bv payment of
judgments or settlements.

(21 WHILE USED IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION, except a private passenger automobile
operated or occupied by the first person named in the
declarations, his or her spouse or any re/af/Vcof either;
lb) COVERAGES A , ANO 8 WHILE THE
OWNED
MOTOR
VEHICLE- IS RENTED OR LEASED T O
OTHERS BY THE INSURED, USED AS A PUBLIC OR
LIVERY CONVEYANCE. OR USED FOR C A R R Y I N G
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE, but the transportation on a
share expense basis in a private passenger automobile of
friends, neighbors, fellow employees or school children
shall not be deemed carrying persons for a charge;
1

USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES
If the named insured is a person or persons and i f during
the policy period such named insured owns a motor vehicle
covered by this policy and classified as "pleasure and
business'*, such insurance as is afforded bv this policy with
respect to the owned motor vehicle under coverages A and
8 applies to the use of a norhowned automobile by an
insured, PROVIDED SUCH USE. OPERATION OR
OCCUPANCY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE
OWNER OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
SUCH AUTOMOBILE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
SUCH PERMISSION,
As respects the "use of non-owned automobiles" under
coverages A and B. the definition of insured in Section I is
changed to read:

(c) COVERAGES A AND B WHILE THE
OWNED
'; 'MOTOR VEHICLE IS USED FOR THE TOWING OF ANY
;
TRAILER
(OTHER THAN A TRAILER AS
DEFINED
HEREIN) OWNEO OR HIRED BY THE INSURED A N D
: NOT COVERED BY LIKE INSURANCE
IN' THE
i COMPANY; OR WHILE ANY TRAILER COVERED BY
, THIS POLICY IS USED WITH ANY MOTOR VEHICLE
; OWNED OR HIRED BY THE INSURED
AND NOT
• -COVERED BY LIKE INSURANC£~IN THE COMPANY;
"'(d) COVERAGES A AND B.
I D TO LIA8ILITY ASSUMED BY THE
INSURED
UNOER ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT; OR
(2! TO ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE U N I T E D
STATES MAY BE HELD LIABLE UNOER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT;
(e) COVERAGES A AND 8. TO THE OWNED MOTOR
VEHICLE WHILE USED BY ANY PERSON WHILE SUCH
PERSON IS EMPLOYED OR OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN
AN AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS OF TH&tNSURED
OR OF
ANY OTHER PERSON OR O R G A N I Z A T I O N , but this
exclusion does not apply to the named insured and spouse
and this insurance applies only as excess insurance over any
'other insurance., to a resident of the same household as the
named insured, to a partnership in which said resident or
the named insured is a partner, or to any partner, agent or
employee of the named insured, such resident or

Insured means:
(a) the \\t%\ person named in the declarations, or
{b) that person's spouse or the relatives of either, and
(cJ any person or organization not owning or hiring such
automobile, but only with respect to his or her or its
liability for the use of such automobile by an insured in
(a) and (b) above.
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION I
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNOER:

partnership.

3..
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(f) COVERAGE A. TO ANY EMPLOYEE WlThLRESPECT
TO BODILY INJURY OF ANOTHER EMPLOYEE OF
THE SAME EMPLOYER INJUREO IN THE COURSE OF
SUCH
EMPLOYMENT
ARISING
OUT
OF THE
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN
THE BUSINESS OF SUCH EMPLOYER, but this exclusion
does not aoplv to the named insured or spouse with respect
to an injury sustained by any such fellow employee;
(g) COVERAGE A,
0 ) TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY EMPLOYEE OF
THE INSURED ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF
•
,
(i) DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED,
IF.BENEFITS THEREFOR ARE IN WHOLE OR IN
PART EITHER PAYABLE OR REQUIRED TO BE
PROVIDED
UNDER / A N Y
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW. OR
,
(ii) OTHER EMPLOYMENT BY THE INSURED; OK
(2) TO ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE
INSUREO OR HIS £)R HER INSURER MAY 8E HELD
L I A B L E ' . UNDER
ANY
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION.
UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS LAW.
OR UNDER ANY SIMILAR LAW;
(hi COVERAGE A. TO BODILY INJURY
TO ANY
INSURED OR ANY MEM8ER OF THE FAMILY OF AN
INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS
THE INSURED;
(i).COVERAGE B. TO INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION
OP PROPERTY OWNED OR TRANSPORTED BY AN
INSURED,
OR PROPERTY RENTED TO OR IN
CHARGE OF AN INSURED other than a residence or
private garage injured or destroyed by a private passenger
automobile covered by-this policy.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY

enti.« amount thereof until the company has paid or
tendered or deposited in court such part of such
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's
' liability thereon;
(b) premiums on bonds to release attachments not tn
excess of the applicable limit of liability, premiums on
required appeal bonds, and the cost of bail bonds
required of the insured because of accident or traffic law
violation, not to exceed $250 per bail. bond, but without
• any obligation to apply for or furnish any such bonds;
(c) expense incurred by the insured for first aid to others
at the time of an accident involving a motor vehicle
insured hereunder;
(d) reasonable expense incurred by the insured at the
company's request, including loss of wages or salary not
to exceed .$25 per day. if such loss is incurred because of
the insured's attendance at trial of any civil lawsuit in
defense against allegation of bodily injury;
PROVIOED THAT THIS INSURANCE DOES N O T
APPLY TO EXPENSE UNDER PARAGRAPH (c) OUE TO
WAR.
DEFINITIONS-SECTION I
Automobile—means a four wheel land motor vehicle
designed for use principally upon public roeds, but
"automobile" shall not include a midget automobile, nor
any vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises.
Automobile Business—means the business'or occupation of
selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, transporting, storing or
parking of land motor vehicles or trailers.
Bodily Injury-means bodily injury, sickness or disease
including death at any time resulting therefrom.
Damages—wherever used with respect to coverage A
includes damages for care and loss of services.
Insured- the unqualified word "insured" includes
{1) the named insured, and

Coverage A. The limit of liability stated in the declarations
as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's
liability for all damages arising out of bodily injury
sustained by on* person in any one accident, and subject to
this provision, the limit of liability stated in the
declarations as applicable to "each accident" isMne total
limit of the company's liability for all such damages for
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one
accident.

(2) if the named insured is a person or persons, also
includes the soouse(s), and
(3) any relatives of the first person named in the
declarations, or of his or her spouse, and
(4) any other person while using the owned motor ~
vehicle, PROVIOED THE OPERATION A N D THE
ACTUAL USE OF SUCH VEHICLE ARE WITH THE
PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR SUCH
SPOUSE AND ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH
PERMISSION, and

Coverage B. The limit of liability stated in the declarations
as applicable to "each accident" is the limit of the
'company's liability for all damages to all property of one or
more persons or organizations in any one accidenL

(5) under coverages A and B any other person or
organization, but only with respect to such person's or
organization's liability for the use of such owned motor
vehicle by an insured as defined in the four subsections
above.

Under coverage? A and 8. the inclusion herein of more than
one insured shall'not increase the limits of liability.
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS
As respects the insurance afforded under coverages A and B
and in addition to the aoplicable limits of liability to pay:
(a) costs taxed against the insured in any such suit and.
after entry of judgment, all interest accruing on the

M

Midget Automobile—means a land motor vehicle of the
type commonly referred to as "midget automobile".
"kart", "go-kart'\ "speedmobile" or by a comparable
name, whether commercially built or otherwise.
Newly Acquired Automobile—means an
automobile,
ownership of which is acquired by the named insured or
spouse, if

84

00002:,'!

heii

coverec
this policy, or the company insures ail
automobiles owned by the named insured and such
spouse on the date of its deliver y,-,and
. ,.

Resident or Reside—when used with reference to the named
insured's household, menns bodily presence in such
household and an intention to continue to dwell therein.
However,
the
named
insured's
unmarried • and
unemancipated children, while away from his or her
household attending school, are deemed to be residents of
such household.

(2) PROVIDED T H A T NO INSURANCE SHALL 8E
APPLICABLE
TO
SUCH
NEWLY
ACQUIRED
AUTOMOBILE
UNLESS
AS
A
CONQITION
PRECEDENT THE NAMED INSURED W I T H I N . 30
OAYS .FOLLOWING
SUCH
OELtVfcRY
DATE
APPLIES TO THE COMPANY FOR INSURANCE ON
SUCH NEWLY ACQUIRED
AUTOMOBILE.,
If more than one policy issued by the'company could be
applied to such automobile the named insured shall elect
which policy shall apply. The named insured shall pay any
additional premium required because of the application of
the insurance to such newly acquired automobile.
Non-Owned Automobile—means an) automobile,trailer or
detachable Jivjog. quarters unit, other than a temporary
substitute automobile, not
.. (1) owned by,
,
*
*";
• • : -y\
(2) registered in the name of, or
•• t>- J (3) furnished or available for the frequent or-regular use
of
the named insured, spouse or any relative,
•j

Occupying—means in or upon or entering into or alighting
from.
••'
Owned Motor Vehicle-^ means *the motor vehicle or trailer
described in the declarations, and includes a temporary
substitute automobile,' a newly acquired automobile, and.
provided the described motor vehicle is not classified as
"commercial", under coverages A and B,'a trailer (as
defined herein) or a detachable living quarters unit owned
by the named insured or spouse.
Person—means a natural person and not a corporation,
partnership, association or business name.
.\" .''
Private Passenger Automobile—means an automobile of the
private
passenger
type
designed solely for
the
transportation of persons and their personal luggage, and
w
Includes station wagons. .
. v . . * . . t, .
Property Damage—means injury to or destruction
property of others, including loss of use-thereof,' • '.*

of
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spo\.
;y blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of
the same household. • • ' " . . '
. *•
•i

Spouse—means a named insured's husband or wife, if a
resident of the same household.
State—includes the District of Columbia, a territory of
possession of the United States and a province or territory
•ofCanada.
># - .;••
^Temporary Substitute Automobile—means an automobile
not owned by the named insured or spouse while
J temporarily used with the permission- of the owner as a
{substitute for the described motor vehicle when withdrawn
from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing,
loss or destruction.
x
Trailer—means a trailer or semitrailer not so described if
[designed for use with a private passenger automobile and if
(•not
( D a passenger trailer,

.,

(2) a trailer used for business purposes with other than a
private p3ssenger automobile, of
i

1

(3) a trailer used as premises for office, store or display
purposes. , / * . . . . ' " •

:
Utility Automobile—means an automobile of the pick-up,
^ panel or van body type with a load capacity of 2,000
> pounds or less.
?

War—means war, whether
i insurrection, rebellion or
].condition incident thereto.

or not declared, civil war,
revolution, or any act or

SECTION II-PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
. . .

INSURING AGREEMENTS
j(c} funeral benefits, and

COVERAGE P-PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
INSURING AGREEMENT

~

1(d) survivor benefits
I

* ":

To pay, in accordance with the Utah Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act, and all Acts amendatory or supplemental
thereto, to each eligible injured person personal injury
protection benefits consisting of:
(a) medical benefits,
(b) disability benefits,

(with respect to bodily Injury, caused by accident and
'arising out of the use of a\ motorvehicle as* a motor vehicle
•provided that the amount of benefits due under thl5
^coverage shall be determined by agreement between the
[eligible injured person, or the legal representative of such
person, and the company, or if they fall to'agree, by
•arbitration.
**
* v.

5
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THIS
INSTANCE
COVERAGES:

DOES

NOT

APPLY

UNDEP

(a) TO BOOILY / W W ? V SUSTAINED BY A N Y PERSON
WHILE OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK
BY A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMEP
INSURED OR A RELATIVE
WHICH IS NOT AN
INSURED MOTOR VEHICLE: •
(b) TO BOOILY INJURY SUSTAINED 8Y ANY*PERSON
WHILE OPERATING THE INSURED MOTOR
VEHICLE
WITHOUT THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT 0 ^
T H E NAMED INSURED OR SPOUSE OR WHILE SUCH
PERSON IS NOT IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF SUCH
INSURED MOTOR VEHICLE;
(c) TO A N Y INJURED PERSON IF SUCH PERSON'S
CONOUCT CONTRIBUTED TO HIS OR HER INJURY
UNDER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING C I R C U M S T A N C E ^
(1) CAUSING BODILY INJURY
HERSELF INTENTIONALLY.OR

TO HIMSELF OR

(2) WHILE COMMITTING A FELONY;

'tnerei ben 9t its, I he amount snown under
coverage designation in the schedule; and

(d) for survivor benefits, the amount shown under the
applicable coverage designation in the schedule;

provided that any amount payable under paragraphs (a),
lb), (c) and id) above shall be reduced by any benefits
which such injured person is entitled to receive under any
workmen's compensation law or any similar statutory plnn,
and any amounts which such person is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because of
military enlistment, duty or service.

DEFINITIONS-SECTION I! ..
The definitions of Bodily Injury, Damages, Newly Acquired
Automobile, Occupying, Person, RelatNe, Resident or
Reside end Spouse under Section I apply to Section II and
under Section I I :
Disability Benefits—means

(d) TO BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANY PERSON
OTHER THAN THE NAMED INSURED OR A N ^
RELATIVE,
WHILE NOT OCCUPYING A N Y MOTOP
VEHICLE, IF THE ACCIDENT OCCURS OUTSIDE T H E
STATE OF UTAH.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of persons injured, policies
applicable, vehicles involved, or claims made, there shall b e
no duplication of personal injury protection benefits, and
the aggregate maximum amount pavable under this and a"
applicable policies with respect to bodily Injury sustained
by any one eliqibt€ injured person as a result of any ore
accident shall not exceed:
(a) for medial benefits, the amount shown under the
applicable coverage designation in the schedule for each
person who sustains bodily injury in any one accident;
\b) 1or disability benefits,
(i) 85% of any loss of income or the amount shown
under the applicable coverage designation in the schedule
per week, whichever is less, for not to exceed the numtotfi* f
of weeks shown under the applicable coverage #
designation in the schedule, after the date of suc^ 'accident, provided that if the disability resulting in such
loss of income includes only a part of a week, the
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion tff
such weekly limit than the number of days lost from
work during the part week bears to the number of days
In his or her full work week, and
(II) for reimbursement for household services, the
•mount shown under the applicable coverage designation
In the schedule per day for not to exceed the number <?f
days shown under the applicable coverage designation in
the schedule;

ii l t ;

'

(i) reimbursement for 85% of any loss of gross income
and loss of earning capacity per person from continuous
inability to work during a period commencing three clays
after the date of the injury and ending on the date such
injured person is able to return to his or her usual
occupation or dies, subject to a limit per injured person
of not to exceed $150 per week for a period of 52
weeks. If such disability continues for in excess of two
consecutive weeks after the date of injury, such three
day waiting period shall not apply; and
(ii) In lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would
have been reasonably incurred for services which, but for
trie injury, the injured person would have performed tor
his or her. household and regardless of.whether any of
such expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12
per day commencing three days after the date of such
Injury-and ending on the date such person is able to
perform such services, or dies, but in no event in excess
of 365 days after the date of such accident If such
disability continues for in excess,of .14 consecutive days
after the date of injury, such three day waiting period
shall not apply.
Eligible Injured Person —means **
• (a) the named insured, spouse, or any relative of either if
such person sustains bodily injury
-,
-•
(1) while occupying a motor vehicle, or
(2) while a pedestrian, as a result of physical contact
with a motor vehicle or motorcycle; or
lb) any other person who sustains bodily injury
0 ) while occupying, with the permission of the named
insured, the insured motor vehicle, or
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(2J wi
J pedmtrlen, as a result of an accident
Involving..the insured motor vehicle.
Funeral Benefits—means reimbursement for funeral, burial,
or cremation expenses.
I n c o m e —means salary,
wages, tips, commissions,
professional fees and profits from an individually owned
business or farm.
Insured Motor Vehicle—means the motor vehicle described
in the declarations or a newly acquired automobile of
which the named insured is the owner and with respect to
which
(a) the bodily injury liability coverage of the policy
applies, and

urslr\
vices and expenses for any non-medlcarremedlal
re and treatment rendered tn accordance with a
ecognlzed religious method of healing,
lotor Vehicle—means any vehicle of a kind required to be
Jstered with the Department of Motor Vehicles-under
itie 41 of the Utah Code, except motorcycles. A motor
hide does not include any vehicle owned by the. United
tates or any state other than Utah, or any political
bdlvlsion of either or any of their agencies on which the
W u r l t y required by Section 5 o^-the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act is not maintained.
pwner—means a perron who holds the legal title to a motor
vehicle or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of.a
lecurlty agreement or lease with option to purchase, with
the debtor or lessee having the right to possession, then
such debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner.

(b)M»verage is required to be maintained under the Utah
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.•

Pedestrian—means a person who is not occupying or riding
Upon a motor vehicle, excluding, however, any. person
occupying or riding upon a motorcycle.

Medical Benefits—means reimbursement for the reasonable
value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray,
dental, and rehabilitation services, including eyeglasses,
hearing aids, prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital and

Survivor Benefits-means compensation on account ot the
fteath of a person who qualified for medics/ benefits or
disability benefits, payable to his or her heirs.

i

SCHEDULE
The applicable set of limits per eligible injuted person i$ indlcalmi

Coverage designation
(a) medical benefits
(b) disability benefits
(?) loss of income per week
number of weeks
Ul\ household semoa, <ate $ex dap<
number of days
(c) funeral benefits
(d) survivor benefits

b

Y

thc

coverage designation shown in the decJarations

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

$2000

,55000

$10,000

$25,000

$100.0CO

$150
52
*\1.
•365
$1000
$2000

$150
52
$12
365
$1000
$2000

$150
52
$12
365
$1000
$5000

$150
52
%\2
365
$1000
S5000

$150
-52
St2
365
$1000
$10,000

SECTION ill - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES
INSURING AGREEMENTS
COVERAGE D-COMPREHENSIVE
(11 The Owned Motor Vehicle. To pay for loss to the
owned motor vehicle EXCEPT LOSS CAUSED BY
COLLISION but only for the amount of each such loss in
excess of the deductible amount, if any, stated in the
declarations as applicable thereto. The deductible amount
shall not apply to loss caused by a fire or by a theft of the
entire vehicle. Breakage of glass, or loss caused by missiles,
falling objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake,
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or
vandalism, riot or civil commotion or colliding with birds or
animals shall not be deemed to be loss caused by collision.

(2) Wearing Apparel and Luggage. To pay for loss caused by
fire, lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion, earthquake,
or theft PROVJDED-THE ENTIRE VEHICLE IS STOLEN,
to wearing aoparel and luggage owned by the first penon
named in the declarations, his or her spouse and any
nlative of either, while such property is in or upon the
owned motor vehicle.
D) Additional Benefits. In addition to the limit of liability,
(a) the company, following a theft of the entire vehicle,
• also will reimburse the named insured for transportation
expenses, not exceeding $10 per day, incurred during the
period starting 48 hours after the report of theft to the

7 ,
5 4 4 0 '*
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compar
wd ending when the company offers
settlemt. . »or the theft, and
(b) the company will pay general average and salvage
charges for which the insured becomes legally liable;
because of the owned motor vehicle being transported.

('
the vehicle is operable, the date and time such
in*-.dd authorizes repairs to be made and delivers such
vehicle to the garage for repairs;
and ending t regardless of the policy period.
(i) upon the date of the completion of repairs or
replacement of the property lost or damaged, or
(ii) upon such earlier date as the company makes or
tenders settlement for such foss or damage, or
liii) at 12:01 A.M. on the thirtieth day after the date of
the commencement of such period.

COVERAGE F-E1GHTY PER CENT COLLISION
To pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that amount
of tots to the owned motor vehicfe caused by coffision. If
the coffision is with another motor vehicle insured with this
company 100% of the loss shall be payable.
COVERAGE G-DEDUCTJ8LE COLLISION
To pay for loss to the owned motor vehicle caused by-*
coffision but only for the amount of each such loss inexcess of the deductible amount stated in the declarations
as applicable hereto. If the deductible amount is $100 or*
less it shall not apply if the collision ijwith another motor
vehicle insured with this company.
Collision-Wearing Apparel and Luggage
If coverage F or G is provided by this policy, the company
also agrees to pay for loss caused by collision to wearing
apparel and luggage owned by the first person named in the
declarations, his or her spouse and any relative of either
while such property is in or upon the owned motor vehic/e,
but only for the amount of each such loss in excess of the
- deductible amount stated in the declarations. In the event
of foss to the owned motor vehicfe and such property in the
same accident, the deductible amount shall first be applied
to the owned motor vehicfe, but only one deductible
amount shall be applied.
COVERAGE H-EMEHGENCY ROAD SERVICE
To pay the reasonable expense incurred in connection with
the owned motor vehicfe because of:

COVERAGE R 1 - A U T 0 M O B I L E RENTAL
T R A V E L EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT

In the event of a foss to the owned motor vehicfe, the
company will reimburse the named insured:
A. Expense for Rental of a Substitute Automobile
For the expense of the rental of a substitute automobile
from a car rental agency or garage, not to exceed $14 per
day, incurred during a period starting with
(1) the date and time of such loss if as a direct result of
such loss such vehicle cannot be operated under its own
power, or
(2) if the vehicle is operable, the date and time such
insured authorizes repairs to be made and delivers such
vehicle to the garage for repairs.
and ending, regardless of the policy period.
(i) upon the date of the completion of repairs or
replacement of the property, or
(ii) upon such earlier date as the comoany makes or
tenders settlement for such loss or damage.
B. Comprehensive or Collision Deductible
For
any
deductible
amount
applicable
to
the
comprehensive and collision coverages In effect on a
substitute automobile rented from a car rental agency or
garage, if the insured is legally liable for such deductible
amount.

(1) deliver/ of gasoline, oil. loaned battery, or change of
tire. BUT NOT THE COST OF SUCH ITEMS;
(2) mechanical first 3»d not to exceed one hour at the
place of disablement;
(3) towing to the nearest garage or service station where
the necessary repairs can be made if the vehicle will not
operate under its own power.
C O V E R A G E R - M 0 T 0 R VEHICLE RENTAL
REIMBURSEMENT
In the event of a foss to the owned motor vehicfe, the
company will reimburse the named insured for the expense
incurred by such insured for the rental of a substitute
automobile from a car rental agency or garage, incurred
during a period starting with

CTravel Expense
if the loss to the owned motor vehicfe occurs more than 50
miles away from the named insured's residence, for
(1) commercial transportation, expense incurred by
(i) the named insured,
(ii) the spouse, and
(iii) any refstive,

(1) the date and time of such foss if as a direct result of
such foss such vehicle cannot be operated under its own
power, or

M

AND.

who was occupying such vehicle at the time of such foss,
irom the site of such foss to the named insured's
residence or to the named insured's destination (at the
option of the named insured).
(2) necessary extra expense incurred for meals and
lodging by the named insured, spouse, and relatives
during a period commencing on the date of such loss and

*^o
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endin
» the date of arrival at the named Insured'*
reside.
or destination or 'at trie end of the fifth c^Y
following the date of such loss, whichever occurs first.
•

• •«•' •

sh
•xpense basis In t prlvete passenger eutornobile of
' friei«js, neighbors, 'fellow employees or school children
shall not be deemed carrying persons for a charge;
-

(1)
TO LOSS
DUE T O T A K I N G
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY;
(2)
TO
LOSS
CONTAMINATION;

If the named insured is a person or persons and if during
the policy period such named insured owns an autornobile
covered by this policy and classified as "pleasure a n d
business" such insurance as is afforded by this policy with
respect to the*owned motor vehicle under coverages 0 , F,
GA H, R and R1 applies to Iou to enon-owmd automobile
provided •
• v
.
(a) such vehicle is a pnvMt§
psssenger or utility
automobile, a trailer as defined herein or. a detachaP'e
living quarters unit and
-•••"*.•.•
-...:;
(b) such vehicle Is being operated by or is In the
possession or custody of the- first person named in the
• declaration*, his or her spouse or'any relative of either;
PROVIDED SUCH 'OPERATION; • OCCUPANCY 0 R
CUSTODY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE 0WN£R
OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION QF SUCH
VEHICLE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH
PERMISSION. AND THAT- SUCH
FIR£"T<NAM£D
INSURED, SPOUSE OR RELATIVE
IS LEGALUY
LIABLE TO THE OWNER THEREOF FOR T H E LOSS TO
SUCH VEHICLE.
.
;
,-:•:
\ : -•:

. " :'

R f „ TO

TO

ANY
>.

RADIOACTIVE
.

(41 TO LOSS DUE TO WAR;
(dJCOVERAGESD, F , G , R AND R 1 :
*.

""'•

(1) TO ANY"LOSS
TO THE OWNED
MOTOR'
VEHICLE
OR- TO A NON-OWNED
AUTOMOBILE
WHICH IS DUE AND CONFINED TO WEAR A N D
T E A R , FREEZING, MECHANICAL O R ' E L E C T R I C A L
BREAKDOWN OR FAILURE, unless such loss is the
direct result of a theft, covered by this policy, of the
entire motor vehicle;
(2) T O ' T I R E S unless stolen',"damaged by fire, malicious
• mischief or vandalism, or unless such loss be coincident
with other loss covered by this policy;

•(e) COVERAGES D / R AND R1 TO "LOSS .DUE TO
CONVERSION, EMBEZZLEMENT'OR'SECRETION BY
ANY PERSON IN POSSESSION OF T H E OWNED
MOTOR
VEHICLE
UNDER A* BAILMENT LEASE,
CONDITIONAL
SALE, PURCHASE
AGREEMENT,
MORTGAGE OR OTHER ENCUMBRANCE;
' .
(f) COVERAGES R AND Rl TO THE EXTENT T H A T
ANY
REIMBURSEMENT FOR
TRANSPORTATION
EXPENSE IS- PAID OR PAYABLE TO T H E N A M E D
INSURED AS A RESULT OF THE THEFT OF A MOTOR
VEHICLE INSURED BY THE COMPANY.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY

THIS INSURANCE OOES NOT APPLY UNDER:
(a) COVERAGES 0 . F . - G , ' H. R AND
NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE
'

DUE

BY

"(3) WHILE ' THE OWNED, MOTOR . VEHICLE
IS
SUBJECT
TO
ANY
BAILMENT
LEASE,
CONDITIONAL SALE.'PURCHASE A G R E E M E N T ,
MORTGAGE OR OTHER ENCUMBRANCE, N O T
DECLARED IN THIS POLICY; . '
••

USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES

EXCLUSIONS-SECTION III

" '^!

(c) COVERAGES D, F , G . H , R A N D R 1 :

• (3) necessary extra expense "for meals, lodging. a n d
• commercial transportation incurred by • the named
insured or some other perron designated by the named
insured for the purpose of returning the repaired o w r i ^
motor vehicle from where it was repaired to the named
\nsurecY3Twidence or owt'maVion. .

A

(1) WHILE MAINTAINED OR USED BY ANY PERSON
WHILE
SUCH
PERSON
IS
EMPLOYED
OR
OTHERWISE
ENGAGED IN AN
AUTOMOBILE
• BUSINESS OF THE INSURED OR OF ANY' 0 T H 6 R
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION, OR
(2) WHILE 'USED, IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION, except a private passenger automobile
, operated or occupied by the Unt person named in the
declarations, his or her spouse or any relative of either;
(b) COVERAGES D. F, G, H, R AND R1 WHILE THE
OWNED MOTOR VEHICLE IS RENTED OR LEASED TO
OTHERS BY T H E INSURED. USED AS A'.PUBLIC OR
LIVERY CONVEYANCE, O H . USED FOR CARRYING
PERSONS FOR A CHARGE, but the transportation on a

(1) Coverage* D, F and G. The limit of the company's
liability for loss shall not exceed the actual cash value of
the property, or if the loss is of a part thereof the actual
cash value of such part, at time of loss, nor what it would
then cost to repair, or replace such property with other of
like kind and quality, less depreciation^*"d -deductible
amount applicable. The limit of liability, for loss to all
wearing apoarel and luggage, of one or mote persons shall
not exceed $200 for each occurrence.

The limit of liability on a non-owned trailer or a non-owned
detachable living quarters, unit shall not exceed $500.

The company may at its option pay for the loss in money
or may repair or replace the property or such part thereof
as aforesaid, or may. return any stolen propeny with
payment for any resultant damage thereto at any time
before the loss is paid or the property is so replaced, or may
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ta*e an or SUCH ' < L». inc prupci i, ul »uc tig; ecu >uiuc uui
there shall be
abandonment to the company. The •
company may a\ .*$ option settle any claim for loss either
with the named insured or the owner of the properry.

incidenta
the use and operation oJ.,the motor venicle as
a vehicle, ..iduding a tape recorder or stereo tape player
permanently installed by the manufacturer of the
automobile and one tape. Equipment does not include a
detachable living quarters unit, even though attached, if the
acquisition of such unit has not been previously reported to
the company and any required premium thereon paid.

(2) Coverage R. In no event shall the company be liable for
more than $10 per day.
."» "
(3) Coverage R 1 . The limit of the company's liability for
reimbursement for all items of expense incurred by all
persons under this coverage shall not exceed ihe total sum
of $400 for any one occurrence.
.
,.

Loss—wherever used with respect to coverages D, F, G, R
end R 1 , means each direct and accidental loss of or damage
to
.
.
.
.
.
(1) an owned motor vehicle, or
(2) its equipment.
Under coverages 0 , F and G, loss also includes direct and
accidental damage to wearing apparel and luggage.

D E F I N I T I O N S - S E C T I O N III
The definitions under Section I, except the definitions of
Bodily Injury, Damages. Insured and Owned Motor Vehicle
apply to Section III and under Section Ml:
Collision—means collision of-a motor vehide covered by
this policy with another object or with a vehicle to which it
Is attached or upset of such motor vehicle. . •:.)'•

Owned Motor Vehicle—means the motor vehicle or trailer
described in the declarations, and includes a temporary
substitute automobile and a newly acquired automobile.

SECTION IV-UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE
,., . INSURING AGREEMENTS
COVERAGE U-DAMAGES
FOR BODILY
CAUSED BY UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLES

INJURY.
J .' •*-

(b) TO BODILY INJURY TO AH INSURED WHTLE
OCCUPYING OR THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY A
LAND MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY THE NAMED
INSURED OB ANY RESIDENT
O F , T H E SAME
HOUSEHOLO, IF SUCH VEHICLE IS NOT A N OWNED
MOTOR VEHICLE; - , . . > . - . .. •• v ,_

To pay all "• sums which the Insured or the legal
representative of such insured shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner" or operator of art
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained
by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor
vehicle provided, for the purposes of this coverage,
determination as to whether the Insured or such
representative is legally entitled to recover such damages,and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement
between the insured or such representative and the
company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to
be legally responsible for- the bodHy injury shall be
conclusive, as between the insured and the company, of the
issues of liability of such parson-or organization or of the
amount of damages to which the Insured^ legally entitled'
unless' such judgment is entered pursuant to an action
prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the
company.
''
•-• .
*
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION IV
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY:
(a) TO BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED, W I T H .
RESPECT TO WHICH SUCH INSURED. THE LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF SUCH INSURED OR ANY
PERSON
ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER THIS
COVERAGE SHALL. WITHOUT WRITTEN CONSENT
OF THE COMPANY. MAKE ANY SETTLEMENT WITH
A N Y PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO M A Y BE
LEGALLY LIABLE THEREFOR;

(c) SO AS TO INURE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO
THE BENEFIT OF
v?.;.\
(1)
ANY
WORKMEN'S' COMPENSATIONDISABILITY BENEFITS CARRIER, OR

OR

(2) ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION Q U A L I F Y I N G
AS A SELF-INSURER U N D E R ' A N Y WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BENEFITS LAW
OR ANY SIMILAR LAW, OR. ^
(31 THE UNITED STATES. OR ANY
' POLITICAL SUBDIVISIOWTHEREOF.

STATE

OR

LIMITS OF LIABILITY •* " * \
(a) The limit", of liability stated in the declarations as
applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's
liability for alldamages, including damages for care and loss
of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one
person in any one accident, and subject to this provision,
the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable
to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's
liability for ail such damages for bodily injury sustained by
two or more persons in any one accident.
lb) Any/amount payable under this coverage because of
bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an
insured under this coverage shall be reduced by:

10
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~\ 1/ ui. ju« •
J on w<;cou"i o; JJC.'J bodily injury by or, ,
on behalf ot
-.
< * ,*
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured motor .
:
vehicle and
'(ii) any other person or organization jointly or
severally liable together with such owner or oocrator
for such bodily injury including all sums paid under
coverage A;

j(2) a.
ther person while occupying an insured motor
vehicle; and
rt3) any person, with respect to damages such person Is
[entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this
.coverage applies sustained by uninsured under (1) or (2)
above.
••
Injured Motor Vehide^means:
i l l ) an owned motor vehicle provided the use thereof is
[by such first named insured or spouse or any other
person to whom such first named insured or spouse has
given permission to use such vehicle if the use is within
Jthe scope of such permission, or

(2). the amount paid and the present value of alt amounts
payable on account of such bodily injury under any
workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law or.
any similar law;
(3) all sums paid or payable on account of such bodily
injury under coverage P of a policy issued by this
company.

12) an automobile not owned by the named insured or
V i y resident of the same household, other than a
'temporary substitute automobile, while being operated
^by such first named insured or spouse,

(c) Any payment made hereunder to or for any insured
shall be applied in reduction of the amount of damages
which he or she may be entitled to recover from any person
who Is an insured under coverage A.

Ptrt the term insured motor~vehide shall not include any
motor vehicle while being used as a public or livery
conveyance, or any motor vehicle while being used without
the permission of the owner.

(d) The inclusion in this policy of more than one motor
vehicle does not increase the limit of liability.
D E F I N I T I O N S - S E C T I O N IV

Uninsured Motor Vehicle— means:
JU) a land motor vehicle with respect to the ownership,
maintenance or use of which there is in at least the
^mounts specified by the financial responsibility law of
'the state in which the described motor vehicle is
^principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident
Wvith respect to any person or organization legally
Yesponsible for the use of such vehicle, or with respect to
'-which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance
policy applicable at the time of the accident but the
company writing the same denies that there is any
coverage thereunder or is or becomes insolvent; or

The definitions of Automobile, Bodily injury. Newly
Acquired Automobile, Occupying, Owned Motor Vehicle,
Person, Relative, Resident. - Spouse and Temporary
Substitute Automobile under Section I apply to Section IV
and under Section IV:
Hit-and-Bun Motor Vehicle—means a land motor vehicle
which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of
physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a
vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of tha
accident, provided:
(1) there cannot be ascertained the Identity of either the
operator or owner of such hit-and-run motor vehicle;
O .
(2) the insured or someone on the insured's behalf shall
have reported the accident within 24 hours to a police or
judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Artotor
•Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within
3 0 days thereafter a statement under oath that the
insured or the insured's legal representative has a cause or
causes of action arising out of such accident for damages
against a person or persons whose identity is
unascertainable. and setting forth the facts in support
thereof; and

(2) a hit-and-run motor vehicle as defined;
i

but the term uninsured motor vehicle shall not include:
(i) a vehicle defined herein as an insured motor vehicle;

(3) at the company's request, the insured or the insured's
legal representative makes available for inspection the
vehicle which the insured was occupying at the time of
• th« accident.
v

lit) a land motor vehicle furnished for the regular use of
\he named insured or' any resident of the same
household;
(Hi) a land motor vehicle which is owned or operated by
a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle
financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any
similar law;
(tv) a land motor vehicle which is owned by the United
States of America. Canada, a state, a political subdivision
of any such government or an agency of any of the
forsgoing;
(v) a land motor vehicle designed for use principally off
public roads except while being used on public roads;

Insured—The unqualified word "insured" means
(1J the first person named in the declarations, his or her
spouse and any re/stive of either;

11
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# (vi)

a land motor. vehicle while .located for use as
'premises.
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SECTION V - A U 7 G M 0 3 1 L E UEAi n iNU

Ml i i,

Ui^VitiviDCHivihNI

AND LOSS OrtSJGHT Cw * ERAGE
INSURING AGREEMENTS
EXCLUSIONS-SECTION

COVERAGE,
S-DEATH
INOEMNITY,
DISMEMBERMENT AND LOSS OF SIGHT

V

THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY T O :

Diviilon 1— Death Indemnity. To pay the amount stated is
applicable to the insured designated for such coverage In
the declarations In event of the death of each insured which
shall result directly and independently of all other causes
from bodily injury caused by accident and sustained by the
/mured while occupying or through being struck b y ^
automobile, provided the death shall occur within 90 days
from the date of such accident.
Division 2—Dismemberment and Loss of Sight. To pay the
highest amount slated as applicable in the Schedule, for lots
as enumerated therein. In the event of bodily injury caused
by accident and sustained by the insured while occupying
or through being struck, by an automobile, provided toss be
sustained by the insured within 90 days from the date of
such acefdent.

(a) BODILY INJURY SUSTAINED IN T H E COURSE OF
HIS OR HER OCCUPATION BY ANY PERSON W H I L E
ENGAGED
(11 IN DUTIES INCIDENT TO THE O P E R A T I O N .
LOADING OR UNLOAOING O F . OR AS AN
ASSISTANT
ON,
A
PUBLIC
OR
LIVERY
CONVEYANCE.
COMMERCIAL
AUTOMOBILE,
AMBULANCE, FIRE TRUCK. POLICE CAR CR
.'OTHER EMERGENCY VEHICLE. OR
(2) IN DUTIES INCIDENT TO T H E
SERVICING OF AUTOMOBILES;

REPAIR

OR

(bl BODILY INJURY OR TO LOSS CAUSED BY OR
RESULTING FROM DISEASE' except pus forming
infection which shall occur through bodily injury to which
this insurance applies;
-.-.
• •• . .

As respect! any insured,
(1) any amount for which the company is obligated or
has made payment under division 2 shall apply fn
reduction of any amount for which the company h
• obligated under division 1;
] (2) payment bf "the amount" stated In the declarations
•shall terminate all obligation of the company under
divisions 1 and 2 of this coverage.

ic) BODILY INJURY DUE TO SUICIDE. SANE OR
INSANE. OR.TO ANY ATTEMPT T H E R E A T ;
Id) BODILY INJURr®U€
(e) BODILY

INJURY

TO WAR;

SUSTAINED WHILE

OCCUPYING

(1) ANY VEHICLE BEING USED FOR RACING OR
Limit of Liability—Division 2. The company's" limit of
liability shall not exceed the applicable amount as stated in
the Schedule for each insured who sustains bodily injury \n
any one accident.

. (2) A N Y MILITARY VEHICLE.

DEFINITIONS-SECTION V

Schedule ._-_«««-«_-»»»,

For Loss of

Hands; feet; sight of eyes; one
hand and one foot; or one
hand or one foot and sight
of one eye
One hand or one foot; or sight
of one eye
Thumb and index finger on
one hand; or three fingers on
one hand
Any two fingers on one hand

1 f Amount under S ;
In Declarations is
$5,000

$10,000

$5,000

$10,000

2.500

5.000

1.500

3.000

1.000

2.000

The- definitions of' Bodily tnfuryl Occupying. Private
Passenger Automobile, Utility Automobile and War under
Section I apply to Section V and under Section V :

Automobile—means a land motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer not operated on rails or crawler-treads, but does
nor mean:
( D a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for
use principally off public roads, except while actually
upon public roads, or
(2) a land motor vehicle or trailer while located for use as
a residence or premises and not as a vertirfe.
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Commercial A
obJIe—means any land motor vehicle
while used in \..- insured's business or occupation other
than
( D a private passenger automobiles
(2) a school bus or
(3) an owned utility automobile not used for wholesale
or retail delivery.

Insured—
is the person or persons designated under
"JPERSONw .NSUREO" in the declarations with a limit of
liability indicated under the caption " A M O U N T S "
applicable to such coverage or coverages.
I
Loss—means with regard to hands and feet, actual severance
through or above wrist or ankle joints; with regard to eyes,
entire and irrecoverable loss of sight; with regard to thumb
and fingers, actual severance through 'or above
ffietacarpophala npeal jo in ts.

POLICY CONDITIONS
CThe Policy Conditions Apply to All Coverages Unless
Otherwise Noted)
1. Notice
(a) In the event of an accident or loss written notice
containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured or
eligible injured person and also reasonably obtainable
Information respecting the time, place and circumstances of
the accident, and the names and addresses of injured
persons and available witnesses, shall be given by or on
behalf of the insured or each eligible injured person, to the
company or any of its authorized agents as soon as
practicable.

Any person or organization, or the legal representative
thereof, having secured such judgment or agreement,
shall be entitled to recover under this policy to the
extent of the insurance afforded. Nothing contained in
this policy shall give any person or organization any right
, to join the company as a co-defendant in any action
against the insured to determine the insured's liability.
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or the insured's
estate shall not relieve the company of its obligations.
(c) Under coverages D, F. G. H. R. R 1 . S and U until 30
days after the required notice of accident or loss has
been filed with the company.
(d) Under coverage P until 35 days after the required
notice of accident or loss has been filed with the
company.

In the event of theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage prompt
notice shall also be given to the police.

3. Assistance and Cooperation of the thsured. The insured
sh^H cooperate with the company and, upon its request,
(b) Coverages A and B. If claim is made or suit is brought
attend hearings and trials, assist in effecting settlements,
against the insured, he or she shall immediately forward to
securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of
the company every demand, notice, summons or other
witnesses and in the conduct of any legal proceedings in
process received by him or her or his or her representative.
connection with the subject matter of this insurance. The
Insured shall not, exceot at the insured's own cost,
(c) Coverage P. If any eligible Injured person, his or b?r
voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or
legal representative or dependent survivors shall institute
incur any expense other than for such first aid to others as
)eg*> *ct>or> to recover Js/7?j?*r for £>£>c?JJytojury agj)r?s? jshalt he imperative at the time of accident.
parson or organization who is or may be liable In tort
therefor, a copy of the summons and complaint or other
4. Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy, exceot
process served in connection with such legal action shall be
bnder coverages P and S. the comoany shall be subrogated
forwarded immediately to the company by such person.
to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor and the
Insured shall do whatever is necessary to secure such rights
(d) Coverage U. If before the company makes payment of
and do nothing to prejudice them.
p, ? ^ , ^ . i — ^ ^ '
loss under coverage U, the Insured or the legal
5. Trust Agreement—Coverages f^and U. In the event of
reoresentative of such insured shall institute any legal
payment to any person under coverage P or U:
action for bodily injury against any person or organization
legally responsible for the use of a motor vehicle involved in
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such
the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint or
payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment
other process served in connection with such legal action
that may result from the exercise of any rights of
shall be forwarded immediately to the company by th*
recovery of such person against any person or
insured or the legal representative of such insured.
organization legally responsible for the bodily injury
2. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the
company:
(a) Unless as a condition precedent thereto there shall
have been full compliance with all terms of this policy.
(b) Under coverages A and Bf until the amount of the
Insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally
determined either by judgment against the insured after
actual trial and affirmed on appeal, if an aopeai has been
taken from said judgment, or by written agreement of
the insured, the claimant and the company.

because of which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the
com pony all rights of recovery which he or she shall have
against such other person or organization because of the
damages which are the subject of claim made under the
coverages;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person
shall take, through any representative designated by the
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compan\
ch action as may be necessary or appropriatev
to recover such payment as damages from such other
person or organization, such action to be-taken In the:
name of such person; m the ev«nt of a recovery, the.
company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for
expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred by it in'
connection therewith;
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company.]
such instruments and pooers as may be appropriate ?o!
secure the rights and obligations of such person and the
company established by this provision.
Any payment made under coverage P to or for any injured^
person shall be applied in reduction of the amount of
damages which he or she may be entitled to recover from
the company for the same accident under either coverage A
or coverage U of this policy.
6.
Medical
Reports; Authorisations;
Claim—Coverages P, S and U.

Proof

of

(a) Medical Reports. As soon as practicable the person
making claim or someone on that person*: behalf shall give
to the company written proof of claim, including full
particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries and
treatment
received and contemplated and other
Information as may assist the company in determining the
amount payable. The injured person shall submit to
physical or mental examinations by physicians selected by
the company and at the company's expense when and asoften as the company may reasonably require and upon.
each request by the company execute authorization to
enable the company to obtain medical reports and copies o f
records. In the event of the injured person's incapacity or^
death, the legal representative of such person shall execute,
authorization for such reports and records. A copy of the
medical report will be sent the injured person upon written
request.
(b) Loss of Wages-Coverage P. If benefits for loss of wages
or salary (or in the case of the self-employed, their
equivalent) are claimed, the person presenting such claim
shall authorize the comoany to obtain details of all wage
or salary payments, or their equivalent, paid to such person
by any employer or earned by such person since the time of
the bodily injury and during the year immediately
preceding the date of the accident
(c) Proof of Claim. Proof of claim shall be made upon
forms furnished by the company unless the company shall
have failed to furnish such forms within 15 days after
receiving notice of claim.
(d) Coverage U. The insured and every other person making
claim shall submit to questioning under oath by any person
named by the company and subscribe the same, as often as
may reasonably be required.
7. Payment of Claim-Coverages P, S and U.
(a) Any amount due is payable
(i) under coverage P w the efigibfe injured person, and
Kinder coverages S and U to the insured, or

{»
the eligible Injured person or Insured, is a minor or
an incompetent person, to a perent or guardian, or
(iii) if the eligible injured person or insured be deceased,
to the surviving spouse
„
,
provided the comoany may. at its option, pay any such
amount due to a person or organization authorized by law
to receive such payment.
(b) Coverage P. Payments under coverage P shall be made
periodically on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred,
after valid proof of loss has been submitted to the
company. If such written proof Is not furnished to the
company as to the entire claim, arty partial amount shall be
paid within 35 days after such written proof is furnished to
the company. Any pan or all of the remainder of the claim
that is subsequently supported by written proof shall be
paid within 35 days after such written proof is furnished to
the company, provided that any payment shall not be due
where the company has reasonable proof to establish that it
Is not responsible for the payment, notwithstanding that
written proof has been furnished to the company.
(c) Coverage S. Any payment made under coverage S shall,
to the extent thereof, constitute a complete discharge of
the company's obligations hereunder and the company shall
not be required to see to the application of the money so
paid.
The company shall have the right and oppoaunity to make
an autopsy where it is not forbidden by law.
8. Other Insurance. Under coverages" A, B, D, F ; G, R and
R L w i t h respect to any liability or loss to which this and
any other automobile insurance policy issued to the named
insured by the company also applies, the total limit of the
company's liability under ail such policies shall not exceed
the highest applicable limit of liability under any one such
po/icy.
Subject to the above paragraph, if the insured has other
insurance against liability or/ocr covered by this policy, the
company under coverages A, B, D, F. G. R and R l . shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of such liability or
loss than the applicable limit of liability bears to the total
applicable limit of liability of all insurance againsi: such
liability or loss.
All of the foregoing provisions and ail coverages are subject
to the following:
(a) The insurance with respect to a newly acquired
automobile SHALL NOT APPLY TO A N Y L I A B I L I T Y
OR LOSS AGAINST WHICH THE INSURED
HAS
OTHER INSURANCE APPLICABLE THERETO IN
WHOLE OR IN PART.
(b) The insurance with respect to
(i) a temporary substitute automobile,
(ii) a trailer, or
(Hi) a nortowned automobile,
shall be excess over other insurance: however, NO
COVERAGE SHALL APPLY TO ANY L I A 8 I L I T Y OR
LOSS IF THE VEHICLE IS OWNED BY A N Y PERSON
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BUSINESS AND IF THE INSURED OR
OWNER HAS OTHER INSURANCE APPLICABLE IN
WHOLE OR IN PART TO SUCH LIABILITY OR LOSS.
(c) The insurance with respect to wearing apparel and
luggage under coverages 0 . F and G shall be excess over
other insurance.
Under coverage P no person may recover benefits afforded
under this coverage from more than one policy or company
on a duplicate basis. If benefits are available to any person
occupying or through being struck by the insured motor
vehicle and benefits are also available to such person as a
named insured or as a relative of a named insured under
another policy providing similar benefits, the policy
providing coverage on the insured motor1 vehicle shall be
primary and the policy available to such person as a named
insured or as a relative of a named insured SHALL NOT
APPLY.
Subject to The preceding paragraph. Jf two or more
insurers are liable to pav benefits under coverage P or any
simitar coverage, the maximum amount pevable under such
coverage shall not'exceed the amount payable under one
policy. In the.event that the company has paid more than
its proportionate share of such benefits, it shall be entitled
to recover the excess from each of the other insurers
providing similarjjenefrts.
Under coverage U with respect to bodily injury to an
insured while occupying a motor vehicle not owned by a
named insured under this coverage, the insurance hereunder
Shall apply only*as excess insurance over any other similar
Insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance
shall then aoo'y only in the amount by which the
applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum
of the applicable limits of liability of all such other
Insurance.
Subject to the foregoing paragraph, under coverage U if the
insured has other similar insurance available to him or her
against a loss covered by this coverage, then the damages
shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance,
and the company shall not be liable under this coverage for
8 greater proportion of the applicable limit of liability of
this coverage than such limit bean to the sum of the
applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
Insurance.
'
Under coverage U, any insurance provided thereunder shall
be excess insurance over any benefits available, or which
would be available but for the application of a deductible,
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance AcL
9. Arbitration. If any person making claim under coverage
U and the comoany do not agree that such person is legally
entitled to recover damages from the owner oxooerator of
an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to the
insured- or do not agree as to the amount payable
hereunder, or if any person and the company do not agree
as to the amount, if any, payable under coverage P, then
each party shall, upon written demand of either, select a

con>petet
d dean teres ted arbitrator, the twu arbitrators
no n*mi;ti . <M select a third arbitrator, or if unable to agree
thereon within 30 days, then upon request of such parson
making ctoirn or the company such third arbitrator shall be
elected by a judge of a court of record in the county and
state in which such arbitration is pending. The arbitrator;
iiall then hear and determine the question or Questions so
in dispute, and the decision in writing of any two
arbitrators, shall be binding uoon such person making claim
and the company, each of whom shall pay his or her or its
ohosen arbitrator and shall bear equally the expense of the
third arbitrator and all other expenses of the arbitration,
•irovitied that attorney fees and fees paid to medical cr
other expert witnesses are not deemed to be expenses of
arbitration but are to be borne by the parry incurring them.
Unless the parties otherwise agree, the arbitration shall be
conducted in the county and state in which such person
making claim resides and in accordance with the usual rules
governing procedure and admission of evidence in courts of
law.
10. Named Insured's Duties When Loss Occurs-Coverages
0. F. G, H. R and R 1 . When loss occurs, the named insured
also shall:
(a) use every reasonable means to protect the damaged
property covered by this policy from any further
damage; reasonable expense incurred in affording such
protection shall be deemed incurred at the company's
request;
(fa) upon the company's request, exhibit the damaged
property to the company and submit to examinations
under oath by anyone designated by the company,
subscribe the same, procure and produce for the
company's examination all pertinent records, receipts
end invoices, or certified copies, if originafs be lost,
permitting copies thereof to be made, alt at such
reasonable times and places as the company shall
designate.
11. No Benefit to Bailee, Insurance under coverages D, F,
G, R and R1 shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier or
other bailee for hire liable for loss to the owned motor
vehicle or a non-owned automobile. .
12. Joint and Several Interests. If two or more insureds are
famed in the declarations, each insured appoints the other
insured or other insureds, jointly and severalty, as his or her
attorney in fact for purposes of cancellation, termination,
modification or changes of the coverages, or any other
provisions of this policy, said appointment to remain valid
and in full forca and effect until 20 days after receipt by
the company of written notification from the insured of
the termination of such appointment. The inclusion of
mora than ona insured shall not operate to increase the
limits of the company's liability.
T3. Two or More Motor Vehicles-Sections I, It, HI and I V .
When two or more motor vehicles are insured hereunder,
the policy shall apply separately to each but a motor
vehicle and a trailer or trailers attached thereto shall be one
motor vehicle as resoects the limits of liability under
coverages A, B, P and U.
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14. Change*. I r
ms of this policy may not be waived or
changed except w, policy endorsement attached hereto,
signed by an executive officer of the company.
15. Alignment. No Interest in this policy Is assignable
unless the company's consent is endorsed hereon. If the
named insured dies, this policy shall cover as named insured
(a) the surviving spouse,
(b) under Sections I, I I , Ml and IV any person having
prooer temporary custody of the owned motor vehicle
until the appointment and qualification of a legal
representative, and thereafter the legal representative,
but only while acting within the scope of his or her
duties as such,
(c) under Section V , any person who, but for such death;
would have continued to be an Insured.
Consent of the beneficiary under division 1 of coverage S is
not a requisite to cancellation, assignment, change of
beneficiary or any other change in the policy.
•
* >
•

•< u

16. Cancellation. The named insured may cancel this policy
by mailing to the comoany written notice stating when
thereafter such cancellation shall be effective.
The company may cancel this policy in accordance with the
terms hereof by written notice, addressed to the named
Insured and mailed to his or her address last known to the
company or Its authorized agent stating when cancellation
shall be effective. Such notice of cancellation shall be
sufficient notwithstanding the death of the named Insured.
The mailing of the notice shall be sufficient proof of notlca
and the effective date and hour of cancellation stated
therein shall become the end of the policy period. Delivery
of written notice shall be equivalent to mailing.
Unless, within 59 days of the effective date of this policy,
th« company mails or delivers a notice of cancellation to
th« named Insured In the manner provided in the two
preceding paragraphs, the company agrees as to each
coverage in force on such effective date:
. •' •*
A* to continue such coverage In force until the expiration
. of the current policy period, and
-,
..
B;"to renew this policy for the succeeding policy period,
. unless the comoany advises the named insured of its
Intention not to renew this policy by notice sent to such
Insured not less than 30 days before the expiration of the
current policy period, in the same manner as is provided
herein for notices of cancellation by the company. Such
renewal shall be at the rates legally in effect at the time
thereof.
These agreements shall be void and of no effect:
1. If the named insured fails to discharge when due any
of his or her obligations in connection with the payment
of premium for this policy or any Installment thereof
whether payable,directly or under any premium finance
plan; or
Z If the named Insured or any other operator who
customarily operates a motor vehicle insured under the

policy
dU nuu« nut ui ivci ^ iiLciiic ui'Uci du^cii^iun
or revo^ j n at any time:
»
m
(i) during the policy period; or
(ii) If the Oolicy Is renewed, during the current policy
period or the 180 days immediately preceding its
effective date.
In the event that the policy Is canceled during the first 59
days following the effective date of the policy, the notice
of cancellation shall be mailed to the named insured not
less than 10 davs prior to the effective date of such
cancellation. After the policy has been in force for 59 days,
subsequent notice of cancellation for non-payment shall be
mailed to the named insured not less than 10 days prior to
the effective date thereof. Notice of any other cancellation
shall be mailed tp the named Insured not less than 20 days
prior^to the effective date thereof.
If the named insured "cancels, earned premiums shall be
computed in accordance with the company's short rate'
table and procedures. If the company cancels, earned
premiums shall be computed pro rata. Premium adjustment
may be made at the time cancellation is effected or as soon
as practicable thereafter, but the.payment or tender, of
unearned premiums is not a.condition of cancellation.
17. Liberalization Clause. If the company revises its policy
form to grant broader coverage without additional charge,
such Insurance as is afforded hereunder shall be so extended
or broadened effective upon adoption of such broader
coverage by the company.
18. Declarations. 8y acceptance of this* policy the named
insured agrees that the statements in the declarations are his
or her agreements and representations, that this policy is
Issued in reliance upon the truth of such representations
and that this policy embodies all agreements existing
between himself or herself and the company or any of its
agents relating to this insurance.
19. Motor Vehicle
Responsibility Laws

Compulsory

Laws

or

Financial

A. Out-of-State Insurance—Coverages A, B and U.
If, under the provisions of the motor vehicle compulsory
Insurance law, motor vehicle financial responsibility law or
any similar law of any xtaf*. anw, insured who Is a
non-resident of such state must maintain insurance with
respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of an owned
motor vehicle or a non-owned sutomobile in such jrtJfe and
the requirements of such insurance are greater than the
insurance provided by this polic/, any Bodily Injury and
Property Damage Liability, Medical Payments and
Uninsured Motor Vehicle insurance afforded under this
policy shall be deemed to comply with such requirements.
Insurance so provided shall be in lieu of the insurance
otherwise provided by the policy, but only to the extent
required by such law and only with resoect to the
ownership, maintenance or use of the owned motor vehicle
or a norhowned automobile in such stMte. The insurance
under this provision shall be reduced to the extent there is
other collectible insurance under this or any other motor
vehicle liability insurance policy. In no e^ent shall any
person be entjtled to duplicate payments for the same
elements of loss.
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United S» -s boundary. Loss in Mexico under Section Iff
shall be determined upon the basis of cost at the nearest
United States point.

8. Financial Responsibility Laws-Cove rages A and 8.
When certified as proof of future financial responsibility
under any motor vehicle financial responsibility law and
while such proof is required during the policy period, this
policy shall comply with such law to the extent of the
coverage 9nd limits required. The insured agrees to
reimburse the company for any payment made by the
company which it would not have been obligated to make
under the terms of this policy except for the agreement
contained in this paragraph.

U'Kter Section V this insurance applies to accidents during
the policy period which occur anywhere.
2 1 . Provisional Premium. It is agreed that in the event of
any change in the rules, rates, rating plan, premiums or
minimum premiums applicable to the insurance afforded.
because of an adverse judicial finding as to the
constitutionality of any provisions of the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act providing for the exemption of
persons from tort liability, the premium stated in the
declarations for any automobile bodily injury, automobile
prooerty damage liability, automobile medical payments
and protection against uninsured motorists insurance shall
be deemed provisional and subject to recomputation.

20. Policy Period. Territory. Under Sections I. I I . Ill and IV
this insurance applies only to toss to a motor vehicle
insured hereunder, other insured property and accidents
which occur during the policy period in the United States
of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or
while such vehicle is being transported between ports
thereof, provided the described motor vehicle is owned,
maintained and used for the purposes stated in the
declarations.

If the final premium thus recomputed exceeds the premium
stated in the declarations, the named insured shall pay to
the comoany the excess as well as the amount of any return
premium previously credited or refunded.

This insurance also applies under Sections I, II and III to
such accidents and toss in Mexico within 50 miles of the

MUTUAL CONDITIONS
1. Membership. The membership fees set out in this policy,
which are in addition to the premiums, are not returnable
but entitle the first insured named in the declarations to
insure one vehicle for any applicable coverage, and to
Insurance for any other coverage for which said fees were
paid so long as this company continues to write such
coverages and such insured remains a risk desirable to the
company.
While this policy is in force, the first insured named in the
declarations is entitled to vote at all meetings of members
and to share in the earnings and savings of the company in

accordance with the dividends declared by the Board of
Directors on this and like policies.
2. No Contingent Liability. This policy is non-assessable.
3. Annual Meeting. The annual meeting of the members of
the company shall be held at its home office at
Bloomington, Illinois, on the second Monday of June at ithe
hour of 10:00 A.M., unless the Board of Directors shall
elect to change the time and place of such meeting, in
which case, but not otherwise, due notice shall be mailed
each member at the address disclosed in this policy at least
10 days prior thereto.

In Witness Whereof, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed by its
President and Secretary at Bloomington, Illinois, and countersigned on the declarations page by a duly authorized
representative of the Company.

SECRETARY

^^^S^Sir

U

PRESIDENT
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6328L AMENDATORY ENDORSEME.

Nothing herein contained snail be held to *hcr. vary, waive or extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements or
limitations of the undermentioned policy other than as stated below.
Effective

.

policy number

12:01 A.M. Standard Time. Attached to ard forming a port of

_

issued toby the STATE F A R M MUTUAL A U T 0 M 0 8 I L E INSURANCE COMPANY, of Bloommgton, Illinois, nr the STATE
F A R M FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, at Bloommgton, Illinois, as indicated by the company name on the policy of
which this endorsement is a part.
{The information above is required only when
this endorsement is issued subsequent to the
preparation of the policy.)

Countersigned.

19.

By
Authorized Representative

In consideration of the premium it which the policy is
written, it ii aqreed that the "Limits of Liability" pro vision
Of Section II ~ Personal Injury Protection Coverage, is
deleted and replaced by the following:

accident, provided that if the disability resulting in such
loss of income includes only 4 p<*i t ol a w»?ck. lr*»
company shall not ba liable lor j greater proportion o*
such weekly limit than the numoer ol days fast from
work during the part week bears to the number ol days
in his or her full work week, and

LIMITS OF L I A B I L I T Y
Regardless of the number of persons injured, policies
applicable, vehicles involved, or claims made, there shall be
no duo'ication of personal injury protection benefits, and
the aggregate maximum amount pavabie under this and all
applicable policies with rev>ec: to bodily injury sustained
by any one eligible injured person as a result of any one
accident snail not exceed:
(a) for medical benefits. the amount shown under the
applicable coverage designation in the schedule for each
perron who Sustains bodily tnjury in any one accident:
provided, the amount payable for expenses Incurred for
services furnished more than three years after the date of
the accident is limited to a maximum of X2000 less any
amount paid or payable for services furnished during the
f i a t three years after the date of the accident.
(b) for disability benefits,
ft) 85% of any loss
under the aoplicable
per week, whichever
of weeks shown
designation in the

of income or the amount shown
coverage designation in the schedule
is less, tor not to exceed the number
under the applicable coverage
schedule, after the date of such

fit) for reimbursement lor household services, the
amount shown undw the applicable coveraqe designation
in the schedule per day for not to exceed the number ol
days shown under the applicable coverage Designation in
the schedule;
(cl for funeral benefits, the amount shown under the
applicable coverage designation in the schedule; and

Id) for survivor benefits . the amount shown under the
applicable coverage designation in the schedule; provided, if
the death occurs more than three years after the date of the
accident, the maximum amount payable is S2000,

provided that any amount payable under paragraphs (a).
lb), (c) and (d) above shall be reduced by any benefits
which such injured person is entitled to receive under any
workmen's compensation law or any similar statutory plan,
and any amounts which such person is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because of
military enlistment, duty or service.

£^^3^^r
President
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Nothing herein coni;iin«\J srwll be hold to alter, vary, waive or e»imd any of the terms, conditions, agreements or
liinitati'vts of the under rum tioruxJ policy other thun us stated UHuw.
CH/v-t.\n»

l?:Ot A . M . Stand^d Time. Attached to and forming a port of

policy numtvr

"

issued *«*
by \U* STATE F A R M M U T U A L A U T 0 M 0 6 I L E INSURANCE COMPANY, oi Hfoomin»jton. Illinois, or the STATE
F A R M FINE ANO CASUALTY COMPANY, ot Blooming ton, Illinois, as indicated by th« conioany noma on the policy of
which tins cndo«*«mam is .1 p»n \.
( T h * information above is rrrjuirevl only when
this endorsement is issued subsequent to the
preparation of the policy.)

Countersigned

_

_

_

—

. 19

ByAuthorized Representative

In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that the definition of equipment is amended to read:

Equipment — means turn eouioment as is usual and incidental to the use and operation of the motor vehicle as a vehicle.
It does not include a rieuu'tuhie living quarter* unit, even flwxjgh attaclied. if the acquisition of such unit has not been
previously reported to the company and any required premium th«tf con paid.

It Is further agreed that the following exclusions art added:
1 . T H I S INSURANCE DOGS NOT APPLY UNOEfl THE PHYSICAL OAMAGE SECTION TO LOSS OF A N Y
R E C O R D I N G TAPE.
Z

THIS INSURANCE

DOES NOT APPLY TO LOSS 8Y THEFT O F ;

(a) A C I T I Z E N S BAND R A D I O . TAPE RECOROER OR TAPE P L A Y E R . OR
lb) A N Y ELECTRONIC DEVICE INCORPORATING ANY OF THE F O R E G O I N G .

unless permanently installed in the opening of the dash or console of the own$d motor y#n/c/# normally used by the
motor vehicle marnjlactutcr for the installation of a radio.

President

62*>CG
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G l e n n C. H a n n i , A1327
R. S c o t t W i l l i a m s ,
3498
STRONG & HANNI
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant &
Third-Party Plaintiff
S i x t h F l o o r Boston B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 2 - 7 0 8 0
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, e t

al.,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

Civil No.

C83-8099

vs.
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN,

Judge Judith M. Billings

Third-Party
Defendant.

I, Grant M. Cutler, do hereby state as follows:
1.

I am the claim superientendent for State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in Salt Lake City.
2.

I am personally familiar with payments made by

State Farm under the No-Fault insurance policy provisions
of State Farm's policy with Lorin Dean Caldwell arising out
of an automobile accident which occurred on or about June 6,

EXHIBIT

B
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19 82, resulting in the deaths of Troy Caldwell and Tamara Hill.
3.

No-Fault insurance benefits were paid by State

Farm to or for the parents of Troy Caldwell in the amount of
$6,53 9.00 and to or for the parents of Tamara Hill in the
amount of $6,123.00.
4.

I am personally familiar with the basic provisions

of the insurance policy of Mr. Caldwell with State Farm.
The policy included a condition entitled Subrogation, a copy
of which condition is attached to this affidavit•
Dated this

day of September, 1984.

Grant M. Cutler
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

September, 1984.

Notary Public - Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

-2-
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake CityV UT 84111
Telephonist8(ft) 521-7500
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAF., B EFPfcBRT—^ Alub S UN ,"LATERY-&-ROSE, P. C.
P.O. Bex 139
Kemmerer, WY 63101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative of
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C83-8099

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and
respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Defendant's

motion

for

summary

judgment

should

not

be

granted because:
1

As to Plaintiff Hill there

f a c t i n t h a t P1 a i n t i f f H i 1 1 w a s
Defendant

as

to

the

i:-

•

Defendant's

: question of material
j f c o ntr ac t w i th t he

•.

payment

of,

and

attempts

to

recover, P.I,P. payments made to Plaintiff Kill.
2.

As to Defendant's motion

for summary

judgment on the

issue of punitive damages, the law is not clear, and Plaintiffs
have moved
their

for an order of this Court allowing them to amend

Complaint

to

set

forth

with

more

particularity

the

independent tort of interference with economic relations.
I.

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiffs

agree

with

Defendant a* paragraphs "!
. .

: '" ':

" .-

..

the
?

. -.".v.

material

facts

set

:\r 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

forth

by

1 0, 12, and

and i n addition thereto rel/v • on

the following unrefuted material facts.
L

The State Farm insurance policy included a provision for

the recovery of Personal Injury Protection - no fault benefits at,
paragraph

f

5f

of

the

policy

conditions,

which

states,

in

pertinent part:
5.
Trust Agreement-Coverages P [.Personal
Injury Protection (P. I.P.)] and U.
In the
event of payment to any person under coverage
P or U:
(a) The company shall be
the extent of such payment to the
any settlement or judgment that
from the exercise of any rights
of
such
person
against
any

entitled to
proceeds of
may result
of recovery
person
or
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organization legally responsible for the
bodily injury because of which such payment
is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for
the benefit of the company all rights of
recovery which he or she shall have against
such other person or organization because of
the damages which are the subject of claim
made under the coverages;
•• • •

2.

State Farm intended and attempted to have withheld from

the CUMIS

payment

to Plaintiffs, the

money

paid

for

P.I.P.

(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor) .
:>

3.

It was necessary for Plaintiffs to hire an attorney to

deal with State Farm relative to its claims for recovery of the
P.I,P.

monies

and

subrogation

for

the

property

damages.

(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor).
h* 4.

Only upon intercession by Plaintiffs1 attorney did State

Farm determine not to further pursue recovery of the
monies.
5.

P.I.P.

(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor).
The CUMIS policy, with a single

liability

limit of

$50,000.00, was not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs' wrongful
death claims.
6.

(Affidavit of Wallace Lauchnor).

P-ia-intjLf f sf attorney was told by the State Farm claims man

for the Plaintiffs' claims, that if Plaintiffs wished to prove
that the deaths of their children were worth $25,000.00 or more
each, Plaintiffs would have to litigate the matter with the tort
feasor and prove the children's worth to State Farm.

3
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Plaintiffs1 attorney made it clear to the State Farm

.7.

claims man that the costs of litigating the worth of the two
children would exceed the recovery claimed by State Farm.
PiadrtfETffs1 attorney offered to let State Farm proceed

Cn B.

with subrogation at State Farm's cost; State Farm refused.
" 9.

The

release signed by

Plaintiff

Hill and

his wife

recited consideration cf $22,245.00 and specifically stated that:
It is understood that the above amount of
twenty two thousand two hundred and forty
five
and
no/100
Dollars
($22,245.00)
represents twenty five thousand and no/100
Dollars ($25,000.00) policy limits less the
collision claim of five thousand five hundred
ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a
controversy exists as to who is entitled to
the said amount, and that the matter will be
resolved between the two or by payment into
court or by judicial determination.
(Hill
Depo., Exhibit 1.)
10.
Court

No discovery has been conducted since the Utah Supreme

rendered

its

opinion

in

Hill

v.

State

Farm

Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, 765 P2d 864 (Utah 1988); Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment relies on the same facts that the
Supreme Court determined were insufficient to sustain summary
judgment

in

Hill v. State

Company.

Farm

Mutual

Automobile

Insurance

'
II.

PLAINTIFF HILL WAS IN PRIVITY OF
CONTRACT WITH STATE FARM

Plaintiffs complain of State Farm's actions in its attempts
to enforce the subrogation and Trust Agreement provisions of the
State Farm automobile policy.

It is essential to recognize that
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State Farm attempted to recover not only the monies it paid to
Caldwell for property damage but also the monies it paid to Hill
and Caldwell for P.I.P.

It cannot be seriously argued but that

State Farm was in privity of contract with Hill as to the
recovery of P.I.P. monies under the "Trust Agreement" policy
conditions.

While State Farm asserts that it stepped into the

shoes of Caldwell only in pursuing the subrogation claim for
property damage, such contention is fatally flawed and must fail
for the reality is State Farm's extortion was in violation of
Utah's doctrine of "equitable subrogation" and it worked as a
detriment to Hill in that he would receive less money from the
settlement with CUMIS.
Although State Farm restricts Plaintiffs' complaints of bad
faith

to

its

restriction
complaint

refusal to waive

is not accurate.

with

its

subrogation

claim,

Plaintiffs' foremost bad

State Farm arises

out of State

Farm's

such
faith
total

failure to investigate whether the paltry CUMIS insurance monies
were sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs1 wrongful death claims.
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d

795

(Utah 1985)

concluded that:
. . . the obligation of good faith performance
contemplates at the very least, that the
insurer will diligently investigate the facts
to enable it to determine whether a claim is
valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and
will thereafter act promptly and reasonably
in rejecting or settling the claim.
The duty of good faith also requires the
insurer ... to refrain from actions that will
injure the insured's ability to obtain the
benefits
of the
contract.
(citations
omitted) (emphasis added)
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State

Farm

apparently

did

not

investigate

and

without

investigating State Farm was unable to determine, in good faith,
(1) whether

the

CUMIS

proceeds

were

sufficient

to

satisfy

Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims, (2) whether State Farm's claim
for subrogation was in fact valid under Utah

law given the

doctrine of "equitable subrcgaticn", and (3) whether Plaintiffs'
claim

that

State

Farm

was

not

entitled

to

subrogation

or

repayment of P.I.P. benefits was valid.
Plaintiffs assert that any reasonable investigation would
show (a) that the $50,000.00 CUMIS policy was not sufficient to
satisfy the Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims but in fact was
wholly inadequate; (b) that Plaintiffs' attorneys had conducted
investigations

to

determine

the

same

matters; and

(c) that

Plaintiffs' attorneys had useful and valid information that State
Farm

could

use

in

its

investigation

and

in

making

its

evaluations.
Instead,
Plaintiffs'
reasonable

State
claims

Farm
and

investigation

made

upheld
of

its
its

facts

own

evaluations,
claims

necessary

rejected

based
to

make

on

no
fair

evaluations and decisions. State Farm's determinations appear to
be that:
(1) Plaintiffs1 wrongful death claims were satisfied
by the CUMIS payment of $50,000.00; that is to say Plaintiffs
were made whole for the wrongful death of two

(2) outstanding

children by the total payment of $50,000.00.
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(2)

Because Plaintiffs' claims were satisfied by the

payment of $50,000.00, State Farm was entitled

to satisfy

its

claim for subrogation as to the $5,500.00 paid to Caldwell for
property damage and State Farm was entitled to reimbursement from
Caldwell and Hill for P.I. P. payments in the sum of $12,622.00
under the trust agreement provisions of the Caldwell policy.
(3)
to

Plaintiffs' claim that State Farm was not entitled

subrogation

or

repayment

of

P.I.P.

benefits

should

be

rejected.
(4)

There

was

legal

burden

and

duty

upon

grief-stricken and devastated parents to file a lawsuit, relive
the worst days of their lives and take that suit to judgment to
show

State

Farm

that

the wrongful

deaths

of

two

outstanding

teenage children were worth more than $25,000.00 each.
(5)
whether

its

State Farm had no duty or burden to investigate
subrogation and

trust

agreement

claims

were

good

claims under Utah law given the unrefutable facts of this case.
(6)

State Farm could enforce

subrogation and recovery of the P. I. P.

its claimed

rights

to

monies as such actions

would not injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefit of
the insurance contract.
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that summary
judgment

should

be

granted

only

when

it

is

clear

from

undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail.
v. Wycoff, 624 P.2d
Construction,

676

1151, 1153

P.2d

387,

the

Larson

(Utah 1981); Frisbee v. K & K

389

(Utah

1984).

State

Farm's
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contentions, as the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Hill v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Supra at 868
decision, place the burden on State Farm to prove that its
contentions were in fact accurate and in good faith.
there

are material questions of

fact with

Clearly,

respect

to

those

contentions for which State Farm has the burden of proof.
Defendant's motion for summary

judgment as to

Plaintiff

Hill should be denied,
III.

UTAH LAW AS TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES

FOR FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH IS UNSETTLED
Defendant is correct in its evaluation of Beck v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (Utah 1985) as not providing for
punitive damages in the first party bad
however,

not

at

all

clear

that

the

faith case.

Utah

Supreme

It is,
Court

is

still of that opinion and it is clear that the Court of Appeals
is not of that opinion.
In Gacron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194
m

m

ii.

•

i

•

i

i

i

•

i

i

i

i

i

(Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals
Bench

and

Billings)

reversed

and

(per Judges Greenwood,

remanded

a district

directed verdict in a First Party bad faith action.
his

appeal, Plaintiff Gagon claimed

improperly

excluded

consequentual
found

no

stipulated,

evidence

of

damages, including

error
and

in

the

the

district

attorney's

excusion

in

court

As part of

that the district
punitive

that
had

damages

fees.
the

agreed,

court

The
parties
to

court
and
court
had

exclude

evidence of punitive damages until the jury had found State Farm
8
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had acted in bad faith. The court concluded its opinion with the
statement that:
If lack of good faith is found on remand,
consideration
of
punitive
damages
and
consequentual damages will be appropriate.
Id, at 1197.
In Gaacn v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.f 771 P.2d 325
(Utah 1988) , State Farm's petition

for certiorari was denied

without opinion by the Supreme Court although Justice Zimmerinan
provided a concurring opinion, which opinion was quoted at length
by Defendant in its brief. The concurring opinion is little more
than a brief recitation of that part of the the Beck opinion
which held that a plaintiff was not entitled to put on punitive
damage evidence unless the plaintiff could make a sufficient case
to go to the jury on an independent tort theory.

What is,

perhaps, more notable is the fact that a majority of the Court
did not join in Justice Zimmerman's affirmance of that portion of
Beck.

Plaintiffs assert that based on the Gacon opinions, the

Supreme Court will rule, in the appropriate case, that punitive
damages are "appropriate" for "lack of good faith."

As the law

is not clear, Defendant's motion should be denied.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS1 ORIGINAL COMPLAINT SETS

FORTH THE INDEPENDENT TORT OF INTERFERENCE
WITH ECONOMIC RELATION
Plaintiffs1 Complaint sets forth all the requisites of the
tort claim for interference with economic relations.

To state a

claim for intentional interference with economic relations, the
plaintiff must show:

9
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(1)
That
the
defendant
intentionally
interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an
improper purpose or by improper means, (3)
causing injury to the plaintiff.
Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isam, 657 P.2d
293, 304 (Utah 1982),
While

Plaintiffs'

original

Complaint

did

not, however,

specifically claim for relief based upon intentional interference
with economic relations, the material allegations and elements of
the tort claim were indeed included in the Complaint,
have

filed

permitting

concurrently

herewith

their

motion

Plaintiffs

for

an

order

them to amend their Complaint to clarify that the

original allegations and elements are indeed an assertion of an
independent tort.
Plaintiffs'

claim

punitive

damages

arising

from

the

intentional interference alleging that Defendant's actions were
malicious or were taken with wanton disregard for Plaintiffs'
rights.

Plaintiffs

submit that

the

Court

should

not

grant

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages
pending the Court's decision on Plaintiffs' motion to amend their
Complaint, as well as further opportunity for discovery in this
case.
V.

STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE; PLAINTIFFS
SHOULD BE ALLOWED A REASONABLE TIME
IN WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
Although

Plaintiffs

filed

this

lawsuit

little time has been available for discovery.

some

years ago,

This matter was
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originally filed on November 18, 1983.

Defendant's first motion

for summary judgment was filed on September 12, 1984, and was
granted by the trial court on October 22, 1984. A lengthy appeal
followed with final disposition on November 1, 1988.

Following

the

attempted

decision

on

appeal, Plaintiffs

settlement of this matter.

unsuccessfully

On iMay 4, 1989, Defendant filed the

present motions for summary judgment.
Lauchnor,

Plaintiffs1

original

At the same time, Mr.

attorney

in

this

matter,

determined that he would most likely be a witness and would have
to withdraw as counsel.

Defendant has filed its latest motion

for summary judgment based on the same facts found insufficient
to support summary judgment the first time around.
Judicial economy and the interest of justice will be better
served if Plaintiff's are allowed time to complete discovery.
Concurrent

with

opposition

to

the

State

filing
Farm's

of

Plaintiffs1

latest

summary

memorandum
judgment

in

motion,

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to amend their Complaint, together
with

concise

and

thorough

interrogatories

and

requests

fcr

production.
As Utah Courts have recognized, summary judgment should not
be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in
discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient
to defeat the motion.

Averbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P2d 376,

377 (Utah 1977).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion for
ary judgment should be dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Q

day of June, 1989.

I

WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Teler?hone: (801) 521-7500
/

ROY A. /0AC OB S»N , JKTjtA 4 80)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
J
VEKAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY
& ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 18 9
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East BroadwaySalt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative of
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

Civil

No.

C83-8099

AFFIDAVIT OF
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
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THE STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
1.

)
) SS.
)

Your affiant is an attorney at law, duly licensed to

practice before all the Courts of this state, and is one of the
attorneys for Plaintiffs.
2.

On or about February 1, 1983 Lorin Dean Caldwell and

Robert Kent and Janet Hill came to me to see if they could obtain
some help, after Mr. Hill and Mr. Caldwell were informed by State
Farm that they would not permit them to accept settlement of
insurance

monies

from CUMIS without

litigation

unless

State

Farm's claim for subrogation was honored by a payment to State
Farm for their collision loss.

The State Farm adjuster or claims

manager also wanted to withhold from the payment the money paid
under PIP no fault.
3.

I then contacted the claims manager for CUMIS to verify

what I had been told concerning the subrogation demands of State
Farm; he confirmed to me by telephone.
4.

On several occasions I contacted State Farm's claims man

and discussed the matter with him, bringing to his attention the
fact that under the Utah case law he was not entitled to claim
any subrogation on the PIP payments.

0000272

5.

State Farm's claims man finally conceded that perhaps he

was not entitled to subrogation for PIP, but that he would not
relinquish any claim whatsoever for the collision loss.
6.

I discussed with the State Farm claims man the fact that

$25,000 per deceased child was certainly not an adequate award
for their deaths by a drunken driver where the liability was
absolutely clear.
7.

I further explained to the State Farm claims man that

the claims department of CUMIS had agreed that their policy was
inadequate

to

satisfy

the claims, and, therefore, they were

ready, willing and able to deliver their policy limits as soon as
the plaintiffs would accept the money, with the hope that State
Farm would not make any further claim for subrogation so that
litigation could be avoided.
8.
that

I again contacted State Farm's claims man but was told

they

circumstance.

would

not

relinquish

their

claim

under

any

He made it very clear to me that if we wished to

prove that the deaths of the two high school students were worth
$25,000 or more each, the Hills and Caldwells would have to
litigate the matter with the tort feasor and prove to him that
this be the case.
9.

I made it very clear to the State Farm's claims man that

the amount involved would not warrant either Mr. Hill or Mr.

3

00Q0272

Caldwell spending such money to hire counsel, as the attorney's
fees and court costs would exceed the recovery being claimed by
State Farm.

I further pointed out that the insureds were going

to end up spending more money to try to prove State Farm's claim
of subrogation than the claim was worth, and that this simply was
unjust,
10.

I also then offered to let State Farm proceed with

subrogation and pay their own counsel if they so desired but felt
it was grossly unfair to expect the insured and Mr. Hill to foot
the bill for this litigation where the money had already been
offered by the tort feasor's carrier•

He nevertheless refused to

acquiesce in any of these suggestions.
11.
Court

No discovery has been conducted since the Utah Supreme

rendered

its

opinion

in

Hill

v.

State

Farm

Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company,^765 P2d 864 (Utah 1988) .
DATED this \[.C

day of V L [ iYl/

, 1989.

R. LAUCZHNOR
Attorney for Plaintiffs
> \ SUBSCRIBED
••,/ ) // r
/
/

AND SWORN
, 1989.

to

before

me

this

( j f.

day

of

WITNESS my hand and officral seal/.

A. JW;, d

NOTARY PUBLIC

iy

My Commission Expires
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East BroadwaySalt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemraerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative of
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

Civil No. C83-8099

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

Plaintiffs,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORDS:
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, and request an Order of this Court,
pursuant

to

Rule

15 of the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure
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permitting said Plaintiffs, in the interest of justice, to amend
their Complaint and to file their First Amended Complaint herein,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

f,

A" .

Defendant

further requests an expedited hearing date for oral argument on
this Motion.
This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the pleadings, files and records herein, and the
Affidavit of Roy A. Jacobson, Jr., which is attached hereto.
DATED this A£>

cay cf

^

^

L,^

J. > w J

•

ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs

SOY A./JJACOBSGJS, JR. /
VEHAR,(/BEPPLER, JACOBSON,
LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 189
Kemraerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

At

day of
'V^t C^,Q_
I hereby certify that on the
1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon Defendant
by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
R. Scott Williams, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative of
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C83-8099

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

EXHIBIT "A"

0000230

COME

NOW, Plaintiffs, by

and

through

their

undersigned

attorneys, and for their cause against the Defendant allege as
follows:
COMMON ALLEGATIONS
1.
Dean

On or about the 6th day of June, 1982, Plaintiff, Lorin

Caldwell, had

an

insurance

policy

with

the

Defendant,

insuring an automobile owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell,
and

the insurance coverage provided by the Defendant on the

automobile included, among other things, collision damage and PIP
coverage.
2.
business

Defendant
within

the

is

an

insurance

State

of

Utah

company
and

the

licensed

to

Plaintiffs

do
are

residents of the State of Utah.
3.

On or about the 6th day of June, 198 2, at or near the

intersection of 3900 South Street, where the same intersects with
700 East Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a vehicle
owned by Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, and insured by the
Defendant, was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle
being driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, and insured by the CUMIS
Insurance Society, Inc.
4.

The

collision

was

caused

by

the

negligence

and

intoxication of Kenneth Paul Bryan.
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5.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and

intoxication

of Kenneth Paul Bryan, Troy

Neil

Caldwell, the

driver of the vehicle insured by the Defendant, was killed by in
collision; at the time of his death, Troy Neil Caldwell, was a
minor under the age of eighteen (13) years.
6.

As

a

further

direct

and

proximate

result

of

said

collision, the Plaintiff, Robert Kent Hill, suffered the loss of
his daughter, Tamara Elaine Hill, who was accidentally killed
while riding in the automobile with the minor decedent, Caldwell,
as a passenger at the time of the accident.
7.

Neither the driver or the passenger of the Caldwell

vehicle was negligent in any manner in causing the accident.
8.

As a direct and proximate result of the accident the

above-named Plaintiffs brought suit against Kenneth Paul Bryan
and others for the wrongful death of the above-named minors.
9.

As a proximate result of the accident, the automobile of

Plaintiff,

Lorin

Dean

Caldwell, was

damaged

in

the

sum

of

$5,510.00.
10.

Kenneth Paul Bryan was driving an automobile insured by

the CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., with a single limit liability
insurance coverage on the automobile in the amount of $50,000.00.
11.

The wrongful deaths of the Plaintiffs' children far

exceeded in value the sum of $25,000.00 per wrongful death, or a
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total of $50,000 as insurance afforded by the single limit policy
aforementioned.
12.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts

and omissions of Defendant herein, Plaintiffs have suffered the
following damages:
(a)

Great

physical, mental, and

emotional

distress,

anguish, pain and suffering;
(b)

Necessary and reasonable attorney

fees in excess

of the sum of $25,000.00; and
(c)

Plaintiff Hill incurred substantial disability and

lost earning capacity as a result of the loss of his daughter
which disability was aggravated by Defendant's actions, to the
damage of Plaintiff Hill;
(d)

Defendant's

wrongful

conduct

impaired

Plaintiff

Hill's ability to mitigate and avert the loss of the family home
and proximately resulted in the forced sale of the family home at
a substantial economic loss to his family.
COUNT I - BAD FAITH
13.
herein,

Plaintiffs
the

reallege

allegations

and

contained

incorporate
in paragraphs

by

reference

1 through

12

above, and further allege as follows:
14.

Plaintiffs arrived at a reasonable compromise solution

and settlement with Kenneth Paul Bryan in the sum of the policy
limits of $50,000, but were unable to conclude their settlement
of the litigation because Defendant failed and refused and still
4
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refuses

to acknowledge that there was

insufficient

insurance

coverage to satisfy the entire claim of the Plaintiffs for the
loss of their children; instead, Defendant demanded that the sum
of $5,510 in collision payment made to Lorin Dean Caldwell and
the PIPS payments to Plaintiffs be reimbursed to the Defendant
out of the insurance policy liability

limits of Kenneth Paul

Bryan.
15•

Defendant

State

Farm

Mutual

Automobile

Insurance

Company failed to join in the litigation and refused to cooperate
in

settlement

of

the

litigation

by

the

Plaintiffs

for

the

insufficient funds afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing
bad

faith

towards

its

insureds

in

attempting

to

settle

the litigation.
16.

Plaintiffs investigated the feasibility of litigation

and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, independent of
the insurance coverage and determined that Kenneth Paul Bryan was
insolvent.
17.

Defendant failed to investigate

the

feasibility

of

contingent litigation and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul
Bryan, or in the alternative, knew that Kenneth Paul Bryan was
essentially judgment proof and insolvent.
18.

Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that

the liability insurance coverage by CUMIS afforded Kenneth Paul

000028a
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Bryan

was

wholly

inadequate

to

fully

and

fairly

compensate

Plaintiffs for the loss of their children.
19.

At all times material herein, Defendant wrongfully and

in bad faith demanded of Plaintiffs that the PIPS and collision
payments

be

subrogated

and

reimbursed

to Defendant

from the

corpus of the $50,000 settlement with CUMIS and Kenneth Paul
Bryan.
COUNT II - INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
20.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above and
further allege as follows:
21.

Defendant knew, or should have known, that it had no

subrogation rights as to Plaintiff Hill and

that

it had no

subrogation rights as to Plaintiff Caldwell until such time as
Plaintiffs

had been fully and fairly compensated for the loss of

their children.
22.

Defendant

knew

of

Plaintiffs'

negotiations

and

agreement with CUMIS.
23.

Defendant, by

intentionally,
Plaintiffs'

and

the

without

settlement with

actions

set

justification,
CUMIS

by

forth

hereinabove,

interfered

asserting

that

with

it was

entitled to subrogation when it knew, or reasonably should have
known, it was not so entitled for the improper purpose of forcing
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Plaintiffs

to relinquish a significant

portion of the CUMIS

insurance proceeds to which Defendant was not entitled.
COUNT III - PUNITIVE DAMAGES
24.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 above and
further allege as follows:
25.

Defendant's actions were taken maliciously and/or with

wanton disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs and, therefore,
punitive damages are appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant
for compensatory and punitive damages in an amount as supported
by the allegations contained in this Complaint, for fees and
costs of this action and for such other and further relief to
which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
DATED this //^day of

<

Z/es.t~-,

, 1989.

ROBERT KENT HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs

WiiU^j^

s/^i-t'iL

BY; V" &V^#~C1 i •> ^ M ^ ^ t u ^
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500

0000286
/

AND
BY:
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR.
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON,
LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

i f day of

1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon Defendant
by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Defendant's attorney
of record as follows:
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq,
R. Scott Williams, Esq,
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR (1905)
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500
ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON, LAVERY & ROSE, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and
as personal representative of
the heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

Civil No. C83-8099

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
AND ORDER THEREON

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
COMES NOW, Wallace R. Lauchnor, of the

firm of Moffat,

Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young, and respectfully moves the Court to
allow

him

to

withdraw

as

counsel

for

Plaintiffs

in

the

above-entitled action on the grounds and for the reason that he
may be called to act as a witness in this matter.

Substitute

counsel for Plaintiffs have made their appearance herein, and all
pleadings

to be

served on Plaintiffs

may

be mailed

to the

following:
Roy A* Jacobson, Jr.
V, Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C.
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, Wyoming 83101
Telephone: (307) 877-3973
DATED this

h/ [

&

•

day of

IOR
Moffat, Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young
Suite 300
261 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-7500

000029;,

ORDER
The Court, having reviewed and considered the above and
foregoing Motion to Withdraw, and good cause appearing therefore,
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wallace R. Lauchnor, of Moffat,
Paulsen, Lauchnor & Young, be, and he is hereby granted leave to
withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the sf
day of
iA^^__
1989, I served the above and foregoing instrument upon all
interested parties by depositing a true and correct copy of the
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
R. Scott Williams, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Robert Kent Hill
6734 South 1560 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Lorin Dean Caldwell
7311 Chris Lane
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
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ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. (4480)
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
P.O. Box 189
Kemmerer, Wyoming 83101
T e l e p h o n e : (307) 877-3973
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT KENT HILL, individually,
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. C83-8099

Plaintiffs,

)
)

)

F_LiINnFFS;_REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

)
)

TO"A~MOT"rWL~ATIT
"

vs.

Judge Young

—ramrrTTTT^mrnM—

)

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

)
)
)

Defendant.

)

COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and
respectfully submit the following reply memorandum

in support of

Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint.
Although

Defendant

acknowledges

that

leave

to

amend

is

regularly granted, it has argued that a special rule of law would
preclude

the granting

of leave

to amend

the Complaint

in this

0000313

action.

Plaintiffs

strongly

dispute

that

such

a

rule

of

law

e x i s t s , but even if it d o e s , leave to amend s h o u l d be g r a n t e d .
THE C O N S I S T E N C Y OR I N C O N S I S T E N C Y OF P L A I N T I F F S ' P R O P O S E D
A M E N D M E N T WITH THE S U P R E M E COURT'S R U L I N G IS

IRRELEVANT

D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s that amendments a f t e r remand
allowed

where

they

ruling.

In

support

authority:

are

"6 W r i g h t

inconsistent

thereof

with

Defendant

& M i l l e r , Federal

the

should not

Supreme

cites

for

Practice

Court's
its

and

be

only

Procedure,

S e c . 1 4 9 8 , s t a t e s , in part:
'Once the case has been r e m a n d e d , the lower
court will permit new issues to be p r e s e n t e d
by an amended pleading that is c o n s i s t e n t
with the j u d g m e n t of the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . ' "
Such

quote

actually

is

taken

horribly

out

of

context;

Wright

&

Miller

say:
A l t h o u g h a m e n d m e n t s to the o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g s
g e n e r a l l y may not be made o n c e the suit has
reached the a p p e l l a t e l e v e l , if the court of
appeals
determines
that
the
lower
court
i m p l i e d l y tried the case on a t h e o r y not set
forth in the p l e a d i n g s , it may p e r m i t a
c o n f o r m i n g a m e n d m e n t - in e f f e c t u n d e r Rule
1 5 ( b ) (or at least by a n a l o g y to it) - to
i n c l u d e that theory in the trial
record.
More
i m p o r t a n t l y , if the a p p e l l a t e
court
d e c i d e s that the district c o u r t a b u s e d its
d i s c r e t i o n in refusing to a l l o w an a m e n d m e n t ,
or
did
not
give
a party
a
sufficient
opportunity
to cure the
defects
in
his
p l e a d i n g s and state a claim for r e l i e f , it
may remand the case with d i r e c t i o n s to a l l o w
the a p p e l l a n t to amend.
O n c e the case has
been r e m a n d e d , the 1 q w _ e j r ^ c p u r t _ ^
niejw LLLy.lL_JiP„J?i: presented by an a m e n d e d
R e a d i n g ; that is c o n s i s t e n t M W i t h _ t h e _ ^ d g m e i i t
of the a p p e l l a t e court. "[emphasis a d d e d )
~
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THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

IS NOT

INCONSISTENT

WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S
While

the

consistency

Court's judgment
Plaintiffs
amendment

inconsistency

in the instant

should
sought

or

be
is

allowed
not

RULING

case
to

of

the

is not relevant

amend

inconsistent

their

with

Supreme

to

whether

complaint,

the

Supreme

the

Court's

ruling.
The

Supreme

Court's

actual

judgment
765

Ilii^il^^i^^Mli^IlIIHIiilii^oiIlEilL^'
that

"Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

in

p 2d

Plaintiffs

original

complaint

864

-

State

Complaints and on State Farm's c o u n t e r c l a i m
set

Hi 11 v. State

(Utah 1988) was

Farm

on

Plaintiffs'

is reversed."

forth

all

the

for a claim for interference with economic r e l a t i o n s .
specifically
economic

claim relief based on intentional

relations.

The amendment

sought

Farm

requisites
It did not

interference

clearly

asks

for

with
such

relief.
Plaintiffs

request the Court enter

to Plaintiffs to amend their

its order granting

leave

Complaint.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th

of November, 1 9 8 9 .

ROY/AV 7 X C 0 B S O N , JR. ( T j 4 4 8 0 ~
V. / A N T H O N f VEHAR
P.O. Box 189
K e m m e r e r , Wyoming
83101
T e l e p h o n e : (307) 8 7 7 - 3 9 7 3
A t t o r n e y s for Plaintiffs
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C E R T I F I C A T E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the e ^ ^ d a y of N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 9 , a
true and complete copy of the above and foregoing instrument was
served upon Defendant by depositing a copy thereof in the United
States m a i l , postage prepaid, a d d r e s s e d as f o l l o w s :
Glenn C. H a n n i , Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

^.w
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ROY A. JACOBSON, JR. [A4480]
V. ANTHONY VEHAR
VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON,
LAVERY & ROSE
P.O. BOX 890
EVANSTON, WYOMING 82931
(307) 789-4200

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE

HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
DECEASED,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C83-8099

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
The plaintiffs,hereby give notice that they appeal the
Court's judgment entered March 26, 1990.

This Notice of Appeal

is filed pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

0000352

DATED thisp&Vk

day of

, 1990.

VEHAR, BEPPLER, JACOBSON
LAVERY & ROSE

Roy A. yacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed/-//first class, postage
prepaid on this o{j~rQ day of M /
, 1990, to the
following counsel of record:
r
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HILL/GBF

<fWf

-2-
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080

MaM£idn;
APR 2 6 1390

3U JTsd)
UULb^7i±i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs Of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
DECEASED,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Civil NO. C83-8099
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendant moves the court for summary judgment with respect to
the remaining claim of plaintiff Caldwell for bad faith against
defendant.

This motion is made on the grounds that the

pleadings, including prior judgment, and affidavits on file
establish there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and
that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

100290

0000351

law, as more fully set forth in defendant's memorandum in support
hereof filed herewith.
DATED this

^/

day of April, 1990.
STRONC

Glenn C. Hanni
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion for summary Judgment was mailed, postage
prepaid, on April «A^ , 1990, to the following:
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101

m A***?

/
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0000355

(imMiE

Glenn C. Hanni #A1327
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080

APR 2 6 1990

LiULn^LZiu u mcy

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually

and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
DECEASED,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Civil NO. C83-8099
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO
WHICH DEFENDANT STATE FARM CLAIMS
NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS
1.

The only issue remaining in this case is plaintiff

Caldwell's claim against State Farm for bad faith.

Caldwell's

complaint against State Farm for bad faith is a first-party
insurance bad faith claim.

[Judgment, dated 3-26-90.]

100291
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2.

The issues raised by Caldwell's claim of first-party

insurance bad faith against defendant are fairly debatable
issues.
3.

[Judgment, dated 3-26-90.]
The basic background facts relating to this matter were

set forth in defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion For
Summary Judgment As To Plaintiff Hill And Partial Summary
Judgment As To Plaintiff Caldwell dated May 4, 1989, which has
recently been considered by this court. Defendant reiterates and
incorporates herein the statement of material facts from that
memo.
4.

Plaintiff's complaint was originally filed on or about

November 17, 1983.

It was dismissed by way of summary judgment

entered on October 22, 1984, which summary judgment was
subsequently reversed by appeal to the Supreme Court.

The case

is now back in the District Court on remand, and this court has,
by way of its judgment dated March 26, 1990, entered summary
judgment dismissing all of plaintiff Hill's claims and dismissing
plaintiff Caldwell's claim for punitive damages.

[See Judgment

dated 3-26-90. ]
5.

In its opinion reversing the District Court's initial

granting of summary judgment, the Supreme Court indicated that
the issue it was being asked to decide in this case was "to
determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds."

100291

[765 P.2d
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00003

at 867]

In conjunction therewith, the Supreme Court identified

two issues of material fact as to the ultimate question of who
was entitled to the disputed $5,510.

First, whether plaintiffs

were fully compensated for their wrongful death claims without
receiving the $5,510; and, second, whether State Farm's
subrogation right was prejudiced by plaintiffs1 settlement with,
and release of, the tortfeasor.

The Supreme Court held that if

either of those fact issues were decided in favor of State Farm,
then State Farm would be entitled to the $5,510.

There is no

indication whatsoever in the Supreme Court's opinion that State
Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to simply let plaintiffs have
the $5,510.
ARGUMENT
STATE FARM IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING CALDWELLfS
CLAIM FOR FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE BAD
FAITH BECAUSE THE ISSUES RELATING
THERETO ARE FAIRLY DEBATABLE.
Caldwell does not assert any bad faith conduct on the part
of State Farm with respect to investigation of his first-party
claim for property damage arising out of the accident which
resulted in the death of his son.

Instead, Caldwell claims State

Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to waive its subrogation
claim and thereby obstructed Caldwell's settlement with CUMIS
Insurance Company, the insurer for the tortfeasor involved in the

100291
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accident.

This claim of bad faith arises out of the payment of a

first-party insurance claim and is therefore a claim of firstparty insurance bad faith. This court specifically found that
Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is a first-party
insurance bad faith claim in its judgment dated March 26, 1990,
where the court stated:
State Farm's motion for partial summary
judgment as to Caldwell's claim for punitive
damages is granted on the grounds that
Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is
for first-party insurance bad faith, which is
a contract claim, and for which no punitive
damages may be awarded absent an allegation
of independent tortious conduct.
[emphasis
added]
That Caldwell's claim constitutes a first-party insurance
bad faith claim is clearly shown in Arnica Ins. Co. v. Shettler,
768 P. 2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) where the court held that conduct
by an insurer after payment of a first-party claim which is
alleged by the plaintiff to constitute bad faith, is still a
claim of first-party insurance bad faith.
In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App.
1987) the Utah Court of Appeals held that there can be no firstparty insurance bad faith, as a matter of law, if the claim is
fairly debatable.

The court stated:

If the evidence presented creates a
factual issue as to the claim's validity,
there exists a debatable reason for denial,
thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim,
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and eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a
claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is
entitled to debate it, whether the debate
concerns a matter of fact or law." . . .
This general policy was explained by the
Utah Supreme Court in Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427
(Utah 1980) :
It would not comport with our ideas
of either law or justice to prevent
any party who entertained bona fide
questions about his legal
obligations from seeking
adjudication thereon in the courts.
[745 P.2d at 842]
Callioux holds that when an issue is fairly debatable, an
insurance company is entitled to debate it.

Further, the

insurance company cannot be found to have acted in bad faith for
debating such an issue.
The facts of Callioux are instructive on this issue.
Callioux1 filed a claim with their insurer, Progressive, for the
total loss of their Jeep which they claimed had gone "into an
uncontrollable skid, rolled down a hill, and subsequently
burned."

[745 P.2d at 839]

Progressive denied the claim because its investigation
indicated "the loss was of incendiary origin, occurring by or at
the direction of David Callioux."

[Id. ]

Callioux was eventually charged with arson and attempt to
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defraud an insurer.

He was acquitted of the criminal charges,

and Progressive paid the first-party claim in full after the
judgment of acquittal.
Callioux then sued Progressive on various theories,
including "bad faith denial of a first-party insurance claim."
[Id.]

The trial court granted Progressive's motion for summary

judgment, and Callioux appealed.

The Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed as indicated above. The court concluded that Callioux'
claim was "fairly debatable" as evidenced by the facts, and,
therefore, they could not have established bad faith on the part
of Progressive.

Thus, Progressive was entitled to summary

judgment.
The same principle applies in the instant case.

The issue

as to whether State Farm was required to waive its subrogation
claim and was not entitled to any of the $5,510, is and has been
throughout the pendency of this case, a fairly debatable issue.
Initially, Judge Billings, then of the Third Judicial
District Court, agreed with State Farm's position and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint in its entirety on summary judgment.
Although the Utah Supreme Court reversed that decision, reversal
was on the basis that there were factual issues with respect to
who was entitled to the $5,510.

The Supreme Court did not

foreclose the possibility that State Farm might still be entitled
100291
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to the disputed monies depending on the outcome of the factual
issues.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's opinion did not give even
the slightest indication of support to plaintiff claim of bad
faith.

It would have been contradictory for the Supreme Court to

indicate State Farm might still be entitled to the money and at
the same time suggest State Farm acted in bad faith by asserting
its right to those monies.
In its Judgment dated March 26, 1990, this court
specifically stated:
The court further finds that the issues
raised by plaintiffs' claims of first-party
bad faith against State Farm are and have
been throughout the pendency of this action
fairly debatable issues. [Judgment of 3-2690, p. 2, para. 6.]
Since Caldwell's claim is for first-party bad faith, State
Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
State Farm respectfully requests the court to grant its
motion for summary judgment and to dismiss Caldwell's remaining
claim of bad faith against State Farm, with prejudice, on the
merits, no cause of action.
DATED this ^J O

day of April, 1990.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
was mailed, postage prepaid, on April JXH , 1990, to the
following:
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr.
V. Anthony Vehar
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose
P. O. Box 189
Kemmerer, WY 83101
Wallace R. Lauchnor
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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RECEIVED
JUN 0 61990/
VEHAR, BEPPLER, LAVERY,
ROSE & BOAL. P.C.

G L E N N C. H A N N I , #A13 27
STRONG & HANNI
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t

Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually
and as personal representative
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN
CALDWELL, Individually and as
personal representative of the
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

\

J. O P

G M E N T

>

Civil

No. C83-8099

,

Judge David S. Young

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

]

Defendant.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to
the remaining claims of plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell,
deceased, was filed in April, 1990, along with a memorandum in
support of that motion.

Plaintiff Caldwell failed to file a

response to defendant's motion for summary judgment and memorandum
in support thereof.

Defendant at the time of filing its motion

for summary judgment and memorandum in support thereof filed a
request for oral argument.

Defendant in May, 19 90, served and

filed a notice to submit for decision.

The court finds that the
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issues raised by the claims of bad faith against State Farm by
plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as personal
representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased,
are and have been througliout the pendency of this action fairly
debatable issues.

The court having considered the records and

files of this case including defendants memorandum in support of
its motion for summary judgment, and being fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

For the reasons set forth in defendant's memorandum

in support of its motion for summary judgment, said motion is
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell,
deceased, no cause of action.
2.

Defendant's request for oral argument is hereby denied.

Dated this

day of June, 1990,
BY THE COURT:

David S. Young, Judge
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have stated, we disagree with that proposition. Defendant does not respond to plaintiffs contention that the endorsement here
does provide coverage beyond the territorially limited coverage under the policy provision, we therefore do not address that
issue.

Affirmed.

Jan Peter Londahl, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Robert M. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Salem, argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain,
Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.

v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 18926.
Supreme Court of Utah.

(b

| K ! Y NUMBER SYSTIM^

Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN
and ROSSMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

74()r.App. 153
Donald A. PANKOVV, Appellant,
v.

Affirmed. Stelts v. State of Oregon, 67
Or.App. 364, 677 P.2d 1106, rev. allowed
297 Or. 458, 683 P.2d 1371 (1984).

STATE of Oregon, Respondent.
CC 84-62; CA A32949.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted March 18, 1985.
'

Wayne BECK, Plaintiff and Appellant,

Decided J u n e 12, 1985.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hood River;
Donald L. Kalberer, Judge.

( o |K(YNUMURSV$nN>

June 12, 1985.

Insured brought action against insurer
for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle a
claim for insured motorist benefits. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Philip P. Fishier, J., entered summary judgment for insurer, and insured appealed.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that: (1) in a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties
and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary in nature and,
without more, a breach of those implied or
express dulies^ean give rise only to a cause
of action in contract, not one in tort, and (2)
question whether insurer breached its duty
of good faith in rejecting insured's claim
for uninsured motorist benefits without explanation and in failing to further investigate matter, such that insured was damaged when it was forced to accept settlement offered by insurer because of financial pressure caused by delay in resolving
matter, was question of fact precluding
summary judgment on contractual theory
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty
to deal in good faith.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Insurance <&='602.1
The good-faith duty to bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts and is a
duty which upon violation may give rise to
a claim for breach of contract.
2. Insurance <s=»602.2(l)
Refusal to bargain or settle under an
insurance contract may, standing alone, be

sufficient to prove a breach under appropriate circumstances.
3. I n s u r a n c e <§=>602.1
Practical end of providing a strong incentive for insurers to fulfill their contractual obligations to their insureds can be
accomplished as well through a contract
cause of action upon a failure to bargain in
good faith without analytical straining necessitated by the tort approach and with
far less potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts.
4. I n s u r a n c e <S=>602.1
A tort cause of action does not arise in
a first-party insurance contract situation by
reason of a failure to bargain in good faith
because the relationship between the insurer and its insured is fundamentally different than in a third-party context.
5. I n s u r a n c e «=»602.1
In a first-party relationship between an
insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary in nature and, without
more, a breach of those implied or express
duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort.
6. Insurance e=> 156(1)
As parties to a contract, the insured
and the insurer have parallel obligations to
perform the contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every contractual
relationship.
7. Insurance <s=»563
The implied contractual obligation of
good-faith performance contemplates, at
the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate these acts to enable it to
determine whether a claim filed by its insured is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim,
and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim,
and also requires the insurer to deal with
laymen as laymen and not as experts in the
subtleties of law and underwriting and to
refrain from actions that will injure the
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of
the contract.

f)fi
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Insurance 0=^602.2(1)
Performance of the implied contractual
m o t i o n of good faith is the essence of
hat (he insurer has bargained and paid
>r and, if breached, will render insurer
tble for damages suffered in consequence
tereof.
Insurance e=>r>02.10( 1)
Damages recoverable against an insur* for breach of its implied contractual
(•ligation of good faith toward insured inude both general damages, those flowing
iiturally from breach, and consequential
amages, those reasonably within contemlation of, or reasonably foreseeable by,
arties at time contract was made.
0. Insurance <S^602.I0(1)
In an action against an insurer for
reach of a duty to bargain in good faith,
iven that insured frequently faces catatrophic consequences if funds are not
vailable within a reasonable period of time
[» cover an insured loss, damages for a loss
/ell in excess of policy limits, such as for a
iome or a business, may be foreseeable
ml provable.
1. D a n u i K c s <£=*{">«. 1 0

la unusual cases concerned with an
usurer's breach of a duty to bargain in
jood faith, damages for mental anguish to
nsured might be provable, but foreseeabilty of any such damages will always hinge
ipon nature and language of contract and
•easonable expectations of parties.
12. Judgment <S=>181(23)
Question whether insurer breached its
luty of good faith in rejecting insured's
•hiini for uninsured motorist benefits with>ut explanation and in failing to further
investigate matter, such that insured was
lamaged when it was forced to accept settlement offered by insurer because of financial pressure caused by delay in resolving matter, was question of fact precluding
summary judgment on contractual theory
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty
to deal in good faith.

Robert J Dcbry, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Don .1 Hanson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Zl MM RUM AN, Justice:
Plaintiff Wayne Peck appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing his claim
against Fanners Insurance Kxchange, his
automobile insurance carrier, alleging that
Farmers had refused in bad faith to settle
a claim for uninsured motorist benefits.
We hold that on the record before us, Heck
stated a claim for relief and a summary
judgment was inappropriate. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Peck injured his knee in a hit-and-run
accident on January 10, 1982, when his car
was stiuck by a car owned by Ann Kirkland. Ms. Kirkland asserted that her car
had been stolen and denied any knowledge
of or responsibility for the accident. Peck
filed a claim with Kirkland's insurer, but
liability was denied on April 20, 1982.
At the time of the accident, Peck carried
automobile insurance with Farmers. Under that policy, Peck was provided with
both no-fault and uninsured motorist insurance benefits. On February 2H, 1982, while
his claim against Kirkland was pending,
Peck filed a claim with Fanners for nofault benefits. Sometime prior to May 26,
1982, Farmers paid Peck $5,000 for medical
expenses (the no fault policy limit) and
$1,299.43 for lost wages.
On .lime 23, 1982, Peck's counsel filed a
claim with Farmers for uninsured motorist
benefits, demanding the policy limit, $20,000, for general damages suffered as a
result of the accident. His counsel alleges
that the brochure documenting Peck's damages, submitted to Farmers with the June
28rd settlement offer, established that his
claim was worth substantially more than
$20,000. Farmers' adjuster rejected the
settlement offer without explanation on
July I, 1!W>.
Peck filed this lawsuit one month later,
on August 2, 1982, alleging three causes of
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action: first, that by refusing to pay his
uninsured motorist claim, Farmers had
breached its contract of insurance with
him; second, that by acting in bad faith in
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain
with Peck, or settle the claim, Farmers had
breached an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; and third, that Fanners
had acted oppressively and maliciously toward Peck with the intention of, or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of, causing
emotional distress. Under the first claim,
Peck sought damages for breach of contract in the amount of the policy limits;
under the second, he asked for compensatory damages in excess of the policy limits
for additional injuries, including mental anguish; and under the third, he sought punitive damages of $500,000.
Sometime in August of 1982, Peck's
counsel contacted Farmers' counsel and offered to settle the whole matter for $20,000. This offer was rejected. Farmers
filed an answer on September 1, 1982, and
at the same time, moved to strike the prayer for punitive damages on the ground that
they were unavailable for a breach of contract. Farmers' motion was granted. On
September 29th, the trial court bifurcated
the case and agreed to try the claim for
failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits
independent of Peck's claim alleging
breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Immediately after the trial judge bifurcated the case, Peck's counsel expressly
revoked the previously rejected offer to
settle the whole matter for $20,000. Instead, Peck offered to settle only the failure to pay the uninsured motorist benefits
claim for $20,000, reserving the implied
covenant or "bad faith" claim for separate
resolution.
On October 20, 1982, Farmers apparently
counteroffered.
Negotiations proceeded,
and sometime in late November, the parties
agreed to settle the uninsured motorist
claim for $15,000. On December 6, 1982,
the parties stipulated to dismissal of that
claim and specifically reserved the bad
faith claim for later disposition.

In mid-December, Farmers moved to dismiss the reserved bad faith claim on two
theories. First, Farmers asserted that under Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d .'HI, 480 l\2d 7.'i9
(1971), it "had no duty to bargain with or
settle plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim
and, therefore, [could not] be held liable"
for breach of contract or bad faith. Second, Farmers argued that even if it had
some duty to bargain or to settle the claim,
the facts set forth in the pleadings on file
did not establish that it had breached the
duty. No memoranda or factual affidavits
supported this motion.
Farmers' motion was opposed by affidavits of Peck, his counsel, and a former
insurance adjuster who worked for Peck's
counsel as a paralegal. In his affidavit,
Peck's counsel recited the dates and terms
of the various settlement offers and the
fact that they had been rejected without
counteroffer. Peck's affidavit stated that
he had accepted the $15,000 offer only because of financial pressures caused by the
substantial expenses he had incurred in the
ten months since the accident. The paralegal's affidavit stated that he had been an
insurance adjuster for 19 years and that he
had reviewed the settlement documentation
submitted to Farmers in June when the
claim was first filed. He expressed the
opinion that a reasonable and prudent insurance company would have valued the
claim at between $.'10,000 and $40,000 and
attempted to settle the matter within
weeks after the initial offer. The paralegal
charged that the "only reason for such a
substantial delay in settling this claim
would be to put Mr. Peck in a situation of
financial need and stress so that he would
accept the first settlement offer," a tactic
he characterized as acting in bad faith.
Planners filed no rebuttal affidavits, and
the trial court granted Farmers' motion
without specifying the basis for its holding.
Peck asks this Court to overrule Lyon
and permit an insured to sue for an insurer's bad faith refusal to bargain or settle.
He points out that many states now allow a
tort action for breach of an insurer's duty
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to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured. Assuming that we abandon Lyon,
Beck argues that the affidavits submitted
in opposition to Farmers' motion for summary judgment were sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Farmers breached an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
Farmers does not now contend, as it did
below, that it had no duty to bargain or
settle. Instead, it argues that under Lyon,
an insurer cannot be held liable for bad
faith simply because it refused to bargain
or to settle a claim; rather, it argues, to
sustain such a claim a plaintiff must produce evidence of bad faith wholly apart
from the "mere failure" to bargain or settle.
Our ruling in Lyon left an insured without any effective remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good
faith with the insured. An insured who
has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for
that loss. Failure to accept a proffered
settlement, although less than fair, can
lead to catastrophic consequences for an
insured who, as a direct consequence of the
loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both
economically and emotionally. The temptation for an insurer to delay settlement
while pressures build on the insured is
great, especially if the insurer's exposure
cannot exceed the policy limits. See Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire
Insurance
Co., 118 N.H. G07, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978);
Harvey & Wiseman, First Party
Bad
Faith: Common Law Remedies and a
Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky.LJ.
141, 146, 167-69 (1983-84) (hereinafter cited as "First Party Bad Faith"); Note, The
Availability
of Excess Damages
for
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First
Party
1. The Court in Lyon considered only the question of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to
a tort cause of action; however, to the extent
that Lyon is philosophically inconsistent with
our recognition today of a cause of action in
contract, it is overruled.
2.

We use the term "first party" to refer to an
insurance agreement where the insurer agrees

Insurance Claims—An Emerging
Trend,
45 Fordham L.Rev. 164, 164-67 (Oct. 1976)
(hereinafter cited as "Availability of Excess
Damages").
[1,2] In light of these considerations,
we now conclude that an insured should be
provided with a remedy. However, we do
not agree with plaintiff that a tort action is
appropriate. Instead, we hold that the
good faith duty to bargain or settle under
an insurance contract is only one aspect of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing
implied in all contracts and that a violation
of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach
of contract.1 In addition, we do not adopt
the limitation suggested by Farmers, but
hold that the refusal to bargain or settle,
standing alone, may, under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a
breach.
We recognize that a majority of states
permit an insured to institute a tort action
against an insurer who fails to bargain in
good faith in a "first-party" situation,*
adopting the approach first announced by
the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.3d 566,
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1973).
See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover
Insurance
Co., R.I., 417 A.2d 313 (1980); Craft v.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d
565 (7th Cir.1978) (applying Indiana law);
MFA Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Flint,
Tenn., 574 S.W.2d 718 (1978). Apparently,
these courts have taken this step as a matter of policy in order to provide what they
perceive to be an adequate remedy for an
insured wronged by an insurer's recalcitrance. These courts have reasoned that
under contract law principles, an insurer
who improperly refuses to settle a firstparty claim may be liable only for damages
measured by the maximum dollar amount
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for
losses suffered by the insured. The present case
involves such a first-parly situation. In contrast, a "third-party" situation is one where the
insurer contracts to defend the insured against
claims made by third parties against the insured
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the
specified dollar limit.
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of the insurance provided by the policy, and
such a damage measure provides little or
no incentive to an insurer to promptly and
faithfully fulfill its contractual obligations.
Accordingly, these courts have adopted a
tort approach in order to allow an insured
to recover extensive consequential and punitive damages, which tliey consider to be
unavailable in an action based solely on a
breach of contract. See Availability
of
Excess Damages, supra, at 168-77; First
Party Bad Faith, supra, at 158.
[3J We conclude that the tort approach
adopted by these courts is without a sound
theoretical foundation and has the potential
for distorting well-established principles of
contract law. Moreover, the practical end
of providing a strong incentive for insurers
to fulfill their contractual obligations can
be accomplished as well through a contract
cause of action, without the analytical
straining necessitated by the tort approach
and with far less potential for unforeseen
consequences to the law of contracts.
The analytical weaknesses of the tort
approach are easily seen. In Gruenberg,
the California court held that an insurer
has a duty to deal in good faith with its
insured and that an insured can bring an
action in tort, rather than contract, for
breach of that duty because the duty is
imposed by law and, being nonconsensual,
does not arise out of the contract. Glossing over any distinctions between first- and
third party situations, the court concluded
that the duty imposed upon the insurer
when bargaining with its insured in a firstparty situation is merely another aspect of
the fiduciary duty owed in the third party
context. Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance
Co., 9 Cal.3d at 573-74, 510 I\2d at 1037,
108 Cal.Rptr. at 485.
Although this Court, in Aynmerman v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d
261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), recognized a tort
cause of action for breach of an insurer's
obligation to bargain in a third-party context, we cannot agree with the Gruenberg
court that the considerations which compel
the recognition of a tort cause of action in
a third-party context are present in the
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first-party situation. In Am merman, we
stated that because a third-party insurance
contract obligates the insurer to defend the
insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duty
to its insured to protect the insured's interests as zealously as it would its own; consequently, a tort cause of action is recognized to remedy a violation of that duty.
19 Utah 2d at 265-66, 430 I\2d at 578-79.
[4] However, in Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co., we held that a
tort cause of action did not arise in a firstparty insurance contract situation because
the relationship between the insurer and its
insured is fundamentally different than in
a third-party context:
In the [third-party] situation, the insurer
must act in good faith and be as zealous
in protecting the interests of the insured
as it would be in regard to its own. In
the [first-party] situation, the insured
and the insurer are, in effect and practically speaking, adversaries.
25 Utah 2d at 319, 480 I\2d at 745 (citations omitted). Sec also Lawton v. Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at
580-81.
This distinction is of no small consequence. In a third party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims
against its insured, who relinquishes any
right to negotiate on his own behalf.
Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,
572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act
in good faith exposes its itisured to a judgment and personal liability in excess of the
policy limits. Santilli v. State Farm Life
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d
965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract
itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the
insurer by its insured. Cf Hal Taylor
Associates v. UnionAnienca,
Inc., Utah,
657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). The insured is
wholly dependent upon the insurer to see
that, in dealing with claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected. In addition, when dealing with
third parties, the insurer acts as an agent
for the insured with respect to the disputed
etaim. Wholly apart from the contractual
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obligations undertaken by the parties, the
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary
obligation to their principals with respect to
matters falling within the scope of their
agency. Id. at 748; see generally 3 Am.
Jur.2d Agency § 199 (1962).
In the first-party situation, on the other
hand, the reasons for finding a fiduciary
relationship and imposing a corresponding
duty are absent. No relationship of trust
and reliance is created by the contract; it
simply obligates the insurer to pay claims
submitted by the insured in accordance
with the contract. Santilli v. State Fai~m
Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. at 61-62, 562
I\2d at 969. Furthermore, none of the
indicia of agency are present. See generally Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., Mo.App., 665 S.W.2d 13, 1820 (1984).
Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a
theoretically sound basis for analogizing
the duty owed in a third-party context to
that owed in a first-party context. And
wholly apart from any theoretical problems, tailoring the tort analysis to first-party insurance contract cases has proven difficult. The pragmatic reason for adopting
the tort approach is that it exposes insurers
to consequential and punitive damages
awards in excess of the policy limits. However, the courts appear to have had difficulty in developing a sound rationale for limiting the tort approach to insurance contract
cases. This may be because there is no
sound theoretical difference between a
first-party insurance contract and any other contract, at least no difference that justifies permitting punitive damages for the
breach of one and not the other. In any
event, the tort approach and the accompa3.

Wc recognize dial in some eases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in
breaches of duty that are independent of the
contract and may give rise to causes of action in
tort. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAnterica, 657
I\2d at 750; lawton v. Great Southwest fire his.
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the law of
this state recognizes a duly to refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional distress to
others. Samms v. F.ccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358
P.2d 344 (1961). Thus, intentional and outrageous conduct by an insurer against an insured, coupled with a failure to bargain, could

nying punitive damages have moved rather
quickly into areas far afield from insurance. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct
Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206
Cal.Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1109, 207
Cal.Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984); Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance
Co., Mont., 668
P.2d 213, 214-16 (1983).
Furthermore, the courts adopting the
tort approach have had some difficulty in
determining what degree of bad faith is
necessary to sustain a claim. E.g., Anderson v. Continental
Insurance
Co., 85
Wis.2d 675, 692-94, 271 N.W.2d 368, 37(>77 (1978). From a practical standpoint, the
state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant;
even an inadvertent breach of the covenant
of good faith implied in an insurance contract can substantially harm the insured
and warrants a remedy.
[5, 6] We therefore hold that in a firstparty relationship between an insurer and
its insured, the duties and obligations of
the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of those
implied or express duties can give rise only
to a cause of action in contract, not one in
tort. 3 This position has not been widely
adopted by other courts, although a "respectable body of authority" is developing.
See Duncan v. Andrew County
Mutual
Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19, and
cases cited therein; Lawton
v. (heat
Southwest Eire Insurance Co., 118 N.I I.
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409
Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Availconceivably result in tort liability independent
of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of
contract. Additionally, the facts that give rise to
a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith
could also amount to fraudulent activity, rendering an insurer independently liable for dam
ages flowing from the fraud. See WetJterbcc i:
United his. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr.
764 (1968). Also, iindcr various unfair practices
acts, there may be statutory requirements that
give rise to independent causes of action. /:./?.,
U.C.A., 1953. §§ 31-27-1 to -24.

ability of Excess Damages, supra p. 4, at
168-71. We further hold that as parties to
a contract, the insured and the insurer have
parallel obligations to perform the contract
in good faith, obligations that inhere in
every contractual relationship.
State
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters
v.
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 232, 494 P.2d
529, 531 (1972); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 I\2d 293, 306
(1982).4
[7.8] Few cases define the implied contractual obligation to perform a first-party
insurance contract in good faith. However, because the considerations are similar, we freely look to the tort cases that
have described the incidents of the duty of
good faith in the context of first-party insurance contracts. From those cases and
from our own analysis of the obligations
undertaken by the parties, we conclude
that the implied obligation of good faith
performance contemplates, at the very
least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the
claim. See Anderson v. Continental
Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d at 692-93, 271
N.W.2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-19, 620
P.2d 141, 145-46, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 695-96
(1979). The duty of good faith also requires the insurer to "deal with laymen as
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties
of law and underwriting" and to refrain
from actions that will injure the insured's
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract. MFA Mutual Insurance
Co. v.
Flint, 574 S.W.2d at 720, quoting Merchants Indemnity
Corp. v. Egglcston, 37
N.J. 114, 122, 179 A.2d 505,'509 (1962);
accord Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969).
These performances are the essence of
what the insured has bargained and paid
4. The duty to perform the contract in good faith
cannot, by definition, be waived by cither party
to the agreement.

for, and
perform
breached
suffered

the insurer has the
them.
When an
this duty, it is liable
in consequence of

obligation to
insurer has
for damages
that breach.

In adopting the contract approach, we
are not ignoring the principal reason for
the adoption of the tort approach—to provide damage exposure in excess of the policy limits and thus remove any incentive for
breaching the duty of good faith. Despite
what some courts have suggested, e.g.,
Santilli v. Slate Farm Insurance Co., 562
I\2d at 969, and what some commentators
have asserted, e.g., J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 8878.15 at 421-26
(1981), there is no reason to limit damages
recoverable for breach of a duty to investigate, bargain, and settle claims in good
faith to the amount specified in the insurance policy. 5 Nothing inherent in the contract law approach mandates this narrow
definition of recoverable damages. Although the policy limits define the amount
for which the insurer may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do
not define the amount for which it may be
liable upon a breach. Lawton v. Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at
579.
[9] Damages recoverable for breach of
contract include both general damages, i.e.,
those flowing naturally from the breach,
and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the
time the contract was made. Pacific Coast
Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford
Accident
& Indemnity
Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325
I\2d 906, 907 (1958), citing Had ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145
(1854). We have repeatedly recognized
that consequential damages for breach of
contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Title
Insurance
Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Idcmnity, 7 Utah 2d at 379, 325 P.2d at 908
5.

In Ammerman, we suggested in dicta that in
an action for breach of an insurance policy, the
damages could not exceed the policy limits. 19
Utah 2d at 264, 430 P.2d at 578. We expressly
disavow this dicta.
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torney fees incurred for settling and deeding claims were foreseeable result of
ntractor's default); lie van v. JJl. Conuction Co., Utah, (»(»<) P.2d 442, 444
)83) (home purchasers entitled to dames for loss of favorable mortgage intert rate resulting from builder's breach of
ntract).
[10,11] In an action for breach of a
ity to bargain in good faith, a broad
tnge of recoverable damages is conceivae, particularly given the unique nature
id purpose of an insurance contract. An
isured frequently faces catastrophic continences if funds are not available within
reasonable period of time to cover an
isured loss; damages for losses well in
xcess of the policy limits, such as for a
ome or a business, may therefore be foreseeable and provable. See, e.g., Rcichcrt v.
ieneral Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724,
28, 428 P.2d 860, 8(>4 (1967), vacated on
dher grounds, 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377,
»9 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1968) (because bankrupty was a foreseeable consequence of fire
usurer's failure to pay, insurer was liable
for consequential damages flowing from
>ankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic
that insurance frequently is purchased not
jnly to provide funds in case of loss, but to
provide peace of mind for the insured or his
beneficiaries. Therefore, although other
courts adopting the contract approach have
been reluctant to allow such an award,
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 581-82, we find no
difficulty with the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish
might be provable.fi See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409
Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Williams, J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine,
123 Utah 145, 150, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (1953).
The foreseeability of any such damages
will always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and the reasonable
expectations of the parties. J. Calamari &
6. Clearly, damages will not be available for die
mere disappointment, flustration, or anxiety
normally experienced in the pioccss of filing an

J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d
ed. 1977).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we
return to a consideration of the present
case. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the insurer in the face of
affidavits of the insured, his counsel, and a
paralegal who had been an adjuster for
many years. In the absence of any responsive affidavits, we take the assertions of
the affidavits as true and view all unexplained facts in a light most favorable to
Reck. It appears that the insurer was
served with Heck's claim on June 23, 1982.
On July 1st, the claim was rejected without
explanation and without any request for
additional facts. The insured heard nothing more from the insurer until after August 2d, when this suit was filed. The
affidavits state that the insured accepted
the settlement offered by the insurer in
late October because of the financial pressure caused by the delay in resolving the
matter. The affidavits also offer the opinion of the expert adjuster turned paralegal
that the delay was in bad faith.
From January until late June, Heck was
apparently negotiating with the car owner's carrier and not with Farmers, for no
claim was filed with Farmers until June
23rd. Therefore, none of the delay between January and June 23rd can be attributed to Farmers. The unexplained delay
thereafter, however, together with a flat
rejection of plaintiffs offer, provides a factual basis for this cause of action sufficient
to withstand summary judgment. Farmers
had an obligation to diligently investigate
and evaluate Heck's claim. It rejected the
claim in one week, and we must infer that
the insurer did nothing to investigate or
evaluate the claim during the following
month.
[12J Under these circumstances and resolving all doubts in Heck's favor, we cannot say that a jury could not find that
Farmers breached its duty of good faith in
rejecting Heck's claim without explanation
insurance claim and negotiating a settlement
with an msuter.

BAILEY v. D E S E R E T F E D . SAV. & LOAN ASS'N
Clio us 701 l\2d 801 (Utah 198*1)
and in failing to further investigate the
Affirmed.
matter. Therefore, we remand the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.
HALL, C.,Ir, and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Claron I). BAILEY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
DESERET F E D E R A L SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18961.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 19, 1985.

Assignee of second deed of trust filed
action requesting that he be awarded excess sale proceeds over amount due holder
of first deed of trust. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., found for assignee, and holder of
first deed of trust appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that affidavit of
attorney representing assignee of second
deed of trust establishing that bankruptcy
judge dismissed assignee's complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale because of secured claims on debtor's property and because bankruptcy court had no interest in
funds, and that bankruptcy judge had earlier favorably responded to statement that
assignee would prefer to go to state court,
demonstrated that bankruptcy court did
not make adjudication on merits, and thus,
bankruptcy court's dismissal was not res
judicata so as to bar state court action by
assignee seeking to recover excess sale
proceeds over amount due holder of first
deed of trust.

Utah

803

Stewart, J., concurred in result.

1. Appeal and E r r o r <s=>2(M(t)
In action brought by assignee of second deed of trust seeking to be awarded
excess sale proceeds over amount due holder of first deed of trust, holder of first
deed of trust, by failing to interpose any
objection at trial to use of affidavit of
plaintiff's attorney, waived objection on basis of allegation that such affidavit was
hearsay, and could not raise such issue for
first time on appeal.
2. J u d g m e n t <e=65f
Finding that court does not have jurisdiction is not the sort of adjudication that
can serve as basis for res judicata on merits.
3. J u d g m e n t <S=*829(3)
Affidavit of attorney representing assignee of second deed of trust establishing
that bankruptcy judge dismissed assignee's
complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale
because of secured claims on debtor's property and because bankruptcy court had no
interest in funds, and that bankruptcy
judge had earlier favorably responded to
statement that assignee would prefer to go
to state court, demonstrated that bankruptcy court did not make adjudication on merits, and thus, bankruptcy court's dismissal
was not res judicata so as to bar state
court action by assignee seeking to recover
excess sale proceeds over amount due holder of first deed of trust.

Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. Hatch,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
J. Steven Newton, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
DURHAM, Justice:
The plaintiff, a mechanic's lien holder
and assignee of a second position trust
deed, filed a complaint with the federal
bankruptcy court asking the court to stay a
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care would have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and if so,
whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the plaintiff
acted in light of all the surrounding cir
cumstances, including the appreciated
risk.
Hcobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 31J
[8] It is well-settled that a plaintiff, act
nig in a reasonanbly prudent manner, has a
duty to foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d at 870,
particularly one that is plainly visible, and
avoid it. Hindmarsh v. O.P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410,
412 (1968). If a plaintiff fails to see or
sees but fails to avoid the danger, then the
plaintiff acted negligently. See Pollesche
v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520
P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff who
sees and ignores the danger is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of
law); Hindmarsh, 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417,
446 P.2d at 412; Whitman v. W.T. Grant
Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920
(1964) (plaintiff can be negligent either in
failing to look or in failing to heed what he
or she saw).
Instruction twenty-five, when read to
gether with all of the other instructions
given on negligence, is a correct statement
of a plaintiff's duty in a negligence action.
Nowhere in instruction twenty-five, nor in
any of the other remaining thirty-eight instructions, did the trial court intimate that
if Deats was negligent then she was precluded from recovering. On the contra**y,
the instructions, when read in their entirety, adequately informed the jury of CSB's
duty of care as a property owner, Deats'
duty of care, and most importantly, of the
procedure by which the jury must apportion negligence if both parties were found
to have acted negligently.
The trial court properly denied Deats'
motion for a new trial. The evidence supporting the jury's findings was ample and
convincing, and the verdict, therefore, was
not unreasonable nor unjust. Roylance,
737 P.2d at 234; Nelson v. Trujillo, 657
t».»i nm TA<? (Utah 1982).

Affirmed
Bank.

Coats to Commercial Security

BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
(o

3, Insurance <s=*602.12(2)
Evidence of attorney fees were inadmissible until insured established that insurer breached implied obligation of good
*aith by refusal to pay claim.

fKIVNUHBIR SYSTEM^

V> • i i Ray GAGON,
and Appellant,

record immediately prior to trial that par
ties and court agreed to exclude evidence
of punitive damages unless and until jur>
found bad faith, and where no objection
was voiced by insured.

ulntiff

v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a State
Farm Insurance Companies, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860137-CA,

John D. Parken (argued), Marcella I
Keck, Dart, Adamson & Parken, Salt LaktCity, for plaintiff and appellant.
Paul Belnap (argued), Strong & HanrSalt Lake City, for defendant and respor
dent.
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
and BENCH, JJ

Court of Appeals of I u*
Dec. 18, 1987
Insured brought action against automobile insurer for payment of claim and
bad faith refusal to pay claim. The Dis
trict Court, John A. Rokich, J., directed
\erdict in favor of insurer on bad faith
issue. Insured appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that evidence
created jury question whether insurer re
fused to pay claim in bad faith.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Insurance <&=>602.12(2)
Evidence created jury questions whether insured should have known that oil
pump was damaged after metal object fell
from pickup truck and struck underside of
car, whether insurer fairly evaluated claim
for damage to engine as result of nonfunc
tioning oil pump, and whether insurer refused to pay in bad faith.
2, Pretrial Procedure <3=752
Evidence of punitive damages was inadmissible in insured's action against insurer for payment oi claim and bad faith refusal to pay claim where judge stated on

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge.
Plaintiff, William Ray Gagon, brought
this action against defendant, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(State Farm), for payment of his insurance
claim and for alleged bad faith refusal to
pay his claim. Plaintiff appeals from the
trial court's directed verdict against him on
the bad faith issue. We reverse and remand.
On September 17, 1983, plaintiff was
driving his 1979 Fiat Spider when a metal
object fell out of the back of a pickup truck
he was following and struck the underside
of his car. Plaintiff stopped his car and
noted that the plastic spoiler under the
front grill had been broken, but he could
see no oil or other evidence of damage to
the car. Plaintiff then restarted the car
and drove about three miles. While driving, he noticed that the car lacked power
and that he was unable to drive faster than
forty-five or fifty miles per hour. Towards
the end of the three miles, he observed that
the oil light was on. He stopped the car,
tried to push it and briefly attempted to
restart \t When the car would not start,
plaintiff had it towed to Steve Harris Im

ports where inspection revealed that the oil
pump was broken. Because the oil pump
stopped functioning, the engine was damaged due to loss of lubrication, costing
$1,517.99 to repair.
Plaintiff reported the incident to State
Farm on September 19, 1983. On September 23, State Farm's appraiser examined
the vehicle and prepared a damage estimate indicating that State Farm would only
cover the external damage to the car and
not the internal damage due to loss of
lubrication. On October 5, 1983, plaintiff
went to State Farm's office and signed a
statement explaining the circumstances of
the incident. On October 12, 1983, State
Farm's claims committee determined that
plaintiff's claim would be denied "for internal repairs to the engine because of mechanical failure—wear and tear." On October 18, 1983, State Farm informed plaintiff
of its decision to deny coverage for internal
repairs and allow coverage for only the
external damage. In December 1983,
plaintiff initiated this action alleging that
State Farm's refusal to pay his claim was
in bad faith.
On the first day of trial, the parties
stipulated that the case would be tried or>
the bad faith issue, and if the jury found
bad faith, plaintiff could then submit evi
dence of punitive damages. On the second
day of trial, the court disallowed plaintiff's
evidence of attorney fees with the proviso
that he would reconsider the admissibility
of attorney fees if the jury found bad faith
After the parties had presented their evidence, both parties moved for a directed
verdict. The trial judge granted State
Farm's motion on the issue of whether
State Farm acted in bad faith in refusing to
pay plaintiff's insurance claim and denied
plaintiff's motion regarding coverage under the policy for engine damage. The
judge then allowed the jury to determine
whether plaintiff was entitled to all the
damages resulting from the accident. The
jury awarded plaintiff $1,517.99, less plaintiff's insurance deductible of $200, plus ten
percent interest from September 17, 1983.
Plaintiff appeals claiming that the trial
court erred in granting State Farm's motion for a directed verdict on the bad faith
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•laim since reasonable minds could have
found that State Farm acted in bad faith.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence of punitive
damages and consequential damages including attorney fees.
I.
[1J In reviewing a directed verdict, the
court must examine all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the losing party.
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728,
732 (Utah 1984). If the evidence permits
reasonable persons to reach different conclusions on the issues, the directed verdict
should not be granted. Little Am. Re/. Co.
v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982);
Cerrit08 Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture
No. i, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982).
After the trial court granted State
Farm's motion for a directed verdict on the
bad faith issue, the Utah Supreme Court
rendered Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).1 In
Beck, the Court held that "as parties to a
contract, the insured and the insurer have
parallel obligations to perform the contract
in good faith." Id. at 801. The Court then
defined the obligation of good faith as contemplating that "the insurer will diligently
investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or
settling the claim." Id. In addition, the
Court stated that the duty of good faith
"requires the insurer to 'deal with laymen
as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting' and to refrain
from actions that will injure the insured's
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract" Id.
With these principles in mind and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, we examine whether reasonable minds could differ as to whether State

Farm breached its obligation of good faith.
It was undisputed that State Farm denied
coverage for plaintiffs claim because "the
damages sustained to the internal parts of
the engine were not a result of a collision
loss but rather a result of a mechanical
failure, wear and tear." However, State
Farm's claims manual states:
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF
OIL:
Claims for damage to the motor caused
by the loss of oil following a roadbed
collision will qualify for payment under
any form of Collision Coverage.
A roadbed collision shall be deemed to
be any contact between the insured vehicle and the roadbed, or any object
fixed, frozen or imbedded in the road
such as a rock, stump, or any other stationary object.
There should be a reasonable compliance with that condition of the policy
which provides, 'When loss occurs the
named insured shall use every reasonable means to protect the damaged property covered by this policy from any further damage.'
This has the effect of treating motor
damage following a roadbed collision as
a part of the direct damage, instead of
indirect damage. Reference to the Conditions Section is made because the payment should not include any amount for
damage resulting from the further operation of the vehicle after damage to the
oil pan or to the motor has become
known to the operator, or after the existence of damage should have become
known by the operator exercising reasonable care.
At trial plaintiff testified that he was in
the wholesale jewelry business and had
never worked on cars other than adding
windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid and
oil. He also testified that he had stopped

1. Beck overruled Lyon v. Hartford Accident andwhether a claim of bad faith gave rise to a tort
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311. 480 P.2d 739 cause of action. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 n. 1. The
Court characterized the ruling in Lyon as leav(1971) to the extent that Lyon was philosophicaling "an insured without any effective remedy
ly inconsistent with the Beck Court's recognition
against an insurer that refuses to bargain or
of a cause of action in contract for the insurer's
settle in good faith with the insured." Id. at
failure to perform the contract in good faith and
798.
• - - i . . «k« nufdion of

his car after hitting the metal object,
looked under the car and did not see any
oil. After inspecting the car, he drove for
another three miles before he noticed a loss
of power, observed that the oil light was on
and stopped the car. In addition, there was
conflicting testimony as to whether the loss
of lubrication occurred within seconds of
impact with the metal object or whether
plaintiff caused the damage by continuing
to operate the vehicle. Plaintiffs witness,
Gary Majnik, who repaired his car, testified
that an engine in a Fiat Spider could be
damaged by loss of lubrication within seconds of hitting an object. Plaintiff also
called another mechanic, Steve Crane, who
testified that a person without general
knowledge of mechanics, who hit something on the underside of a 1979 Fiat and
dented the oil pan, would not know whether to continue driving the car other than as
indicated by the warning systems in the
car. He also stated that the warnings systems can malfunction.
Based on these facts, we find that reasonable minds could differ as to whether
plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, knew
or should have known that the oil pump
was damaged and that he should not continue to drive the car. Further, we conclude that reasonable persons could reach
different conclusions as to whether State
Farm fairly evaluated the claim and acted
reasonably in rejecting or settling the
claim. Therefore, we hold that, in light of
Beck, the directed verdict on the bad faith
issue was improperly granted, and the issue should have been decided by the jury.
II.
[2,3] The second issue is whether the
court improperly excluded evidence of puni-

tive damages and consequential damages
including attorney fees. Immediately prior
to the trial in this case, the judge stated on
the record that the parties and the court
agr""d to exclude evidence of punitive damages unless and until the jury found that
State Farm had acted in bad faith. No
objection was voiced by plaintiff. Therefore, we find no merit in plaintiffs claim
that evidence of punitive damages was improperly excluded. On the second day of
trial, the court stated that it would exclude
evidence of attorney fees but would reserve the right to later admit evidence of
attorney fees if the jury found bad faith.
Generally, attorney fees are not chargeable
to an opposing party unless there is contractual or statutory liability for them. Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 698 P.2d
346, 348 (Utah 1979). However, according
to Beck, consequential damages such as
attorney fees may be recoverable in an
insurance carrier lack of good faith case.
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. Therefore, we
find no error in the exclusion of attorney
fees until after plaintiff established that
State Farm breached its implied obligation
of good faith. If lack of good faith is
found on remand, consideration of punitive
damages and consequential damages will
be appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur.
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 28, 1988.
Appeal from Third District Court, Salt
Lake County; John A. Rokich, J.
Paul M. Belnap, Stephen J. Trayner, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and petitioner.
John D. Parken, Marcella L. Keck, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
ORDER
The above-entitled petition for writ of
certiorari having been heretofore considered, it is hereby ordered that the same
be denied.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in
denial of certiorari):
Defendant State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company ("State Farm") seeks review of
the Court of Appeals' opinion, 746 P.2d
1194 (Utah App.1987), which reversed the
trial court's grant of a directed verdict in
favor of State Farm on plaintiff William
Ray Gagon's claim that State Farm had
acted in bad faith in refusing to pay an
insurance claim. The Court today denies
the writ. 1 agree that the holding below is
correct; however, 1 write separately for
the purpose of disavowing the implications
of dicta in the last sentence of the Court of
Appeals' opinion.
The Court of Appeals first properly held
that the facts were sufficient to go to the
jury on the question of whether State Farm
had breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing described in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
The Court of Appeals then properly held
that, under the facts of this case, the trial
court had not erred in excluding evidence
of punitive damages and consequential

damages, which consist of attorney fees,
when it sent to the jury the separate question of whether State Farm had breached
the contract of insurance when it refused
to pay the claim. The Court of Appeals
then remanded the case to the trial court so
that the question of breach of the Beck
covenant could be sent to the jury. All this
is an appropriate handling of the trial
court's ruling.
In the last sentence of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals states: "If lack
of good faith is found on remand, consideration of punitive damages . . . will be appropriate." 746 P.2d at 1197. While this
statement is not part of the Court of Appeals' holding, the trial court may consider
this dictum binding on remand. Specifically, the trial judge may feel compelled to
peVmit the jury to award punitive damages
if Gagon shows nothing more than a
breach of the Beck covenant of good faith.
To do so would be error under Beck.
Therefore, I think it important to state that
this possibly casual remark by the Court of
Appeals should not be considered an accurate or binding statement of the law on the
availability of punitive damages.
In Beck, we were very careful to make it
plain that a claim for an insurer's breach of
its implied covenant to act in good faith
toward its insured did not, alone, give rise
to a cause of action in tort; rather, the
cause of action was one in contract. While
consequential damages for breach of the
covenant would be available, tort damages,
including punitive damages, would not. To
recover punitive damages, a plaintiff would
have to show all of the elements of a
separate tort. Beck, 701 P.2d at 800-02 &
n. 3. Accordingly, under Beck, a plaintiff
is not entitled to put on evidence of punitive damages unless he or she can make
out a sufficient case to go to the jury on an
independent tort theory. Id.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.
|KlYNUMBtRSYSUM>
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 870222-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 21, 1989.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1989.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond S.
Uno, J., of possession of controlled substance, and she appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) motor
vehicle passenger was seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment when deputy
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate and expected
her to wait while he ran warrants check,
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became
defendant, constituted temporary detention
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed crime.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., filed dissenting opinion.
1. Criminal Law «=»1030(2)
Court of Appeals would not consider
claim raised for first time on appeal, that
Utah Constitution and law provide greater
protection than Fourth Amendment of
United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.C.
A.1953, 77-7-15.
2. Arrest «=»68(4)
Motor vehicle passenger was seized
within meaning of Fourth Amendment
when deputy sheriff who had stopped vehicle took passenger's name and birthdate
and expected her to wait while he ran warrants check; under totality of the circumstances, passenger was reasonably justified
1. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing

in belief that she was not free to go. U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
3. Automobiles <s=»349(17, 18)
Fourth Amendment seizure of motor
vehicle passenger constituted temporary
detention supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that passenger had committed
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs
testimony that deputy believed there was
possibility vehicle he had stopped for having faulty brake light was stolen as driver
was not registered owner and was unable
to find vehicle registration, it was reasonable to ask passenger her name to determine if her names corresponded with owner's name that had been learned prior to
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not
detained for unreasonable period of time.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued),
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R.
Larsen (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., for
plaintiff and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of her motion
to suppress and her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.1 We affirm.
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a
faulty brake light. Defendant was a passenger in that vehicle. At the suppression
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the
license plate and obtained the name of the
registered owner. He then approached the
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for
her license. The name on the license was
not the name of the registered owner.
on defendant's motion to suppress.

When Stroud requested the registration
certificate, the driver was unable to produce it. Stroud then asked defendant for
identification, reasoning that there was a
possibility the car was stolen because there
was no registration and no owner present.
After initially denying that she had any
identification, defendant told Stroud her
name and birthdate.
Stating that he would be right back and
expecting the driver and defendant to remain, Stroud returned to his vehicle and
ran license checks on the two, determining
that the driver was driving on a suspended
license and that defendant had several outstanding warrants. He did not, however,
inquire as to whether the car was stolen,
nor did he know of any reports of stolen
cars matching that car's description. He
then wrote a citation on the driver and
requested a backup police officer.
When defendant was informed that she
was being arrested for outstanding warrants, she exited the vehicle, holding a
backpack which had the name "Karen" on
it. Defendant initially denied that the
backpack belonged to her, but later admitted that it was hers. Incident to her arrest, the bag was searched and was found
to contain amphetamines, drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah identification.
Defendant's version of the sequence of
events varies from Stroud's. She testified
that after Stroud received the driver's license, he asked defendant if she had any
identification. She said that she did not.
He told them to wait, that he would be
right back, and returned to his vehicle for
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to
smoke a cigarette or two. When he returned, he asked for the registration certificate. When it could not be produced,
Stroud asked defendant to return to his
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she
gave him her name and birthdate. He then
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen
minutes later, he came back to their car,
gave the driver a citation, took defendant
out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her,
2. Utah has never drawn any distinctions between these two provisions and has "always
considered the protections afforded to be one
and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,

and put her in the front seat of the sheriff's car. She had possession of her bag at
this time. Defendant stated that she gave
Stroud her name and birthdate because she
was required to do so, and did not believe
that she could leave.
The issues on appeal are: (I) whether
defendant may raise, for the first time on
appeal, the argument that state law and
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution
provide greater protection than the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3)
if there was a seizure, whether it was
reasonable.
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress,
we will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility and accuracy
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies.
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156,
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a "correction of error" standard. Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
[ 11 Defendant claims that her detention
violated the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section
14 of the Utah Constitution. She also argues that the legislative intent behind Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide
greater protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures than is provided by
the fourth amendment, and that her seizure violated the provisions of both constitutions.2 However, defendant failed to
1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote comment, the court indicated that it has not ruled
out the possibility of making such a distinction
in a future case. Id. at n. 8.
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level dant was, therefore, seized when Stroud
and first raised her statutory argument in took her name and birthdate and expected
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to her to wait while he ran a warrants check.
such different constitutional guarantees Under the totality of the circumstances,
without any analysis before the trial court defendant was reasonably justified in her
does not sufficiently raise the issue to per- belief that she was not free to go.
mit consideration by this court on appeal.
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
13] Now, the concern is whether the
Ct.App.1987). "IWJhere a defendant fails seizure was reasonable and permissible unto assert a particular ground for suppress- der the fourth amendment. In State v.
ing unlawfully obtained evidence in the tri- Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per
al court, an appellate court will not consid- curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted
er that ground on appeal
[MJotions to the reasoning in United States v. Merritt,
suppress should be supported by precise 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein
averments, not conclusory allegations
" the Fifth Circuit specified three constituState v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah tionally permissible levels of police stops:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated:
as the citizen is not detained against his
There is nothing in the record to indicate
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
that the point now urged upon this Court
the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
was unavailable or unknown to defenthat the person has committed or is
dant at the time he filed his motion to
about to commit a crime; however, the
suppress, and to entertain the point now
"detention must be temporary and last
would be to sanction the practice of withno longer than is necessary to effectuate
holding positions that should properly be
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
presented to the trial court but which
may arrest a suspect if the officer has
may be withheld for the purpose of seekprobable cause to believe an offense has
ing a reversal on appeal and a new trial
been committed or is being committed.
or dismissal.
We, therefore, decline to consider this ar- Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18.
gument on appeal.
We conclude that the present case involves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify
SEIZURE
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reason[2] Defendant avers that she was
able "articulable suspicion" that defendant
seized within the meaning of the fourth
had committed a crime. To determine if he
amendment because she felt that she was
acted reasonably under the circumstances,
not free to leave when Stroud told her to
"due weight must be given, not to his inwait while he returned to his vehicle to
choate and unparticularized suspicion or
check on the driver's license and to run a
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inwarranto check on defendant. "A seizure
ferences which he is entitled to draw from
within the meaning of the fourth amendthe facts in light of his experience." Terry
ment occurs only when the officer by v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883,
means of physical force or show of authori- 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
ty has in some way restricted the liberty of
At this point, we defer to the findings of
a person/' State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,
87 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Further, "[w]hen a the trial judge because of his preferred
reasonable person, based on the totality of position in evaluating the witnesses' credithe circumstances, remains, not in the spir- bility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The
it of cooperation . . . but because he be- record indicates that the trial court believes he is not free to leave," a seizure lieved Stroud's testimony in concluding
occurs. Id.; see also United States v. there was an articulable suspicion that deMendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. fendant had committed a crime. Prior to
1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Defen- asking defendant for identification, Stroud

believed that there was a possibility the car period of time, We, therefore, affirm dewas stolen because the owner was absent fendant's conviction.
and there was no registration. He knew
that the driver was not the owner, but
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
determined that it was reasonable to ask
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
defendant her name to determine if it corresponded with the owner's name he had
Although the legal analysis applicable to
learned prior to stopping the vehicle. The this case is ably set out in the majority's
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle conclusion that the arresting officer had an
check is of no great significance because articulable suspicion that the automobile
not all stolen cars are reported immediate- had been stolen, much less that defendant
ly. The trial judge stated that where there had in any way participated in the theft.
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a
The only facte relied on by the officer
suspended license, and there is "no way of were that the driver's name was not the
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and name of the registered owner and the drivwhether they have permission to drive it er was not able to locate the registration
because the owner is not present," a rea- certificate. These facte are just as consistsonable officer would inquire regarding the ent with the more likely scenario that the
identity of a passenger. In weighing the driver borrowed the car from its rightful
testimony, the court was justified in find- owner. Absent more—and this is all the
ing that the amount of time defendant was officer pointed to—there was simply no
required to wait, even though a passenger, articulable suspicion, as a matter of law,
was reasonable and did not take any longer that the car had been stolen.
than a normal traffic stop.
I would accordingly reverse.
Thus, there was substantial evidence for
the trial court to find as it did. Although a
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitutional requirements in that Officer Stroud
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that
the car could have been stolen, and defendant was not detained for an unreasonable
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Robert Kent HILL, individually and as
Personal Representative of the heirs of
Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as
personal representative of the heirs of
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,
v.
Kenneth Paul BRYAN, Third-Party
Defendant and Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 20335, 20391.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 1, 1988.
Subsequent to settlement of wrongful
death action, personal representatives of
persons killed in accident filed suit against
automobile insurer. Insurer filed third-party claim against driver of second automobile. The District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judith M. Billings, J., granted summary
judgment for automobile insurer on issue
of subrogation and denied insurer's summary judgment motion against driver of
second automobile. Personal representatives and insurer appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that (1) in determining allocation of amount received by
insured from third-party tort-feasor for
subrogation purposes, it is not assumed
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the amount of damages incurred; (2) in absence of specific contractual terms in either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the insured
must be made whole prior to any recovery
by insurer against the tort-feasor; and (3)
where personal representatives released
driver of second automobile from further
liability in order to obtain settlement, insurer's only recourse was to show either that
the personal representatives were fully
compensated or that personal representa-

tives' action in releasing second driver
breached the insurance policy.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
See also 709 P.2d 257.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>934(1)
In reviewing grant of motion for summary judgment, all doubts or uncertainties
concerning issues of fact are viewed in
light most favorable to party opposing
summary judgment.
2. Subrogation <3=>1
Subrogation is equitable doctrine and
is governed by equitable principles.
3. Insurance <s=601
In absence of express terms to the
contrary, insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor.
4. Insurance <^»606(1)
Where court record did not reveal extent of subrogation terms of automobile
policy and it was not possible to ascertain
intent of parties as to extent of their respective rights under the subrogation
clause, the doctrine of subrogation would
be applied according to general principles
of equity.
5. Insurance <3=*606(10)
Where personal representatives of motorists killed in accident released driver of
second automobile from further liability in
order to obtain settlement with insurer of
second automobile, they were not entitled
to receive future compensation from driver
of second automobile; thus, insurer of first
automobile could only be reimbursed from
personal representatives of persons killed
in the accident and had no claim on driver
of second automobile.
6. Insurance s»601
In determining allocation of amount
received by insured from third-party tortfeasor in order to determine insurer's right
to subrogation, it is not assumed that the
amount of the settlement is coextensive
with the amount of damages incurred.
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7. Judgment <*=»181(23)
Where amount of damages suffered by
insured was disputed by insured and insurer, summary judgment on automobile insurer's subrogation claim was not appropriate.
8. Insurance <s=»601
If plaintiffs' action in releasing tortfeasor breaches insurance policy and insurer can show it could have recovered from
tort-feasor, it will be entitled to proceeds as
a matter of equity.
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for
Robert Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell.
Glenn C. Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt
Lake City, for State Farm Mut Auto. Ins.
Co.
J. Anthony Eyre, Heinz J. Mahler, Salt
Lake City, for Kenneth Paul Bryan.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant,
arguing that numerous triable issues of
fact exist and claiming bad faith. State
Farm appeals from a judgment in favor of
third-party defendant Bryan. We reverse
the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm
the judgment against State Farm.
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned
and driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, who
was legally intoxicated, ran a red light and
struck a vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin
Caldwell and driven by Caldwell's son.
Plaintiff Robert Hill's daughter was an occupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force of
the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son
and Hill's daughter. At the time of the
accident, Caldwell's vehicle was insured by
State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured
by Cumis Insurance International. State
Farm paid $5,510 to Caldwell for property
damage to his vehicle. Shortly thereafter,
Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an
attempt to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State
1, To arrive at these figures, the parties subtracted the property damage amount from the total
policy proceeds and divided the remainder
equally between them. The disputed property
785 P 2d—20

Farm thereupon notified Cumis of its subrogation claim for the amount it had paid
Caldwell for property damage.
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who
filed separate suits against Bryan and independently investigated the extent of his
financial holdings. These investigations revealed that, aside from the Cumis policy,
Bryan was insolvent. After this discovery,
Caldwell and Hill withdrew their suits
against Bryan and made a claim with Cumis for the policy proceeds, which were to
be divided evenly between them. Cumis
refused to simply deliver one-half to each
plaintiff because of State Farm's subrogation claim. Plaintiffs therefore sought a
waiver of claim from State Farm, arguing
that the value of their wrongful death actions far exceeded Bryan's policy limits.
State Farm refused to waive its subrogation claim and apparently urged plaintiffs
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that
the amount of their damages could be judicially ascertained. Plaintiffs determined
the cost of acquiring such a judicial determination to be prohibitive.
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of
claims in favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other
possible defendants. In return, Cumis tendered $22,245 to Hill and $27,755 to Caldwell.1
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy
proceeds unless State Farm's subrogation
interest was accounted for, its tender to
Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245
made to Caldwell alone and a check for
$5,510 made jointly to Caldwell and State
Farm. The latter draft corresponded to
the amount of property damage incurred
by Caldwell and accounted for State
Farm's subrogation claim. The release
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute
surrounding the $5,510 by stating:
[A] controversy exists between State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and
Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to
the said amount, and that the matter will
be resolved between the two or by paydamage award was then added to Caldwell's
portion because he was the owner of the damaged automobile.
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ment into court or by judicial determination.
Plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach
an accord for more than one year after the
release was signed. Plaintiffs filed suit
against State Farm, seeking payment of
$5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of
State Farm for its refusal to waive the
subrogation claim. In turn, State Farm
filed a third-party claim against Bryan for
subrogation and indemnity. State Farm
also counterclaimed against plaintiffs for
$5,510.

superior equitable position, and the insurer's equitable position cannot be superior to
the insured's unless the insured has been
completely compensated.
Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505
P.2d 783 (1972); see also Culver v. Insurance Co. of S. Am., 221 N.J. Super. 493,
535 A.2d 15 (1987); Westendorfv. Stasson,
330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1983).
When the amount of damages incurred
by the insured has been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation right
of the insurer is usually undisputed. The
State Farm filed a motion for summary insured is not entitled to double recovery,
judgment on both plaintiffs' complaints and and the insurer is equitably entitled to reon its own counterclaim. The trial court cover any amounts from the insured that
granted the motion, awarding State Farm the insured recovered from the tort-feasor.
When the insured settles with the tort$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The
court also decreed that State Farm had no feasor before the amount of damages has
been judicially determined, it is more difficaube of action against Bryan.
cult to ascertain whether the insurer is
[1] In reviewing a grant of a motion for entitled to recover all or any of the amount
summary judgment, all doubts or uncer- paid on the policy to the insured. See
tainties concerning issues of fact are generally Comment, Subrogation in
viewed in the light most favorable to the Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of
party opposing summary judgment. Insurers and Insureds in Settlements
Mountain States TeL & TeL Co. v. Atkin, with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp.
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah L.Q. 667 (1983).
1984). Where a triable issue of fact exists,
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v.
the cause will be remanded for determinaBarnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783
tion of that issue.
(1972), this Court examined an insurance
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is company's claim for subrogation against its
subrogated to the rights of plaintiffs and insured where the insured had settled with
that State Farm should thereby recover the a third-party tort-feasor. The insurance
amount it paid for property damage from company asserted that the settlement covthe amount plaintiffs recovered from the ered the insured's entire claim and that the
third-party tort-feasor. Plaintiffs argue insurance company was therefore entitled
that State Farm's subrogation rights do to receive reimbursement for the medical
not arise until plaintiffs have been made expenses it had paid the insured. In reviswhole.
ing the summary judgment, this Court not[2,3] Subrogation is an equitable doc- ed that a lump-sum settlement without aptrine and is governed by equitable princi- portionment as Co specific items of damage
ples. This doctrine can be modified by is not sufficient to indicate whether the
contract, but in the absence of express insured had received double compensation
terms to the contrary, the insured must be for the same injury. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 106,
made whole before the insurer is entitled to 505 P.2d at 786. In order to ascertain what
be reimbursed from a recovery from the the settlement in Barnes was intended to
third-party tort-feasor. Lyon v. Hartford cover, this Court reversed and remanded
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, the cause for a trial. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 107,
318, 480 P.2d 739, 744 (1971). Noncontrac- 505 P.2d at 787.
tual subrogation rights will only be enSetting forth the purpose and intended
forced on behalf of a party maintaining a allocation of money given in the settlement
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is a simple matter. As this Court noted in
Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settlement was intended to include damages previously paid to the insured by the insurer,
the tort-feasor who is aware of the insurer's subrogation claim should offer payment in two drafts: one draft for the insured alone and a separate draft issued to
the insured and the insurer jointly. Id. 29
Utah 2d at 106, 505 P.2d at 787. In so
doing, the apportionment of the settlement
amount is clearly shown and the intentions
of the parties can most effectively be enforced.
[4] In the case now before the Court,
the insurer's right to subrogation was set
forth in the insurance policy. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal the extent of
the subrogation terms, nor does it provide
a complete copy of the insurance policy.
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent
of the parties as to the extent of their
respective rights under the subrogation
clause. Therefore, the doctrine of subrogation should be applied in this case according to general principles of equity.
As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared
two separate drafts when tendering payment to Caldwell under the settlement.
The first draft was to Caldwell alone and
the second draft, in the amount of $5,510,
was made to Caldwell and State Farm.
State Farm now argues that the joint draft
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to
cover plaintiffs' property damage. This
contention is incorrect. The language of
the release does not provide for the allocation of the $5,510. The release states that
the parties have yet to determine the rightful owner of that amount because "a controversy exists" between State Farm and
Caldwell "as to who was entitled to the
said amount, and that the matter will be
resolved between the two or by payment
into court or by judicial determination." In
other words, at the time the draft was
conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the
parties had not agreed whether that
amount was intended for property damage
or to satisfy the wrongful death claim.
Cumis acted properly in acknowledging
State Farm's subrogation claim and in be-

ing certain that, to the extent State Farm
was justified in taking reimbursement from
Cumis's policy limits, it would be able to do
so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the
release shows that neither Cumis nor plaintiffs intended the amount to be allocated to
property damage without further negotiation.
[5] Because the parties have been unable to resolve the subrogation question,
we are required to determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds. State
Farm argues that the amount recovered by
plaintiffs from Cumis represents the entire
amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, argue that the amount
received from Cumis only compensates
them for a portion of their damages and
therefore they are not obligated to reimburse State Farm until they receive a full
recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan
from further liability in order to obtain the
settlement with Cumis, they are not entitled to receive future compensation from
Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reimbursed from plaintiffs and has no claim on
Bryan. See 73 Am. Jur.2d Subrogation
§ 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to limitations placed on the rights of subrogor).
[6] In determining the allocation of an
amount received by an insured from a
third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the amount of damages incurred. Damages encompass the injuries
suffered by a plaintiff. The amount of a
settlement almost universally reflects the
greatest amount that a plaintiff could have
possibly received from a tort-feasor without litigation. As the court in Janzcn v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67 (Minn.
1979), stated:
[M]any considerations enter into settle
ments. Respondent may have wished to
avoid possibly protracted and frustrating
legal battles; respondent may have needed the money immediately; or respondent may have been pressured into the
agreement for other reasons. Thus, the
amount of the settlement and compensation may not adequately reflect the actual loss

868

Utah

765 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Id. at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1983); Florida
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377
So.2d 827, 830-31 (Fla.1979).
One of the considerations which may lead
an insured to settle with a third-party tortfeasor for an amount less than its damages
is that the tort-feasor is insolvent and less
than adequately insured. Here, Bryan was
personally insolvent, and his insurance policy was for an amount apparently insufficient to cover the full extent of plaintiffs'
claims.2
Several courts have noted the importance
of a tort-feasor's solvency or adequacy of
insurance in influencing the insured's decision to settle and will not allow an insurer
to exercise a subrogation claim where the
settlement was reached due to the tort-feasor's inability to fully compensate the insured. See, e.g., Government Employees
his. Co. v. Graff, 327 So.2d 88, 91 (FJa.
1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554.
In light of these principles and prevailing
Utah law, we hold that in the absence of
specific contractual terms in either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the insured must be made whole prior
to any recovery by the insurer against the
tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with
the tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes
to the insured unless the insurer can prove
that the insured has already received full
compensation.
Our holding does not undermine the suggestion in Barnes that a settlement agreement can effectively allocate the damages
it is intended to cover through the use of
multiple drafts made out to appropriate
parties. Instead, where the language of
the release leaves the allocation uncertain
and where there is no controlling contractual language to the contrary, the insured
should be given the benefit of the doubt as
to its damages and the burden will rest
with the insurer to prove that the insured
has been fully compensated. This procedure has been used by other courts and will
result in the most effective implementation
of the equitable principles underlying the
2. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to
tender the full policy amount prior to litigation

doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Conlon, 153
Conn. 415, 216 A.2d 828 (1966); Dimick ex
reL Dimick v. Lewis, 127 N.H. 141, 497
A.2d 1221 (1985).
[7] In the instant ca^e, the amount of
plaintiffs' damages is a question of fact
which has yet to be determined. There is
no specific contractual language in the insurance policy which requires allocation of
the settlement amount, nor does the release specify who should receive the $5,510
paid jointly to State Farm and Caldwell.
Because the amount of plaintiffs' damages
is disputed by the parties, that amount
should be set through judicial determination so that the proceeds from Bryan's
policy can be equitably distributed. Th^t
judicial determination will be factually
based, and therefore summary judgment
was inappropriate in this case.
State Farm also claims that if it is not
entitled to the $5,510 payment from
Bryan's insurer, then the releases signed
by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extinguish its subrogation claim against Bryan.
Allowing plaintiffs to extinguish State
Farm's claims would be tantamount to a
breach of the subrogation provision in the
insurance policy. If, however, the amount
of damages incurred by plaintiffs exceeds
the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm
must also demonstrate that it could have
recovered the $5,510 from Bryan, absent
the releases and without relying on the
insurance policy proceeds. See, e.g., Royal
Indem. Co. v. Pharr, 94 Ga. App. 114, 117,
93 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1956). As we stated in
Barnes:
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a superior equity and thus to be entitled to
prevail must present proof which establishes that the damages covered by defendant's settlement were the same or
cover those for which the defendant has
already received indemnity from plaintiff; otherwise, the receipt of payment
from the tort-feasor does not entitle the
plaintiff to the return of the payments
made by it
or serious negotiation over the amount of plaintiffs' damages.

CRUZ v. WRIGHT

Utah

869

Cite *• 765 P2d 869 (Utah 19M)

Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d
783, 787 (citations omitted).
[8] We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in State Farm's claim against
Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims
cannot rise above the claims of the subrogees, plaintiffs Hill and Caldwell. Because
Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from any
further liability, State Farm is unable to
pursue its claim against him. Instead, as
explained above, State Farm's only recourse is to show either that plaintiffs were
fully compensated and thus State Farm is
entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's insurance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs'
action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy, and if State Farm shows it
could have recovered from Bryan, it will be
entitled to the proceeds as a matter of
equity.
Summary judgment in favor of State
Farm on plaintiffs' complaints and on State
Farm's counterclaim is reversed. Judgment in favor of Bryan is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.
(o
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Lori CRUZ and Nicholas A. Cruz,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Jed WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20465.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 2, 1988.
Husband sued negligent driver to recover damages for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident, and wife sued driver
to recover for loss of consortium. The
District Court, Fourth District, Utah County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., granted defendant's motion to dismiss the loss-of-con-

sortium claim, and wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that the
constitutional open courts provision did not
prohibit abolishment of a common law lossof-consortium cause of action.
Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law <s=>328
Open courts provision of constitution
is not to be read as preserving every common law cause of action that may have
existed prior to adoption of constitution.
Const, Art. 1, § 11.
2. Husband and Wife <S=»209(3, 4)
Even if loss-of-consortium cause of action did exist at common law, such cause of
action was abolished by adoption of Married Women's Act of 1898. U.C.A.1953,
30-2-1 et seq., 30-2-4.
Samuel King, Jeffrey O. Burkhardt, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
D. Gary Christian, Gregory J. Sanders,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiff Lori Cruz appeals from the trial
court's dismissal of her claim for loss of
consortium arising out of injuries suffered
by her husband in an automobile accident
caused by defendant Jed Wright Her primary argument on appeal is that article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution—the
open courts provision—prevented the legislature from abolishing the husband's common law cause of action for loss of consortium and that we should extend a parallel
cause of action to the wife. We adhere to
our prior decisions and hold that in passing
the Married Women's Act of 1898, the legislature eliminated the common law loss-ofconsortium cause of action. We further
hold that the 1898 Act did not run afoul of
article I, section 11.
Following an automobile accident in
which Nicholas Cruz was injured, Nicholas
and his wife, Lori, filed an action against
the driver of the other car, Jed Wright,
alleging that Nicholas was injured as a
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Robert Kent H i l l , individually and
as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the
h e i r s of Tamara Elaine Hill #
deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell,
i n d i v i d u a l l y and as personal
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the heirs of
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased,
P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants,

No«, 20335, 20391
F I L E D
November 1, 1988

v.
state Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,
v*
Kenneth Paul Bryan,
Third-Party Defendant
and Cross-Appellee.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Judith h. Billings
Attorneys:

Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for Robert
Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell
Glenn C* Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake city,
for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
J, Anthony Eyre, Heinz J* Mahler, Salt Lak* City,
for Kenneth Paul Bryan

DITRKAM, Justice:
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of summary
j., Igment in favor of defendant, arguing that numerous triable
issues of fact exist and claiming bad faith. State Farm
appeals from a judgment in favor of third-party defendant
Bryan* We reverse the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm
the judgment against State Farm.
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned and driven by
Kenneth Paul Bryan, who was legally intoxicated, ran a red
light and struck * vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin Caldwell

and driven by Caldwell'* son. Plaintiff Robert Hill's
daughter was an occupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force
of the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son and Hill's
daughter. At the time of the accident, Caldwell's vehicle
was insured by State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured by
Cumis Insurance International. State Farm paid $5,510 to
Caldwell for property damage to his vehicle• Shortly,
thereafter, Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an attempt to
satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State Farm thereupon notified
Cumis of its subrogation claim for the amount it had paid
Caldwell for property damage.
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who filed
separate suits against Bryan and independently investigated
the extent of his financial holdings. These investigations
revealed v it, aside from the Cumis policy, Bryan was
insolvent. After this discovery, Caldwell and Hill withdrew
their suits against Bryan and made a claim with Cumis for
the policy proceeds, which were to be divided evenly between
them. Cumis refused to simply deliver one-half to each
plaintiff because of State Farm's subrogation claim.
Plaintiffs therefore sought a waiver of claim from State
Farm, arguing that the value of their wrongful death actions
far exceeded Bryan's policy limits. State Farm refused to
waive its subrogation claim and apparently urged plaintiffs
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that the amount of
their damages could be judicially ascertained. Plaintiffs
determined the cost of acquiring such a judicial determination
to be prohibitive.
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of claims in
favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other possible defendants. In
return, Cumis "tendered-$22,2-43 t$--Kill tr.d -$27,755 to
Caldwell.1
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy proceeds
unless State Farm's subrogation interest was accounted for,
its tender to Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245 made
to Caldwell alone and a check for $5,510 made jointly to
Caldwell and State Farm. The latter draft corresponded to
the amount of property damage incurred by Caldwell and
accounted for State Farm's subrogation claim. The release
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute surrounding the
$5,510 by stating:
IT* To arrive at these figures, the parties subtracted the
property damage amount from the total policy proceeds and
divided the remainder equally between them. The disputed
property damage award was then added to Caldwell's portion
because he was the owner of the damaged automobile.
Nos. 20335, 20391
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[A] controversy exists between State Para
Mutual Insurance Company and Lorin D.
Caldwell as to who is entitlad to the said
amount, and that the matter will be
resolved between the two or by payment
into court or by judicial determination.
plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach an accord
for more than one year after the release was signed.
Plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm, seeking payment
of $5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of State Farm for
its refusal to waive the subrogation claim. In turn, State
Farm filed a third-party claim against Bryan for subrogation
and indemnity. State Farm also counterclaimed against
plaintiffs for $5,510,
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on
both plaintiffs' complaints and on its own counterclaim.
The trial court granted the motion, awarding State Farm
$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The court also decreed
that State Farm had no cause of action against Bryan.
In reviewing a grant of a motion for summary
judgment, all doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of
fact are viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Mountain States Tel, S Tel, Co, v,
Atkin, Wright & Wiles, 681 P,2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). Where
a triable Issue of fact exists, the cause will be remanded for
determination of that issue.
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is subrogated
to the rights of plaintiffs and that State Farm should thereby
recover the amount it paid for property damage from the amount
plaintiffs recovered from the third-party tort-feasor.
Plaintiffs argue that State Farm's subrogation rights do not
arise until plaintiffs have been made whole.
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed
by equitable principles. This doctrine can be modified by
contract, but in the absence of express terms to the contrary,
the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled
to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor. Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d
311, 318, 480 P,2d 739, 744 (1971)- Noncontractual subrogation rights will only be enforced on behalf of a party
maintaining a superior equitable position, and the insurer's
equitable position cannot be superior to the insured's unless
the insured has been completely compensated. Transamerica
Ins. Co, v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); see
also culver v. Insurance Co, of H« Am*, 221 N,J. Super. 493,
535 A,2d 15, (1987)? Westendorf v, Stasson, 330 N,W.2d 699
(Minn. 1983),
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When the amount of damages incurred by the insured
has been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation
right of the insurer is usually undisputed• The insured is
not entitled to double recovery, and the insurer is equitably
entitled to recover any amounts from the insured that the
insured recovered from the tort-feasor.
When the insured settles with the tort-feasor before
the amount of damages has been judicially determined, it is
more difficult to ascertain whether ths insurer is entitled to
recover all or any of the amount paid on the policy to the
insured. See generally Comment; Subrogation in Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of Insurers and Insureds in Settlements
with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp, L*Q. 667 (1983) •
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d
101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this Court examined an insurance
company's claim for subrogation against its insured where
the insured had settled with a third-party tort-feasor• The
insurance company asserted that the settlement covered
the insured's entire claim and that the insurance company
was therefore entitled to receive reimbursement for the
medical expenses it had paid the insured* In revising the
summary judgment, this Court noted that a lump-sum settlement
without apportionment as to specific items of damage is not
sufficient to indicate whether the insured had received double
compensation for the same injury* Id. at 106, 505 P.2d at
786* In order to ascertain what the settlement in Barnes was
intended to cover, this Court reversed and remanded the cause
for a trial* IdL_ at 107, 505 P.2d at 787,
Setting forth the purpose and intended allocation of
money given in the settlement is a simple matter. As this
Court noted in Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settlement
was intended to include damages previously paid to the insured
by the Insurer, the tort-feasor who is aware of the insurer's
subrogation claim should offer payment in two drafts: one
draft for the insured alone and a separate draft issued to the
insured and the insurer jointly. Id. at 106, 505 P,2d at
787• In so doing, the apportionment of the settlement amount
is clearly shown and the intentions of the parties can most
effectively be enforced.
In the case now before the Court, the insurer's right
to subrogation was set forth in the insurance policyUnfortunately, the record does not reveal the extent of the
subrogation terms, nor does it provide a complete copy of the
insurance policy. We are thus unable to ascertain the intent
of the parties as to the extent of their respective rights
under the subrogation clause. Therefore, the doctrine of
subrogation should be applied in this case according to
general principles of equity.

Nos* 20335, 20391
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As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared two separate
drafts when tendering payment to Caldwell under the
settlement. The first draft was to Caldwell alone and the
second draft, in the amount of $5,510, was made to Caldwell
and State Farm* State Farm now argues that the joint draft
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to cover plaintiffs'
property damage. This contention is incorrect* The language
of the release does not provide for the al) -nation of the
$5,510* The release states that the parti
ave yet to
determine the rightful owner of that amoun*
cause *a
controversy exists* between State Farm and aldwell *as to
who was entitled to the said amount, and that the matter will
be resolved between the two or by payment into court or by
judicial determination** In other words, at the time the
draft was conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the parties had
not agreed whether that amount was intended for property
damage or to satisfy the wrongful death claim* Cumis acted
properly in ackowledging State Farm's subrogation claim and in
being certain that, to the extent State Farm was justified in
taking reimbursement from Cumis's policy limits, it would be
able to do so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the release
shows that neither Cumis nor plaintiffs intended the amount to
be allocated to property damage without further negotiation.
Because the parties have been unable to resolve the
subrogation question, we are required to determine who is
entitled to the settlement proceeds. State Farm argues that
the amount recovered by plaintiffs from Cumis represents the
entire amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argue that the amount received from Cumis only
compensates-.tiiem for a portion of their damages and therefore
they are not obligated to reimburse State Farm Until they
receive a full recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan
from further liability in order to obtain the settlement with
Cumis, they are not entitled to receive future compensation
from Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reimbursed from
plaintiffs and has no claim on Bryan. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d
Subrogation § 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to
limitations placed on the rights of subrogor) •
In determining the allocation of an amount received
by an insured from a third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume
that the amount of the settlement is coextensive with the
amount of damages incurred* Damages encompass the injuries
suffered by a plaintiff* The amount of a settlement almost
universally reflects the greatest amount that a plaintiff
could have possibly received from a tort-feasor without
litigation* As the court in Janzen v. Land 0'Lakes, Inc., 278
N.W.2d<67 (Minn* 1979) , stated:
[M]any considerations enter into settlements*
Respondent may have wished to avoid possibly
protracted and frustrating legal battles;
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respondent may have needed the money
immediately; or respondent may have been
pressured into the agreement for other
reasons. Thus, the amount of the settlement
and compensation may not adequately reflect
the actual loss . • . .
Id, at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339 N.W.2d 552, 554
TRInn. 1983); Fl"oHda Farm Bureau Ins, Co, v. Martin, 377 so.
2d 827, 830-31 (Fla. 1979}•
One of the considerations which may lead an insured to
settle with a third-party tort-feasor for an amount less than
its damages is that the tort-feasor is ^solvent and less than
adequately insured. Here, Bryan was pe, tonally insolvent, and
his insurance policy was for an amount apparently insufficient
to cover the full extent of plaintiffs' claims.2
Several courts have noted the importance of a tortfeasor's solvency or adequacy of insurance in influencing the
insured's decision to settle and will not allow an insurer to
exercise a subrogation claim where the settlement was reached
due to the tort-feasor's inability to fully compensate the
insured. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff,
327 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. 1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554.
In light of these principles and prevailing Utah law,
we hold that in the absence of specific contractual terms in
either the release and settlement or the insurance policy, the
insured must be made whole prior to any recovery by the insurer
against the tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with the
tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes to the insured unless
the insurer can prove that the insured has already received
full compensation.
Our holding does not undermine the suggestion in
Barnes that a settlement agreement can effectively allocate
the damages it is intended to cover through the use of multiple
drafts made out to appropriate parties. Instead, where the
language of the release leaves the allocation*uncertain and
where there is no controlling contractual language to the
contrary, the insured should be given the benefit of the doubt
as to its damages and the burden will rest with the insurer
to prove that the insured has been fully compensated. This
procedure has been used by other courts and will result in the
most effective implementation of the equitable principles
underlying the doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Automobile
2~. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to tender the
full policy amount prior to litigation or serious negotiation
over the amount of plaintiffs' damages*
Nos. 20335, 20391
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Ins, Co. of Hartford v« Conlonf 216 A-2d 828 (Conn. 1966);
DlmicK ex rel. Dlmick v* Levis, 49? A.2d 1221 (N*H, 1985),
In the instant case, the amount of plaintiffs'
damages is a question of fact which has yet to be determined.
There is no specific contractual language in the insurance
policy which requires allocation of the settlement amount/ nor
does the release specify who should receive the $5,510 paid
jointly to State Farm and Caldwell. Because the amount of
plaintiffs' damages is disputed by the parties, that amount
should be set through judicial determination so that the
proceeds from Bryan's policy can be equitably distributed.
That judiclli'ir^et^rmijitftl>ari-iril-l--l&c factually based; and
therefore summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.
State Farm also claims that if it is not entitled to
the $5,510 payment from Bryan's insurer, then the releases
signed by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extinguish its
subrogation claim against Bryan. Allowing plaintiffs to
extinguish State Farm's claims would be tantamount to a
breach of the subrogation provision in the insurance policy.
If, however, the amount of damages incurred by plaintiffs
exceeds the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm must also
demonstrate that it could have recovered the $5,510 from
Bryan, absent the releases and without relying on the
insurance policy proceeds* See, e.g., Royal Indenu Co* v.
Pharr, 94 Ga. App, 114, 117, 93 S.E,2d 784, 786 (1956). As we
stated in Barnes:
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a
superior equity and thus to be entitled to
prevail must present proof which establishes
that the damages covered by defendant's
settlement were the same or cover those for
which the defendant has already received
indemnity from plaintiff; otherwise, the
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor does
not entitle the plaintiff to the return of
the payments made by it«
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d 783, 787 (citations
omitted) .
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in State
Farm's claim against Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims
cannot rise above the claims of the subrogees, plaintiffs Hill
and Caldwell. Because Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from
any further liability, State Farm is unable to pursue its
claim against him- Instead, as explained above, State Farm's
only recourse is to show either that plaintiffs were fully
mmnensated and thus State Farm is entitled to be reimbursed
from Bryan's insurance policy proceeds or thai plaintiffs'
action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy, and
7
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i f S t a t e Farm shows i t could have recovered from Bryan/
w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o the proceeds as a matter of e q u i t y .

it

Summary judgment i n favor of S t a t e Farm on
p l a i n t i f f s ' complaints and on S t a t e Farm's counterclaim i s
r e v e r s e d - Judgment in favor of Bryan i s affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. H a l l , Chief J u s t i c e

Richard C Howe, A s s o c i a t e
Chief J u s t i c e

I . Daniel Stewart, J u s t i c e

Michael D. Zimmerman, J u s t i c e

Nos. 20335, 20391

8

TabU

92

Utah

657 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ad observed the defendant at close range
>r a period of some five minutes under
xcellent lighting conditions. The defendnt matched closely the description given
y Ricks immediately after the robl>ery.
/ithin eight days after the robbery, Ricks
lentified the defendant at the lineup. Oaserson's identification matched closely that
f Ricks. The minute divergence of his
escription would certainly not reach a level
o as "to give rise to a very substantial
ikelihood of irreparable misidentification",
>immons supra, at 384, but would merely
;o to the weight of the evidence. Manson,
upra.
This state has from the beginning aligned
tself with the constitutional guidelines set
>y Stovall and its progeny and it continues
,o do so today. See State v. Perry, 27 Utah
M 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972); State v. Malmwse, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982).
[2] In light of our holding that the out:>f-court identification of defendant met in
all respects the guidelines set by constitutional requirements and by this Court, we
next address the issue of whether the incourt identification of defendant made by
Casperson and Ricks should have been suppressed.
There was nothing improper
about the out-of-court identification to require independent in-court identification of
the defendant, although the trial record reveals that that was done.
[3] Both victims compared the appearance of the defendant on the day of the
trial with that on the day of the robl>ery.
Both commented upon his dancing gait.
Both gave their mnemonic impressions of
his demeanor during the holdup and positively identified him as the gunman. Thus,
even were we to hold (which we do not)
that the out-of-court identification should
have been suppressed, the in-court identification was sufficient for the jury to find
that the victims' courtroom identification
"rested on an independent recollection of
[their] encounter with the assailant, uninfluenced by the pre-trial identifications
. . . " See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980).

[4,5] Whatever divergence existed between Casperson's and Ricks' in- and outof-court identification had to be weighed
and determined by the jury and went to the
credibility of the witnesses, not to the issue
of admissibility. State v. Casias, Utah, 567
P.2d 1097 (1977); State v. Wilson, Utah, 565
P.2d 66 (1977). It is not our province to
measure conflicting evidence, credibility of
witnesses, nor the weight to be given the
one or the other. That responsibility belongs strictly to the trier of fact. State v.
Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977), and the
cases cited therein. The evidence before
the jury in this case was substantial so that
it could have pro|>erly arrived at a verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[6J Appellant's argument that there was
insufficient evidence to link the drugs
found on his j>erson to the robbery at the
Prescription Center North pharmacy must
be rejected for the same reason as his argument that there was likelihood of misidentification. The jury heard Casperson testify
that his pharmacy was missing a bottle of
Seconal pills after the robbery. The only
other pharmacy from which this bottle
could have been taken (Prescription Center
pharmacy in a medical center on 25th
Street in Ogden) was not missing any Seconal pills. The bottle found on defendant
was part of the inventory of missing drugs
made by Cas|>erson and Ricks after the
robbery. Defendant's argument that it
could have been stolen in any one of previous robberies went to the credibility, not to
the admissibility of the evidence. Again,
"[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not
within the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder." State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d
229, 231 (1980).
[7,8] Appellant next contends that evidence of alibi was improperly suppressed in
the trial court and that the prosecution and
his own attorney entered into a stipulation
that certain hearsay evidence given by a
witness (now deceased) could not l>e used at
trial. This issue was not raised for determi-
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nation by the trial court and does not appear in the record. When a defendant
predicates error to this Court, he has the
duty and responsibility of supporting such
allegation by an adequate record. Absent
that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which
the review court has no power to determine.
This Court simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record. See
State v. Jones (1982), 657 P.2d 1263, and
cases cited therein. See also Mcliridv v.
State, Alaska, 368 P.2d 925, 929 (1962),
cert, denied, 374 U.S. 811, 83 S.Ct. 1702, 10
L.Ed.2d 1035(1963).
The verdict below is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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award, and appeal and cross appeal were taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that:
(1) Utah recognizes tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations;
(2) although individual interferences by seller with buyer's business might have been
justified as an overly zealous attempt to
protect seller's contract interest, the actions, cumulatively, crossed the threshold of
tortious conduct; (3) where intentional interference was a step toward achieving goal
of reselling the building free of buyer's
interest the verdict could not be upheld on
theory of improper purpose; (4) breach of
contract for immediate puq>ose of injuring
the other contracting party satisfies the
improper means alternative of the tort; (5)
evidence warranted conclusion that seller
breached its express and implied contractual duties for purpose of ruining buyer's
business and obtaining possession, satisfying the "improjKir means" alternative; and
(6) it was error to reduce punitive damage
award to 20 percent of compensatory damages.
Modified as regards punitive damages
and affirmed.
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion.

LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET
COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Respondent,
v.
T. Richard ISOM dba Richard's Fine
Furnishings, Defendant, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant.
No. 17264.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 10, 1982.

Seller of furniture business sued buyer
to repossess business, terminate buyer's interest and obtain deficiency judgment, in
which buyer counterclaimed for intentional
interference with contractual relations.
The Fifth District Court, Washington County, Robert F. Owens, Circuit Judge sitting by
designation, entered judgment on jury verdict for buyer but reduced punitive damages

1. Torts o=>12
One party to a contract cannot be liable
for the tort of interference with contract
for inducing a breach by himself or the
other contracting party.
2. Torts <e=>12
Right of action for interference with a
specific contract is but one instance, rather
than the total class, of protections against
wrongful interference with advantageous
economic relations,
3. Appeal and Error c=> 1170.1
Appellant has the burden of demonstrating that any error has affected his
substantial rights. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 61.
4. Appeal and Error c=>930(1)
Every reasonable presumption is exercised in favor of validity of a general verdict.
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5. Trial to330(5)
Where more than one cause of action
has been submitted to a jury and where one
of those causes of action was error free,
supported by substantial evidence, and an
appropriate basis for general verdict, the
judgment on that verdict will be affirmed,
even though the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the verdict on one of the other
causes of action submitted.
6. Torts to 10(1)
Tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations reaches beyond protection of an interest in an existing
contract and protects a party's interest and
prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract and perhaps not expected to be.
7. Torts
tolO(l)
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic relations.
8. Torts to26(2)
In an action for tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations plaintiff must allege and prove more
than the prima facie tort but is not required
to negate all defenses of privilege, and privilege is an affirmative defense.
9. Torts to26(2)
To recover damages for tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage plaintiff must prove that
defendant intentionally interfered with
plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, for an impro|>er purpose or by improper means, causing an injury to the
plaintiff, and privilege is an affirmative
defense which is not an issue unless the acts
charged would be tortious on the part of an
unprivileged defendant.
10. Torts <s=>28
Instructions were sufficient to permit
recovery on theory of tort of interference
with prospective economic relations where
although they did not expressly require
proof of improper purpose or improper
means they required proof that challenged
action was "without justification" and defi-

nition of that term as requiring wrongful or
malicious conduct was functional equivalent
of improper means or improper purpose and
instructions covered the privilege defense.
11. Torts <s=>27
There was sufficient evidence to sustain jury verdict against seller of furniture
business for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations that caused
injury to buyer in that seller intentionally
interfered with and caused termination of
actual or jwtenlial relationships between
buyer and customers, suppliers and potential business associates by, among other
things, causing customers to leave the store.

refused to accept buyer's tender of payment
in full and had refused to permit him to
exercise option to purchase the building.
16. Torts to26(2)
Alternative of improper purpose, or
motive, intent or objective, will supjvort a
cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective economic relations even
where defendant's means were proper and
that purpose will be satisfied where it can
he shown that the actor's predominant purpose was to injure plaintiff.

in-

17. Torts to 10(3)
Where rielilierate interference by seller
of furniture business with buyer's prospective economic relations with customers, suppliers and |x>tential business associates was
not an end in itself but an intermediate step
to achieve long-range financial goal of profitably reselling building free of buyer's
lease interest, the seller could not be held
liable for tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic relations on basis
of the alternative of improper purpose, i.e.,
to injure or ruin buyer's business merely for
sake of injury.

14. Torts <&=> 10(3)
Although in isolation, furniture business seller's interferences with buyer's business might be justified as an overly zealous
attempt to protect seller's interest under
contract of sale, in total and in cumulative
effect, as a course of action extending over
three and one-half years and culminating in
failure of buyer's business, the seller's acts
crossed the threshold beyond what was incidental and justifiable to what was tortious
and actionable as intentional
interference
with prospective economic relations.

18. Torts to 10(3)
The alternative requirement of improper means to support an action for tort of
intentional interference with prospective
economic relations is satisfied where the
means used to interfere with economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations
of statutes, regulations or recognized common-law rules and such acts are illegal or
tortious in themselves and are clearly improper means of interference unless they
consist of constitutionally protected activity
like the exercise of First Amendment
rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

12. Torts <£=> 10(3)
Driving away an individual's existing
or potential customers is the archetypical
injury designed to be remedied by cause of
action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
13. Contracts to 168
Duty of good-faith performance
heres in every contractual relation.
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15. Torts to27
It could not l>e said that loss sustained
by buyer of furniture business was due to
unilateral decision to close after being
served with seller's complaint rather than
to seller's actions charged as intentional
interference with prospective economic relations as jury could have found that lawsuit was but another instance of seller's
ongoing pattern of harassment and parties
had reached an impasse in that seller had

19. Torts to 10(3)
Commonly included among the "improper means" alternative of the tort of
intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage are violence, threats or
other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation or discouraging falsehood, and means
may also l>e improper or wrongful because
they violate an established standard of a
trade or profession.

20. Malicious Prosecution <s=*39
Process @=>168
Torts to 10(3)
Not only may institution of groundless
lawsuits give rise to cause of action for tort
of intentional interference with prospective
economic relations but may also give rise to
indejKjndent cause of action in tort for
abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
21. Torts to 10(3)
A deliberate breach of contract, even
where employed to secure economic advantage, is not by itself an "improper means"
which will sup|x>rt cause of action for tort
of intentional interference with prosj>ective
economic relations.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
22. Torts to 10(3)
A party whose immediate purpose is to
inflict injury does not satisfy the "improper
purpose" element of the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic relations so long as the long-range or predominant purpose is to further a legitimate
economic end.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
23. Torts to 10(3)
Neither a deliberate breach of contract
nor immediate pur|x>se to inflict injury
which does not predominate over legitimate
economic end will, by itself, satisfy the "improper means" element of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations but they may do so in combination.
24. Torts to 10(3)
Breach of contract committed for immediate purpose of injuring the other contracting party is an "improper means" that
will satisfy the improper means element of
the tort of intentional interference with
economic relations.
25. Torts to 10(3)
Seller of furniture business could be
held liable for tort of intentional interfer-
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ence with prospective economic relations
based on interference by improper means
where it breached its express and implied
contractual duties for the purpose of ruining the buyer's business.
26. Damages <s=»94
It was error to mechanically apply a
ratio and reduce punitive damages award to
20 percent of compensatory damages
award.
27. Damages <s=>94
Amount of compensatory damages is
only one of a significant number of factors
in awarding punitive damages.
28. Damages «=>94
The jury or other fact finder has broad
discretion in weighing the various factors in
arriving at an appropriate award of punitive damages.
29. Damages <*=>94
Where jury found $65,000 compensatory damages for tortious interference with
prospective economic relations and $35,000
punitive damages, it was error to order the
punitive damages reduced to 20 |>ercent of
the compensatory damages, absent indication that punitive damages award was flagrantly excessive and unjust, especially in
view of abundant evidence of interference
by improper means.
30. Damages «s=>91(l)
Economic motives will not insulate a
defendant from liability for punitive damages where he acts maliciously.

Gary R. Howe, W. Clark Burt, Salt Lake
City, for Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co.
Arthur H. Nielsen, Clark R. Nielsen, Salt
Lake City, for Isom.
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$60,000 at $500 per month plus interest for
ten years.
In 1975, when the contract balance was
$27,000, Leigh Furniture (hereafter "the
Leigh Corjxjration") brought this action
against Isom to repossess the business, terminate his interest under the contract, and
obtain a deficiency judgment for any sums
due after liquidation. Isom denied that he
was in default under the agreement, alleged his tender and the Leigh Corjwration's refusal to accept the sum due under
the contract, and counterclaimed for $100,000 damages caused when the Corporation
intentionally and maliciously forced him out
of business and into bankruptcy. Isom also
sought punitive damages.
The jury found for Isom in all respects,
including compensatory damages of $65,000
and punitive damages of $35,000 on his
counterclaim. The district court denied the
Leigh Corporation's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which challenged the legal and evidentiary basis for
the verdict on the counterclaim. However,
the court reduced the punitive damages to
$13,000, and, upon Isom's accepting that
remittitur, also denied the Corporation's
motion for a new trial on the amount of
punitive damages. Judgment was thereupon entered on the verdict against the Leigh
Corporation (reduced as to punitive damages). The Corporation took this appeal,
and Isom cross-appealed, challenging the
reduction of punitive damages.
The issues on this appeal are exclusively
concerned with Isom's recovery on the
counterclaim. They are: (1) whether Utah
has a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations;
and, if so, (2) whether that tort was proved
on the facts of this case; and (3) whether
the punitive damages should have been reduced.

Milkovich, Utah, 611 P.2d 730, 732 (1980);
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sathcr,
Utah, 605 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980); Lamkin v.
Lynch, Utah, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (1979), the
facts were as follows.
Leigh Furniture, a closely held family
corporation, operated a main store in Cedar
City and branch stores in Kanab and St.
George. The principal owner and chief executive officer was W.S. "Dub" I^eigh
(hereafter "Leigh"). In 1969, Leigh decided
to sell the St. George store. He contacted
T. Richard Isom ("Isom"), a Utah native
then living in Washington State but desirous of returning to Utah, as a possible
buyer.
Discussions ensued, and Isom
moved to St. George and l>egan working as
an employee in the Leigh store. On May
14, 1970, Isom signed the contract to buy
the St. George store from the l^eigh CorjK>ration. Isom agreed to maintain the inventory, together with cash and accounts receivable, at a level of at least $60,(KM), and
to provide the Leigh Corporation with an
inventory each quarter and a financial
statement each month.
In the same document, the Ixugh Corporation leased Isom the parking lot and the
first floor of the building containing the
store, but expressly retained the second
floor of the building, which consisted of 17
apartments the Corj>oration had leased to
others. As monthly rental, Isom agreed to
pay 3% of his gross sales for the previous
month, with a minimum of $500 |>er month
the first year and $600 per month thereafter. The lease term was ten years, with an
option to renew for an additional ten years.

I. THE FACTS

The contract also granted Isom an option
to purchase the entire building, including
the upstairs apartments, exercisable once he
had paid the $60,000 balance on his contract. The option price was to be determined at the time of exercise by a committee of three appraisers, one to be appointed
by each party and a third to be chosen by
the other two.

With all conflicts resolved in favor of the
prevailing party and all evidence viewed
and inferences drawn in the light most su[>portive of the verdict of the jury, Cintron v.

1. The court instructed the jury "that it has
been established that W.S. Leigh was at all
times acting as the agent for plaintiff, Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Company, and within the
scope of his authority at the time of the events

OAKS, Justice:
In 1970, I,eigh Furniture and Carpet Co.,
a corporation, sold a furniture business in
St. George to T. Richard Isom on a contract
specifying a $20,000 down payment for immediate possession, with the balance of

LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET CO. v. ISOM

Finally, the contract provided that if
Isom defaulted in payment or performance
of any term and the default remained uncured for 60 days, the Iveigh Cor|>oration
could cancel the agreement, repossess the
merchandise and real proi>erty, and retain
all payments and rents as liquidated damages.
For one year, relations between the contracting parties were peaceful, but in June
and July of 1971, Leigh began to complain
about the contract and to state that he
wanted to sell the entire building but prospective buyers would not purchase it subject to Isom's long-term lease and option to
buy. 1 In a letter to Isom, Leigh complained
that Isom was in default on his payments
and was allowing his inventory to drop below $60,000. (Isom was behind in his payments at that time but was within the
60-day grace |>eriod in the contract and
therefore was not in default.) At that
same time, Ixiigh visited Isom in the store,
verbally attacking him while he was with a
customer and causing the customer to leave
the store.
Beginning in July, 1971, Leigh, his wife,
and the Corj>oration's bookkeeper, acting as
the Leigh Corporation's agents, began a
continuous pattern of visiting Isom at least
once a week while he was working in his
store, questioning him concerning his operation of the business, and making demands
and accusations. In addition to the visits,
Iveigh wrote defendant letters criticizing
various aspects of the business. In one
week in the summer of 1971, Isom received
four letters from Leigh, his wife, and his
bookkeeper complaining alnjut the furnace,
the heat, ami the delay in receiving the
monthly financial statements. All of this
conduct on Leigh's part had the cumulative
effect of demoralizing and upsetting Isom
and his employees, reducing their productivity, and impairing their ability to deal with
the public and to conduct their business.
out of which this action arose." That ruling, to
which there was no objection, makes the Leigh
Corporation fully responsible for all of Leigh's
actions in this matter.
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At the same time, despite the existing contract with Isom, Ijeigh attempted to sell the
building to two of Isom's employees.
In December, 1971, the Leigh Corporation's attorney again informed Isom that
Leigh was dissatisfied with the contract
and Isom's performance under it, and demanded an audit of the store's inventory
and books. Although no provision of the
contract entitled the Leigh Corporation to
audit Isom's business and Leigh's demand
came during Isom's busy Christmas season,
Isom agreed on condition that the audit be
taken after the new year and that it be
confidential. The audit was performed by
a certified public accountant employed by
the Corporation in its Cedar City store.
Following the audit, the accountant called
Isom's father, an attorney who represented
Isom, to inform him that a change in Isom's
business was needed and to recommend that
Isom bring in a business associate who had
expertise in furniture retailing and who
could contribute some additional working
capital to the business.
The Corporation's weekly visits continued
through the summer of 1972. In the spring
of 1972, the Leigh Corporation's bookkeeper, on one of his visits to Isom's store,
insisted that Isom date all his accounts receivable. Isom refused. Later that same
summer, while visiting the store, Leigh accused Isom of subletting the parking lot in
violation of the lease agreement and threatened to terminate Isom's business and repossess the store. Isom had permitted a
friend to fence a portion of the vacant lot
on the property he leased from the Corporation to temporarily store some merchandise
for a plumbing business. In response to
Leigh's threats, Isom had his friend remove
his merchandise and the fence.
In June or July, 1972, Leigh again met
with Isom's attorney (his father) to complain about Isom's performance under the
contract. Leigh said he felt Isom maintained an inadequate inventory to act as
security, and to alleviate his feelings of
financial insecurity he wanted to sell the
building to someone else. He also suggested that Isom bring in an associate with

additional capital and more experience in
furniture retailing. Specifically, Leigh suggested Brent Talbot, who had available capital and twenty years' experience in furniture retailing. Leigh indicated that if Talbot came in as a business partner "everything would be all right."
In response to this discussion, Isom's attorney began to pursue partnership discussions with a Mr. Hayes Hunter, who owned
and operated a furniture store in Cedar
City. On one of two trips that he and
Hunter made to inspect Isom's business,
they were observed together in Isom's store
by the Leigh Corporation's bookkeeper. A
few days later, Isom's attorney received a
phone call from Leigh, who angrily told him
that if he had any ideas about bringing
Hayes Hunter into the business, he "could
forget it" because Leigh wouldn't have
Hunter in the store. Thereafter, at Hunter's request, neither Isom nor his attorney
pursued any further negotiations with
Hunter regarding a possible partnership.
Approximately a month later, in August,
1972, Leigh again told Isom's attorney that
Isom needed to have Talbot as a partner
and encouraged him to pursue negotiations
toward that end. Leigh again complained
about the long-term lease he had given
Isom and stated that he "should kick [Isom]
out" and sell the building.
Shortly after this discussion, Leigh's attorney sent Isom's attorney a complaint
Leigh intended to file in court to terminate
the sale agreement and dispossess Isom.
Oral and written negotiations ensued, during which Isom attempted to arrive at some
settlement of Leigh's complaints and resolve all the disputes embodied in the
threatened lawsuit.
On September 28, 1972, the parties signed
a supplemental agreement, drafted by
Leigh's attorney, which incorporated and
supplemented
the
original
contract.
Among other things, it required Isom (1) to
advance $20,000 toward the unpaid balance
of the purchase price (a condition demanded
by Leigh), half u}M>n execution of the supplemental agreement and half on or before
January 15, 1973; and (2) to obtain Leigh's
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prior written approval of any person to and employees, became less frequent and
whom Isom intended to convey any owner- less demanding. Other than Isom's reship interest in the business whether as quired defense of the two groundless suits,
partner, investor, or corporation sharehold- the period between October, 1972, and
er. 2 Isom paid the $20,000 in accordance April, 1974, was relatively calm. Isom was
with the supplemental agreement, which able to devote himself to operating his busireduced the unpaid balance on the purchase ness, and the $27,000 net loss for the calenprice to $27,000 in January, 1973, and pre- dar year 1970 was turned into a $17,000 net
paid the monthly installments under the profit for the calendar year 1973. Isom's
store continued to make a profit into the
contract through December, 1975.
first part of 1974, accruing a net profit of
The supplemental agreement was intend$5,000 through August, 1974.
ed to resolve all the disputes l>etween Leigh
In April, 1974, following the conclusion of
and Isom. However, even after its execution, Leigh continued to pursue previously the lawsuit by the plumbing company,
initiated lawsuits against Isom, causing Ijeigh renewed his questions and pressures
on Isom. Leigh continually complained to
Isom to incur the expense and effort of
defending two groundless actions. In the Isom about the store's inventory, the air
first, Ijeigh sued Isom and a former employ- conditioner, the length of time it took
Isom's accountant to prepare the monthly
ee, Francis Leany, for $4,000—the value of
furniture Leany had purchased from the financial statements, and the format of the
Leigh Corporation while employed in its St. financial statements. Ijeigh refused to pay
George store. After trial in December, for a store window broken by customers of
1972, the court found that the Corporation the adjacent bicycle shop, even though the
and Leany had offset their accounts long contract gave the Corporation "the obligation of all exterior maintenance and repairs
before Isom acquired the business and ruled
that the Corporation had no right to the to the building." The heating bills began to
disputed $4,000. The suit was dismissed on accumulate because the Leigh Corjwration
refused to pay its share in violation of the
January 26, 1973.
contract provision that required it "to pay
In the second action, a plumbing company
60% of the cost of space heating, payable
sued the Leigh Corporation and Isom to
each month heat is furnished the apartrecover $2,000 worth of repair work it had
ments." To resolve the matter, Isom was
performed on the furnace in the leased
required to make trips to Cedar City.
building. In accordance with the contract,
Leigh and other representatives of the
Isom had paid the first $500 toward the cost
of repair. Although the contract made the Corporation continued to visit Isom while
he was at work in the store, demanding
Corporation, as lessor, responsible for all
costs in excess of $500, it refused to pay the that he produce various documents and recbalance of the repair bill, asserting instead ords and reiterating demands that he date
that Isom was liable. After another trial, his accounts receivable. Leigh renewed his
the court sustained Isom's position and re- threats to cancel the contract. Isom was
quired the Ijeigh Corporation to pay the required to spend a substantial amount of
his time attending to these visits and rebalance of the repair bill.
sponding to the demands. During this
After the $20,000 prepayment and the
same time, sales l>egan to decline, and the
execution of the supplemental agreement,
store became unproductive.
Leigh continued to visit defendant to check
In the summer of 1974, Isom's attorney
on his operation of the business, but his
visits, either in person or through his wife followed Leigh's prior suggestions by ap2. Contemporaneous with the execution of the
supplemental agreement, Leigh gave his written approval of two individuals whom Isom
requested as prospective partners in the busi-

ness. For reasons unrelated to this lawsuit,
neither of these men ever acquired any interest
in the business with Isom.
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proaching Brent Talbot about joining
Isom's business. He wrote Leigh and his
attorney requesting Leigh's approval, but
Leigh did not respond. Isom's attorney
again wrote to Leigh, outlining the advantages of bringing Talbot into the business.
Isom and Talbot eventually reached a tentative partnership agreement, but Leigh refused to approve Tall>ot unless Isom agreed
to terminate his contract and his ten-year
lease, "drop out" of the store completely,
and turn it back to l*eigh. These terms
being unacceptable to Isom, the negotiations with Talbot were discontinued.
Thereafter, Isom's attorney submitted repeated requests to associate a Mr. Applegate in the business, but never received any
response from Leigh.

as required by the original contract, so that
Isom could exercise his option to purchase
the property.
Isom's attorney again met with Leigh
and Leigh's attorney on February 14, 1975,
and told them the $27,000 balance on the
purchase price would soon be paid and that
Isom planned to exercise his option to buy
the property. Leigh stated he would not
sell the property to Isom for its $130,000
value (as determined by Isom's appraiser,
subject to Isom's leasehold) because he had
an offer to sell the property for $200,000
free of Isom's lease and option. Although
at the conclusion of the meeting Leigh
agreed to appoint an appraiser to permit
Isom to exercise the purchase option in
accordance with the original contract of
sale, he later refused to do so and, in fact,
never did.

Leigh's continuing threats to evict Isom
had a demoralizing effect on Isom and his
employees. Isom devoted a considerable
amount of time to responding to in-store
visits by Leigh, his wife, and his bookkeeper. These visits interrupted sales activities,
and provoked complaints from his customers. The business declined, dissipating the
$5,000 profit of August, 1974. By December, 1974, the business showed a net loss of
$6,500. Isom concluded that he would have
to pay off the $27,000 remaining on the
purchase price to keep Leigh from active
interference in the affairs of the store. To
raise the necessary funds, he was required
to take additional time away from his business.

On February 24, 1975, without notifying
Isom of any default, Leigh filed the complaint in this case, seeking to repossess the
premises and terminate Isom's interest under the contract. Three days later, unaware that the complaint had l>een filed,
Isom tendered to Leigh the $27,000 balance
due. He requested that Leigh give a receipt for the payment, appoint an appraiser
to facilitate his exercise of the purchase
option, and approve Brent Talbot as his
business associate under the existing lease
if the purchase of the building were not
accomplished.

On December 29, 1974, Isom's attorney
met with Leigh in San Francisco, where he
informed Leigh of Isom's plans to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Leigh replied that Isom could do whatever he wanted.
Isom's attorney again requested
Leigh's approval of Talbot as a business
partner after full payment of the purchase
price and under the long-term lease and
purchase option of the contract. Leigh
again refused to approve Talbot as a partner. He reiterated his regret at having
granted a long-term lease and stated that
he had to get the proj>erty back. He suggested that Isom liquidate all the store's
stock and turn the store back to him.
Leigh also refused to appoint an appraiser

Isom learned of the lawsuit before he was
served with process. Though demoralized,
he nevertheless continued to negotiate with
Leigh and to operate the business through
February, 1975. I,eigh never responded to
Isom's tender of the remaining $27,000, although he again told Isom's attorney that
he would never approve Talbot's association
with Isom under the long-term lease, even
for the few months required to finance a
purchase of the building, nor would he |>ermit a sale of the property for its appraised
value of $130,000. When confronted by
Isom's attorney and accused of being recalcitrant so that Isom's business would fail
and Ixjigh could reacquire the business and
property, Leigh made no denial.

In March, 1975, while talking to a customer in his store, Isom was served with
Leigh's complaint. This service of process
despite his continuing efforts to negotiate,
surprised and upset Isom so much that he
dismissed the customer he had been helping.
Upon reading the complaint, he noted that
it apj>eared to l>e the same complaint Leigh
had threatened to file in 1972 and that it
reopened the disputes which the supplemental agreement and the prepayment of $20,000 had been intended to resolve. Because
of the complaint's prayer for an order restraining Isom from doing further business
until an audit could be conducted to determine if he was maintaining adequate security for the $27,000 balance, Isom concluded
he could do no further business. He therefore closed the store immediately after being served. Within the next week, Isom's
suppliers contacted him to request return of
their furniture. Isom replied that at that
time he was unable to determine whether
he would remain in business, but that he
could not release any of his inventory until
the dispute with Leigh was finally resolved.
Isom declared bankruptcy shortly thereafter.
At trial, there was expert testimony that
the value of Isom's leasehold was $45,000,
and the net value of Isom's furniture retailing business as of March, 1975, was $59,300.
Isom testified that he paid the Leigh Corporation a total of $53,000 plus interest on the
total $80,000 purchase price, none of which
he recouped. He further testified that because of his bankruptcy he was never able
to exercise his option to purchase the building. The record further indicates that
through bankruptcy proceedings, the Leigh
Corporation, as secured party, finally
achieved its goal of reacquiring the business, including inventory, accounts receivable, and the leased premises.
II. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
|1] Iveigh Furniture first contends that
Isom's recovery cannot be sustained as an
interference with contract because the evidence showed no conduct which "intentionally and improj>erly interferes with the per-

between anothformance of a contract .
er and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to j>erform the contract." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 706 (1979). See also Bunnell v.
Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602
(1962); W. Prosser, Ilandlnok of the Law
of Torts § 129 at 929 30 (4th ed. 1971);
AnnoL, 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952). In this
case, the only contract in evidence was the
contract between Isom and the lieigh Corporation. It is settled that one party to a
contract cannot lie liable for the tort of
interference with contract for inducing a
breach by himself or the other contracting
party. Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65
Cal.App.3d 990, 998, 135 Cal.Rptr. 720, 72526(1977); Cuker Industries, Inc. v. William
L. Crow Construction Co., 6 A.D.2d 415, 178
N.Y.S.2d 777 (1958); Houser v. City of /&?(/mond, 91 Wash.2d 36, 39, 586 P.2d 482, 484
(1977); Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d
972, 977 (1979). Isom having failed,to
prove a cause of action for intentional j interference with contract, we cannot sustain
the verdict on that theory.
[2] However, the right of action for interference with a s|»ecific contract is but
one instance, rather than the total class, of
protections against wrongful interference
with advantageous economic relations.
Sumwalt Ice Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,
114 Md. 403, 414, 80 A. 48, 50 (1911); 1 F.
Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts
§ 6.11 (1956); Restatement
(Second) of
Torts § 766 comment c (1979); 45 Am.
Jur.2d Interfcrtmce §§ 49 51 (1969). We
therefore proceed to consider whether the
jury's verdict for Isom can be sustained on
the basis of the related tort of interference
with prospective economic relations.
[3—51 If so, we can affirm the judgment.
Consistent with the well-settled principle
that the appellant has the burden of demonstrating that any error has affected his
substantial rights, Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Startin v. Madsvn, 120 Utah 631, 636, 237 I\2d
834, 836 (1951), we follow the authorities
that exercise every reasonable presumption
in favor of the validity of a general verdict.
Specifically, where more than one cause of
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action has been submitted to a jury and
where one of those causes of action was
error-free, supported by substantial evidence, and an appropriate basis for the general verdict, the judgment on t h a t verdict
will be affirmed, even though the evidence
was insufficient to sustain the verdict on
one of the other causes of action submitted.
Berger v. Southern I'acific Co., 144 Cal.
App.2d 1, 5, 300 P.2d 170, 173 (1956); Granone v. County of IA)S Angeles, 231 Cal.
App.2d 629, 42 Cal.Rptr. 34, 51 (1965); Aaronson v. City of New Haven, 94 Conn. 690,
110 A. 872 (1920); In re Van Houten's Will,
147 Iowa 725, 124 N.W. 886 (1910); Watson
v. Long, Mo.App., 221 S.W.2d 967, 971
(1949); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938
(9th Cir.1980) (applying Cal. law); Adkins
v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th
Cir.1971) (applying Tenn. law). Sec generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 787
(1962).
III.

INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A.

History and Elements of the Tort

[6,7] The tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations
reaches beyond protection of an interest in
an existing contract and protects a party's
interest in prospective relationships of economic advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to
be). Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815,
537 P.2d 865, 86&-69, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745,
748-49 (1975); Restatement, supra, § 766B
comment c; W. Prosser, supra, § 130. Although previously faced with arguments or
circumstances presenting the issue, e.g.,
Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682, 683
(1982); Soter v. Wasatch
Development
3.
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See, e.g., Estes, "Expanding Horizons in the
Law of Torts—Tortious Interference," 23
Drake L.Rev. 341 (1974); Harper, "Interference
with Contractual Relations," 47 Nw.U.L.Rev.
873 (1953); Perlman, "Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A
Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine," 49 U.Chi.
L.Rev. 61 (1982); Sayre, "Inducing Breach of
Contract," 36 Harv.L.Rev. 663 (1922 23); "Developments in the Law—Competitive Torts,"
77 Harv.L.Rev. 888 (1964); Note, "Tortious In-

Corp., 21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968),
we have never expressly resolved the question of whether Utah recognizes this tort.
We now resolve that question, in the affirmative.
The plethora of decided cases and abundant literature on the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic relations has been helpful in our consideration.*1 In summarizing the history of this
tort, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch.
37, "Interference with Contract or Prospective Contractual Relation" (1979), observes
that its elements are a curious blend of the
principles of liability for intentional torts
(in which the plaintiff proves a prima facie
case of liability, subject to the defendant's
proof of justification) and for negligent
torts (in which the plaintiff must prove
liability based on the interplay of various
factors). The disagreement and confusion
incident to this blend of intentional and
negligent tort principles has produced two
different approaches to the definition of
this tort.
Influenced by the model of the intentional tort, many jurisdictions and the first
Restatement of Torts define the tort of
intentional interference with prospective
economic relations as a prima facie tort,
subject to proof of privilege as an affirmative defense. To recover, the plaintiff need
only prove a prima facie case of liability,
i.e., that the defendant intentionally interfered with his pros|>ective economic relations and caused him injury. As with other
intentional torts, the burden of going forward then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate as an affirmative defense that under the circumstances his conduct, otherwise culpable, was justified and therefore
privileged. 4 This is the approach assumed
terference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and
Contractual Integrity," 81 Colum.L.Rev. 1491
(1981); "Interference with Contract Relations,"
41 Harv.L.Rev. 728 (1927 28); Annot., 9 A.L.
R.2d 228 (1950); Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 9 (1981);
Annot., 6 A.L.R4th 195 (1981).
4.

See, e.g., St. Louis-San Francisco Railwav Co.
v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 132-33 (5th Cir.1979);
liuckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 537 I\2d
8G5, 872, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 752 (1975); Alfred
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in several Utah decisions describing the related tort of interference with contract.
Bunnell v. Bi//s, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d
597, 602 03 (1962); Gammon v. Federated
Milk Producers Association, Inc., 11 Utah 2d
421, 426, 360 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1961), and 14
Utah 2d 291, 295-96, 383 P.2d 402, 405 06
(1963). This approach was also suggested
in a subsequent case that described (though
it did not formally adopt) the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Searle v. Johnson, Utah,
646 P.2d 682(1982).
The problem with the prima facie-tort
approach is that basing liability on a mere
showing that defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiff's prospective economic
relations makes actionable all sorts of contemporary examples of otherwise legitimate
persuasion, such as efforts to persuade others not to eat certain foods, use certain
substances, engage in certain activities, or
deal with certain entities. The major issue
in the controversy—justification for the defendant's conduct—is left to be resolved on
the affirmative defense of privilege. In
short, the prima facie approach to the tort
of interference with prosj>ective economic
relations requires too little of the plaintiff.
Under the second approach, which is modeled after other negligent torts, the plainA. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton &
Nolan, DC, 374 A.2d 284, 289 (1977); Owen v.
Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 360, 77 N.E.2d 318,
320 21 (1948); Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 465, 205 N.W. 630,
633 (1925); Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty,
Inc., 121 N I L 640, 433 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1981);
Mitchell v. Aldrich, 122 Vt. 19, 24, 163 A.2d
833, 836-37 (1960); Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65
Wash.2d 157, 162 63, 396 P.2d 148, 151-52
(1964). This approach is also adopted by F.
Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts,
§§ 6.11-.12 (1956), Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 9
§ 2[b] (1981); and 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference
§ 56 (1969).
5.

The text of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766B (1979) states.
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual
relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary
harm resulting from loss of the benefits of
the relation, whether the interference consists of

tiff must prove liability based on the interplay of various factors. The
Restatement
(Second) of Torts now defines an actionable
interference with prospective economic relations as an interference that is both "intentional" and "improper." Id. a t § 766B.5
Under this approach, the trier of fact must
determine whether the defendant's interference was "impro|>er" by balancing and
counterbalancing seven factors, including
the interferor's motive, the nature of his
conduct and interests, and the nature of the
interests with which he has interfered. Id.
at § 767. In those jurisdictions which have
followed the negligence model, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that in view of
all of these factors the defendant's interference was improper. This obviously inqwses
a very significant burden on the plaintiff
and magnifies the difficulty of resolving
some contested issues on the pleadings. So
far as we have been able to discover, only
four states have specifically adopted the
Restatement (Second) definition of the elements of this tort,* though others have apparently applied some |>ortion of the Restatement formulation in their own definitions. 7
In short, there is no generally acknowledged or satisfactory majority (>osition on
the definition of the elements of the tort of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third
person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or
continuing the prospective relation.
6.

Dolton v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, Colo.App., 642 P.2d 21, 23 (1981); Weitting v. McFeeters, 104 Mich.App. 188, 304
N.W.2d 525 (1981); United Wild Rice, Inc. v.
Nelson, Minn., 313 N.W 2d 628, 632 33 (1982);
Yaindl v. Ingersoll Rand Co. Standard PumpAldrich Div., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611,
621-22 & n. 11 (1980).

7.

See, e.g., Insurance Field Services, Inc. v.
While & White Inspection & Audit
Senice,
Inc., Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 384 So.2d 303, 306 07
(1980); Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 III.
App.3d 547, 45 111 Dec. 765, 413 N.E.2d 98,
101 02 (1980); St oiler Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Insurance Co., Iowa, 258 N.W.2d 336,
340 (1977); Anderson v. Dairyland Insurance
Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637 l\2d 837 (1981).
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intentional interference with prospective
economic relations. In its historical review,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that "the law in this area has not fully
congealed but is still in a formative stage"
so that the "several forms of the tort . . .
are often not distinguished by the courts,
and cases have been cited among them
somewhat indiscriminately." Id., Introductory Note to ch. 37 at 5. We concur in the
Restatement (Second fs rejection of the prima facie tort approach l>ecause it leaves too
much uncertainty al>out the requirements
for a recognized privilege ami the defendant's burden of pleading and proving these
and other matters. Id. Hut we also reject
the Restatement (Second)'* definition of the
tort because of its complexity. We seek a
better alternative.
Oregon has outlined a middle ground by
defining the tort of interference with prospective economic relations so as to require
the plaintiff to allege and prove more than
the prima facie tort, but not to negate all
defenses of privilege. Privileges remain as
affirmative defenses. This approach originated with Justice Linde's opinion in Top
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978).
After summarizing the history of this tort
and specifically refusing to require a plaintiff to prove that the interference was "improper" under the balancing-of-factors approach specified in the
Restatement
(Second), the court defined the cause of
action for "wrongful interference with economic relationships" as follows:
Either the pursuit of an improper objective of harming plaintiff or the use of
wrongful means that in fact cause injury
to plaintiff's contractual or business relationships may give rise to a tort claim for
those injuries. . . . In summary, such a
claim is made out when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful
by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself. Defendant's liability
may arise from improper motives or from
the use of improper means.
Top Service Body Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 205,
209, 582 P.2d at 1368, 1371. A subsequent
decision of that court restated and elaborat-

ed what the plaintiff must prove, as follows:
In Top Service we decided that the defendant's impro|>er intent, motive or purpose to interfere was a necessary element
of the plaintiff's case, rather than a lack
thereof being a matter of justification or
privilege to 1x3 asserted as a defense by
defendant. Thus, to be entitled to go to
a
j»ry, plaintiff must not only prove that
defendant intentionally interfered with
his business relationship but also that defendant had a duty of non-interference;
i.e., that he interfered for an improper
purj)ose rather than for a legitimate one,
or that defendant used improper means
which resulted in injury to plaintiff.
Straulxi v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361, 600
P.2d 371, 374 (1979). Cf. Anderson v.
Dairyland Insurance Co., 97 N.M. 155, 637
P.2d 837, 840 41 (1981) (nominally adopting
the Restatement (Second) definition in Section 766 B but using the Oregon elements of
improper means or improper motive to
define requirement that interference be
"improper").
[8, 9] We recognize a common-law cause
of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, and adopt
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under
this definition, in onler to recover damages,
the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the
plaintiff. Privilege is an affirmative defense, Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682
(1982), which does not become an issue unless "the acts charged would be tortious on
the part of an unprivileged defendant."
Top Service Body Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 210,
582 P.2d at 1371.
B. Jury Instructions
In this case, the trial court apparently
instructed the jury jointly on the separate
intentional torts of interference with contract and interference with prospective economic relations. As noted in Part II, the

verdict cannot be sustained as to the former, so the only remaining question is
whether the instruction and evidence permit the verdict to be sustained as to the
latter.
So far as it related to the elements of
proof of the two torts, the trial court's
entire instruction was as follows:
[Isom's] counterclaim is based on a theory
of tortious interference with a business
relationship and with contractual rights.
Before you can find the [Corporation]
liable for tortious interference, you must
find that the following elements have
been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. The existence of a valid contract or
business relationship both existing
and prospective;
2. Knowledge of the contract or relationship by the alleged interferor;
An intentional interference which
causes a breach or termination of the
business relationship or contract;
Without justification;
Which results in damage to the party
whose business relationship or contract has been disrupted.
You arc instructed that if you find that
the [Corporation] was reasonably acting
to protect a legitimate economic interest
of its own, arising out of or in conjunction with the May 14, 1970 agreement,
was exercising its right to terminate the
agreement, or was exercising its right to
assert an honest claim, then the [Corporation's] conduct was justified and privileged and not wrongful or malicious and
[Isom] is not entitled to recover for any
intentional interference with business or
contractual relations.
[10] As to the tort of interference with
prospective economic relations, this instruction does not precisely mirror the elements
we have just specified, because it does not
expressly require Isom to prove "impro|>er
8. In Coronado Mining Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co, Utah, 577 P.2d 957, 9C0 (1978), we stated:
'The exercise of a legal right constitutes justifi-

purpose or improper means." However, the
instruction does require Isom to prove that
the Corporation's action was "without justification." 8 Because of the way that term
was defined in the instructions, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict is premised
upon findings that include each of the elements in the cause of action as we have
defined it, and any disparity of phraseology
between the given instruction and the new
definition was not prejudicial.
Under the trial court's definition of "justification," the jury had to find that the
Corporation's conduct was "wrongful or
malicious" before they could find for Isom.
Those terms are functionally equivalent to
"improper means or improper pur|>ose."
Conversely, if the jury found that the Corporation "was reasonably acting to protect
a legitimate economic interest of its own,
arising out of or in conjunction with the
May 14, 1970 agreement" (such as its right
to terminate the agreement or to assert an
honest claim thereunder), then the Corjx>ration's conduct was "justified and privileged
and not wrongful or malicious," and Isom
was not entitled to recover. In view of this
instruction, we conclude that the verdict for
Isom was clearly based on the jury's finding
that the Corporation was not reasonably
acting to protect its legitimate economic
interest under the agreement, and is tantamount to a finding that the Corporation's
conduct was "wrongful or malicious." The
trial court's instruction imposed an even
heavier burden on the plaintiff (here, the
counterclaimant, Isom) than our definition,
since it required the plaintiff to negate the
existence of any justification. Consequently,
we proceed to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict for
the cause of action as we have defined it.
C.

Evidence of Intentional Interference
and Causation
[11,12] Reviewing the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury's verdict against the Ixjigh
cation and is a complete defense to an action of
tortious intervention of contractual rights." (
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Corporation for intentional interference
with prospective economic relations that
caused injury to Isom.

able to contribute expertise and additional
capital to Isom's business.

[13,14] Taken in isolation, each of the
There was ample evidence that Isom had
business relationships with various custom- foregoing interferences with Isom's busiers, suppliers, and |>otential business associ- ness might l>e justified as an overly zealous
attempt to protect the Corporation's interates, and that Leigh, the former owner of
the business, understood the value of those ests under its contract of sale. As such,
none would establish the intentional interrelationships. There was also substantial
competent evidence that the Corporation, ference element of this tort, though some
through Leigh, his wife, and his bookkeep- might give rise to a cause of action for
er, intentionally interfered with and caused breach of sj>ecific provisions in the contract
a termination of some of those relationships or of the duty of good faith performance
(actual or potential). Their frequent visits which inheres in every contractual relation.
to Isom's store during business hours to Even in small groups, these acts might be
confront him, question him, and make de- explained as merely instances of aggressive
mands and inquiries regarding the manner or abrasive—though not illegal or tortious
in which he was conducting his business —tactics, excesses that occur in contractual
repeatedly interrupted sales activities, and commercial relationships. But in total
caused his customers to comment and com- and in cumulative effect, as a course of
plain, and more than once caused a custom- action extending over a period of three and
er to leave the store. Driving away an one-half years and culminating in the failindividual's existing or potential customers ure of Isom's business, the Leigh Coronais the archetypical injury this cause of ac- tion's acts cross the threshold beyond what
tion was devised to remedy. E.g., Guillory is incidental and justifiable to what is torv. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 286 P.2d 474
tious. The Corporation's acts provide suffi(1955); Tattle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 cient evidence to establish two of the eleN.W. 946 (1909); W. Prosser, Handbook of
ments in the definition of this tort: an
the Law of Torts § 130 (4th ed. 1971); Ke- intentional interference with present or
statement (Second) of Torts § 76613(a).
prospective economic relations that caused
injury to the plaintiff.
Other actions by which the Leigh Corporation imposed heavy demands on Isom's
[15] Focusing on the issue of causation,
time and financial resources to the detri- the I^eigh Corj>oration argues that Isom's
ment of his ability to attract and retain losses resulted from his inadequate working
customers and conduct the other activities capital or from his unilateral decision to
of his business included: numerous letters close his store immediately after being
of complaint, Leigh's demand for an audit served with the complaint and to file for
of Isom's books and inventory during the bankruptcy shortly thereafter. These argubusy holiday season, his continued threats to ments are unavailing tacause there was
cancel the contract and sell the building substantial evidence of causation to sup|x>rt
and business to another buyer, his refusal to the jury's verdict. For example, the jury
pay the contracted share of the heating bills could have found that the initiation of this
or the cost of repairing the furnace and the lawsuit was but another instance of the
store's broken window, his refusal of the Corporation's ongoing pattern of harasstendered payment of the balance due under ment, which made it imjxmible for Isom to
the contract, and his suit for repossession, continue to o|>erate his business with any
termination, and injunction. Leigh's refusals anticipation of success or profit. The paralso prevented Isom from consummating ties had reached an impasse: Ixiigh had
potentially advantageous business associa- refused to accept Isom's tender of payment
tions with Hunter, with Talbot, and finally in full and had refused to permit Isom to
with Applegate, all experienced retailers exercise his option to purchase the building
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or to associate himself with experienced
partners. Upon being served with the complaint, Isom could reasonably have concluded that the Corporation's interference and
harassment would continue to thwart his
commercial efforts for the foreseeable future. On analogous facts, a California
court held in a case involving a seller's
malicious interference with his buyer's business that "it was reasonable for [the buyer)
to have elected to close rather than to continue to accumulate operating expenses
without receipts coming in to meet them."
Drouet v. Moulton, 245 Cal.App.2d 667, 54
Cal.Rptr. 278, 282 (1966).
The evidence was also sufficient to support the verdict under the requirement that
the intentional interference with prospective economic relations (in this case, Isom's
relations with his customers, suppliers, and
potential business associates) must have
been for an improper purpose or by the use
of improper means. These two alternatives
are discussed in the next two sections.
D.

Improper Purpose

[16] The alternative of improper purpose (or motive, intent, or objective) will
support a cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations even where the defendant's means
were proper. In the context of the related
tort of interference with contract, Prosser
had this to say about improper purpose:
Since Lumley v. Gye there has been
general agreement that a purely "malicious" motive, in the sense of spite and a
desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its
own sake, will make the defendant liable
for interference with a contract. The
same is true of a mere officious intermeddling for no other reason than a desire to
9. On this same point, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts holds that a competitor's interference
with a prospective contractual relation is not
improper if, among other things, "his purpose
is at least in part to advance his interest in
competing with the other." Id. § 768(d). The
authors explain:
The rule . . . developed to advance the actor's
competitive interest and the supposed social
benefits arising from it. If his conduct is
directed, at least in part, to that end, the fact

interfere. On the other hand, in the few
cases in which the question has arisen, it
has been held that where the defendant
has a proper purpose in view, the addition
of ill will toward the plaintiff will not
defeat his privilege. It may be suggested
that here, as in the case of mixed motives
in the exercise of a privilege in defamation and malicious prosecution, the court
may well look to the predominant purpose underlying the defendant's conduct.
[Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
§ 129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971).
Because it requires that the improper
purpose predominate, this alternative takes
the long view of the defendant's conduct,
allowing objectionable short-run purposes
to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial activity, such as a businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor
in order to further his own long-range economic interests, could l>ecome tortious. In
the rough and tumble of the marketplace,
competitors inevitably damage one another
in the struggle for personal advantage.
The law offers no remedy for those damages—even if intentional—because they are
an inevitable byproduct of competition.
Problems inherent in proving motivation or
purpose make it prudent for commercial
conduct to be regulated for the most part
by the impro|>cr means alternative, which
typically requires only a showing of particular conduct.'
The alternative of improper purpose will
be satisfied where it can be shown that the
actor's predominant purpose was to injure
the plaintiff. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 133 (5th
that he is also motivated by other impulses,
as, for example, hatred or a desire for revenge is not alone sufficient to make his
interference improper. But if his conduct is
directed solely to the satisfaction of his spite
or ill will and not at all to the advancement of
his competitive interests over the person
harmed, his interference is held to be improper.
Id. § 768 comment g.
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Cir.1979); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Aurora Air Service, Inc., Alaska, 604 P.2d
1090 (1979); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co.,
152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911); Tuttle
v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909);
Wesley v. Native Lumlrer Co., 97 Miss. 814,
53 So. 346 (1910); Huston v. Trims-Murk
Services, Inc., 45 Or.App. 801, 609 P.2d 848
(1980); Prosser, § 129, quoted supra.

achieving the long-range financial goal of
profitably reselling the building free of
Isom's interest. Because that economic interest seems to have been controlling, we
must conclude that the evidence in this case
would not sup|K>rt a jury finding that the
Corporation's predominant purpose was to
injure or ruin Isom's business merely for
the sake of injury alone.

For example, in Alyeska Pi\>eline Service
Co., supra, the parties had a contract under
which RCA provided a communications system along Aiyeska's pipeline. RCA, in
turn, contracted with Aurora to furnish air
transportation ? ! ong the route. About a
year later, Aurora lost its contract with
RCA when Alyeska elected to take over the
air transportation function under a contract
provision that permitted it to do so. Aurora thereufmn sought damages from Alyeska, alleging that Aiyeska's decision, which
caused RCA to terminate its contract with
Aurora, had been motivated by spite, resulting from an earlier payment dispute and
litigation between Alyeska and Aurora.
Alyeska pleaded that it had acted to further
its own economic and safety interests. The
Alaska Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict against Alyeska, explaining:
[I]f one does not act in a good faith
attempt to protect his own interest or
that of another but, rather, is motivated
by a desire to injure the contract party,
he forfeits the immunity afforded by the
privilege. [Authorities cited.] . . .
In
the case at bar, the central factual issue
. . . was whether Alyeska was genuinely
furthering its own economic and safety
interests or was using them as a facade
for inflicting injury upon Aurora. There
was sufficient evidence upon which the
jury could properly find that Alyeska was
acting out of ill will towards Aurora,
rather than to protect a legitimate business interest. [Emphasis added.]
604 P.2d at 1094.

However, because we will affirm the
judgment on the general verdict on any
ground for which there is substantial factual support in the record, Berger v. Southern
Pacific Co. and other authorities cited in
Part II, supra, we must examine the record
to determine whether the verdict can be
supported on the basis of the alternative
that the Corporation's interference was accomplished by impro|)er means.

(17J As noted earlier, there is substantial evidence that the Leigh Corporation
deliberately injured Isom's economic relations. But that injury was not an end in
itself. It was an intermediate step toward

E.

Improper Means

118,19J The alternative requirement of
improper means is satisfied where the
means used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are
clearly "improj>er" means of interference,
Scnrlc v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682 (1982)
(secondary boycott); Gammon v. Federated
Milk Producers Association, Inc., 14 Utah 2d
at 295 96, 383 P.2d at 405 06 (1963) (price
fixing), unless those means consist of constitutionally protected activity, like the exercise of First Amendment rights.
NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
U.S.
,
102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982).
"Commonly included among improper
means are violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bril>ery,
unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Top Service Body Shop,
Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371 & n. 11. Means may
also l)e improper or wrongful because they
violate "an established standard of a trade
or profession." Id. at 1371.
[20] By forcing Isom to defend what
appear to have been two groundless lawsuits, the Leigh Corporation was clearly employing an improjKT means of interference
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with Isom's business. Such use of civil litigation as a weapon to damage another's
business, besides being an intolerable waste
of judicial resources, may give rise to independent causes of action in tort for abuse of
process and malicious prosecution. Crease
v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455,
519 P.2d 888, 890 (1974) (abuse of process);
Baird v. Intermountain
School Federal
Credit Union, Utah, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (1976)
(malicious prosecution); Johnson v. Mount
Ogden Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 169,
169-73, 460 P.2d 333, 334-46 (1969) (malicious prosecution); W. Prosser, Handlxyok
of the Law of Torts §§ 120, 121 (4th ed.
1971). The jury's verdict can therefore be
sustained on the ground that the Leigh
Corporation intentionally interfered with
Isom's economic relations by improper
means.

action for intentional interference with economic relations.
Two cases illustrate how breach of contract (or lease), when done with a purpose
to injure, satisfy this element of the tort.
In both cases, the defendant committed a
breach not just to obtain relief from its
obligation under the contract or lease (for
which contract damages would have made
the plaintiff whole), but to achieve a larger
advantage by injuring the plaintiff in a
manner not com|»ensable merely by contract damages. In l>oth cases, the defendant ruined the plaintiff's business by its
breach, and in l)oth cases the plaintiff was
given substantial damages for the tort of
interference with prospective economic relations.

(23,24] Neither a deliberate breach of
contract nor an immediate puq)ose to inflict
injury which does not predominate over a
legitimate economic end will, by itself,
satisfy this element of the tort. However,
they may i\o so in combination. This is so
because contract damages provide an insufficient remedy for a breach prompted by an
immediate purjwse to injure, and that purpose does not enjoy the same legal immunity in the context of contract relations as it
does in the competitive marketplace. As a
result, a breach of contract committed for
the immediate purpose of injurying the other contracting party is an improper means
that will satisfy this element of the cause of

In Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 145
P.2d 305 (1944), a retail grocery chain contracted with the plaintiff to publish and
distribute a "shopping news." In order to
do so, the plaintiff abandoned his printing
customers and expanded his distribution organization. After becoming the plaintiff's
sole customer and acquiring complete
knowledge of his business, the retailer deliberately breached its contract in order to
ruin the plaintiff's business by cutting off
the work required to sustain it and then
hired his employees. The California Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the
plaintiff, awarding damages for breach of
contract and additional damages for "tortious interference with his business" in order to give him "complete recompense for
his combined injuries . . . ." Id. at 546, 145
P.2d at 310. The gravamen of the tort, the
court explained, was the defendant's
breaching its contract with plaintiff as a
means of acquiring plaintiff's employees:
Although defendant's conduct may not
have been tortious if he had merely broken the contract and subsequently decided to hire plaintiffs employees, an additional factor is present in this case.
From the evidence the trial court could
reasonably infer that the breach, at the

10. Likewise, for reasons discussed in the preceding section, a party whose immediate purpose is to inflict injury does not satisfy the

element of ''improper purpose" so long as the
long-range or predominant purpose is to further a legitimate economic end.

There is also another basis for affirming
that verdict on the basis of impro|>er means.
f21,22] A delilxjrate breach of contract,
even where employed to secure economic
advantage, is not, by itself, an "improper
means." Because the law remedies breaches of contract with damages calculated to
give the aggrieved party the benefit of the
bargain, there is no need for an additional
remedy in tort (unless the defendant's conduct would constitute a tort inde|>endent of
the contract).10
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time it was made, was intended as a
means of facilitating defendant's hiring
of plaintiff's employees.
A breach of
contract is a wrong and in itself actionable. It is also wrongful when intentionally utilized as the means of depriving
plaintiff of his employees, and, in our
opinion, constitutes an unfair method of
interference with advantageous relations
within the rule set forth above. [Emphasis added.]
/(/. at 548, 145 P.2d at 311.
In Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of
Washington, 88 Wash.&l 595, 564 P.2d 1137
(1977), a lessor deliberately breached its
duty to repair a structurally unsound wall
on the leased premises in order to destroy
the restaurant business of a lessee who had
leased a portion of the premises. The lessor's purpose was to retake the entire building as soon as possible, demolish the structure, and erect a more profitable building.
The jury gave a verdict of $42,000 against
the lessor. Apart from the $3,100 damages
for breach of the lease (economic losses
from temporary closure of the restaurant
business), this verdict represented a recovery of damages for inconvenience, discomfort, and mental anguish for "the tort of
intentional interference with business expectancies."
The Washington Supreme
Court sustained the verdict in an opinion
that squarely relies on the combination of
improper means and improper purpose in
defendant's deliberate breach for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.
After reviewing cases holding that a
breach of covenants may also give rise to
liability in tort, the court summarized:
It appears to be the general view that, in
those instances in which the conduct of
the breaching party indicates a motive to
destroy some interest of the adverse party, a tort action may lie and items of
damage not available in contract actions
will be allowed.
Id. at 603, 564 P.2d at 1143. The court then
acknowledged the "separate line of cases"
holding that a breach of duty under a contract or a lease does not constitute an independent tort even where it interferes with

the injured party's business relations.
court explained as follows:

The

The distinguishing feature between the
two lines of cases would seem to be
whether the interference with business
relations was a mere incidental consequence of the breach or a motive or purpose therefor.
Id. at 604, 564 P.2d at 1143. In Cherberg,
the court found that the defendant had
breached its lease and interfered with the
plaintiff's business not for the "privileged"
reason of escaping from an unsatisfactory
return on its investment in the leased premises (upon payment of contract damages),
but for the imj>ormissible purpose of injuring the tenant in order to secure an advantage !>eyond the scoj)e of the lease:
There is, instead, evidence in the record
from which the jury could have inferred
the lessor used the condition of the wall
as a means to oust the petitioners and
gain possession of the leased premises in
order that the lessor might put those
premises to a different and perhaps considerably more profitable use. Proof of a
breach based uf>on such a motive demonstrates a failure to make a good faith
effort to meet obligations under the lease
and may give rise to liability in tort.
[Emphasis added.]
Id. at 605, 564 P.2d at 1143-44.
As stated by the court in Schisgall v.
Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224,
232, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1955):
If the defendant acted merely as a contracting party (at legal liberty |>erhaps to
breach its agreement upon payment of
damage), that is one thing. But if the
defendant went further, and acted with
intent to inflict injury beyond that contemplated as a result of the mere breach
of contract, I would hold that the contract does not grant the defaulter immunity from tort liability. [Emphasis added.]
[25J In the case at bar, the Leigh Corporation breached its contract in various
ways.

It breached its implied duty to exercise
all of its rights under the contract reasonably and in good faith. Cahoon v. Cahoon,
Utah, 641 P.2d 140, 144 (1982); Rio Algom
Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., Utah, 618 P.2d 497, 505
(1980); Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 I\2d
857, 859 (1979). Leigh's unexplained refusal to approve Isom's prospective business
partners without consideration of their merits indicates an absence of good faith and
provides evidence that the Corporation's
breach was intended to deprive Isom's business of additional capital and valuable expertise which (at least with regard to Talbot) Leigh himself had repeatedly urged
Isom to acquire. Similar refusals to approve prospective subtenants under a contract clause in order to injure the tenant's
business have been held to constitute tortious interference with economic relations.
Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, Ala.,
350 So.2d 1035 (1977); Nizzo v. Amoco Oil
Co., Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 333 So.2d 491 (1976).
In addition, Leigh, his wife, and his bookkeeper continually interrupted sales activities with their visits, tetters, threats, and
demands, causing customers to comment
and complain and sometimes to leave. Although the contract entitled the Corj>oration, as lessor and secured party, to reasonable supervision of Isom's business, the jury
had sufficient evidence to conclude that this
conduct constituted an unreasonable exercise of contract rights and/or was done in
bad faith for the purpose of injuring Isom's
business relations.
The Corporation also breached its contractual duty by refusing Isom's tender of
the balance of the purchase price and by
refusing to appoint an appraiser to establish
a price for the sale of the entire building,
thereby preventing Isom from exercising
his purchase option. There is evidence of
Leigh's purpose in the fact that he openly
regretted his contract with Isom and frequently expressed his desire to "get Richard
out" of the business and building. Furthermore, he continually contacted prospective
buyers for the building, even approaching
two of Isom's employees for this purpose.
All of the above provide substantial evidence from which the jury could have con-

cluded that the Cor|>oration breached its
express and implied contractual duties for
the purpose of ruining Isom's business and
obtaining possession of the building in order
to sell it more profitably elsewhere. By
themselves, the Corporation's breaches
would not satisfy the requirement of "improper means," but they could do so when
coupled with the improper purpose of injuring Isom. In combination, a breach of contract and an intent to injure satisfy the
improj)cr means requirement for the cause
of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations.
F.

Summary

In defining the tort of intentional interference with pros|>ective economic relations,
we reject the two extremes of the prima
facie tort and the balancing-of-factors approach. Instead, we adopt the Oregon definition, under which the plaintiff must prove
that the intentional interference with existing or potential economic relations that
caused injury to the plaintiff was done for
an improper purpose or by improper means.
The jury instructions in this case, which in
effect required a finding that the Corporation's conduct was "wrongful or malicious,"
were sufficiently in harmony with this definition to permit the jury to return a verdict
under it. There was sufficient evidence of
intentional interference and causation.
To satisfy the alternative of improper
pur|>ose, the defendant's purpose to injure
the plaintiff must predominate over all other pur|>oses, including the long-range purpose of achieving some personal economic
gain. Under this definition, the evidence is
insufficient to justify a verdict against
Leigh Corporation on the basis of improper
purpose. Improper means refers primarily
to actions that are contrary to law, such as
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules. The Leigh Corporation's pursuit of two groundless lawsuits
against Isom was an improper means. A
deliberate breach of contract for the purpose of injuring the contracting party is
also an improper means, and there is also
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict on that basis.
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IV.

REDUCTION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
26] Leigh Furniture challenges the proety of any damages on Isom's countering as discussed earlier, but advances no
jument against the $35,000 verdict on
nitive damages in particular.
Isom's
>ss-appeal challenges the remittitur by
lich the district court reduced the punie damages in reliance on the rule that
^ amount of punitive damages "should
linarily bear some reasonable relation to
e actual damages sustained."
Holdaway
Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 79, 505 P.2d 295, 296
)73). Following the "guide" of Kesler v.
ygers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 (1975), and
ince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325
575), where this Court reduced punitive
images to an amount equal to twenty and
?hteen percent of the comj>ensatory damfes, respectively, the district court found
at $13,000 (exactly twenty |>ercent of the
mpensatory damages awarded by the jury
this case) would adequately accomplish
e purpose of punitive damages, and reiced them by remittitur to that amount,
om asserts error in this mechanical applittion of a fixed ratio as a basis for such
;duction. We agree.
The purposes of punitive damages are
ell stated in Kesler v. Rogers, supra:
They are: a punishment of the defendant
for particularly grievous injury caused by
conduct which is not only wrongful, but
which is wilful and malicious so that it
seems to one's sense of justice that mere
recom|>ense for actual loss is inadequate
and that the plaintiff should have added
compensation; and that the defendant
should suffer some additional penalty for
that character of wrongful conduct; and
also that such a verdict should serve as a
wholesome warning \o others not to engage in similar misdoings.
42 P.2d at 359. Accord Branch v. Western
'ctroieum, Inc., Utah, 657 I\2d 267 (1982).
Vs reflected in this statement of purpose
md in numerous other authorities, punitive
11. We do not address the question of whether
the theory of punitive damages would permit
their award for an intentional tort, one of

damages are awarded "where the nature
of the wrong complained of . . . goes l>eyond merely violating the rights of another in that it is found to be willful
and malicious," Elkington v. Foust, Utah,
618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980) (emphasis added),
or a result of "reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of" the rights of others.
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., supra.1*
[27] We have recently had occasion to
review the factors that the fact-finder
should consider in determining the amount
of punitive damages. See First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards,
Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982). For purposes of this case, we need only reemphasize
that the amount of compensatory damages
is only one of a significant number of factors to be considered in that determination.
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah, 605 P.2cl 314, 328 (1979), modified on another point, 617 P.2d 700 (1980).
The district court's reduction of punitive
damages solely on the basis of that factor
was therefore in error.
[28-301 The jury (or other fact-finder)
has "a broad discretion" in weighing the
various factors and arriving at its determination of an appropriate award of punitive
damages. Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d
130, 133, 339 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1959). The
standards that guide a court in reviewing
the jury's determination are also reviewed
and reaffirmed in First Security Bank v.
J.B.J. Feedyards, supra, and need not be
r e l a t e d here. This jury found $65,000
compensatory damages and $35,000 punitive
damages. We find nothing in the ratio
between those two amounts, or in the other
circumstances of this case, to persuade us
that the award of punitive damages was "so
flagrantly excessive and unjust as to indicate a disregard of the rules of law by
which damages are regulated," or "so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury" or "so excessive as to be shocking to
one's conscience and to clearly indicate paswhose elements is malice (improper purpose).
That circumstance is not before us.
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be affirmed, even though the evidence
sions, prejudice or corruption on the part of
was insufficient to sustain the verdict on
the jury." First Security Bank v. J.B.J.
one of the other causes of action sul>Feedyards, supra, at ll. 1 2
mitted.
The record contains abundant evidence
Under my view of the instruction given
that Leigh Furniture interfered with Isom's
economic relations by improper means, in- the jury, set out in Part III H, it is unnecescluding breaching its contract with the in- sary to take any (K)sition on the principle
tent to injure Isom, a circumstance from above quoted l>ecause that principle is not
which the jury could infer sufficient malice involved in this case. Even though the
to justify their award of punitive damages. instruction instructed jointly on the tort of
Economic motives will not insulate a de- interference with contract and the tort of
fendant from liability for punitive damages interference with prospective economic rewhere he acts maliciously. Fury Imports, lations, it did not offer alternatives or
Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d 1376 (5th choices to the jury as to the separate torts
Cir.1977), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 921, 101 or theories of recovery. The jury could not
S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); Cherne have been conscious that they were being
Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, instructed on two separate torts. They
were not told that they could choose beInc., Minn., 278 N.W.2d 81 (1979).
tween them. I agree with the majority
On Isom's cross-appeal, the judgment is opinion that the instruction properly
modified to reinstate the full amount the defined the tort of interference with projury awarded as punitive damages.
spective economic relations and we must
As modified in respect to punitive dam- presume that the jury followed the instrucages, the judgment on the verdict for de- tion in finding liability against the defendfendant Isom is affirmed. Costs to respon- ant. The fact that the instruction may
have also defined another tort which does
dent.
not lie in this case is of no consequence.
HALL, C.J., STEWART, J., and VcNOY There was comi>etent evidence adduced to
CHRISTOFFERSEN, District Judge, con- support the elements of interference with
prospective economic relations as illustrated
cur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. by the cases of Cherlterg v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 Wash.2d 595, 564
HOWE, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the majority opinion but ex- P.2d 1137 (1977) and Buxbom v. Smith, 23
press a reservation as to the following sen- Cal.2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944). It should
be noted that in both of those cases one
tence in Part II:
contracting party committed that tort on
[W]here more than one cause of action
the other contracting party. No third party
has been submitted to a jury and where
was involved.
one of those causes of action was errorWhile 1 recognize that the principle quotfree, supported by substantial evidence,
and an appropriate basis for the general ed ai>ove, which is called the "two issue
rule," is supported by the cases from the
verdict, the judgment on that verdict will
eral and special damages $900; punitive
12. Where appropriate, we have affirmed puni$1,000); Falkenbeig v. Nvff, 72 Utah 258, 270
tive damage awards much in excess of the
72, 269 P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (actual damages
amount of compensatory damages awarded.
$362.50; punitive $1,500); and cases cited with
See Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41
approval in Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77,
(1980) (compensatory $12,000; punitive $30,79 80, 505 P.2d 295, 296 (1973). Moreover, in
000); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379
at least one case, we have held that punitive
P.2d 380 (1963) (compensatory $350 to one
damages may l)e a wauled where only equitable
plaintiff and $1,000 to another; punitive
relief was granted and no compensatory dam$1,500); Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130,
ages were awarded Nash v. Craigco, Inc.,
339 P.2d 1022 (1959) (actual damages $140;
Utah, 585 P.2d 775(1978).
punitive $860); Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah
156, 161 64, 247 P 2d 431, 433 35 (1952) (gen-
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jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion,
there is a contrary point of view exemplified by the following cases: Bredouw v.
Jones, Okl., 431 P.2d 413 (1967); Heinen v.
Heinen, 64 Nevada 527, 186 P.2d 770 (1947);
Martin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 Mont. 31,
149 P. 89 (1915). Apparently this Court has
not heretofore decided this question and I
prefer to reserve an expression of opinion
on it until it is squarely before us. See Ivie
v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781

(1959) and Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588
P.2d 702 (1978) for examples of a somewhat
similar situation arising because of conflicting jury instructions.

O I KHNUMBERSrSfCM)

98 Wash.2d 569
Melvin M. BELLI, Petitioner,

may discharge attorney at any time with or
without cause.

v.
Donald R. SHAW and Patricia Shaw, husband and wife; and Walter B. Dauber
and Joan Dauber, husband and wife, Respondents.

4. Attorney and Client s=>76(l)
Ordinarily, no s|>ecial formality is required to discharge attorney and any act of
client indicating unmistakable purpose to
sever relations is sufficient.

No. 48084-2.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.
Jan. 13, 1983.
In a suit involving a dispute over attorney fees, the Yakima County Superior
Court, Ted Kolbaba, J., rendered judgment
for defendants notwithstanding a verdict
for plaintiff.
Plaintiff apj>ealed. The
Court of Appeals, 29 Wash.App. 875, 631
P.2d 980, affirmed.
Appeal was taken.
The Supreme Court, Pearson, J., hold that
where there was undisputed evidence that,
before the second trial in a defamation action, the client entered into a contingent fee
arrangement with two attorneys which excluded the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover attorney fees.

5. Attorney and Client <s=>76(l)
Employment of other counsel, which is
inconsistent with continuance of former relationship, shows unmistakable purpose to
sever attorney and client relationship.
6. Attorney and Client «=> 134(1)
Plaintiff could not recover pursuant to
fee agreement allegedly made in 1959 with
former partner of firm after client's contract with plaintiff was repudiated.
7. Attorney and Client c=>134(l), 151
Plaintiff could not recover attorney
fees pursuant to "forwarding fee" arrangement with another attorney where there
was no evidence that client authorized
plaintiff's continued participation in case
after first trial in defamation action and
plaintiff's involvement after that trial was
minimal at most. CPU DR 2-107.

Affirmed.
Dore, J., dissented with opinion in
which Dimmick and Hosellini, J J . , joined.
1. Attorney and Client <&=»76(1)
Where, before second trial in defamation action, client entered into contingent
fee agreement with two attorneys which
excluded plaintiff, that direct repudiation
by client of his contract with plaintiff constituted discharge of plaintiff from employment.
2. Attorney and Client «=>134(1)
Attorney discharged before completion
of undertaking f^r which he was engaged
may recover from his client reasonable compensation for professional services actually
rendered.
3. Attorney and Client <*=>76(1)
Unlike general contract law, under contract between attorney and client, client

James Hurley, Yakima, for petitioner.
John Gavin, Rodney Smith, Yakima, Law
Offices of Melvin Belli, Daniel Smith, San
Francisco, Cal., for respondents.
PEARSON, Justice.
Plaintiff Melvin Belli appeals a Court of
Appeals decision affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in his action for
attorney fees. Plaintiff brought this action
in 1977 against defendants, partners' in a
Yakima law firm, claiming $50,000 in attorney fees pursuant to a fee agreement allegedly made in 1959 with J.P. Tonkoff, a
former partner in the Yakima firm. The
jury awarded plaintiff $50,000, but the trial
court entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The court concluded as a matter of law there was not sufficient evidence
of a fee agreement which would entitle
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Ronald Dean Lancaster, pro se.
David L. Wilkinson, Kimberly Hornak,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff filed, in propria persona, a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial
court with respect to his guilty plea to and
subsequent conviction of second degree
murder. The trial court dismissed the petition as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
therefore not permissible. We reverse and
remand for entry of findings on the merits.
In response to plaintiff's petition, the
State brought a motion to dismiss on the
ground that under the rationale of State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (UUh 1987), plaintiff was precluded from bringing a motion
for post-conviction relief until he had first
brought a motion to set aside his guilty
plea. The trial court adopted that rationale
in its order denying writ of habeas corpus,
and the State repeats it before this Court in
challenging the merits of plaintiffs habeas
corpus petition.
State v. Gibbons is inapposite here. Gibbons pleaded guilty to several charges and
then appealed directly after the trial court
had sentenced him to consecutive terms of
imprisonment. He did not file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea before perfecting
his appeal, and the State argued that this
Court should decline to consider the guilty
plea issue because it was not raised below,
740 P.2d at 1311. This Court declined to
follow the State's request and remanded
the case to enable Gibbons to file a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, retaining jurisdiction over the case for further action.
State v. Gibbons did not represent a collateral attack on the guilty plea.
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a postconviction petition to challenge the validity
of his guilty plea some nine years after the
time for a direct appeal had run. It appears from his handwritten pleadings that
he was originally charged with first degree
murder, but pleaded to second degree mur-

der when the prosecution was unable to
prove the aggravating circumstances with
which he had been charged. In his habeas
corpus petition, plaintiff appears to allege
that he thought he had pleaded to "unintentional murder" and that he should have
been sentenced to one to fifteen years'
imprisonment instead of five years to life.
Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of
knowingly and intentionally committing the
offense and was therefore unlawfully imprisoned and that he had been denied due
process and effective assistance of counsel.
In addition, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statutes under which he
was charged and sentenced.
This Court has repeatedly stated that
habeas corpus is not a substitute for and
cannot be used to perform the function of
regular appellate review. Porter u Cook,
747 P.2d 1031, 1032 (UUh 1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (UUh
1983); Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700,
702 (UUh 1979). But it has also recognized
that review by habeas corpus is appropriate in unusual circumsUnces to assure fundamenUl fairness and to reexamine a conviction when the nature of the alleged error
is such that it would be unconscionable not
to reexamine. Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1115
(Stewart, J., concurring in result). Moreover, rule 65B(i) of the UUh Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically provides that a prisoner who asserts a subsUntial denial of his
constitutional righU "may institute a proceeding under this rule." See also Martinez v. Smith, supra, where this Court
held a petition for habeas corpus reviewable without first requiring the withdrawal
of a guilty plea. Given the allegations
plaintiff made in his petition, it was therefore error for the trial court to dismiss the
petition without granting a hearing.
Without the benefit of findings, this
Court is in no position to review the validity of plaintiff's claims. It is safe to assume that trial courU prefer to give short
shrift to the many post-conviction petitions
which they decide lack merit. It is equally
safe to assume that an appellate court will
be unable to review the case in a vacuum

and will have to remand it where no rationale for dismissal or denial is given. A
simple finding, on the other hand, will suffice in the vast majority of cases to limit
the judicial process to one review. The
trial court's basis for dismissing plaintiff's
petition in this case was erroneous, as sUted. The record is too sparse for this Court
to determine whether the issues raised by
the pleadings were legal, so that it could
affirm tho trial court on the ground that
the claims were properly resolved as a matter of law. See Gonzales v. Morris, 610
P.2d 1285, 1286 (UUh 1980). Instead, it
appears that plaintiff claims irregularity in
the reception of his guilty plea, an issue
that should have been considered by the
trial court.
The case is remanded for entry of findings on the meriU.

was not precluded from seeking reformation of commission schedule under contract; and (3) middleman was not entitled
to recover costs of deposing two witnesses
and serving subpoena on one witness.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Pleading ®=>248(4)
In breach of contract action in which
middleman who sold "coffee extender product" for supplier sought to recover commissions under contract with supplier, trial
court erred in denying middleman's motion
to amend to include cause of action for
reformation of contract so the commission
schedules could be changed; issue of commission schedules was not raised until second day of trial and court did not allow
middleman to submit evidence on issue of
parties' intent in entering contract
2. Reformation of Instruments «=>25

(o

|«YHUHM«SVSUM>

LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
NATURES WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 860311-CA.
Court of Appeals of UUh.
April 21, 1988.
Middleman brought action for breach
of contract against supplier, seeking accounting and judgment for sums due under
contract. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered
judgment in favor of supplier, and middleman appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) trial court
erred in denying middleman's motion to
amend to include cause of action for reformation of contract BO the commission
schedules could be changed; (2) middleman

Middleman who sold "coffee extender
product" for supplier was not precluded
from seeking reformation of commission
schedule under contract with supplier because contract included integration clause.
3. Reformation of Instruments <S=>36(1),
45(1)
Reformation of contract is equiUble
remedy which must be pled with particularity and esUblished by clear and convincing
proof.
4. Costs <s=*176, 193
In middleman's action against supplier
to recover commissions under contract with
supplier, middleman was not entitled to recover costs of deposing two witnesses and
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d).
5. Costs e=>207
Party claiming entitlement to cost of
depositions has burden of demonstrating
that depositions were reasonably necessary
and whether that burden is met is within
sound discretion of trial court. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 54(d).
6. Appeal and Error <S=>984(1)
Trial court's ruling on whether to
award party the costs of depositions is pre-

508

Utah

753 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

LLOYD'S UNLIMITED v. NATURE'S WAY

Utah

509

Cite as 753 P.2d 507 (UlahApp. 1988)

sumed correct and will not be disturbed
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest
clear abuse of discretion. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 54(d).
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), Leslie W.
Slaugh, Ray G. Martineau, P.C., Provo, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Terry M. Crellin (argued), M. Wayne
Western, Thorpe, North & Western, Sandy,
for defendant and respondent.
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
and BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), initiated this action against defendant, Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an
accounting and judgment for sums due under the contract. The court found that the
parties had entered into a valid and enforceable contract and awarded Lloyd's
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the
court improperly denied its motion to
amend the complaint to include a cause of
action for reformation and that the trial
court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Lloyd's requests modification of the
lower court's award and entry of judgment
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Alternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judgment be vacated and the case remanded.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdle (Dowdle),
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burningham (Burningham), president of Nature's
Way, began negotiating terms of a contract
involving a "coffee extender product"
(product). The contract was to provide
that Lloyd's would receive a commission
from Nature's Way for product sold to
Yurika Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Nature's Way in consideration of Lloyd's efforts in inducing Yurika to purchase and
market the product. In early August 1982,
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document

which stated that Lloyd's would receive
$1.00 commission for each pound of product sold. On August 11, 1982, after Dowdle and Burningham discussed the document, Dowdle crossed out the commission
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a
new schedule in the handwritten contract
which, as found by the trial court, provided
the following commission schedule:
1 unit—60 packets pack:
.25$
1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack:
.35*
1 unit—5 lb. bulk pack:
50$
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack:
$1.00
The parties then signed the agreement.
Several days later, Dowdle's secretary
typed the agreement from the handwritten
version. The typewritten agreement set
forth the same commission schedule as set
out above except the commission on the 5
lb. bulk pack was .50$ rather than 50$.
The typewritten agreement also repeated
verbatim the following clause from the
handwritten agreement: "This agreement
contains the entire understanding of the
parties hereto and may not be altered,
amended, modified, or discharged in any
way whatsoever except by subsequent
agreement in writing by all parties hereto."
The parties then signed the typewritten
agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's
$500, representing commission earned from
April 24, 1982 to August 1, 1982. The
parties did not make a formal accounting
of the sizes or amount of the product sold
to earn the $500 commission.
Between August 1, 1982 and February
28, 1984, Nature's Way received more than
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd's.
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action,
alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint
that Nature's Way owed it commissions
based on the following commission schedule:
60 packets pack:
$ .25
2 lb. bulk pack:
.35
5 lb. bulk pack:
.50
37 lb. bulk pack:
1.00
Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5
stated "Defendant denies the validity of
the agreement and therefore denies the
allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's
complaint to the effect that defendant is

obligated or indebted to Plaintiff in any
sum of money."
After two days of trial, the judge found
the contract was enforceable and awarded
commissions to Lloyd's based on the lesser
commission amounts stated in the typewritten contract, rather than those set forth in
Lloyd's complaint. Subsequently, Lloyd's
filed a motion to amend its complaint to
include a cause of action for reformation of
the contract, stating that it was not aware
until the second day of trial that Nature's
Way contested the commission schedule
Lloyd's had asserted in its complaint.

trial of these issues. [2] If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by
the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such
evidence.

After both parties filed extensive memoranda and several post-trial motions, the
court ruled that the typewritten agreement
was a valid, integrated and enforceable
contract, awarded Lloyd's $416.25, and denied the motion to amend the complaint.
The court denied Lloyd's its requested
costs incurred in taking Burningham's deposition and in serving Burningham with a
subpoena.
On appeal, Lloyd's claims that: 1) the
trial court erred in denying its motion to
amend the complaint to include a cause of
action for reformation; 2) the trial court
erred in faihng to award Lloyd's its costs
of depositions and service of subpoenas;
and 3) the trial court's findings of fact are
not supported by the evidence.

There are two parts to Utah R.Civ.P.
15(b). General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06
(Utah 1976). Under the first part of the
rule, it is mandatory for the trial court to
grant leave to amend pleadings to conform
to the evidence to include issues tried by
the express or implied consent of the parties. Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99
(Utah 1983); General Ins. Co., 545 P.2d at
505-06. The second part of the rule is
permissive and allows the pleadings to be
amended when evidence is objected to at
trial on the ground that it raises issues not
framed by the pleadings. General Ins.
Co., 545 P.2d at 506. Utah R.Civ.P. 8(b)
states that "[w]hen a pleader intends in
good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder." Subsection (d)
of the same rule further provides that
"[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than
those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading."

I. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
A. Amendment of Pleadings
Lloyd's first contention is that the trial
court erred in denying its motion to amend
the complaint. Amendment of pleadings is
specifically addressed in Utah R.Civ.P.
15(b), which states:
[1] When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendments of
the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the

The Utah Supreme Court discussed the
proper application and purpose of the
pleading rules in Cheney v. Rucker, 14
Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), as
follows:
They must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure
to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertain-
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ing to their dispute. What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and
an opportunity to meet them. When this
is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality
to allow examination into and settlement
of all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a
new issue if he so requests.
Accord Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 970-71 (Utah 1982).

During the first day of trial, the parties
addressed, almost exclusively, the question
of what consideration Lloyd's was to provide in order to earn the commissions.
Burningham testified that he expected
Dowdle to do a lot of traveling to procure
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regard
to payment of Dowdle's travel expenses,
"That's the reason why I offered the commission. And I offered that—I offered it
to him because it would have been very
lucrative for him." !

B. Procedural Background
In order to properly assess the validity of
the trial court's rulings, we must first provide a rather detailed description of the
procedural history of this case.
The record reveals that proceedings in
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of
lack of consideration, up until the second
day of trial. As stated earlier, Nature's
Way's answer to the complaint generally
denied liability under the contract, without
specifically addressing the commission rate
amounts alleged in the complaint. The answer also included an affirmative defense
of lack of consideration.' Prior to trial,
Lloyd's filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest. The motion was supported by the affidavit of a
certified public accountant which calculated
the amount due under the contract utilizing
the commission schedule as alleged in the
complaint and invoices of sales made by
Nature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memorandum in support of the motion and
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again
set forth the same schedule as in the complaint. Nature's Way's memorandum in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment states "Defendant has no objection to
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested
facts other than that important uncontested facte were omitted." The memorandum
then sets forth additional "facts" but does
not mention the commission rate amounts.
The court denied the motion for summary
judgment.
1. This testimony strikes us as inconsistent with
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement

[1J Consequently, we hold that the trial
court erred in denying the motion to amend
to include a cause of action for reformation
of the contract where the issue of commission schedules was not raised until the
second day of trial and where the court did
not allow Lloyd's to submit evidence on the
issue of the parties' intent in entering the
contract. Because the motion to amend
should have been granted, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings on the reformation issue.

On the second day of trial, Burningham
testified under direct examination as to
what the contract said, as follows:
Q. What does it state will be payable
for one unit of the two-pound bulk
pack?
A. .25 cents.
Q. .25 cents?
A. That's correct.
Q. Quarter of a cent, I guess.
On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel
began to question Burningham about the
intent of the parties on the commission rate
amounts. The trial court sustained Nature's Way's objection to such questioning.
After trial, but before the court entered
its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
Lloyd's filed a motion for an order granting leave to file an amended complaint to
conform to the evidence to include a cause
of action for reformation of the contract.
Lloyd's also filed a post trial memorandum
which included excerpts from the deposition of Burningham, as follows:
Q. Had you made commissions to
Lloyd's . . . you would pay him 35
cents for each two pound bulk pack?
A. Correct.
Q. Based on the 300 figure?
A. Correct.
Q. For the five pound bulk you would
pay him 50 cents based on the 180
figure?
A. Correct.
Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidavit
which stated that he habitually noted deci-

mal points erroneously, as was done on at
least part of the handwritten agreement.
Several months after the trial, the court
entered findings of fact, which included the
following: the handwritten agreement executed by the parties had commission rates
of .25c, .35c, 50*, and $1.00; the typed
agreement executed by the parties had
commission rates of .25c, .35c, .50c, and
$1.00; and the intent of the parties with
respect to commissions did not change between execution of the two agreements.
Further, the court found that the parties
had stipulated to the amount of product
sold during the time in question. The court
concluded that the typed contract was a
valid, integrated and enforceable contract
and entered judgment for $487.87 and costs
of $138.77.
The court denied the motion to amend
the complaint to include a cause of action
for reformation.
C. Application of Law
In this case, when, on the second day of
trial, Burningham first testified that the
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack
was a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney
did not object to the testimony on the
ground that it was not within the issues
framed by the pleadings. Therefore, because no objection was raised, we conclude
that there was implied consent to trying of
the issue and the first part of Rule 15(b)
applies, allowing consideration of the issue.
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of
the issue of commission rates only on the
second day of trial, and by the court's
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find
that it was an abuse of discretion to concomitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to
the newly raised issue, by the court's refusal to consider evidence of intent and denial
of the motion to amend the complaint to
plead reformation of contract. There was
no evidence of prejudice which would result
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment
would allow realization of one of the criteria under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the
merits of the action."

Id. at 772. Reformation has also been applied in instances of drafter error. "Reformation is clearly appropriate where there is
a variance between the written deed and
the true agreement of the parties caused
by a draftsman." Hottinger v. Jensen, 684
P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984).
On remand, the court should allow
Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can
muster to establish its right to reformation
of the contract. Moreover, it is not pre-

yieldcd commissions of only $416.25 over the
time period in question.

2. The court may have believed reformation was
not available for other reasons, but the inte-

gration clause was the only rationale mentioned
by the court.

D. Reformation of Contract
[2,3] We further note that the trial
court apparently believed that the typewritten agreement could not, as a matter of
law, be reformed, because of the integration clause included in the contract.2
Reformation of a contract is an equitable
remedy which must be pled with particularity and established by clear and convincing
proof. Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772
(Utah 1985). The Briggs court stated:
A contract may be reformed for either of
two reasons. First, if the instrument
does not embody the intentions of both
parties to the contract, a mutual mistake
has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if one party is laboring
under a mistake about a contract term
and that mistake either has been induced
by the other party or is known by and
conceded to by the other party, then the
inequitable nature of the other party's
conduct will have the same operable effect as a mistake, and reformation is
permissible.

STATE v. STUKES
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eluded from doing so by the integration
clause included in the contract. An integration clause may prevent enforcement of
prior or contemporaneous agreements on
the same subject, but "does not prevent
proof of fraudulent representations by a
party to the contract, or of illegality, accident, or mistake
[PJaper and ink possess no magic power to cause statements
of fact to be true when they are actually
untrue." Corbin on Contracts, § 578 at
405-07 (1960).
II. COSTS
[4-61 Lloyd's also contends that the
court erred in failing to award it the costs
of deposing Burningham and Webb and
serving a subpoena on Burningham. Utah
R.Civ.P. 54(d) provides that except as the
rule otherwise provides, "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs
"
The general rule is that under Utah
R.Civ.P. 54(d) "costs" means those fees
which are "required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses
" Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). However, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that the expenses of taking depositions are
also allowable as costs if they were reasonably necessary. John Price Assoc, Inc. v.
Davis, 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). Deposition costs are generally allowed as necessary and reasonable "where the development of the case is of such a complex
nature that discovery cannot be accomplished through the less expensive method
of interrogatories, requests for admissions
and requests for the production of documents." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).
The party claiming entitlement to the costs
of depositions has the burden of demonstrating that the depositions were reasonably necessary and whether that burden is
met is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Id.; First Sec. Bank of Utah
N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah
1974). The trial court's ruling on whether
to award a party costs of depositions is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. First Sec.

Bank, 521 P.2d at 567. The Utah Supreme
Court has declined to extend the rule,
which allows recovery of the cost of taking
a deposition, to expenses such as service of
a subpoena. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774.
Lloyd's claims that the depositions of
Burningham and Webb were essential for
the development and presentation of the
case and that Webb's deposition was taken
because both parties anticipated that Webb
would be unavailable to testify at trial. In
addition, Lloyd's argues that because portions of Burningham's depositions were
used at trial, it should be awarded the costs
of Burningham's deposition. Lloyd's also
contends that it should have been awarded
the costs of serving Burningham with a
subpoena to insure his appearance at the
deposition. Nature's Way had previously
failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to
compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that
the subpoena was necessary to secure
Burningham's appearance at the deposition.
Nature's Way, to the contrary, argues
that because Lloyd's did not use Webb's
deposition at trial and did not publish Burningham's or Webb's deposition at trial, the
court properly denied Lloyd's the costs of
the deposition. Nature's Way also contends that Lloyd's could have avoided the
cost of the subpoena by telephoning Nature's Way's attorney to see if the corporation would produce Burningham for a deposition, and, therefore, the trial court correctly denied Lloyd's the cost incurred in
subpoenaing Burningham.
We find that, in view of these arguments, the trial court's decision to deny
Lloyd's the costs of the two depositions
was reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's failed
to prove that the deposition costs were
reasonably necessary and could not be accomplished through less expensive means.
Therefore, because the burden of proof
was not met and because the trial court's
decision was reasonable, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Lloyd's the costs of taking the
depositions.
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We also hold that the trial court's decision to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoenaing Burningham was not unreasonable, in
light of Frampton, where the court declined to extend the rules for awarding
deposition costs to expenses such as service
of subpoenas and vacated the trial court's
award of such costs. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Lloyd's the costs
of serving the subpoena.

Appeals held that petition failed to satisfy
applicable requirements,
Petition denied,

Criminal Law <£»1071
Petition for certificate of probable
cause lacked required affidavit of counsel
or memorandum of law supporting defendant's position that issues presented on appeal were novel or fairly debatable.

Bradley P. Rich, Yengich, Rich, Xaix &
III. FINDINGS
Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
Lloyd's third claim of error is that the
trial court's findings are not supported by appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen.,
the evidence. Because we hold that that
the trial court erred in denying the motion Sandra L. Sjogren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
to amend, we need not reach the issue of plaintiff and respondent.
whether the findings are supported by the
Before JACKSON, ORME and
evidence.
GREENWOOD, JJ. (On Law and
The judgment of the trial court is vacat- Motion).
ed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinMEMORANDUM DECISION
ion.
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on a
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur.
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause.
Appellant's counsel filed the petition on
March 10, 1988. It was accompanied by a
brief Memorandum of Points and Authorities, but was not supported by the affidavit
of counsel required by State v. Neeley, 707
P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme
Court set forth the rationale for the procedure mandated in Neeley as follows:
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
The record of proceedings below is not
Respondent,
available in this Court at the time such
v.
petitions are brought. In addition, the
petitions filed by the defendants are genDickie Lynn STUKES, Defendant
erally conclusory and contain little inforand Appellant.
mation concerning the case. The attorNo. 880154-CA.
ney general, who is by law required to
argue before this Court, is uninformed
Court of Appeals of Utah.
concerning the facts of the case or the
proceedings taken in the court below and
April 22, 1988.
therefore finds it difficult to respond to
petitions for certificates of probable
cause. This Court is likewise unFollowing ruling of the Third District
informed concerning the record until oral
Court, Summit County, Pat B. Brian, J., on
argument. In order that this Court may
search issue, defendant filed petition for
make an informed decision in issuing cer-

certificate of probable cause. The Court of

TabW

LYON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY
Utah

lawful possession from whom it is taken. 1
all witnesses who have not been examThe court correctly stated to the jury that:
ined. He may also cause the witnesses
* * * The state must establish either
to he kept separate, and to he prevented
that (iary Hill was such owner, or that
from conversing with each other until
he had some kind of special ownership
they have all been examined. [Emphaor special right of possession. 8
sis added.]
[61 In defendant's point (4) he argues
that although Mr. Hill testified that meat
'litis there is vested in the trial judge a
was missing from his plant, he could not
eparatc discretion on both whether to exsay exactly the amount thereof nor exactly
lude the witnesses, and whether he should
when it was taken; and that though Hill
idmonish them to keep apart and not talk
saw the meat and his labels thereon in
o each other.
the county jail, it was not proved to be
the same meat taken from the defendants
[3] We do not doubt that if there is
by Officer Julian. However, Mr. Hill
some reason to exclude the witnesses, it
identified the meat to the best of Ins ability
would seem that in most instances the
from the photographs of the packages taklatter admonition should also be given.
en at the scene, and from the observations
However, in this case, in addition to the
made of them at the county jail. Any lack
fact that it was discretionary with the
of positiveness in his testimony could as
trial judge,11 there are additional reasons
well be regarded by the jury as indicating
why we do not regard the omission of the
his honesty as it could in discrediting the
admonition as reversible error: (1) there
evidence. In any event, the matter comwas no request for such an admonition;
plained of by the defendant goes to the
and (2) there is no indication as to how
credibility of the State's evidence, and not
to its competency. Eroni that evidence,
whatever may have been discussed (which
and the inferences that reasonably could be
is not shown except in generality) would
drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonhave had any adverse effect upon the deably find, as its verdict indicated that it
fendant.
did: that the meat in question was stolen
from the packing plant in Brigham City;
[4, 5] As to point (3) : defendant atthat recently after its theft it was found
tacks his conviction on the ground of variin the possession of the defendant; that
ance between the charge as made against
he made a false, and therefore ipso facto
him and the proof as to the ownership of
unsatisfactory, explanation of his possesthe meat in question: that the information
sion, which facts justified the verdict of
stated it belonged to (iary Hill, whereas
guilty of its theft. 9
the evidence showed that it belonged to a
partnership of Mr. Hill and a Mr. d r a n t
Thompson.
The reason this contention
fails is that one who steals property has no
standing to question the title of anyone in
6. S«M» Stuff v.
30S l\2d 471.
7.

Keiuhuk.

2.'M Or.

HI2.

SIM» IVoplo v. Edwards. 72 Cnl.Anp. 102,
2:M» l \ '.Ml. 0 5 0 ; ItiirrHli v. State, 45.'?
1\2<1 312 (Okl.Cr.lJMMM.

8. See also Sir. 77 21 17, r.C.A.IWtf.
which states with i-«'s|M»ct to nitrtnorsliip

Affirmed.

No costs awarded.

CALL1STER, C. J., and

TUCKETT.

H E N R I O D and E L L E T T , JJ., concur.
property t h a t : '* * * * it is sufficient
to refer to or ileseribe such property as
IH'IOIIKUIK
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to

any

one

or

MI ore

of

.such

partners
* * *." (Emphasis added.)
9. Sec. 7«»-:5X-1. r.<\A.1!>.r»:i:
State v.
I W l l o . 40 Ctah fit*, 11!) I \ 1023; State
v. Allied, 1(1 Ctah 2d 4 1 , 305 IV2.1

25 U t a h 2d MO
The S T A T E of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
David Craig CARLSEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 11876.

Supreme Court of Ctah.
Feh. 5, 1071.

Defendant was convicted he fore the
hirst District Court, Cache County, Lewis
Jones, J., of attempted second-degree hurglary, and he appealed. The Supreme Court,
Tuckett, )., held that where trial court
directed clerk to furnish defendant true
and complete copy of documents, minute
entries and transcript of proceedings without cost to him and where defendant was
notified that transcript filed in Supreme
Court would he made availahle In him for
purpose of aiding him in appeal, conviction for attempted second-degree hurglary
was not improper on ground that trial
court failed to furnish defendant without
cost copies of minute entries and transcript
of proceedings of his trial.

TUCKETT,

Justice:

The defendant was found guilty of attempted second-degree hurglary, and from
the verdict and the judgment of the court
sentencing the defendant to a term in the
Utah State Prison he has appealed. The
sole hasis of the defendant's appeal is
that the trial court failed to furnish him
without cost copies of minute entries and
a transcript of the proceedings of his trial.
The record hclies defendant's contention
in that it shows that the court helow did in
fact make an order directing the clerk to
furnish the defendant a true and complete copy of the documents, minute entries
and a transcript of the proceedings without cost to the defendant. The record also
shows that the defendant was notified that
the transcript filed in this court would he
made availahle to him for the purpose of
aiding him in this appeal.
It appears that the defendant's contentions hefore this court are without merit
and the verdict and judgment of the court
helow are affirmed.
CALLLSTER, C. J., and H E N R I O D ,
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, J J., concur.

Affirmed.

Criminal Law <3=»I077

Where trial court directed clerk to
furnish defendant true and complete copy
of documents, minute entries and transcript
of proceedings without cost to him and
where defendant was notified that transcript filed in Supreme Court would he
made availahle to him for purpose of aiding him in appeal, conviction for attempted second-degree hurglary was not improper on ground that trial court failed to furnish defendant without cost copies of minute entries and transcript of proceedings of
his trial.

David Craig Carlsen, pro se.
Vernon K. Romney, Atty. den., Lauren
N. Rcaslcy, Asst. Atty. C.en., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
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23 Utah 2d 311
Barbara LYON, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H A R T F O R D A C C I D E N T AND I N D E M N I TY COMPANY and Yoscmlte Insurance
Company, Defendants and Appellant.
No. 12068.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feh. 0, 1071.

Injured passenger, after
ohtaining
judgment against uninsured motorist and
another for injuries sustained in motor vehicle collision, hrought action to recover
henefits under uninsured motorist coverage
of two policies. The Third District Court,

LYON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT J ¥D INDEMNITY COMPANY
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Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall, J., entered judgment for the passenger. Her insurer appealed, and she cross-appealed.
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held
that where policy contained uninsured motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000
per person hut contained provision that the
endorsement applied only in amount hy
which limit of liability exceeded applicable
limit of liability of other similar insurance
and where the passenger recovered under
another policy containing $10,000 uninsured motorist endorsement, the former
policy's excess-escape clause was effective
and the passenger was only entitled to recover on the former policy the difference
between limits of the policies' endorsements notwithstanding uninsured motorist
statute, but that the passenger was entitled
to interest on judgment on the policies only
from time that judgment was rendered
against uninsured motorist and another.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with order to render judgment in accordance with opinion.

withstanding uninsured motorist
U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1.

statute.

3. Insurance C=>532
Where insured's damages exceeded
policy limits under uninsured motorist coverage and insurer was not subject to double exposure for the insured's medical expenses, the insurer was not entitled to set
off amount that it had paid under medical
payment coverage against amount that it
was deemed liable to pay under uninsured
motorist coverage under provision of policy which stated that insurer was not obligated to pay under uninsured motorist coverage that part of damage which represented expenses for medical services.

Ilcnriod, J., did not participate herein.

I. Insurance C=*53l.3
Purpose of uninsured motorist statute
is to provide protection only up to minimum statutory limits for bodily injuries
, and not to provide insured with greater insurance protection than would have been
available had he been injured by insured
motorist. U.C.A.1953, 41-12-5, 41-12-21.1.
2. Insurance C=>53l.3
Where one policy contained uninsured
motorist endorsement with limit of $20,000
per person but contained provision that the
endorsement applied only in amount by
which limit of liability exceeded applicable
limit of liability of other similar insurance
and where passenger recovered under another policy containing $10,000 uninsured
motorist endorsement the former policy's
excess-escape clause was effective and the
passenger was only entitled to recover on
the former policy the difference between
limits of the policies' endorsements not-
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4. Insurance C=^606(4)
Where insured remained uncompensated for her total damages, her insurer was
not entitled to receive $2,000 paid into
court by insurer of judgment debtor on basis of former insurer's right of subrogation
for medical payments.
5. Insurance O»607.l(8)
Where insurer was not entitled to
award from another insurer based on subrogation rights for medical payments,
judgment for $500 attorneys' fees as former insurer's share of expenses in recovering the medical payments could not be sustained.
C. Interest 0 3 9 ( 2 )
Where insurer's obligation to perform,
under expressed terms of contract, did not
arise until there was legal determination of
liability of uninsured motorist and extent
of damages sustained, insured was entitled
to interest on judgment against the insurer
under uninsured motorist provision only
from time that judgment was rendered
against uninsured motorist and another.
7. Insurance O=>602.l
Insured was not entitled to damage for
insurer's failure to bargain with her or settle her claim in connection with uninsured
motorist.

Harold G. Christensen, of Worsley,
Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for
defendants-appellant.
Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae,
Richardson & Kinghorn, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff-respondent.
David R. Dee and Leonard \V. Hurningham, Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah Trial
Lawyers Assn., for amicus curiae.
CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in a
motor vehicle collision. She was a passenger in the automobile of one Martinez;
Yoseniitc Insurance Company had issued a
liability policy upon this vehicle which contained an uninsured motorist endorsement
in accordance with Sec. 41-12-21.1, U.C.
A. 1953, as amended 1967. In a separate
action plaintiff was granted a jury verdict
of $70,830.75 against the operators of two
other motor vehicles, who were deemed
jointly and severally liable. One driver,
Robert (i. Hutcher, was insured with Allstate, his coverage conformed to the statutory minimum as provided in Sec. 41-12-5,
$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one
person. The other driver, Scott G. Nickel,
was an uninsured motorist.
Plaintiff was an insured under a policy
issued to her father by Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company, which contained
an uninsured motorist endorsement with a
declared limit of $20,00X) per person. In
addition, plaintiff was covered under a
medical expense provision. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's tort action, Allstate,
the insurer of Hutcher, tendered $10,000,
the limit of its coverage. Plaintiff received $8,000; the other $2,000 was paid to
the clerk of the court because Hartford asserted subrogation rights to the $2,000 that
it had paid plaintiff under the medical expenses coverage.
Plaintiff initiated the instant action to
recover the benefits under the uninsured
motorist coverage of both the Yoseniitc
and Hartford policies. The trial court

awarded judgment to plaintiff against
Hartford for $20,000, the face amount of
the uninsured motorist coverage in the policy it had issued in which plaintiff was a
named insured.
Plaintiff was awarded
judgment against Yoseniitc for $10,000, the
maximum coverage contained under its uninsured motorist endorsement. In addition,
plaintiff was awarded $500 for reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred in assisting Hartford in the recovery of $2,000 medical payments from Allstate.
Hartford
was
awarded the $2,0(K) under its subrogation
rights for medical payments. The trial
court awarded plaintiff interest from the
day of her original judgment except for
the $500 attorneys' fees. Hartford appeals,
and plaintiff cross-appeals.
On appeal, Hartford asserts that under
the terms of its policy its obligation to
plaintiff cannot exceed $10,000, under its
uninsured motorist coverage, which is the
difference between the policy limits of
Yoscmite and Hartford.
The Hartford
policy provides:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not
owned by the named insured, the insurance under Coverage D--Uninsured Motorists shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such insured and applicable
to such automobile as primary insurance,
and this insurance shall then apply only
in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance.
In Russell v. Paulson * this court upheld
the validity of an excess-escape clause contained in an uninsured motorist provision,
wherein the insurer was obligated to pay
only that amount by which the limits of its
policy exceeded the limits of all other
available insurance.
In other words,
where the insured is injured in a nonowned vehicle upon which there has been
issued an uninsured motorist endorsement,
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he coverage to the insured under his poli:y constitutes excess insurance.
Subsequent to the decision in Russell v.
Paulson, the legislature enacted Sec. 4 1 12-21.1, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1967,
which provides:

SBMES

the form of a "pro rata," "excess insurance," "excess-escape," or other similar
clause, are invalid as a part of uninsured
motorist protection, on the ground that
the statute requiring every liability policy to provide this type of protection will
not permit the insurer to provide in any
way that the coverage will not apply
where other insurance is also "available," despite the fact that the insured
may thus be put in a better position than
he would be in if the other motorist
were properly insured.
Other courts
have stated, however, that the design and
purpose of uninsured motorist statutes
are to provide protection only up to the
minimum statutory limits for bodily injuries, and not to provide the insured with
greater insurance protection than would
have been available had he been injured
by an insured motorist, and have held
such "other insurance" provisions are
valid where they do not reduce coverage
below the minimum statutory limits.

Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile liability insurance policy insuring
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
or property damage suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed
in this state, with respect to any motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state, unless coverage is provided
in such policy or a supplement to it, in
limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions filed with and approved by the
state insurance commission for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run
motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. * * *
Plaintiff convinced the trial court that
See. 41-12-21.1 indicated a legislative intent to overrule the holding in Russell v.
Paulson; she successfully contended that
this excess-escape clause limited the protection afforded the insured in a manner
contrary to the policy expressed by the legislature and was therefore invalid. Plaintiffs argument is sustained by case authority, for there has been a marked divergence of opinion among the judiciary as to
the proper interpretation of these uninsured motorist statutes. The two views
are succinctly expressed in 28 A.L.R.3d
551, 554 Anno: Uninsured Motorists—
"Other Insurance" :

[1J The latter view appears to be in
accord with this State's statutory scheme.
Section 41-12-21.1 is part of the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act; the
minimum limits of uninsured motorist coverage are correlated with the minimum
limits of coverage required for an automobile liability policy under Sec. 41-12-5, U.
C. A. 1953.

In Tindall v. Farmers Automobile Management Corp. 2 the court rejected plaintiff's argument that an excess-escape
clause contained in an uninsured motorist
provision violated the Illinois uninsured
motorist statute (paragraph 755(a) (Sec.
143a) of Chap. 7$, Ill.Rev.Stat. (111.1ns.
Code)). The court observed that the statutory provision was designed to promote
and encourage protection complementary to
that afforded by the financial responsibility act, thereby affording coverage to the
same extent as would have been in effect
A number of courts have held that if the tort-feasor had complied with the
"other insurance" provisions, whether in
, . 0 , B . A W a - l « . 2 ! » N . R a - « » . » A . K « * W« ( • » " ) •

minimum requirements of the financial responsibility act. :t
In Martin v. Christcnscn, 4 this court
held that the provisions of Sec. 41-12-21.1
did not preclude the application of a clause
providing that if the company had issued
more than one policy to the insured, the insurer would be liable only up to the maximum coverage of its highest limit of any
one policy for any one accident or loss.
This court cited as authority M. F. A. Mutual Ins. Co. v .Wallace 5 in its rejection of
the argument of insured, that the statute
fixed the minimum coverage under each
policy separately; and, therefore, the insured was entitled to the maximum amount
under both policies.
In 52 Virginia Law Review 538, 554-557
(1966), there is an incisive critique of the
recent judicial trend of permitting the
stacking of policies, i. e., the courts have
allowed recovery up to the combined limits
of each policy available to the injured insured by ruling that "excess" or "other insurance" clauses were invalid. The author
asserts that the Uninsured Motorist Acts
are not being applied in a manner which
places the victim of an uninsured motorist
upon an equal footing with the victim of
an insured motorist. In reference to the
Virginia Act, the author states:
In these cases the courts have looked
only to the number of policies available
to pay the judgment obtained against the
uninsured motorist.
No thought has
been given to the fact that the act was
intended merely to fill, not overflow, an
insurance vacuum. Surely the (ieneral
Assembly did not intend to foster a
scheme whereby the innocent victim of
an insured motorist may be penalized.
It seems more logical that it intended to
3. Also see lliin-is v. Southern Farm I'ureau Casualty Ins. Co., Ark., 4IS S.W.2.1
052 (107O); M.RA. Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Wallace, 245 Ark. 230. 431 K.\\\2<1 742
(100K) ; Jackson v. Stair Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., La. A pp.. 235 So.
2d 021 (11)70); Long v. 1'nitnl Stairs
Fire Ins. Co., l.a.App., 23(1 So.24 521
(107<M; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe,
KM! X.ll. 422, 213 A.2.1 420 (1005);

guarantee a source from which an insured could recover his damages up to
limits of $15,0<K)/$30,(XK)/$5,(MX) with respect to any accident.

*

*

*

*

*

*

\\y their application of the Uninsured
Motorist Act, the courts in many instances have placed the innocent victim
of an uninsured motorist in a superior
position to that which he would have occupied if his wrongdoer had had liability
coverage. The pendulum has made the
full swing. Hefore the enactment of the
Uninsured Motorist Act, one who had
taken pains to protect the public against
the effect of his own negligence by
carrying insurance was himself left unprotected against the effect of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Today
the same person, through his uninsured
motorist endorsement, is usually better
protected and procedurally is in a better
position if the wrongdoer is uninsured.
12] A careful review of the case law
reveals that the better reasoned cases give
effect to an excess-escape clause contained
in an uninsured motorist endorsement. In
the instant action, the trial court erred by
its refusal to apply such a clause in Hartford's policy. Plaintiff is entitled to recover only the difference between the limits of the policies issued by Hartford and
Yosemitc, i. e., $10,000.
Defendant, Hartford, further contends
that it is entitled to set off the $2,000 that
it has paid under the medical payments
coverage against the amount that it is
deemed liable to pay plaintiff under the
uninsured motorist coverage.
Hartford
cites the following provision in its policy:
The company shall not be obligated to
pay under Coverage I)—Uninsured Moeonlra, Moreloek v. Millars' Mutual Ins.
Assn.. 125 III.App.2«l 2*3. 2(»0 N.K.24
477 (1070), wherein I In' court, Appellate,
5th District, declined to follow the holdings of the other Illinois Appellate Courts.
4. 22 I t ah 2«l 415,
(1000).
5.

Note 3, supra.
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orists that part of the damage which the
insured may he entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an uninsured
highway vehicle which represents expenses for medical services paid or payahle under Coverage \\—Medical
Expense.
A similar provision was interpreted by
le court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual
utomobile Ins. Co. 6 as follows:
* * * we consider it to he designed
to protect the insurance company from
double exposure for medical payments.
Thus, it prevents an insured whose medical expenses have been paid under the
Medical Payments Coverage from collecting for those medical expenses once
again, in the event that a judgment for
general damages in his favor and against
the insurance company under its Uninsured Motorist Coverage falls below the
policy limits of that coverage. However,
in a case such as Mr. Taylor's where the
award for general damages exceeds the
policy limits on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, the insurance company must pay
its insured the full limits of the policy,
in this case $5,000 regardless of what it
has paid him under the Medical Payments Coverage. We are fortified in
our interpretation of this amendment by
the fact that this is the only just meaning that it could have. Mr. Taylor paid
two separate premiums for two separate
coverages. * * * To interpret the
amendment as the company would have
us do, would make the Medical Payment
Coverage useless except in cases where
the insured suffered physical injury as a
result of his own negligence. * * * 7
13] In the instant action, plaintiff's
damages exceeded the policy limits under
the uninsured motorist coverage, and Hart6. Ln.App., 237 So.2d 000, 093 (1070).
7. Also Hvv Hutchison v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 34 A.l».2d 1010,
312 X.Y.S.2d 7S0 (1970).
8. State Farm Mutual In.s. Co. v. FnrmerH
Kxcluingc, 22 Utah 2d 183, 181, 450 P.
2d 458 (1000).

ford was not subject to double exposure
for plaintiff's medical expenses.
Under
such circumstances, Hartford was not entitled to offset the medical payments against
the uninsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiff in her cross-appeal asserts that
the trial court erred in its award to Hartford the $2,000 paid into the court by Alb
state under Hartford's right of subrogation for medical payments, when plaintiff's
damages far exceed her recovery therefor.
Subrogation springs from erpiity concluding that one having been reimbursed
for a specific loss should not be entitled
to a second reimbursement therefor.
This principle has been accepted in the
insurance field with respect to property
damage, and with respect to medical
costs by an impressive weight of authority. * * *»
The Hartford policy provides:
In the event of any payment under
Coverage II—Medical Fxpcnsc of this
policy, the company shall be subrogated
to all the rights of recovery therefor
which the injured person or anyone receiving such payment may have against
any person or organization and such person shall execute and deliver instruments
and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
Since subrogation is an offspring of equity, equitable principles apply, even when
the subrogation is based on contract, except as modified by specific provisions in
the contract. In the absence of express
terms to the contrary, the insured is entitled to be made whole before the insurer
may recover any portion of the recovery
from the tort-feasor. 9 If the one responsible has paid the full extent of the loss, the
9. ProvidoiM'tt Washington Insurance (V>. v.
I lowers. 07 N..l.Sni»er. 475, 171 A.2d 120,
124 (10(H); First National Hank of
Lnfayette v. Stovall, La.A pp., 128 So.
2d 712. 717 (1061) ; 4(1 C.J.S. Insurance
§ 1200, p. 155.

insured should not claim both sums, and
the insurer may then assert its claim to
subrogation. 10
[4,5] In the instant action, there are
no terms in this general subrogation clause
which would support Hartford's subrogation claim to the $2,000, while plaintiff remains uncompensated for her total damages. Furthermore, since Hartford is not
entitled to the award, the judgment for
$500 attorneys' fees as Hartford's share
of expenses in recovering the medical payments cannot be sustained.
Plaintiff further asserts that since this is
an action in contract between an insured
and an insurer, she is entitled to interest
from the date of her loss, the date of the
accident, and not from the date she was
granted judgment against the tort-feasors.
The insurance contract provides:
The company will pay all sums which
the insured shall be legally entitled to recover os damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
* * * [Fmphasis added.]
[6] Since Hartford's obligation to perform, under the express terms of its contract with the insured, did not arise until
there was a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured motorist and the extent of the damages sustained, the insured,
plaintiff, is entitled to interest only from
the time that judgment was rendered
against the tort-feasors.
[7] Finally, plaintiff contends that the
trial court should have awarded her damages for Hartford's failure to bargain with
her or settle her claim. She concedes that
there is no case in point but asserts that
this court should analogize her situation to
that where a liability insurer refuses in
bad faith to settle a claim with third parties
within the policy limits and a judgment in
excess of the policy limits is rendered
against the insured. 11 She reasons that by
10. MeCuiiiiell v. Coiiawny, 02 Ohio A pp.
335, 23 N.R.2tl 070. 071 (1030).
M. Ammonium v. Farmers fun. Kxchange,
10 Ft.ih 2d 201, 130 l\2d f>70 (1007).
4R0 P 2 d - 4 7 > ?

Hartford's failure to bargain, she was
compelled to incur legal expenses for
which she is entitled to be compensated.
Plaintiff's analogy is untenable because
of the distinction in the relationship between a liability insurer and its insured
and that between the insurer and its insured in connection with an uninsured motorist. In the former situation, the insurer
must act in good faith and be as zealous in
protecting the interests of the insured as it
would be in regard to its own. 12 hi the
latter situation, the insured and the insurer
are, in effect and practically speaking,
adversaries. 1 3
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and this cause is remanded with an
order to render judgment in accordance
with this opinion. Each party should bear
its own costs.
TUCK F I T ,
F L F F T T and
KTT, J J., concur.
IIF.NRIOD,
herein.

J.,

does

not

CROCKparticipate

mitH>

25 Utah 2d 310
Jamas P. KNUCKLES, Plaintiff ««*
Respondent,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12254.
Supreme Court of Ftah.
Feh. 5, 11171.

Action by insured against insurer for
benefits under policy for loss of sight.
The Seventh District Court, Grand County,
12. Amincriuan v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
note 11, supra.
13. 7 Appleiiuin, Insurance Law and Practice, 1070 Supp., § 1331, p. 12S.
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irnacy to b r i n g h i m w i t h i n t h e class of
p e r s o n s w h o a r c p e r m i t t e d t o i n h e r i t by
t h e law of t h e s i t u s is a q u e s t i o n , not of
d e s c e n t o r d i s t r i b u t i o n , but of p e r s o n a l
s t a t u s , a n d a s s u c h is g o v e r n e d by the
p e r s o n a l l a w of t h e child, a n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o r a c q u i s i t i o n of a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t u s
by the c h i l d ' s p e r s o n a l law will be given
effect u n d e r t h e i n h e r i t a n c e law of the
situs ( s o l o n g as such r e c o g n i t i o n d o e s
not v i o l a t e t h e public policy of the f o r u m
o r s i t u s ) , as will t h e d e n i a l of such status.
A n d we t h i n k t h e e m i n e n t P r o f . Hcalc in
bis " C o n f l i c t s of L a w s , " Vol. 2, s e c . 30-4.1,
p. 1033, r e f l e c t s t h e l e t t e r a n d spirit of o u r
c o n c l u s i o n a n d t h a t of t h e A.U.K. c i t a t i o n
a b o v e , w h e n h e said :
If a b u s t a r d is l e g i t i m i z e d by t h e law
of t h e d o m i c i l e , he m a y i n h e r i t , and if
t h e l a w of t h e d o m i c i l e finds him illegitim a t e h e m a y not i n h e r i t e v e n t h o u g h by
the l a w g o v e r n i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n he would
inherit.
C A L U S T K R , C. J., a n d T U C K K T T , J.,

F o r p u r p o s e s of
acknowledgment

r e s i d e d at

t h e time, a n d

the

son

h a v e no such r i g h t to i n h e r i t

.

J., c o n c u r s

in t h e

.

.

law

as

well

was

The distribution

result.

as

illegitimate
under

Illinois

of

the estate

must

be

Subsection (4) r e a d s :
If t h e r e is n e i t h e r issue, h u s b a n d ,
wife, f a t h e r n o r m o t h e r , t h e n in equal
s h a r e s to t h e b r o t h e r s a n d s i s t e r s of the
d e c e d e n t , a n d to the c h i l d r e n o r g r a n d c h i l d r e n of a n y d e c e a s e d b r o t h e r o r sist e r by r i g h t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Subsection (6) r e a d s :
If

fact t h a t

father.

law.

mother,

issue,
brother

t a t e m u s t g o to t h e n e x t kin in e q u a l de-

The

g r e e , e x c e p t i n g t h a t w h e n t h e r e a r e two

ed in 10 A m . J u r . 2 d B a s t a r d s § 159 as fol-

At c o m m o n l a w i l l e g i t i m a t e
children
could not i n h e r i t p r o p e r t y . 4 T h e c o m m o n
law of K u g l a u d is t h e l a w of U t a h e x c e p t
as it h a s been m o d i f i e d by s t a t u t e ; a n d
while t h e s t a t u t e p e r m i t s t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e
child to i n h e r i t from its m o t h e r a n d from
its f a t h e r if h e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e child to
he his, t h e s t a t u t e m a k e s n o p r o v i s i o n for
i n h e r i t i n g from the b r o t h e r s a n d s i s t e r s
who a r c l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n of t h e i r f a t h e r .
S e c t i o n 74-4 11, U.C.A.1 ( )53, s e e m s to
indicate a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t that a n illegiti
mate c a n n o t i n h e r i t from c o l l a t e r a l half
Mood r e l a t i v e s o n t h e f a t h e r ' s side. It p r o vides t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y of a n i l l e g i t i m a t e
child w h o d i e s i n t e s t a t e w i t h o u t l e a v i n g
h u s h a u d o r w i f e o r l a w f u l issue will g o to
his m o t h e r o r in c a s e of h e r d e a t h to her
heirs at l a w . T h i s s t a t u t e p r e v e n t s t h e d e cedent from p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e e s t a t e of
his half sister, a n d it w o u l d s e e m that t h e
legislature i n t e n d e d that s h e ( o r in c a s e of
her p r i o r d e a t h , h e r d e s c e n d a n t s ) should
not be able to s h a r e in his e s t a t e .
The appellants, therefore, cannot take
under S u b s e c t i o n ( 1 ) , s u p r a , a s h a r e of the
decedent's property t h r o u g h their mother,
nor c a n t h e y t a k e u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n ( 6 )
above for t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e y a r e not r e c ognized in law a s t h e " n e x t of k i n . " T h e
term " n e x t of k i n " r e f e r s to n e a r e s t blood
relatives w h o w o u l d t a k e the p e r s o n a l estate of o n e w h o d i e s i n t e s t a t e 5 a n d d o e s
not include b a s t a r d s . 0 S i n c e t h e i r m o t h e r
could not i n h e r i t a n y p a r t of t h e e s t a t e of

o r m o r e c o l l a t e r a l k i n d r e d in equal de-

the d e c e d e n t ,

gree,

precluded

but

claiming

through

different

a n c e s t o r s , t h o s e w h o claim t h r o u g h

lows:

Sertioit 71-4 10, U . C . A . I W K J .

father,

neither

of any d e c e a s e d b r o t h e r o r sister, t h e es-

T h e law is stat-

•„».*{ Aiii..hir.lM I>»\srent ami
g$ 1!> mid lit).

wife,

leaves

nor sister, n o r c h i l d r e n or g r a n d c h i l d r e n

t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o c c u r r e d in Illi-

nois is of n o i m p o r t a n c e .

the decedent

husband,

under

T h e r e is a l s o n o q u e s t i o n a b o u t h e r b e i n g
a c k n o w l e d g e d by h e r n a t u r a l

N o w , t h e a p p e l l a n t s t a k e only t h r o u g h
their m o t h e r .
If s h e c o u l d not t a k e , t h e n
her d a u g h t e r s c a n n o t t a k e .

.

If the e s t a t e of the f a t h e r of t h e m o t h e r
w a s being p r o b a t e d in U t a h , t h e s e appell a n t s would t a k e t h e s h a r e w h i c h w o u l d belong to t h e i r d e c e a s e d m o t h e r . : t
However,
it is not the e s t a t e of h e r f a t h e r but r a t h e r
is t h a t of h e r blood half b r o t h e r , t h e legitim a t e son of h e r f a t h e r , w h i c h is b e i n g probated.

T h e r e is no q u e s t i o n but w h a t the m o t h appellants

and Appellant,

might

R v e r y i l l e g i t i m a t e child is a n h e i r of
t h e p e r s o n w h o a c k n o w l e d g e s himself to
be t h e f a t h e r of such child, a n d in all
c a s e s is a n h e i r of his m o t h e r ; a n d inh e r i t s his o r h e r e s t a t e , in w h o l e o r in
p a r t , as t h e c a s e m a y be, in t h e same
m a n n e r as if h e h a d been b o r n in lawful
wedlock.

I c o n c u r in t h e r e s u l t . 1 low-ever, I c a n
not see t h a t t h e l a w s of Illinois h a v e a n y thing to do with the case. T h e deceased
w a s a r e s i d e n t of U t a h , a n d h i s p r o p e r t y is
in U t a h . T h e r e f o r e , w e n e e d only look to
U t a h law to see w h o t a k e s . 1

2.

in w h i c h

In U t a h o u r s t a t u t e 2 p r o v i d e s :

sult).

1.

be

o t h e r state w h e r e the f a t h e r

K C L K T T , J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g in t h e r e -

Utah

may

sufficient, a l t h o u g h it took place in an-

tion ( 4 ) or ( 6 ) .

CUOCKKTT,

of

inheritance,

recognition

m a d e p u r s u a n t to S e c t i o n 7 4 - 1 - 5 , Subsec-

concur.

er

or

T R A N S A M E R I C A I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y v. B A R N E S
Utah
78;$
c u e us r<or» r.LM 7.s;i
n e a r e s t a n c e s t o r m u s t be p r e f e r r e d to
LM»
. riahLM 10!
those c l a i m i n g t h r o u g h a n a n c e s t o r m o r e
T R A N S A M E R I C A INSURANCE COMPANY,
remote.
a California corporation, Plaintiff

the

from

the

appellants

likewise

inheriting and,

cannot be c o n s i d e r e d

a s b e l o n g i n g to the

class of " n e x t of k i n . "
Distribution

3.

In r«' Chirr's Kstnte, 31 Utah 57, 8t» P.
757 fHMXj).

4.

2 Wendell's
p«B« 2M.

are

therefore,

JJIaekstone

v.
Earl R. BARNES, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 12771.
S u p r e m e Court of ('tali.
Nov. 17, l!>7*~\

A u t o m o b i l e liability i n s u r e r b r o u g h t
a c t i o n t o e n f o r c e its c l a i m e d r i g h t of sub
r o g a t i o n to c e r t a i n funds r e c e i v e d by <ie
f e n d a n t in s e t t l e m e n t of his t o r t a c t i o n for
personal injuries against third party.
The
T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Salt L a k e C o u n t y ,
S t e w a r t M. H a n s o n , J., rendered
summary
j u d g m e n t for d e f e n d a n t , a n d plaintiff a p
pealed.
The S u p r e m e C o u r t , Callister, <'.
J., held t h a t w h e r e r e c o r d w a s insufficient
to i n d i c a t e w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t w h o had
r e c e i v e d m e d i c a l e x p e n s e p a y m e n t s from
i n s u r e r , w a s paid t w i c e for h i s i n j u r i e s and
r e c o r d w a s i n a d e q u a t e to e s t a b l i s h w h o had
g r e a t e r e q u i t y a n d did not c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h
that tort-feasors or their representatives
h a d a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e k n o w l e d g e of in
s u r e r ' s r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n , issues of fact
were raised, precluding summary judgment
for d e f e n d a n t .
R e v e r s e d a n d r e m a n d e d for t r i a l .
T u e k c l t , }., c o n c u r r e d in result,
l l e n r i o d , J., d i s s e n t e d a n d

filed

C r o c k e t t , J., d i s s e n t e d a n d

filed opin

I. I n s u r a n c e C=>606(4)
W h e n ' an a u t o m o b i l e liability p o l i o
did not specify o c c u p a n t of a vehicle beini,
used by an i n s u r e d as a " p e r s o n

insured,"

d e f e n d a n t , w h o w a s such a p a s s e n g e r , w h o
had been paid by i n s u r e r u n d e r m e d i c a l e \
pense coverage and against whom

('niiuiieutaric.*

opu

insurer

5.

Hallentihe h.nv I >i» -liumir.v inure NIJ.N.

6.

10 C.J.S. Jln.stimfa § lib
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subsequently brought action to enforee its
claimed right of subrogation to funds received by defendant in settlement of his
tort action for personal injuries against
third party, was not an "insured" subject
to insurer's subrogation rights under policy
clause providing that insurer shall be subrogated to all insured's rights of recovery.
I Per (allister, ( . I., with one Justice concurring and oiK' Justice concurring in the
result.)
2. Insurance G^60G(I)
Regardless of an express contract provision, an insurer may b< entitled to subrogation. (IVr (.'allister, C. J , with one Justic*' concurring and one Justice concurring
in the result.)
3. Subrogation C^l
imputable principles apply to subrogation. (IVr ( allister, < '. J., with our Justice
concurring and one J list ice concurring in
tin result. I
4. Insurance C^GOfi(l)
Insured is entitled to be made whole
before insurer may recover any portion of
insured's recovery from tort-feasor; if one
responsible has paid full extent of the loss,
insured should not claim both sums, and insurer may then assert its claim to subrogation. (IVr I allister, ('. J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
5. Subrogation 0 > l
Subrogation is not a matter of right
but may be invoked only in those circumstances wlure justice demands its application. (IVr ("allister, < . J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
6. Subrogation C=>»
Subrogation is not permitted where it
will work any injustice to others. ( IVr
(allister, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)
7. Subrogation C=>i
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities of one's case must be strong. (IVr
(allister, C. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)

8. Subrogation C=^\
The purpose of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to effect an adjustment
between parties so as to secure ultimately
the pa\ incut or discharge of the debt by a
person who in good conscience ought to
pay for it. (IVr (allister, t'. J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)
9. Insurance C=»G06( 10)
If third-party tort-feasor's settlement
with person who had received payment
from automobile liability insurer for medical expenses was intended to include the
prior medical expenses paid for by insurer,
two drafts should have been issued, one to
insurer and person receiving benefits jointly and one to that person alone. (IVr (allister, ('. J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)
10. Insurance C^f>0(i(IO)
If settlement by third party tort feasor
with person who had received medical expense payments from automobile liability
insurer was made with knowledge, actual
or constructive, of insurer's subrogation
right, such settlement and release was a
fraud on insurer and would not affect insurer's right of subrogation as against
tort feasor or his insurer. (IVr (allister,
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one
Justice concurring in the result.)
11. Judgment C=>IB5.3(I2)
When record, in automobile liability
insurer's action to enforce its claimed right
of subrogation to certain funds received by
defendant in settlement of his tort action
for persnnal injuries against third party,
was insufficient to indicate whether defendant, who had received medical expense
payments from insurer, was paid twice for
his injuries and record was inadequate to
establish who had greater equity and did
not clearly establish that tort-feasors or
their representatives had actual or constructive knowledge of insurer's right of
subrogating issues of fact were raised,
precluding summary judgment for defendant. (Per (.'allister, C. J., with one Justice

('h>Ks.r)fl.r» IV1M 7S.{

concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
12. Insurance €=3606(10)
If an insurer has had an opportunity
to assert its subrogation rights to thirdparty tort-feasors who have entered into
settlement with person against whom subrogation rights arc claimed and insured has
neglected to give notice or enforce its ele
mauds, it may be determined under such
circumstances that insurer's rights in equity are equal or inferior to those of person
against whom subrogation is claimed.
(IVr (allister, C. J., with one Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the
result.)
13. Equity €=>54
F.quity will not relieve one who could
have relieved himself. (Per ('allister, (\
J., with one Justice concurring and one
Justice concurring in the result.)
14. Insurance G=>60l.2
Insurer, to establish a superior equity
against person who has received medical
expense payments from insurer and thereafter recovered against third party tortfeasors, and thus to he entitled to prevail
in subrogation action, must present proof
which establishes that damages recovered
by defendant's settlement were the same or
cover those for which defendant has already received indemnity from insurer;
otherwise1, receipt of payment from tortfeasor does not entitle insurer to return of
payments made by it. (IVr Callister, (\ J.,
with one Justice concurring ami one' Justice concurring in the result.)

Utah
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certain funds received by defendant in settlement e>f his tort action for personal injuries against thirel parties. Hoth parties
moved for summary judgment based em the
pleadings, affidavits, admissions and answers to interrogatories; the trial court
granted judgment to the defendant. Plaintiff appeals therefrom and seeks judgment
rendered in its favor.
Defendant was a passenger in a motor
vehicle, owned and operated by one Jenson; plaintiff had issued a policy of insurance to Jenson. The vehicle was involved
in a collision, and defendant sustained personal injuries. Plaintiff, under its medical
expense coverage, paid defendant $1,()00,
the maximum benefit under the policy.
Thereafter, defendant filed an action
against the alleged tort-feasors, whom he
claimed by their negligence caused the collisiem with the vehicle in which he' was riding. Defendant alleged that he' had sustaineel permanent injuries, auel sought
$65,IMX> general damages anil $il),(X)0 special damages. Plaintiff notified defendant's attorney of its claimed subrogation
right; however, plaintiff refused to participate in defendant's action or te) permit his
counsel to act on its behalf. Defendant
has emphasized that the law firm that represents plaintiff also representee! the tortfeasors, with whom defendant entereel into
a settlement for a lump sum of $7,5(H).
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reimbursement to the extent of $l,()00 less a
reasonable attorney's fee and its proportionate share of the costs from the fund
recovered by defendant from the tort-feasors.

William II. Henderson and Mark S.
Miner, Salt Lake City, fe)r defendant and
respondent.

Plaintiff predicates its right e>f subrogation on three alternative theories: one, on
an express contract as provided in the insurance policy issued to Jenson; two, on
an implied contract as money had and receiveel; or thirel, on a ejuasi contract for
unjust enrichment.

CAU.ISTKR, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff insurer initiated this action te>
enforce its claimed right of subrogation to

The insurance contract provided that the
company would pay, "on behalf of the insured," all reasonable medical expenses for
bodily injury caused by accident and sus-

Allan L. Larson, of Wen shy, Snow &
("hrislensen, Salt Lake1 City, for plaintiff
.mil appellant.

5U5 P.?d-'->0
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tained l>y any person while occupying an
owned automobile while being used by an
insured. The policy further defined an
"insured" as a person or organization described under "Persons Insured."
l.'nder
the express provisions of the policy, an occupant of a vehicle being used by an insured was not specified as a "person insured." The subrogation clause of the policy provided:
In the event of any payment under
the Liability or Medical Kxpense ( o v e r age or under Part II of this policy, the
company shall be subrogated to all the
insured's rights of recovery therefor
against any person or organization and
the insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever
else is necessary to secure such rights.
The insured shall do nothing after loss
to prejudice such rights.
| Kmphasis
added. |
[1,2] From the foregoing, defendant
was not an "insured" under the express
provisions of the contract; and, therefore,
it may not be urged that as an insured he
breached the contractual provisions of the
subrogation clause. Regardless of an express contract provision, an insurer may be
entitled to subrogation.
Subrogation springs from emiity con
eluding that one having been reimbursed
for a specific loss should not be entitled
to a second reimbursement therefor.
This principle has been accepted in the
insurance field with respect to property
damage, and with respect to medical
costs by an impressive weight of authority. . . .•
| 3-81 Imputable principles apply to subrogation, and the insured is entitled to be
made whole before the insurer may recover
any portion of the recovery from the tort1. Slat*' Farm Mutual I us. < V v. Farmers
his. KM•liaiuie. 22 Flab 2d is:;. 1st. ir,o
l\2d jr>S (1!MHh.
2. L>on v. Hartford Are. iV Imlcm. Co., 2"i

Ftah IM :sii. :ns, iso IMM IM 0071 >.
3

Heaver County V. Home hidein. Co., NS

Ftah i, :».u :i7. rvj IMM i:;r> do:;ri).

feasor. If the one responsible has paid the
full extent of the loss, the insurer should
not claim both sums, and the insurer may
then assert its claim to subrogation. 2 Subrogation is not a matter of right but may
be invoked only in those circumstances
where justice demands its application, and
the rights of the one seeking subrogation
have a greater equity than the one who opposes hini.:< Subrogation is not permitted
where it will work any injustice to others.
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities
of one's case must be strong, as equity will,
in general, relieve only those who could
not have relieved themselves. 1 The purpose of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to effect an adjustment between parties so as to secure ultimately the payment
or discharge of a debt by a person who in
good conscience ought to pay for it. 5
Plaintiff urges that defendant's settlement and release of his entire claim must
necessarily include all of his medical expenses, and therefore, he has received double paxment to the extent that plaintiff
paid under its medical coverage. On the
other hand, defendant claims that he sustained severe injuries, hut he was compelled
to settle for a sum that inadequately compensated him for the total damages sustained.
19. 101 The settlement was for a lump
sum without apportionment as to specific
items of damage. From the state of the
instant record, there is insufficient evidence to indicate whither defendant was
paid twice.
When the settlement was
made, the tort-feasors or their representatives apparently had actual or constructive
knowledge that some of defendant's medical expenses had previously been paid by
plaintiff.
Perhaps the negotiated settlement was reduced by this amount, particularly when defendant's counsel had been
4.

Aslilou .b'likins his. I'D. V. I.avion Sugar
Co., so I i;1i, :\:\:\. :;:t7. :io l\2d 701
(P.KIoL

5.

Holmsieail v. Abbott O. M. Diesel, In.-..
1!7 1 tali 'J.I 100. VX1 I'.iM r,2."i (VM2).
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informed that he- did not represent plain- tort-feasor does not entitle the plaintiff to
tiffs interest. If the settlement were in- the return e>f the payments made by it."
tended to include plaintiff's prior medical
This cause is reversed and remanded for
expenses, two drafts should have been isa trial in accordance with this opinion.
sued, one to plaintiff and defendant jointly
N<J costs are awareled.
and one te> defendant, alone. If the settlement were made with knowledge, actual or
KLFKTT, J., concurs.
constructive, of plaintiff's
subrogation
right, such settlement and release is a
T U C K K T T , J., concurs in the result.
fraud on the insurer and will not affect
the insurer's right of subrogation as
H K N R I O D , Justice (dissenting):
against the tort-feasor or his insurance
J elissent. The main opinion indulges
8
carrier.
generalities as substitutes for the facts in
subrogation matters relating to insurance
[11-14J The present state of the record
contracts.
inadequate to establish who has the
The policy in this case provided two
greater equity. The record does not clearthings pertinent to this ease: It insuied
ly establish that the tort-feasors or their
liarnes, defendant here, who was no signarepresentatives had acttial or constructive tory to the insurance contract, but a beneknowledge e>f plaintiff's right of subrogaficiary thereof, by the happenstance- that
tion. If such fact be established, they may
he' was a passenger in the car owned by
not disregard plaintiff's known subrogation
the insured who paid the premium. As
right in settling the liability. In such a
such beneficiary he obtained no greater
case, the te>rt-fease>rs in good conscience
rights under the policy than did the in
should discharge the liability and plaintiff
sured, and under the terms e)f the' policy
docs ne>t have a right in equity superior
the insurance company, plaintiff here, was
to defendant's. Furthermore, if plaintiff
I) required to pay medical benefits to the
had nu opportunity to assert its subrogadefendant, as passenger, and 2) was subrogated, in equity, which is the- ease here, to
tion rights te> the tort-feasors and neglected
any recovery for such benefits made- by
to give' notice or enforce its demands, the
1
trial court may determine under such cir- defendant.
cumstances that plaintiff's rights in equity
Dcfcnelant, having full knowledge of the
are equal or inferior te> defendant's, i. e\, policy terms, after having been paid the
equity will not relieve one who could have
maximum medical benefits of $1,000 by the
relieved himself. The plaintiff tej establish
plaintiff insurance' company, sued for both
a superior equity and thus to be entitled to medical and general damages.
At this
prevail must present pre>e>f which establishpoint the insurance company, plaintiff
es that the damages covered by defendant's
here, notified Jiarnes of its equitable right
settlement were the same or cover those of subrogation to recover back what it had
for which the defendant has already repaiel liarnes ($1,(KK)) for the medicals.
ceived indemnity from plaintiff; otherPanics settled his suit against the tort-feawise, the receipt of payment from the
sor fe>r $7,500, giving a full release for all
Hi dwell On Insurance 2d, § (>| :1J)7, |>|>.
.'{IS .*>."»<>; Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nrv. .'Mil, -MM
I MM 10 (1!Mjr>) ; Hospital Service Corp.
of Khode Island v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.,
101 It.l. 708, 227 A.2d 105, 111* (10071 ;
Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 210 Ark. (ISO.
1.10 S.YV.LM 707. 700 (1000) ; 0A Appleman Jus. Law & I'raetiee, § 1002, p. 210.

7.

15 Itlashfield Automobile Law and l'raetiee, $ ISI.U, p. 102.

I. There was nothing therein requiring the
company to sue for or assist Haines in
recovering anything oilier than what the
eompany had paid under the policy, the
maximum $1,000.
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claims, without insisting that the release or $1,(XM) as compared to $7,500 settlement
which should amount to 100% recovery, in
include or exclude the medical payment of
my opinion, but at least a proportionate re$1,000 already paid. In equity one is said
covery from Harnes. I b i s would seem to
to he required to do equity. If this he so,
be equity, and there is no equity in sending
Harnes should have said "I have heen paid
this case back to determine any other equi$1,000 on the claim for medical damages
ties between plaintiff and defendant, since
which I sued you for along with general
such equities already were resolved in an
damages, and therefore I cannot give you
insurance contract, to the terms of which
a release for all claims unless you either
Harnes was but a beneficiary, not a signapay an additional $1,000 to the insurance
tory, and to which he was no party as to
company or make out two checks, one to it
subrogation rights, and in which contract
for its equitahle subrogation right of reimhe was not entitled to lay down his own
bursement of $1,000, leaving a second
rules, but to whose terms, if he relies on
check to me for $6,500." Harnes having
its terms, lie must comply,—one of which
failed in equity either to notify the plainis that certainly he cannot sign a release of
tiff company of its willingness to accept a
all claims unless he recognizes the rights
sum for a "release of all claims," without
of the contract under which he has acceptcondition or exclusion of the one claim,—
ed benefits, without reserving rights to the
the medical one,—is not responsive to the
insurer in a release.
maxim that "lie who seeks equity must do
54
equity."
It is no answer for the main
CROCK KTT, J., dissents and files opinopinion to return this case to determine
ion.
what Barnes's understanding with the deCROCK KTT, Justice (dissenting) :
fendant tort-feasor's insurance carrier was,
since such circumstances are quite irreleIt is important to bear in mind that, as
vant and inconsistent with any rights correctly set forth in the main opinion, the
plaintiff and defendant here may have en- defendant Harnes was not an "insured" untertained. Harnes, defendant here, cannot der Jensen's policy with plaintiff Trausadjudge the conditions under which he may america. Therefore Harnes and Transgive a release for all claims, without reseramerica had no contractual relationship
vation, without being obligated to abide by nor obligations to each other. Defendant
Harnes simply became a third-party benefithe only contract that gave him any rights
for medical payments at all—the insurance ciary of Transamerica's promise to its inpolicy, and the only thing involved here. sured, Jensen, that it would pay up to
It seems silly for him to say that I am $1000 medical to any occupant of his car
who was injured. It should be assumed
bound by the policy under which, though I
was no signatory thereto, I am not bound, that Jensen both desired and paid for this
if the insurer doesn't intervene and protect protection to his passengers, of which
Harnes became a beneficiary. Transamerime in some fantastic claim I made in my
ca received the premium for that proteccomplaint, which I admitted in my brief
that I, "Harnes, fearful of losing suit tion and should fulfill that obligation and
should not be permitted to sue and recover
settled it for a lump sum of
from the third-party beneficiary (defend$7,500." To this author, this sounds like a
ant Harnes). Allowing it to take the monfirst-class shakedown, and as icing on a
ey away from the intended beneficiary to
cake that would give a double payment of
reimburse itself results in failure to fulfill
$1,000 medical expense paid by the plainthe promise for which it accepted the pretiff insurance company, which latter in eqmium, and defeats the purpose for which
uity should have at least some kind of relief, and which should be the amount paid,
its insured (Jensen) paid his money.
2. State Farm Mutual v. Fnrmers Insurance Exchange, 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 l\2d 158 (Ji)Gi)).

The conclusion thus slated is affirmed
by the well known authority, Couch on Insurance, Sec. 61:172, 2d lul., wherein it is
stated:

where such a subrogation would be available to this plaintiff, it certainly would heobliged at least to make it clearly appear
that $1000 of the settlement received by
Harnes in the other suit was for the medical expense plaintiff had paid. On the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions
and answers to interrogatories, the trial
court could view the facts thus: that inasmuch as the settlement of Harnes (defendant here) in the other case wherein he settled his claim of $65,000 for $7500 was
indicated as being for his personal in
juries, and with no segregation nor indication as to separate medical expense, there
therefore would exist no reasonable basis
for a finding that the $1IXK) medical expense which had been paid by plaintiff
Transamcrica was repaid in that settle
incur.

It may be required by statute or contract that some person other than the insured shall have the benefit of the insurance procured by the insured.
When
such is the ease, the insurer may not assert any claim by way of subrogation
against such person, [this is] on the
theory that the policy is designed to afford protection to such third person ami
this purpose would obviously be defeated
if the insurer could sue the third person
to recover from him the payments made
by the insurer to the third person. (Citation) [Kmphasis added.)
It is also significant that Transamerica's
policy contained numerous and ample provisions for its own protection, including
On the basis of what I have said above I
rights of subrogation expressly reserved to
think the trial court was justified in con
itself, but it did not include the right of
eluding that there was no disputed issue of
subrogation against any third-party benefifact which if resolved in favor of the
ciary, therefore not against one in the poplaintiff would entitle it to prevail, and
sition of the defendant Harnes.
that accordingly, the summary judgment
further, assuming without conceding was proper in order to avoid the time, trouthat there may be some circumstances ble and expense of a trial.
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whether the insurance should be only on
Mr. Lewis or whether it should be on both
of them. Being then undecided, the Lewises told Mr. Pike that they would later contact him and inform him of their decision as
to whether they wanted joint insurance.
Pike told them that insurance could be added any time after the loan was closed. The
disclosure statement contains a section entitled "Insurance" in which the following
statement appears:
Credit Life And Disability Insurance is
not required to obtain this loan. No
charge is made for credit insurance and
no credit insurance is provided unless the
borrower signs the appropriate statement
below.
Immediately below those sentences appear
blanks for the borrower to indicate how
much insurance he desires, and also a space
is provided for the lw>rrower to sign if he
does not want credit life or disability insurance. In this case, these blanks were not
filled in and the Lewises did not sign to
indicate whether they did or did not desire
the insurance.
About 10 days later the Lewises returned
to The Lockhart Company to pick up the
check for the proceeds of their loan. They
saw Mr. Pike and told him they were going
to California and he wished them "a good
trip." The subject of the insurance was not
discussed. In early August Mr. Lewis returned to Lockhart to see Pike. The latter
was not there and Lewis left a note for him
relating to insurance. Mr. Lewis thereafter
also tried to contact Pike by telephone, but
apparently was unsuccessful. Mr. Lewis
made a second personal visit to discuss insurance with Pike but again failing to find
him, left another note for him. In response
to that note Pike's secretary sent Mr. Lewis
a letter informing him that Pike was on
vacation until August 28, and that when he
returned she would give him Lewis' note
and "tell him what you said." Pike claims
that he tried several times to reach Mr.
Lewis by phone but was unsuccessful. Mr.
Lewis died of a heart attack on September
17 without any credit life insurance having
been put in force.

WKSTLEY v. FA RIME R'S INS. EXCHANGE
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Plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred in granting a summary judgment
against her because there were genuine issues as to material facts with res|>ect to
whether Pike's failure to provide insurance
or follow up on requests and inquiries relating to insurance constituted negligence.
She emphasizes that during the loan closing
she informed both Pike and her husband
that she did not want a loan which did not
include credit life insurance on her husband's life. Thus she argues Pike was negligent in not seeing that her demand was
fulfilled prior to the issuance of the loan
proceeds. The difficulty with the plaintiff's
argument is that her firm resolution to
have insurance on her husband was not
carried into effect by her actions at the
time of closing. She admits that the matter of insurance was to be left open until
she and her husband got back to Pike and
informed him of their decision with resj>ect
to whether they wanted joint insurance.
She knew that no premium had been
charged as a loan cost. She also does not
claim that when she left the closing she
believed that insurance on her husband was
then in effect. While there is no question
that she wanted her husband insured, her
actions in leaving the closing knowing that
no premium had been charged by Lockhart
for any insurance renders her earlier expressed intentions for naught. It is clear
that no order was made at closing to Pike
by the Lewises for any insurance. She and
her husband later picked up the check for
the loan proceeds in the presence of Pike
but made no inquiry nor gave any order
respecting insurance.
Plaintiff further contends that Pike's
failure to follow up on Mr. Lewis' requests
and inquiries constitutes negligence on his
part and is actionable by her because she
was jointly and severally liable with him on
the loan. This argument presupjx)ses that
there was some legal duty on Pike to contact Mr. Lewis and assist him in making a
decision as to the Lewis's insurance requirements. Plaintiff has not cited us to any
authority that in such an instance there is
any legal duty on the part of an insurance
agent to promptly follow up on inquiries.

Had Mr. Lewis at any time given a specific
order for insurance to Pike and then had
Pike negligently failed to put the insurance
in effect, we would have an entirely different case. The plaintiff does not claim that
an order for insurance was ever given by
her or her husband and thus there was no
legal duty on Pike to put any insurance in
effect. Had the lewises determined at any
time what insurance coverage they desired,
presumably other persons in Lockhart could
have taken such an order. It is regrettable
that Mr. Lewis and Pike missed each other
and as a consequence the insurance which
Mrs. Lewis so strongly desired was never
put into effect. This case serves an illustration of how important decisions and
plans are often found unmade at the time
of an unexpected death.

Court held that: (1) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying insurance
agent's motion to amend complaint, since
amendment would have delayed trial and
the substance of agent's new allegation was
known a full year earlier when agent discussed it in his dej>osition, and (2) insurance
agent could not recover from insurance
company for breach of contract as a result
of company's withdrawal from agent of a
series of policies for which agent had received renewal commission, since the contract and all evidence clearly indicated that
the policies were never intended to be part
of the agreement entered into between the
parties.

The summary judgment is
Costs awarded to respondent.

1. Pleading o=»2.16(1)
Although Rules of Civil Procedure tend
to favor the granting of leave to amend
complaint, the matter remains in the sound
discretion of trial court. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 15.

affirmed.

HALL, C I , and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, J.I., concur.

Dave WESTLEY, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
FARMER'S INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
dba Farmer's Insurance Group, Deveaux
Clark and Clark Young, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 18225.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 21, 1983.

Insurance agent brought action against
insurance company to recover for breach of
contract and defamation. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, .1., entered summary judgment for company, and agent appealed. The Supreme

Affirmed.

2. Pleading <s=*236(2)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying insurance agent's motion to
amend complaint filed against insurance
company, since amendment would have delayed trial and the substance of agent's new
allegation was known a full year earlier
when agent discussed it in his deposition.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15.
3. Insurance o=>85
Insurance agent could not recover from
insurance company for breach of contract
as a result of company's withdrawal from
agent of a series of policies for which agent
had received renewal commission, since the
contract and all evidence clearly indicated
that the policies were never intended to be
part of the agreement entered into between
the parties.

Lambertus Jansen, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Warren Patten, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from pretrial rulings of
the trial court in an action between an
insurance agent and his company (hereinafter "Farmer's").
In May, 1978, plaintiff became an agent
for Farmer's. The parties signed a contract
which set forth the terms and conditions of
their relationship. Although not mentioned
in the contract, Farmer's assigned plaintiff
certain |>olicies known as "500 series," ! for
which plaintiff received renewal commissions.
In the spring of 1979, plaintiff entered
into a partnership with one Joseph Roberg
as a private investigator. Thereafter, he
admittedly worked only part-time for
Furmer's. In September, the partnership
was moved to the third floor of a building
in downtown Salt Lake City. The telephone was answered "law office" and later,
"Boberg West ley." Farmer's advised plaintiff that it objected to the location of plaintiff's office, the manner in which the telephone was answered, and plaintiff's parttime status. When plaintiff failed to remedy the situation, Farmer's withdrew from
plaintiff the "500 series" policies and reassigned them to another agent.

Utah
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Citi» as 663 l\2d 95 (Utah 198.1)

3. Municipal Corporations c=>712
the trial court entered an order which (1)
denied plaintiff's motion to amend; (2)
granted Farmer's motion for summary
judgment on the first count of plaintiff's
complaint; and (3) denied Farmer's motion
for summary judgment on the second count
of plaintiff's complaint. At a subsequent
settlement conference, plaintiff agreed to
dismiss the second count.
[1,21 On appeal, plaintiff contends that
the court erred in not allowing him to
amend his complaint. Although Rule 15 of
the Utah Rides of Civil Procedure tends to
favor the granting of leave to amend, the
matter remains in the sound discretion of
the trial court.2 On the facts presented, we
arc not convinced that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant
the requested leave to amend. An amendment would certainly have delayed the trial
and the substance of plaintiff's new allegation was known a full year earlier when
plaintiff discussed it in his deposition.

On April 23, 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint setting forth two counts. In the first
count, plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had
breached its contract with him in taking the
"5(H) series" policies from him. In the?
second count, plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had defamed him. Depositions were
taken and in November, 1981, Farmer's
moved for summary judgment on both
counts. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff retained new counsel who immediately moved
for a continuance of the trial scheduled for
January 13, 1982. Plaintiff also moved to
amend the complaint to include an allegation that Farmer's had maliciously removed
plaintiff's name from the list of agents in
the telephone directory. After a hearing,

|'l| Plaintiff also contends that the presence of factual issues precludes entry of
summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah
Rides of Civil Procedure. The integrated
contract itself and all evidence as to the
parties' understanding thereof clearly indicate that the "500 series" policies were never intended to be part of the agreement.
In plaintiff's deposition, the following interchange occurred:
Q. What wjts your understanding of the
500 policies as far as the company's rights
to take them away from you?
A. Well, I understood that as long as
you were servicing the policies—or the
policyholders~ that really there should be
no problem. However, I also knew that
if the company wanted I suppose they
could take them back for just about any
reason.
Since there are no significant disputes
present as to the contractual relationship of
the parties, the summary judgment stands.3
Affirmed. No costs awarded.

1.

Fxistin^ insurance policies written by former
agents.

3.

2.

Duplet v. Yates. 10 Utah 2d 251. :*5I P.2d «24
(lfHJO).

Morris \. Mountain States
Hi ah. fi.58 l\2d I19!» (1983).

Tel. & I el. Co.,

W*y»* M. PATTERSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

ALPINE CITY, a Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 18114.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 21, 1983.

City appealed from summary judgment
rendered by the Fourth District Court,
Utah County, J. Robert Hullock, J., declaring sewer connection fee invalid. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) sewer
connection fee assessed by city was not
established as required by law and was,
therefore, invalid where city had not by
resolution or ordinance in writing established the sewer connection fee, and (2) if
sewer connection fee was to be used to
retire bonded indebtedness, all users in the
system had to be treated equally, and latecomers could not be subjected to arbitrary
increase whereby fee of $700 in first month
was increased to $1,000 in second month
and $1,500 in third mouth, which was not
required to cover increased costs, but was
done to induce early purchase of required
510 connections to raise sum required to be
deposited before funding was approved by
appropriate federal agencies.
Affirmed.

t. Municipal Corporations c=»100(1)
Language of statute requiring that all
resolutions of municipal governments shall
be in writing is mandatory. U.C.A.1953,
10 3 500.
2. Municipal Corporations <3^712
Sewer connection fee assessed by city
was not established as required by law and
was, therefore, invalid where city had not
by resolution or ordinance in writing established the sewer connection fee. U.C.A.
1953, 10 3 5<M, 10 3 717.

Municipalities may make a reasonable
charge for the use of a sewer system in
order that it be self-sustaining, but no
greater charge is authorized. U.C.A.1953,
10 8 38.
4. Municipal Corporations c=>7!2
If sewer connection fee was to IK; used
to retire bonded indebtedness, all users in
the system had to be treated equally, and
latecomers could not l>e subjected to arbitrary increase! whereby fee of $700 in first
month was increased to $1,000 in second
month and $1,500 in third month, which was
not required to cover increased costs, but
was done to induce early purchase? of required 540 connections to raise sum required to be deposited lie fore funding was
approved by appropriate federal agencies.
U.C.A.1953, 10 8 38.

John C. Racklund, Provo, for defendant
and appellant.
Ray M. Harding, Pleasant Grove, for
plaintiff and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
Defendant Alpine City appeals from a
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff
declaring a sewer connection fee invalid.
In 1976 Alpine City joined with American
Fork, Lehi and Pleasant Grove in establishing the Timpanogos Special Service District
to create a waste water treatment facility
serving the named cities. In 1977, after
obtaining various loans and grants, Alpine
City had to deposit the sum of $375,000
before funding was approved by the appropriate federal agencies. Alpine City estimated that with a projected hookup of 540
sewer connections, the initial price j>er connection would IK; $700,
In 1978 Alpine City enacted an ordinance
which provided that a fee for connection to
the city sewer system could be fixed from
time to time by resolution of the city conn-
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Rule 15* Amended and supplemental pleadings*
W Amendments. A party may amend hi? pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Othenvise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
•\ifc-plc-ad-iirg-urc-xr-icd by cxprcf ? or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even aP-er judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation hack of amendments, Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading*
id) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Comoilcr*t Nfttes, — ThN rule is substantially identical to Hole 15, FR.C.P.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendments.
—After pretrial order.
—-Alternative to dismissal.
——Payment of attorney fees.
Prolix complaint.
—Amendment of response.
—Answer.
To include counterclaim.
—Complaint,
To defeat motion for summary judgment.
To include damage*.
—Considerations.
Prejudice.
—Court's discretion,
Abused.
Not abused.
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend.
—Following dismissal.
—Late Amendment.
Day of trial.
— —During or after trial.
—Reply amounting to amendment.
Amendment to conform to evidence.
—Allowed.
—Alternative to dismissal.
—Amendment unnecessary.
——Consent to try issue.
Evidence supporting findings.
Issue raised by complaint.
—Consent to try issue.
Not found.
—Construction of rule.
—Defense not pl*ad<H±
Affirmative dufetiso.
Issue tried by parties.
—Failure to object to evidence*.
•—lasUtJS net pleaded.
Mutual mistake.
—New cause of action.
Child support.
—New theory of recovery.
—Not allowed.
—Notice.
—Prejudice.
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried.
Relation back of amendments.
—Adding or substituting parties.
—Statute of limitations.
—Untimely service of ordinal complaint.
Supplemental pieadingn.
—Answers.
——Allowed.
Not allowed.
Cited.
Amendments.
—A/ter pretrial order.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to amend his answer to in-

clude as a defense an issue that had be*n specifically excluded as a trial issue by a pretrial
order, where the amendment was made long
before trial, the opposing party had adequate
Opportunity to meet the additional issue raised,
and neither party was placed in a position of
any greater advantage or disadvantage or prejudice by virtue of the amendment to the plead'
ing. Lewis v. Muullrcti, 627 P.2d 94 tUwh
1981).
—Alternative to dUmUsai.
——Payment of attorney fees.
Where, aa a condition to filing their fourth
amended complaint, appellants agreed to pay a
$150 attorney fee. it was neither coercive nor
unfair to them and U not a ground for reversal
regardless of whether or not the payment of
such attorney's fees are authorized by the
Rules. The alternative was to dismiss, and in
granting a dismissal without prejudice trie
court could stay any new action that might be
commenced until costs of the action that had
been dismissed including attorney's fees had
been paid. The appellants invited the court to
impose such conditions in order to avoid a dismissal and the necessity of starting over again.
Tebbs k Tebbs v, Oiiveto, 123 Utah 158, 256*
P.2d 699 (1953).
Prolix c o m p l a i n t
Where complaint was prolix rather than be*
ing a short, concise statement of a claim as
contemplated by Rules 8(a) and oXeKl), it was
reasonable to permit plantiff to redraft pleadings rather than dismiss the action without
prejudice. McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 7
Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958).
—Amendment of response.
Whether a motion t/» amend a r**pons* tn an
amended complaint should be allowed more
than ten duys after the amended complaint
was flled lies within the sound discretion of the
Until court. Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 5U8 P.2d
802 (Utah 1974).
—Answer.
... — To include counterclaim.
In personal injury action in which defendants insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend
insured and lawyer had not met defendant
until just before taking his deposition und
therefore did not know that defendant had injuries and believed plaintiff to have been at
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to
include counterclaim was an ubuso of dlscre*
tion Bince case was one where "justice requires* amendment. Gillman v. Hansen. 2b'
U u h 2d 166, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971).
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--T-J ii*-fV *i -":>tion for summary* hH~
ment.
H jpvenfiF-d amendment of a pleading
i"-(-uid not he allowed to defeat a motion for
2ii.Timarv judgment if the amendment dotri not
effect on" substantial change in the issue? as
they wprs cr'jr.nallv formulated in the pleading. DMp.'^r •. Vat*?, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d
624 ri9^»
— - T o include damages.
Trial court did not en* in allowing plaintiffs
to amend their complaint to include damacert.
even though plaintiffs' anginal complaint was
iniquity for an injunction, where such amend
mimt did not import into the cape a new and
different
cause of action. Hjorth v.
WhittenburR. 121 Utah 324. 241 P.2d 907
(1952>.
—C o ii s i d e r a t i o T i a.
Prejudice.
A primary consideration that a trial judge
must take into account in determining
whether leave should he granted to amend
pleadings during tnal is whether Lhe opposing
side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by
having an issue adjudicated for which he had
not had time to prepare. Bektna Bar V Ranch
v. Huth, 6G4 P,2d 453 (Utah 1983V.
Trial court did not err in refusing plaintiffs
permission to amend complaint hy pleading adverw»"possession, wnere yuiiuLiu3*Ti»u -corner
indicated that they would not rely on adverse
possession and had failed to show requisite
payment of taxes on disputed parcels. Stratford
v. Morgan. 680 P.2d 360 (Utah J084).
—Court's discretion,

to include two additional defendants
'h- '-ase had boen pending for over three
aintiff waited until just before trial
-r motion. Kelly v, Babcock & Wilc»r T4n P 2d 1189 (Utah Ct„ App, 1.987').,,,
— Piam legal without opportunity to amend.
Tr.al court did not abuse if.* discretion in dismissing an action without first allowing plaintiff an opportunity to amend where the record
showed that plaintiff was allowed to amend his
original complaint but no amendment of substance was contained in the amended complaint and that the trial court granted continuance* for plaintiffs convenience at the hearings upon the motions to dismiss hut plaintiff
never appeared at any of the hearings except
the final motion to reconsider and set aaide the
order of dismissal. Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2
Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d 98H, cert, denied. 348
U.S. 900, 75 S CI. 221. 99 U Ed. 706 (1954).
Tnal court, abused its discretion in dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to join
indispensable parties, and not allowing an
amendment or granting a continuance, even
though defendant claimed no surprise but
merely relied on the likelihood of increased
costs and complexity if the amendment were
granted, Intermountain Physical Medicine
Assocs. v, Micro-Dex Corp., 739 F.2d 1131 (Ct.
Apn 1PH~4
—FoUoTving ci^n* «An ftrCer of aisir **
' "J"""J:-*~*"inn,
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-vj**d.
Sterner v Star-e, 2"
. -C^
il9"2% N eh.-'- '
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* "*" i-. " - *S ^ r t time
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3

—«—Abused.
Ti iai court abused its discretion when it r.pi*
ther allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint to conform to an issue raised for the first
time at trial nor allowed him to try the newly
raised !irf»jp. aithough both parties consented
to r r;ai of 'he new i«yue. Lloyd's Unlimited v.
V i t u r ^ vVa> Mk'z Ltd., 753 ?.2d 507 (Utah
"'
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Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 F.2d 1168 (Utah
1983).
——During or Alter trial.
The rule permitting amendment of pleadings
is to be liberally construed so us to further the
interests of justice; howwer, the rule is to be
applied with less liberality when the amend*
menCd are proposed during or atler trial, rather
than before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d
245 (Utah 1983).
—Reply amounting to amendment.
Trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to file a reply in the proceeding as it was
nothing more than an amendment to plaintiffs
complaint. It m the substance and not the
name of a pleading that determines its character. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P 2d
167 (19541
Amendment to conform to evidence.
—Allowed.
In action to recover wages for services rendered where complaint was based on both an
express contract and on quantum meruit, and
court struck quantum meruit after plaintiffs
evidence was m, and reinstated it at the close
of the defendant*' evidence, such ruling on the
part of the court was not error in absence of
showing that the employer was misled or prevented from presenting all its evidence, since
the ruling was equivalent to a rule permitting
an ameudment to conform to proof. Morria v.
Rusuell, 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451, 26
A.L.K.2d 947 (1951).
—Alternative to dismissal.
Allowing amendment of the pleadings to
conform with the evidence adduced at trial is
much preferred to the alternative of dismissal,
especially where a trial has proceeded to conclusion on the existing pleadings and where
the defendant has suffered no prejudice by reason of any deficiency in the pleadings. Gill v.
Timm. 720 P.2d 1.152 'Utah 1986).

Issue raised by complaint
Wholesaler's complaint that fishing boats
were defective and not fit for purposes intended
was sufficient to raise the is»ue of breach of
express and implied warranty, without amendment of the pleadings. Pacific Murine
Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswirt Corp., 525
P.2d 615 {Utah 1974).
—Consent to try issue.
——Not found.
Where the parties, in an action on an insurance policy, stipulated in their pleadings that
the value of a building was $2,000 and while
the trial was in progress oue of the parties testified that he was to receive $1,000 for the
building in a sale, such testimony did noc put
the value of the building in issue, as alone it
did not amount to consent to try the is*ue of
the value of the building National Farmers'
Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4
Utah 2d 7, 2a6 P.2d 249. 61 AL.R.2d 635
(1955).
—Construction of rule.
Thi3 rule should be read as having two part*,
the llr9t of which is applicable when issues not
raised in the pleadings are tried by the express
or implied consent of the parties, and the second of which is applicable where a motion to
amend is made in response to an objection to
the introduction of evidence; in the first case
the trial court has no discretion whether co allow amendment of the pleadings and must do
so; only in the second case may the court determine whether prejudice, undue delay in
amending or laches ought to prevent the
amendment. General Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Carmeero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah
1976).
—Defense not pleaded.

-Affirmative defense.
Defendant wa3 not entitled to an amendment of tho pleadings under thb rule so as to
assert the defense of a statute of limitation
where ail of the facta necessary were pleaded
—Amendment unnecessary.
and there was no new or different evidence.
Defendant failed to assert the defense and it
——Consent to try i&aue.
In quiet title action, trial court erred when it was waived. Apparently it waa defendant's indenied plaintiffs motion for leave to amend tention to waive the defense until it was displeading to conform to evidence, but outcome covered during the trial that plaintiffs eviwas not affected since issues were before the dence seriously weakened defendant'* defense.
court by consent of both parties. PouUen v. Goeltt v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 5
Utah 2d 204, 293 P.2d 632 (1956).
Pouisen, 672 P.2d 97 (Utah 1983).
Although Rule 6(c) requires that affirmative
——Evidence supporting findings.
defenses be pleaded, it must be looked to in
Where pleading did noc fill the requirement light of the fundamental purpose of the rules of
of Rule <S;ai but the evidence supported finding liberalizing pleading and procedure to the end
that defendant did owe certain amount, failure that parties can present all their legitimate
u> amend luily the pleadings to this eifeci waa contentions; all that parties are entitled to is
nonprejudicial in view of rule. Seaman* v. An- notice of the issues raised and an opportunity
to meet them, therefore, where defendants did
dersen, 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209 (1952).
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not plead subsequent agreement as an affirmative defence to action on prior agreement and
plaintiff, whose objection to evidem-e on subsuquent agreement was overruled, sought no con'
tinuance and did not claim surprise or disadvantage in meeting the new issue, trial court
not only did not abuse its discretion in allowing issue to be raised and receiving evidence on
it but it would haw failed the plain mandate of
justice had it refused to do so. Cheney v.
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 3S1 P.2d W (1963».
Failure to raise the defense of usury in an
answer to a complaint constituted a waiver of
the defence that could not be cured by amendment of the answer after evidence had been
presented. Meyer v. Deluke, 23 Utah 2d 74.
457 P.2d 966 (1969)
Under Subdivision <b,\ the fact that a defense, even an affirmative defense, ha.? not
been formally pleaded is immaterial if the issue has been tried by express or implied consent. General Ina. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P 2d 502 (Utah 1976)
Although estoppel was an affirmative defense which was nut raised m the pleading?,
where the evidence offered at trial supported
the principle, thu trial court's arrant of motion
to amend the pleading* to conform to evidence
of estoppel would not be overturned absent a
gnawing of abuse of discretion. Big Butte
Ranch,"inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977),
——-Issue tried by parties.
Underlying purpose of rule is that judgment
should be granted in accordance with law and
evidence a* ends of justice require, whether the
pleadings are actually amended or not: even
though defendants did not plead a particular
defense, that should not have precluded them
from relying on that defend if that was what
justice required and if case was actually tried
on a different issue or a different theory than
was pleaded. First Sec. Bank v, Colonial Ford,
Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979).
Trial judge erred in concluding that defendant waived a defense by failing to raise it in
hja pretrial pleadings where the issue was
tried bv the oartics. Loader v. Scott Constr.
Corp., 68J P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984).
'—r"Huurv to nbj«ot to evidence.
Where defendant bad ample opportunity to
present contrary evidence and did not object to
plaintiffs evidence on grounds that it was not
within issues of case, defendant could not complain of findings bawd on this evidence.
Draper v. J.3. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah
567, 244 P.2d 360 (1952).
—Issues not pleaded,
Mutual mistake.
Even though the issue of mutual mistake
was not roiled by the pleading?, »t would have
been proper for the court, in consonance with

Rule 15

RuJe 54(c)(1), to have reformed the contract if a
mutual mistake of fact had been established by
clear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P 2d 287 (Utah
1934).
—New cause of action.
Amendment may he allowed if it does not
change the liability sought to be unforced
against the defendant. While in a technical
sense it may be a new cause of action yet it
may be allowed if it is not a wholly different
cause of action or legal obligation. Wells v.
Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167 U954*.
——Child support
Where wife brought independent action for
child support claiming that prior child support
award was void, but court held prior award
valid, court did not orr in allowing wife to
amend her complaint to seek arrearage on
prior award since amended complaint would
still deal with same cause of action, namely,
child .support. Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241,
272 P.2d 167 (1954).
—New theory of recovery.
If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the
parties, the court may base its decision on that
theory and deem the pleadings amended, even
if the theory WHS not originally pleaded or set
forth in the pleadings or the pretrial order.
However, that the issue has. in fact, been tried,
and that thia procedure has been authorized by
express or implied consent of the parties, must
he evident from the record. Colman v. Colman,
743 P.2d 782 (Utah CL App. 1987).
—Not allowed.
In bank's action to recover on promissory
note guaranteed by defendants, trial court
properly denied defendants' motion, made after
presentation of all the evidence, to amend their
answers to allege that they had signed their
guaranty under mistake, since there was no
change in theory of issue, and since trial court
had found that defendants knew what they
were signing. First Sec. Bank v. Colonial Ford,
Inc., 597 P.2d 359 (Utah J979).
—Notice,
If an issue ia to be tried and a party's rights
concluded with respect thereto, he must have
notice thereof and «m opportunity fo meet it.
When a party has had .such notice and opportunity, trial of the issue raised is fair; this rule
accordingly allows liberal amendments if the
issue is tried "by express or implied consent of
the parties." National Farmer*' Union Prop.
erty & Can. Co. v, Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 2#6
P.2d 249. fil A.L.R,2d 035 (1955),
—Prejudice*
A party must not be prejudiced in any way
by the introduction of new issues, but where an
unpieaded partnership issue wag raised at
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trial, was not objected to by defendant, and
both sides went into fucta of the partnership,
then* was no error in finding on the issue since
there was no indication defendant wad surprised or minted by introduction uf the iswue.
Buehner Block Co. v. Clcsos, 6 Utah 2d 226,
310 P.2d 517 (1957).
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried.
In action to set aside certain deeds, the
prayer of thu complaint that the deed* "he declared null and void" did not open the door to
allow the trial court to fu\d the deeds invalid
on any ground that might be urged at the trial:
but it was restricted to the grounds set forth in
the complaint, ar tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Mitchell v. Palmer,
121 Utah 245. 240 P.2d 970 (1952).
ooio+wftM luirk of amendments.
—Adding or substituting parties.
Generally, Subdivision (c) does not apply to
amendments that substitute or add new parties to those brought before the court by the
original pleading, because such amendments
amount to assertion of a new cause of action
and defeat thu purpose of statutes of limitations, but an exception to this rule exists, as to
both plaintiff and defendant, when now and old
parties have an identity of interest, so it can be
assumed or proved that relation back is not
prejudicial. Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 543
P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. JetTerson Ins.
Co., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App, 1988).
The relation-back doctrine did not apply to
amended third-party complaint where there
was no identity of interest with the existing
parties other than privity of contract, since
privity of contract is insufficient identity of interest for purpose of Subsection (c) of this rule.
Parry v. Pioneer Whale. Supply Co., 681 P.2d
214 (Utah 1984).
Where plaintiff sought to amend complaint
to include claims against third-party defendant, but plaintiffs chums against third party
were not comparable in theory or damage*
sought to defendant's third-party complaint,
third party aid nuv r^r^^.ti^:..^ ^v.;ntjfps
potential claims against him within the period
of the statute of limitations, nor did he have an
identity of interest with those originally
named as defendants. Consequently, the
amended compluint did not relate back to the
original complaint and was barred by the statute of limitations. Vina v. JetTerson ins. Co.,
761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1986).
—Statute of limitations.
Amendments are allowed to complaints and
process, even though the amendment relates
back to the time of original filing and even
though, but for the right to amend, the statute
of limitations period would have run. Meyers v.
Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 19811.

—Untimely service of original complaint.
The amendment of a complaint dismissed for
untimely service must also be dismissed. Cook
v. Starkly. 5-48 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976).

P-2d 1276 (Utah VJ
M d 1051 (Utah (
Chavez, 749 ?.2d 6

Supplemental pleadings,
—Answers,
Allowed.
in quiet title action it i* not error to permit
amendment of defendants' pleadings to assert
an interest in claims relocated after suit wus
filed but before trial. Stevens v. Memmott, 9
Utah 2d 37, 337 I\2d 418 (1959).
——Not allowed.
In taxpayers' suit seeking to set aside sale of
part of tract of city property, where the complaint urged that the sale was void for irregularity of city council procedure and asked for
an o»uci *!i»<. vl«v c!,~:::r~*a K" ™*niir*d to remove structures placed on the property, a motion of the defendants for permission to file a
supplemental answer showing a subsequent attempt to satisfy the requirements of H 10-8*8
was properly denied since the supplemental
pleading was not an answer to the facta alleged
in the complaint, nor justification for denying
the relief prayed, except that part of the complaint that sought removal oi the structures.
Rowley v. Milford City, 10 Utah 2d 299, 352
P.2d 225 (1960).
Cited in Murray v. Miller, 1 Utah 2d 43, 261
P.2d 950 (1953); Ballard v. Buiat, 8 Utah 2d
308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959); Wilson v. Gardner,
10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 (1960); Haiistrom
v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d Hi, 378 P.2d 355 (1963);
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n,
14 Utah 2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1963);
Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. Bowers, IS Utah 2d
202, 398 P.2d 206 (1905); Hoidaway v. Hall, 29
Utah 2d 77, 505 P,2d 295 (1973); Thomas J.
Peck & Sons v. Lee Hock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah
2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973); Christopher v.
Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 ?,2d 1009 (Utah
1976); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah
1977); L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. County
„:?czzl± 575 ? «M io:H (Utah 1978); Porter v.
Porter, 577 P.2d 111 (Utah 1978); Howard v.
Howard, 601 p.2d 931 (Utah 1979); First Inv.
Co. v. Andersen. 621 P.2d 683 (Utah 1980);
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980); Bradford v. Alvey &
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah I960); Hales v.
Hales, 656 P.2d 423 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit
Union v. Moeiler, 656 P.2U 988 (Utah 1982);
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676
P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate,
Inc. v. Nlelson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983); Call
v. City of W<*st Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah
1986); Ebbert v. Ebhert, 744 P 2d 1019 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Newroeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
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P.2d 12?« !UUh 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747
r.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Oatea v.
Chavez 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am* Jur. 3d. — tilA Am. Jar. 2d Pleading
5? 289 to 295, 306 et seq., 329 to 331.
C.J.S, — 71 C.J.S. Pleading *$ 275 to 33$.
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal
injury action by including action for wrongful
dcath after statute of limitations ha« run
aRainat independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d
933.
Amendment of pleac:r»ff after limitation h:t<?
run, so as to *el up subsequent appointment as
executor or administrator of plaintiff who profc?5ed to bring the action in that capacity without previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th
198.
Amendment of pleading to add, substitute,
or change capacity of, party plaintiff as relat-

ing back to date of original pieodinff, under
Rule 15(c) of Federal Rule* of Civil Procedure,
so aa to avoid bar of limitations 12 A.L.R. Fed.
23.1.
What constituted "prejudice" to puny who*
object* to evidence outride issue* made by
pleadings go as to preclude amendment of
pleadings under Rule 15fb) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 44$.
Construction and application of Rule 15(d) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for
allowance of supplemtntal pleading? setting
forth transactions, occurrences, or event* subsequent to original pleading, 28 A.L.R. Fed.
129.
Key Numbers. — Pleading «* 229 to 296.

Rule 16, Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon
motion of a party, may direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial
for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted for lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly disposition of
the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any action, in addition
to any pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion
may direct that a scheduling or management conference he held. The court
may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court.
Scheduling or management conferences may also he held by way of telephone
conferencing between the court and counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions and agreements reached at scheduling and management conferences may be formally made an order of the court. At the conference, the
court may consider the following matters:
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amendment of pleadings;
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery;
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions;
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